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Abstract 
The production, distribution, and consumption of information goods have faced various 
challenges over the years. Currently, the status-quo in this field is being shaken by the 
emergence of the Internet as the prime ground for information exchange. 
 
This powerful new information distribution medium, is very attractive for consumers, who find 
it much more comfortable. It is also appealing for distributors as it enables a near costless 
replication and distribution of information commodities. If the on-line medium is combined 
with P2P distribution, such costs are decreased even further. 
 
However, this near annulment of the mentioned costs, by the Internet, has enabled an 
explosion of free content exchange. Content scarcity has thus been virtually eliminated in the 
on-line environment, and is thus challenging age-old intellectual-property regimes 
 
Commercial players have begun adopting all-digital on-line distribution and P2P distribution 
technologies, inscribed within operations that are characterized by Business Models (BMs) 
which have simply been transposed from the “real world” onto the on-line environment. 
These BMs are, typically, very dependent on the scarcity of the delivered content, thus, to 
make up for its natural loss, in the on-line medium, said BMs generally require the 
employment of access restricting Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology to artificially 
recreate the lost scarcity. 
 
In spite of the potential of the Internet medium, attested by the successes of many 
information content distributing initiatives (legitimate or not), commercial initiatives have 
generally attained unremarkable results. DRM technologies have frequently been resented 
and circumvented by users and consequently abandoned by commercial players. P2P 
distribution technology has also been retreated from, in favour of more traditional ones. 
Finally, the overall obtained economic results have generally, been unimpressive. 
 
In this work, we set of to discover and identify the root causes of the lack of success of 
commercial online (specifically, P2P based) content distribution initiatives, and, of the 
associated, frequent failure of DRM (security) technologies. 
We discovered that such root causes are, fundamentally, not technical but mostly economic 
and are related to the enforcement of inadequate, information scarcity dependent BMs in a 
scarcity adverse environment. We then identified some BMs which we believe to be 
adequate for such an environment. 
The existing P2P content distribution tools, both in the commercial and non-commercial 
sectors, are either inadequate or suboptimal, to provide the necessary support for the 
identified BMs. We thus proceeded to conceive a P2P content distribution architecture, upon 
which such BMs can be securely implemented. 
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Resumo 
A produção, distribuição e consumo de bens informacionais têm enfrentado vários desafios 
ao longo dos tempos. Actualmente, o status-quo neste campo está a ser abalado pelo 
surgimento da Internet como o terreno privilegiado para a troca de informação. 
 
Este novo e poderoso meio de distribuição de informação, é muito atraente para os 
consumidores, que o consideram muito mais confortável que anteriores soluções. É 
atraente também para os distribuidores de conteúdos informacionais, pois permite uma 
enorme redução dos custos replicação e distribuição desses bens. Se o meio on-line for 
combinado com a distribuição P2P, esses custos são reduzidos ainda mais. 
 
No entanto, a quase anulação de custos permitida pela Internet, abriu caminho a um 
crescimento explosivo na troca livre de conteúdos media. A escassez (no sentido 
económico do termo), de conteúdo informacional, foi assim praticamente eliminada no 
ambiente on-line, o que coloca sérios desafios aos regimes de propriedade intelectual há 
muito estabelecidos. 
 
Vários operadores comerciais começaram já a adoptar a distribuição digital e on-line assim 
como tecnologias de distribuição P2P. Isto tem sido feito no contexto de operações 
comerciais caracterizadas por Modelos de Negócios (MNs), que foram simplesmente 
transpostos do "mundo real" para o ambiente on-line. Estes MNs são, normalmente, 
estritamente dependentes da escassez do conteúdo distribuído. Por essa razão, para 
compensar a perda natural dessa escassez no meio on-line, os referidos BMs requerem, 
tipicamente, o emprego de tecnologia de restrição de acesso ao conteúdo, para 
artificialmente recriar a escassez perdida. A tecnologia em questão é globalmente chamada 
de tecnologia de Digital Rights Management (DRM). 
 
Apesar do potencial do meio Internet, atestado pelos sucessos de variadas iniciativas 
(legítimas ou não), na área da distribuição livre de conteúdo informacional, as iniciativas de 
cariz comercial têm geralmente obtido resultados nada notáveis. As tecnologias de DRM 
têm-se revelado incómodas para os utilizadores e são frequentemente por eles 
contornadas. Consequentemente, isto tem resultado no seu abandono pelos operadores 
comerciais. O emprego de tecnologias P2P de distribuição tem também recuado, em favor 
de outras mais tradicionais. Por fim, os resultados económicos obtidos têm, em geral, sido 
inexpressivos. 
 
Neste trabalho, tratamos de investigar e identificar as causas da falta geral de sucesso das 
iniciativas comerciais de distribuição de conteúdo on-line, (com um enfoque especial 
naquelas que empregam distribuição P2P), assim como da falha frequente das tecnologias 
DRM associadas. 
Descobrimos que essas causas não são, fundamentalmente, de natureza técnica, mas 
principalmente económica e que estão relacionadas com o emprego de MNs desadequados 
por dependerem da preservação da escassez dos bens distribuídos num ambiente adverso 
a essa escassez. Em face do anterior, procedemos então à identificação de alguns MNs 
que acreditamos serem adequados para tal ambiente. 
 
As ferramentas, actualmente existentes, para a distribuição P2P de conteúdo, tanto no 
sector comercial como no não-comercial, são inadequadas ou insuficientes, para fornecer o 
suporte necessário para os MNs identificados. Para responder a essa necessidade, 
concebemos uma arquitectura P2P de distribuição de conteúdo, sobre o qual os MNs 
referidos podem ser implementados com segurança. 
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Symbols and Acronyms 
 
CDist – A Content Distributor is a commercially operating entity whose activity consists of 
the distribution of media content. 
 
BM – A Business Model is a conceptual construct which describes the rationale of how an 
organization creates, delivers, and captures value. 
 
IG – An Information Good is a commodity whose main market value is derived from the 
information it contains. If it is not bound to a fixed physical body, the Information Good is just 
the information itself. 
 
IO – An Information Object is the same thing as an information good. 
 
DRM – Digital Rights Management is an activity, developed by hardware or software access 
control technologies, on behalf of copyright holders and individuals, whose purpose is to 
protect the rights of such entities, by controlling or limiting the use of their digital property 
and devices after sale. 
 
PKI – A Public Key Infrastructure is a set of hardware, software, people, policies, and 
procedures which work together to create, manage, distribute, use, store, and revoke digital 
certificates. 
 
TTP – A Trusted Third Party is an entity which facilitates interactions between two parties 
who both trust it. 
 
P2P – Peer-to-Peer is a mode of computer networking, where each computer in the network 
can directly interact with other network computers either as client or as a server, for the 
sharing of various resources such as files, peripherals, sensors, etc. 
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I Introduction 
1 Context 
The on-going Internet revolution is changing the way that we interact with informational 
content, and exponentiating the amount of such content at our reach. 
 
This new medium, and associated technologies, has greatly lowered the costs associated to 
information reproduction, distribution and access, hence, contributing to the democratization 
of those activities. It has thus been primarily used for the free exchange of content 
(legitimately and illegitimately). In this field, P2P computer interaction has played a key role, 
as it optimally exploits Internet’s distribution costs reducing capabilities. 
 
The commercial sector is trying to catch up. It has developed various initiatives aimed at 
exploiting online content distribution. In an initial stage the promoters of these activities have 
typically tried to do a direct transposition of pre-Internet BMs onto the on-line environment 
and employed complex and heavy DRM technology to try to enforce “artificial scarcity” onto 
that environment.  
 
Many such experiments (with different BMs and supporting tools) have occurred and, some 
of them, are still in operation, employing P2P distribution. However, overall, the field is still 
immature. Commercial initiatives are lagging behind, free or pirate ones, in terms of their 
overall popularity, acceptance by the public and overall social impact. Economic failure, 
altogether, is not uncommon as well. 
 
This problem deserves attention because a purely pirate distribution of content is not 
sustainable. If those activities grow incessantly they may undermine the production of the 
very goods that such systems deliver. Furthermore, the tackling of that problem must 
definitely include, and not refrain from, all-digital on-line delivery (Internet), as this is an 
extremely powerful medium, whose capabilities for information manipulation and distribution 
must inevitably be exploited to the fullest. 
 
Thus If we wish to maintain a rich and evolving cultural sphere, while employing the most 
powerful means at our disposal ever (the Internet), for the distribution of information content, 
than we need to find solutions to enable a secure and sustainable exploitation of that 
medium that can assure the rewarding of information content producers. 
2 Objectives 
The purpose of this work is to contribute, with concepts and tools, to the maturing of secure 
and sustainable on-line content deliver, specifically, over P2P networks. 
 
Our objectives are to thoroughly identify the causes of the disappointing performance of 
commercial on-line delivering initiatives, (specifically those operating over P2P), and to find 
adequate solutions to overcome the identified problems. 
3 Major Results 
In line with what is expressed in the previous sections we have identified the main issues 
that have delayed the progress of secure and sustainable on-line content delivery, to be 
primordially of an economic nature. 
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We realized that the entities attempting to attain an economically sustainable online 
distribution of information content, have frequently failed to securely exploit that medium 
because they have not correctly assessed the full depth of the changes brought on by the 
Internet, such as the elimination of information scarcity that it has led to, and have thus been 
employing inadequate BMs. 
 
We thus performed our own in depth analysis of the present state of things and derived the 
necessary conclusions. Building on them we defined a set of possible BMs appropriate for a 
sustainable exploitation of on-line content distribution. 
 
As the tools to optimally support such BMs over a P2P operation mode are missing, we then 
defined a suitable P2P architecture which offers the necessary tools. 
 
We can thus state that the work conducted during the course of this dissertation has 
successfully arrived to the formulated objectives. Notably: 
• we identified of the main causes preventing a solid adoption of the on-line medium 
for commercial content distribution (specifically P2P); 
• we developed and formalized new BMs, specifically conceived for said on-line 
operation and, thus, optimally adapted to the new content access paradigm which 
that medium entails; 
• we conceived and designed, to a certain degree of detail, an appropriate technical 
support structure for those BMs, thus demonstrating the feasibility  of sustainable and 
secure P2P content distribution; 
• additionally, we also developed some work on the field media object structuring and 
enrichment which resulted in an addition to the MPEG-21 international standard. 
 
Accordingly, based on the outcomes of this thesis, we can claim that it is indeed possible to 
implement successful on-line businesses, which employ P2P content distribution, while 
taking full advantage of the great potentialities and flexibility offered by the Internet for 
information content production, distribution and access. 
4 Structure of the Dissertation 
Figure 1 presents a graphical depiction of the various parts of this dissertation, of their role in 
it and of their interrelations. In Figure 1, white boxes represent a chapter (or a section of it), 
grey boxes represent annexes, the gradient filled box represents the problem which is 
identified and addressed in this work, and the rounded corner boxes represent the 
relationships between the previous “entities”. 
 
Chapter II contains a description of the present state-of-the-art in the field of P2P content 
distribution, as well as in the associated fields of DRM technologies and P2P distribution 
employment in commercial initiatives. The contents of this chapter are complemented by 
those of Annex B.  
 
Chapter III presents our analysis of the above mentioned state-of-the-art. It thus performs 
the identification of the precise problem/shortcoming, afflicting the present P2P content 
distribution scenario. 
 
Chapter IV and V present the proposed solutions for the identified problem. The business-
oriented component, of such solutions, is presented in chapter IV, whereas the technical 
component is presented in chapter V. The content of chapter IV is complemented by 
Annex C, and that of chapter V by Annex A and D. 
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Figure 1 – Structure of the Dissertation 
 
In chapter VI we expose the comparative advantages of our solutions and their specific 
contributions to the advancement of the state of the art in the field of sustainable and safe 
distribution of media content over P2P. This chapter also presents the publications that were 
achieved in the scope of such contributions. 
 
Finally, in chapter VII, we present our concluding remarks and expose the main venues for 
the future continuation of the developed work. 
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II P2P Content Delivery Survey 
1 Introduction 
This PhD work focuses on the development of safe solutions for the P2P distribution of 
media content. This safeness should be interpreted in a broad manner. It encompasses both 
reliability of content discovery and retrieval/distribution as well as more strictly security 
related aspects, such as communicational confidentiality, exchanged data integrity, 
authenticity and non-repudiability, as well as privacy and anonymity. 
 
The solutions, that are sought for are meant for legitimate P2P content distribution initiatives. 
These are, typically, commercial ones. Such initiatives involve various aspects, other than 
just the mere P2P distribution of content, which profoundly impact that distribution. The most 
relevant of such aspects are the copyright protecting DRM technologies, which are 
employed in parallel to P2P distribution, and the manner in which both these technologies 
are combined for the support of specific Business Models. These factors will, thus, guide and 
condition the present survey. 
 
The survey is divided into three parts. The first one, section 2, describes the state of the art 
in what regards P2P content distribution. The second, section 3, presents an overview of the 
current state of development of DRM technology and related initiatives. The third part, 
section 4, discusses the intersection of the technologies presented in the previous two 
sections, in the context of current commercial, P2P based, media content distribution 
initiatives. This last section is not limited to the discussion of technological issues as it 
includes a short discussion of some economic aspects 
2 P2P Technology Survey 
2.1 Introduction 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) is a communication model in which each of the intervenient parts has the 
same capabilities, and either party can initiate a communication session [1], as opposed to 
the Client-Server model, where each party (server or client) has a different and specific role 
assigned to it.  
 
A peer-to-peer computer network links its constituting nodes via ad hoc connections and 
relies mainly on the computing power and bandwidth of the network’s participants rather 
than concentrating it in a reduced number of central nodes (servers). In “pure” peer-to-peer 
networks, no clients or servers exist and all nodes present equal behaviour, simultaneously 
operating as both "clients" and "servers” (see Figure 2). In other cases, these systems may 
have a more hybrid operation, resorting to some centralization for some specific purposes, 
within the overall P2P operation. 
 
P2P computer networks are typically designed for the sharing of computer resources such 
as, content, storage and CPU cycles (among others), through direct exchange, rather than 
requiring the intermediation of a centralized server or entity [2]. The section of these systems 
devoted to the distribution/sharing of informational content on the Internet, is that which as, 
recently, received most of the growing, research and public attention surrounding P2P. It is 
mostly on this subset, of the possible applications of peer-to-peer computer interaction that 
this survey focuses on.  
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Figure 2 – Pure P2P Interaction Overview 
 
Peer-to-peer is not entirely new. The term P2P in itself is relatively new, but basic P2P 
technology has existed for as long as USENET and FidoNet since the late 70s early 80s of 
the 20th century [3]. 
 
USENET, was originally created in 1979 by two Duke University graduate students, for the 
distribution of e-mail-like messages (called "articles") to newsgroups. Files were distributed 
in batches over phone lines using a flooding algorithm. Consequently, there was no effective 
way to centralize the functioning of USENET. The resulting application was an extremely 
decentralized and distributed one [3]. 
 
FidoNet, such as USENET, is a decentralized and distributed application for the exchange of 
messages between users of different Bulletin Board System (BBSs). After experiencing an 
initial exponential growth and a later shrinking in size because of the closure of many BBSs, 
it remains in use today [3]. 
 
Recently, though, the interest for P2P networking has grown tremendously [4] [5], among 
Internet users and professionals, especially in the case of file-sharing applications. This 
renewed and globalized interest began growing in 1999 when an 18-year-old college student 
developed Napster, which combined the instant-messaging system of IRC, the file-sharing 
functions of Microsoft Windows and UNIX, and the advanced searching capabilities of 
various search engines for the facilitation of online digital music files swapping [6]. It became 
the fastest growing software online, of all time [6].  
 
Such a rapid growth, though, was made possible by three factors which characterized that 
time [6]: 
• growing Internet access bandwidth; 
• growing desktop processor power; 
• decreasing prices for data storage units. 
 
Napster's facilitation of the transfer of copyrighted material led to its legal prosecution by 
copyright owners, which filed a law suit against it in December 1999 [7].  Napster was 
condemned, and after some further attempts for its maintenance online, it was finally 
terminated in 2002 [8]. 
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Nonetheless, the open space left by Napster's demise was swiftly occupied by numerous 
other applications/networks, such as FastTrack and Gnutella, and the number of P2P 
technology users kept rising exponentially [6]. The post-Napster applications adopted a 
decentralised approach, which made them harder to police (and to target judicially), and 
have also gained an added range of capabilities. 
 
Distributed lists and searching procedures were developed and are offered by such networks 
as FastTrack and Gnutella [9]. Content can now be retrieved in separate blocs from different 
hosts simultaneously, minimizing the strain on their bandwidth, and increasing the availability 
of the specific content. Even the user’s privacy can now be preserved, (up to a certain point), 
by some systems, such as Freenet, which allows anonymous exchange of content [10].  
 
Promising developments were also made in P2P look-up services based on distributed 
Dynamic Hash Tables (DHTs), which organize peers into structured overlay networks, 
assigning each data item to a specific peer, thus allowing much faster searches. 
 
Many promising applications (cooperative file systems, P2P caching, multicast, mobility 
management, denial-of-service protection, and presence detection), can potentially be built 
on top of these look-up services. 
 
Furthermore, with the advancement of P2P software and protocols, several of the developed 
systems, like Gnutella, Gnutella2, EDonkey Network [11], etc., are either interoperable 
and/or can be accessed through a single interface/application, thus maximizing their overall 
capacity and attractiveness. 
 
Even though the development of P2P technologies has had to face some legal obstacles, it 
was not stopped. Relatively recently, P2P technologies have even begun to be embraced by 
large and legitimate companies, either for the optimization of their inner data structures or to 
try to tap into its vast potential for the distribution of information rich content such as music or 
video. 
 
The embrace and development of P2P content distribution in the commercial and non-
commercial sectors, has, nonetheless, been uneven. The development of P2P technologies 
and their employment in non-commercial content distribution initiatives (legitimate or 
copyright infringing), has proceeded tremendously fast. These solutions are typically 
developed in an open and cooperative manner, and are freely distributed. This contributes to 
an accelerated development pace, increased user receptivity and, thus, a reduced 
deployment time. 
 
In the commercial sector, that process has been much slower. Such initiatives, generally 
employ either proprietary P2P solutions or pre-existing ones. This sector has not invested a 
comparable amount of effort on the development of P2P solutions and the efforts that have, 
in fact been, made, were not done in an environment of openness and interoperability.  
 
The structure of the survey, of the P2P content delivery field, here presented, is composed 
by the following sub-sections: 
• section 2.2 presents the current status of the overall technical field of P2P content 
delivery; 
• section 2.3 presents the most relevant P2P content distribution systems, in 
existence, which embody the technical provisions described in section 2.2; 
• section 2.4 contains a summarizing analysis of the field in scope. 
 
Throughout the presented survey, a special emphasis is placed on the observation of 
security and reliability aspects of the approached P2P solutions and technologies. 
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2.2 Technical Panorama 
2.2.1 Introduction 
In P2P computer systems there are two main operational concepts: the peer (or network 
node or servant), and the communication protocol to which the peer is bound and its 
associated overall network of nodes. 
 
A peer is a computer application which interacts with other peers through the Internet. A P2P 
protocol is a set of rules and procedures, which constitutes the language and communication 
methodology, which the peers of a specific network, use in order to intelligibly interact with 
each other, thus constituting a P2P network.  
 
Therefore a P2P network is something of a greater ethereality than many other networks. 
Such a network exists only as a varying set of multiple peers and their common protocol. If 
peers change the employed protocol, than, the constituted network will be a different one 
from the original. 
 
P2P computer systems have been employed for a variety of different purposes. The most 
relevant of those include [2]:  
 
• Communication and Collaboration – Systems providing the infrastructure for the 
facilitation of direct, (frequently real-time), communication and collaboration between 
peer computers, such as chat and instant messaging applications; 
 
• Distributed Computation – The purpose of these systems is to take advantage of the 
distributed processing power available in the network’s peers, by breaking down a 
processing-intensive task into small work units and distributing them by the peers. 
Such applications of P2P technology inevitably require central coordination, and are 
thus not purely P2P. Seti@home is an example of such a P2P system; 
 
• Database Systems – These P2P systems work as distributed databases. Several 
technologies were built within this context such as a scalable distributed query 
engine which allows relational queries to be performed through thousands of 
computers (PIER Project [12]), or a metadata infrastructure based in W3C’s RDF to 
provide P2P systems with coherent querying capability (Edutella Project [13]); 
 
• Content Distribution – The purpose of these P2P systems and infrastructures is to 
facilitate the sharing of digital media and other information rich content between 
users. Such systems vary from relatively simple direct file sharing applications, to 
more sophisticated systems which constitute a distributed storage medium capable 
of enforcing relatively secure and efficient publishing, organizing, indexing, 
searching, updating, and retrieval of data. Some examples of content distribution 
P2P systems are: Gnutella, FastTrack, eDonkey, etc. 
 
Presently the most popular application of the P2P computer communication model, is that 
which is related to the facilitation of media content distribution. Both the public usage and 
scientific interest for such P2P systems has grown very rapidly in the past years, to the point 
where the P2P network generated data traffic represents a large portion of the overall 
Internet data exchange. 
 
Such a great interest as led to an accelerated evolution in P2P technology which greatly 
advanced and multiplied the number of different available peers, and associated protocols 
(and thus the number of networks).  
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The initial ones were the simplest. They merely connected to a central server (or “central 
peer”) to search for content, and once it was found, it was downloaded from its contributing 
peer. This was the case, for instance, of Napster, were the sharing of content was performed 
on a P2P basis, but the content registering and searching process was centralized. 
 
Such solutions were advantageous in terms of content searching efficiency, but presented a 
single point of failure and “legal attack“, the “central peer” [14]. 
 
In a second wave of P2P technology, development a new type of peer and networks 
emerged. These networks (such as Gnutella), were completely decentralized both in terms 
of content storing and distribution as well as in terms of content registering and searching. 
The peers no longer connected to a central peer, but instead established direct 
communication with other equal peers. When initiating its activity, a peer would connect to a 
certain number of other peers, which, on their own turn, were connected to other peers etc., 
in a vast distributed network [14]. 
 
In order to search for a specific resource, the inquiring peer would ask all of its neighbouring 
peers if they possessed it. They would then see if they did, and also pass the message on to 
all the peers they were connected to, and so forth.  
 
The main advantage of this approach was that it eliminated the central point of failure which 
existed in previous P2P solutions. The disadvantages included inefficient content searching 
and the formation of islands of sub-networks that weren't connected to each other [14].  
 
The developments in P2P technology have never stopped, and in a third wave of P2P peers 
and protocols, many improvements were achieved in terms of increasing the efficiency of 
content searching and locating, peer “trustworthiness” assessment, removal of “poisoned” or 
otherwise bad content, increasing download speeds and overall networks reliability, 
combating free riding, load balancing, etc. 
 
These third wave systems brought some centralization back to P2P architectures. They 
introduced new concepts such as super-node (or super-peer) or tracker, and have also 
introduced some differentiation between the peers. Instead of a flat topology of homogenous 
peers, third wave systems present a somewhat hierarchical structure where some peers 
take on a more central role and greater responsibilities in the overall coordination of the 
network. 
 
The regular peers connect to central peers (super-peers, trackers, etc), to obtain from these 
specific services, such as content location, content retrieval, data forwarding, interaction 
coordination, etc. The central peers generally interact with each other in a loose and 
decentralized way, similar to the interaction between the second generation peers. 
 
The next sections (of the enclosing section 2.2), present an overall view of the present P2P 
technological landscape. 
2.2.2 Basic P2P Taxonomy 
The existing P2P protocols/networks, and thus, the individual applications that adhere to 
them, may be subdivided into different categories, according to different characterization 
vectors. The main such vectors are: 
• their level of decentralization – pure peer-to-peer networks would be totally 
decentralized. Still, in practice these systems have varying degrees of centralization. 
The three main categories are [2]: 
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o Purely Decentralized – all of the network’s peers operate in exactly the same 
way, without any centrally coordinating entity. No specialized roles exist for 
any of the constituting nodes and these are connected in a “flat” layer of 
peers. Gnutella is an example of such a decentralized P2P system [15], 
especially before the introduction of ultra-peers (similar to super-nodes). 
Figure 3 presents an example of a purely decentralized P2P architecture. 
 
Figure 3 – Decentralized Peer-to-Peer Architecture 
 
o Partially Centralized – some of the network’s nodes have more central roles 
than others, acting as semi-central indexes of the resources which are made 
available by the local network. These special peers, termed super-nodes, are 
dynamically selected and the way in which they are organized may vary 
between networks. A typical example of this type of P2P network is FastTrack  
[16]. Figure 4 offers a graphical presentation of the architecture of this type of 
P2P network. 
 
Figure 4 – Partially Centralized Peer-to-Peer Architecture 
 
o Hybrid Decentralized – the interaction between the network’s peers is 
coordinated by a central entity which stores all the resource describing and 
locating information. After a desired content is found, the source and 
destination peers contact each other directly for the transfer to take place. 
The central entity contributes to an optimization of content location and 
retrieval but also constitutes a central point of failure and bottlenecking which 
renders this type of P2P systems more vulnerable to censorship or some 
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forms of malicious attacks. Napster was an example of this type of systems 
[2]. This type of architecture is depicted in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 – Hybrid Decentralized Peer-to-Peer Architecture 
 
• their distributed resource placement scheme (or structuring) – P2P overlay networks, 
may contain a vast number of nodes and a large amount of available resources. The 
ways in which the nodes are logically connected to each other and how the 
resources are placed in the network may vary. It may be done in a non-deterministic 
(ad hoc) way or in a rule adhering way. This difference in the logical topology of the 
network, and of its resources, is what separates structured from unstructured 
networks [2]: 
 
o Unstructured Networks – they are composed of arbitrarily connected nodes 
and the placement of content, within the network’s tissue, is unrelated to the 
overlay topology. New nodes are easily added just by copying the links of an 
already connected node and then forming its own links over time. These are 
resilient to node transience but deal poorly with content discovery and 
location. Gnutella and FastTrack are two examples of popular unstructured 
P2P systems [17]; 
 
o Structured Networks – their overlay topology is tightly controlled. Nodes and 
contents (or pointers to them), are placed at precisely specified locations 
according to a globally consistent protocol. Such networks perform a mapping 
between content and location, through the use of distributed routing tables [2]. 
The main technological approach employed, by P2P networks of this type for 
its structuring, are the distributed hash table (DHT) based, lookup services. 
These may be flat or hierarchical [18]. Some notable such protocols are 
Chord, Pastry, Tapestry, Content Addressable Network (CAN), Kademlia and 
Tulip. Still, some non-DHT based approaches/networks exist such as Freenet 
[10], Hypercup [19] and Skipnet [20]. In section B.1 of Annex B some of the 
above mentioned protocols are explained.  
Structured networks are very efficient at locating content objects whose 
identifier is precisely known, but have difficulty in enforcing a globally 
consistent protocol [21]. 
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Structured P2P architectures are typically purely decentralized, with all nodes playing 
equivalent roles. Unstructured P2P architectures, may present any type of centralism level. 
 
Finally, some proposals exist for hybrid structured-unstructured systems such as the one 
presented in [22], which is built upon the Gnutella architecture. 
2.2.3 Content Discovery and Location 
Content discovery is the ability, of a P2P system, to discover about the existence of content 
objects which satisfy some specific (search) criteria. Content location is the ability of such a 
system to locate a specific content object in its tissue (peer collective), typically, so that it 
may be retrieved. 
 
The methods and means through which the two activities are performed are, generally, 
closely intertwined and, many times, can’t actually be separated from each other, in 
operational terms. Furthermore, the nature and details of such methods typically derives 
from the type of P2P system where they have their place. 
 
In light of the above, in the following sections we present the fundamental aspects of the 
state of the art in the fields of P2P content discovery and location (jointly), as a function of 
the structuredness of the P2P system type where such tools are employed. 
2.2.3.1 In Unstructured Architectures 
In unstructured networks the available content needs to be searched-for, given its random 
location. Typically, in such systems, when a specific content object is discovered (i.e. the 
existence of a file whose content satisfies some semantic criteria is discovered), it has also 
been located, as the peer which can match the query to the file, generally, also possesses 
the file. 
 
There are several methods which can be employed in this type of search, most notably [2]: 
• Brute Force Methods – such as flooding the network with propagating queries in a 
breadth-first or depth-first manner until the desired content is located; 
• Sophisticated Methods – such as the use of random walks and routing indexes. 
 
The need for the employment of searching mechanisms for the discovery and location of 
content in unstructured networks will inevitably affect its global scalability, persistence and 
availability. 
 
Thus, the main disadvantage, of unstructured P2P systems, within the present context, is 
that a desired content, even if present, may not always be located, or the process of 
discovering it may be very inefficient. Recently distributed, or globally highly desired content, 
is likely to be easily discovered given is wider diffusion through the network. However, rare 
or old data shared by only a few other peers, is unlikely to be successfully found.  
 
Unstructured systems are thus more appropriate for file-sharing purposes and also for 
applications where [21]:  
• the standard searching operation is keyword based – resources are not precisely 
identified, and thus the advantages of structured networks are diminished; 
• the most desired content is generally replicated at a relatively large fraction of 
participating peers – content is widely distributed enough to be easily discovered; 
• the peer population is highly transient and instable – it is very hard if not impossible 
to employ a globally consistent protocol to the layout of the network’s topology and 
resource placement and, thus, the use of a structured network becomes impractical. 
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Nonetheless, even in the cases were the previous characteristics occur, the problem of 
scalability still resides, especially as the size of the network grows. This is, therefore, one of 
the subjects still under study in unstructured P2P systems. 
 
 
Several new search methods and other mechanisms have been proposed to deal with the 
scalability problems inherent to these systems, such as [2]:  
• an algorithm that resorts to the heterogeneity of unstructured systems (most 
specifically Gnutella) to improve their scalability and search efficiency [21]; 
• a replacement for the flooding mechanism for searches, which is based on the use of 
multiple parallel random walks [23]; 
• the use of proactive replication schemes by copying/distributing content to nodes that 
did not request it in order to increase the content’s diffusion through the system thus 
facilitating its discovery and retrieval [23]. 
• a distributed flow control, and topology creation, algorithm which: 
o prevents the overloading of nodes by restricting the flow of queries into them; 
o performs some load balancing (in terms of search query processing), by 
dynamically evolving the overlay topology to ensure a balanced flow of 
queries between the nodes. 
• the use of more elaborate broadcast policies, which resort to the selection of the 
neighbouring nodes, to which to forward search queries to, based on their past 
history, associated to the use of local indices where each peer harbours a list of the 
data made available by the nodes located within a certain radius from itself [24]. 
2.2.3.2 In Structured Architectures 
Structured P2P systems are efficiently scalable, (in what regards content discovery and 
location), in a situation where the exact identifier of the desired content is known. The case 
of keyword based searching remains somewhat of an issue, for these systems, even though 
some proposals have been put forward to address it. These are generally based on the use 
of distributed inverted indexes [25]. 
 
The main disadvantage of structured P2P systems is the difficulty of enforcing a globally 
consistent protocol for node connections, resource placements and efficient query routing in 
the face of an ever changing node population, where nodes join and abandon the network at 
any time and not always behave in a benevolent manner [21]. 
 
Some of the most relevant lookup protocols, employed by structured P2P systems, for 
content placement, discovery and location are presented in section B.1 of Annex B. 
2.2.4 Content Exchange/Retrieval 
P2P systems may use a number of different mechanisms and protocols for the exchange of 
data (coordination and communication data as well as content data). The HTTP protocol is 
frequently employed as well as custom develop ones. Several P2P systems and peers also 
deliver provisions so that peers may be reachable behind firewalls and NAT schemes. 
 
In terms of the way that content files are exchanges between the peers, P2P protocols may 
employ: 
• Bulk content exchange – these systems implement the retrieval of content in one 
single piece from one single source. After the retrieval is finished the downloaded 
file’s validity may them be validated or not; 
• Fragmented content exchange – in such systems, peers retrieve, a specific desired 
content file, in several fragments from several different other peers. This scheme 
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generally leads to a greater content availability and allows for a speedier download of 
content than its bulk exchange counterpart.  
Furthermore, fragmented multi-sourced content retrieval allows a more efficient 
application of bartering schemes, as is the case for the BitTorrent system. In the 
cases were the P2P protocol enforces a validation of the downloaded content, to 
combat pollution and data corruption, this content retrieval scheme is also more 
advantageous as it permits the immediate discarding of corrupted fragments 
eliminating the need to download the entire content before being able to assess its 
validity. 
2.2.5 Content Availability 
The content delivered, by content distribution P2P systems, is distributed and stored through 
the system’s composing peers, which individually are not reliable. In order to ensure the 
persistence of content access, and to ease its diffusion, these systems resort to the 
replication of content on a varying number of nodes. This enhances their overall 
performance in terms of content accessibility and also in what regards resisting censorship 
attempts and sabotage [2]. Such content replication schemes can be divided into the 
following types [2]: 
 
• Passive Replication – The content is backed up and thus replicated in every peer 
which requests it and retrieves it form another peer. This way the content’s diffusion 
occurs in an unenforced way according to natural demand; 
 
• Cache-Based Replication – According to this scheme a specific content is not 
replicated only in the nodes which requested it but also in all the nodes which, 
somehow, come into contact with it. For instance, in Freenet [10], upon a successful 
search and location of a resource, it is transferred back to the requesting node 
through all the nodes which were initially traversed by the search request. The 
traversed nodes will all save a local copy of the resource thus increasing its overall 
availability; 
 
• Active Replication – In this type of scheme, active methods and mechanisms are 
employed to coordinate, or make more agile, the diffusion of content throughout the 
network so as to improve the resource’s locality and availability; 
 
• Other techniques – Some techniques, such as that used by OceanStore [26] (a 
project for a global persistent data store), resort to the observation of traffic and 
content demand to determine the content replication needs, and act upon that in 
order to satisfy demand. 
 
Data replication creates problems in the fields of data consistency and synchronization 
(making sure that all the copies of a resource are all equal and that, upon updating of the 
resource, that all the copies are equally updated), especially in P2P content distribution 
systems, which are built to permit the deletion and updating of the distributed/stored content.  
Many times some type of a trade-off must be accepted by maintaining an acceptable ratio 
between data consistency restrictions and data replication and thus availability [2]. 
 
Content replication presents greater problems to structured systems because of the stricter 
relationship between resource identifiers and locations that takes place in such systems. 
Nonetheless, solutions have been devised for this, which generally resort to the use of 
aliases, multiple hash functions, successor-lists or leaf-sets [27]. 
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2.2.6 Content Management 
A typical P2P computer system’s operation is based upon the sharing of some type of 
resource between its constituting nodes. Such a resource may be information (typically 
stored in files), data storage space, data transmission capacity, processing capacity, etc. 
 
As in all systems were resource sharing between multiple independent entities occurs, it 
becomes necessary to employ some form of coordination, or management, of the access to 
those resources, and their consumption, so that it can occur in a rational and sustainable 
way, and so that the system may provide a reliable, efficient and constant service to the 
nodes which compose it. 
 
The resource management operations more frequently offered are those which permit 
content location and retrieval. Nonetheless, several other additional operations may be 
supplied, for instance, for the removal (or usage invalidation) of resources, for the updating 
of resources, for the creation and maintenance of different versions of a resource, or for the 
imposition of content consumption restrictions. 
 
It should be noted that the distributed nature of these networks, the unreliability of its 
composing nodes and the ease with which they can be infiltrated by nefarious peers, makes 
any task of global coordination difficult. 
 
Within the realm of content distributing P2P networks, the following resource management 
facilities and practical examples stand out: 
 
• Content Deletion and Update – The enforcing of global content deletion and 
updating, in a synchronized and coordinated fashion (P2P network wise), is not a 
simple goal to achieve. Still, some systems offer these, or similar, functionalities. For 
instance PAST [28], does not truly support delete functionality. Instead, the owner of 
a file may reclaim the storage space associated to it but it does not guarantee that 
the file will, globally, cease to be available. Another example is the Publius system. In 
it the files are published in association with password information, assuring that only 
the publisher can later delete or change the content. Still this system resorts to a pre-
defined set of servers for content storage [29]; 
 
• Content Validity Expiration – Some systems provide mechanisms to allow the 
imposition of validity terms to the information which they distribute. The FreeHaven 
project enforces document expiration through the use of Rabin’s information 
dispersal algorithm, and the signing of the data shares which carry with them validity 
time-stamps; 
 
• Content Versioning – This functionality consists of permitting the insertion, and 
existence, of several different versions of the same content, simultaneously, in the 
system, in a controlled, organized and reliable way. OceanStore [26], for instance, 
offers such functionality by employing universal unique data object identifiers, data 
encoding and redundant and ring-structured distribution and document id lists 
maintenance; 
 
• Directory Structure – Some systems provide an abstraction layer, above content 
access, which works as a global directory structure. This way, they provide a mask, 
which hides the distributed nature of the network and of content location. 
Mnemosyne [30] is one such system. 
The WayFinder system also supports a distributed directory structure over a P2P 
infrastructure [31], by overlaying the individual peer’s directory structures on top of 
one another resorting to name or semantic proximity. Ivy [32], implements a multi-
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user read/write P2P file system. It employs a set of logs, (one log per participant), 
stored in a DHash distributed hash table. Data is located and retrieved by consulting 
all logs, yet data modification is achieved through the modification of only the log of 
the modifying peer; 
 
• Content Searching – Content discovery capabilities may also exist, in varying 
performance and efficiently levels. Unstructured P2P topologies (Gnutella, Kazaa), 
provide keyword based search functionalities whose use is intuitive but not efficiently 
scalable. Structured systems provide very efficient content discovery facilities, but 
these are based on rigid file identifiers. 
The development of mechanisms for the provision of keyword based search facilities 
operation, upon an exact-match query sub-layer is something that is still to be 
satisfactorily handled; 
 
• Data Storage and Bandwidth Management – This consists of the managing of data 
storage space and bandwidth usage by the peers. The amount of disk space that is 
to be contributed with, by each peer, is generally something that each one of them 
can specify independently. MojoNation allows users to donate data storage capacity 
in exchange for economic or other type or rewarding. The PAST system [28] employs 
a secure quota system. The system’s users are either attributed a fixed quota of data 
storage capacity, which they can consume, or alternatively they can take advantage 
of as much capacity as that which they contribute themselves, on their node. The 
PAST system also proposes an optional extension of itself, for the incorporation of 
reliable organizations, named brokers. These are able of trading storage capacity 
and of issuing smartcards to users, which control the storage capacity usage and 
supply, that a user can or must perform respectively.  
Besides the quota system, these schemes may employ additional methods to 
prevent or dissuade nefarious events, such as denial of service attacks. Publius, for 
instance, employs such methods. Its publishers are requested to perform 
computational work, solving a mathematical problem, before obtaining permission to 
publish content.  
The Kosha system, is a proposal for a P2P enhancement of network file systems. 
According to its operating scheme, the participating nodes are organized into a 
structured P2P overlay. It employs NFS facilities to make files available throughout 
the network assuring file location transparency [33]; 
2.2.7 Benevolent Use Enforcement 
P2P systems are especially dependent on the voluntary and benign participation of their 
users and constituent nodes, in order to provide a reliable and efficient service. This makes it 
necessary to employ mechanisms which promote and stimulate a benign and cooperative 
behaviour, from the users and peers, as well as to provide some support for the 
accountability of actions performed and for the “punishing” of sabotaging or selfish behaviour 
[2]. 
 
Uncooperative behaviour, in P2P systems, generally consists of the so-called "free-rider" 
attitude, where users/nodes only consume the system’s resources and do not contribute 
back with any. Sabotaging behaviour, on the other hand, comprises a vas set of possible 
actions, like: 
• Poisoning and polluting attacks, where corrupted, or somehow altered content, which 
does not correspond to its description, is injected into the system thus rendering the 
search for desired assets more inefficient; 
• Insertion of viruses or malware into carried data; 
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• Denial-of-service attacks where some portion of the network (or possibly all of it), is 
deliberately overwhelmed with inflowing information by other network peers which 
take advantage of their inside knowledge of the system; 
• Spamming, where unsolicited information is sent across the network; 
• Collusion attacks, where multiple nodes cooperate in order to, somehow, harm, elude 
or manipulate the network for their own selfish or sabotaging purposes. 
 
Such behaviour may be motivated by any number of reasons, such as: 
• the desire to manipulate the systems for some kind of inappropriate, individual gain; 
• vandalism; 
• the attaining of some gain, coming from the damaging of the network’s operability.  
 
P2P solutions lacking the referred mechanisms will most likely experience systemic 
problems ranging from significant degradation of performance to unreliable and 
untrustworthy availability of resources, or even to complete system inoperability.  
 
Still, it is technically very difficult to promote incentives for fair use and to provide 
accountability in peer-to-peer systems. The transient population of users/peers, the difficulty 
to perform peer identification and to maintain trustworthy records about peer’s past 
behaviour and the level of decentralization of these systems makes it so [2].  
 
Two main types of solutions have been put forward for the enforcing of fair and benevolent 
use in P2P systems [2]: 
• Trust-based Incentive Mechanisms – These mechanisms use trust as the 
determining factor for the establishment of a P2P transaction. Users/peers will be 
prompted to maintain a posture which will earn them the confidence of the other 
peers and thus contribute to better servicing of their requests. The principal example 
of such mechanisms are the Reputation Management mechanisms; 
• Trade-based Incentive Mechanisms – When these mechanisms are employed, 
whenever a peer is sharing some resource, and thus servicing the system, it is 
immediately rewarded by the system, either directly or indirectly, and vice versa. This 
category is fundamentally composed by various micro-payment mechanisms and 
resource trading schemes such as Bartering Mechanisms. 
 
The next sub-sections focus on the main types of Trust-based Incentive Mechanisms 
(Reputation Mechanisms) and Trade-based Incentive Mechanisms. 
2.2.7.1 Trust Based Incentive Mechanisms 
In trust based incentive mechanisms, a peer accedes to cooperate, or fulfil another peer’s 
request, if it trusts the requesting peer (or if its trusted peers trust it). In this way, the serviced 
peer is not compelled to explicitly reward the servicing peer. The service is performed 
because in that way the servicing node earns the trust of the serviced peer and of the 
community/network. That earned trust will later be beneficial to it when it seeks to be 
serviced by the community. 
 
Enabling of this type of incentive system requires the systematic evaluation of the 
behavioural history of the peers (or their reputation), by each other, and thus implies the 
existence of some reputation computation infrastructure or mechanism. These are called 
reputation management systems.  
 
Such systems operate as organized, inter-peer, information exchange networks, where the 
transacted data describes the perception, by the emitting peers, of the behaviour of the other 
such nodes, with which they interact.  This is done in a way so as to permit that each node 
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may obtain a notion of the reliability and trustworthiness of the surrounding mean (P2P 
system).  
 
These mechanisms can be implemented in a relatively easy and reliable way, when a 
trusted centralized entity exists, which can be resorted to for the coordination, monitoring 
and information delivering, concerning node behaviour. Still, this is not the case for the 
typical P2P systems. 
 
In most peer-to-peer networks, given their distributed nature and the difficulty in 
unequivocally identifying peers, no single, recognizable entity exits which is in a position to 
manage and distribute reputation information. Therefore such information must also be 
managed in a distribute way throughout the network.  
 
The main purpose of P2P reputation management systems is to perform or facilitate the 
aggregation of reputation information which is obtained by the individual peers, in the regular 
interaction with each other, and to it make available, throughout the entire network, in a safe 
and scalable way, thus permitting the formation of a global reputation rating for the system’s 
constituting peers. 
 
Several such mechanisms have been proposed and/or implemented [2]. A few examples are 
presented below: 
 
• The EigenTrust algorithm, which compiles global reputation data about peers based 
upon their history of uploads. This data is distributed through the network’s peers 
which they use in order to evaluate each other’s credibility before engaging in 
exchanges. Such global reputation values are calculated using the local reputation 
values which peers assign each other and weighing them by the global reputation of 
the assigning peers [34];  
 
• A partially centralized mechanism has been put forward in [35]. This system uses 
central reputation computation agents and data encryption, in order to securely 
manage and locally store, reputation information. Two different ways were conceived 
for the calculation of reputation values, a credit/debit and a credit only scheme; 
 
• PeerTrust is a decentralized reputation mechanism presented in [36]. According to 
this scheme, a trust value for a peer is calculated based on: the level of satisfaction 
proportioned to other peers, by that peer; the total number of transactions in which 
the peer was involved; and a balancing factor to attenuate the effects of malicious 
reports. The reputation data is stored in the network in a distributed fashion; 
 
• Approaches based on the peer’s utility to the system, instead of on its 
cooperativeness and fairplay, have also been proposed. These mechanisms resort to 
the calculation of a peer’s utility, based on the amount and popularity of content 
stored and shared by the peer [37]; 
 
• Distributed auditing mechanisms have also been considered for the enforcement of 
fair and benevolent use. In such schemes, nodes will more or less randomly audit 
each other’s logs, comparing them with those of every node with which the audited 
node claims to have share a resource. This way, prevaricating nodes will be 
detected. This scheme implies some way to unambiguously and universally identify 
peers; 
 
• A proposal also exists for combined use of the reputations of peers and resources 
[38], which provides a finer grained picture of the credible assets in a P2P system. 
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Just like other components of P2P architectures, reputation systems are also the target of 
attacks. The purpose of such attacks is not to directly affect the availability of resources, but 
mainly to hamper the system’s ability to provide accountability for malicious behaviour on the 
part of the participating peers. These attacks may be of multiple types. Some of the most 
relevant ones include: 
• a peer joins the system and behaves in a correct manner long enough to obtain a 
good reputation. It them starts behaving inappropriately; 
• groups of peers collude in order to provide each other undeserved positive 
reputations; 
• isolated peers, or groups of them, cooperate to damage the reputation of other 
peer(s), for instance through “ID stealth“ behaviour [38]; 
 
• the peer(s) exploit the use of pseudonyms, by P2P systems (given the lack of a 
central peer identifying entity), by creating and controlling multiple identities, in order 
to be able to discard the bad reputation earned into some of the identities, while 
leaving the reputation of the others untouched.  
2.2.7.2 Trade Based Incentive Mechanisms 
In trade based incentive mechanisms, a peer accedes to cooperate, or fulfil, another peer’s 
request if it is explicitly rewarded for that. Such reward consists of a resource/service that the 
requesting peer supplies/performs for the cooperating/servicing peer, and in this way, both 
the peers obtain a gain from the transaction. 
 
While in trust based systems, confidence is earned throughout time and can be later profited 
from, whenever desired. In trade based incentive mechanisms, when a peer wishes to 
consume some resource from the system it must contribute with a resource of its own, more 
or less, immediately. 
 
Trade based incentive mechanisms can be classified as either providing immediate reward 
(barter trade based), or deferred reward (bond based). 
 
Generally the barter trade based mechanisms involve the immediate mutual exchange of 
resources (files), and thus, can be called resource trading schemes. The bond based 
schemes involve the exchange, between peers, of “bonds” in which the requesting peer 
promises an action in return to the servicing peer [31]. These can be considered micro-
payments schemes. 
2.2.7.2.1 Resource Trading Schemes (Barter Based) 
This type of trading schemes, which, as previously explained, imply a direct mutual 
exchange of resources between the peers, are arguably the most appropriate for insuring 
the sustainability of peer-to-peer economies and communities/systems in their initial stages 
of existence [39]. Several such schemes have been proposed or implemented. 
 
One of the most notable, of such mechanisms, is that which is implemented in BitTorrent 
[40]. In the BitTorrent system the resources (files) are broken into several smaller pieces. 
Each peer, who desires to obtain the entire resource, must retrieve all the pieces from other 
peers, which already have them. In the process, the peers reciprocate by uploading the 
fractions of the resource, which they have, to peers which don’t have it, and which are 
uploading to them. In this way, the peers form bidirectional content delivering connections 
implementing the bartering system. 
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In [41] a bartering system is presented, which proposes an extension to simple one-to-one 
exchanges, in order to permit transitive chains of peer exchanges, where n-way transactions 
take place between rings of peers. It also proposes an algorithm for the detection of the 
content exchange rings 
 
Another resource trading mechanism is proposed in [42], where peers acquire resources, 
from other peers in the network, by trading with their own resources. The main resource, in 
which the work is focused, is storage space/data. However, it also theorizes the extension of 
the tradable goods to processing cycles or even to abstract resources, as well as the trade 
of one type of resource for another. 
2.2.7.2.2 Micro-payments Schemes (Bond Based) 
Several centralized and decentralized micro-payment (or bond), based incentive systems 
have been developed or proposed for P2P networks. Some possible examples are: 
 
• A decentralized bond based incentive mechanism is that which is employed by 
FreeHaven. The nodes which constitute this network establish contracts, to store 
each other's data, for a certain period of time. By honouring the established 
contracts, a node increases its reputation, and thus the chances of the other peers 
honouring its commitments to it [43]; 
 
• In [44] a bond based incentive system is presented, whose operation is based on the 
maintenance of a distributed list of the resource consumption and contribution of 
each participating peer. The accumulated credits of a node increase as it contributes 
with resources, and decrease as the node consumes resources; 
 
• A proposal for a peer-to-peer system where each peer is a software agent and where 
all the agents cooperate for mutual benefit is laid forth in [45]. Two pricing 
mechanisms are presented to motivate each agent to maintain a rational and self-
advantageous behaviour while at the same time safeguarding systemic efficiency; 
 
• In [46] a micropayment system, PPay, is presented, which takes advantage of the 
specific characteristics of P2P networks, to optimize its operation and assure 
security, guaranteeing that all fraud is detectable, traceable and unprofitable through 
the employment of the concepts of floating and self-managed currency. 
 
Micro-payment schemes fall under two main categories [47]: 
• Fungible – in these payment types, peers are paid with something redeemable, that 
may later be used in exchange with other peers; 
• Non-fungible - in these payment types, peers are paid with something that cannot be 
traded with other peers. 
2.2.8 Security 
2.2.8.1 Introduction 
P2P content distribution systems are voluntarily formed and have a distributed, open and 
autonomous nature. These networks are constituted by inherently selfish and unreliable 
nodes (or even non-benevolent nodes), whose behaviour is erratic and unpredictable. In 
such conditions it is hard, for such systems, to provide a secure peer interaction and content 
exchange environment. Some mechanisms must, thus, be put in place, so that P2P 
networks may achieve some operational security and reliability. 
 
The main concerns generally addressed by such mechanisms are [2]: 
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• Identity security – these mechanisms are meant to enable the maintenance of 
identity verifiability for peers and users; 
• Communication security – these mechanisms are meant to enable the maintenance 
of communicational confidentiality, integrity,  authenticity and anonymity; 
• Content security – these mechanisms are meant to enable the maintenance of 
content integrity, authenticity, availability, and access control; 
 
The security related mechanisms, of P2P systems, frequently involve cryptographic means 
[2]. These are based on either symmetric/secret key or asymmetric/public key schemes, or 
combinations of the two: 
• secret key schemes operate based on a common knowledge of a secret key by the 
sender and receiver/storer. The key is used for encryption and decryption of data and 
message authentication. These mechanisms require that the keys are separately and 
a priori distributed in an out of bound procedure [6]; 
• public key based mechanisms use asymmetric key pairs. One of the keys is publicly 
distributed, while the other is kept private. In these schemes no need for an out-of-
band key distribution structure exists, nonetheless it is still necessary to assure the 
safe distribution of public keys [6]. 
2.2.8.2 Identity Security 
Distributed systems, such as P2P networks, which have a very transient population, allow for 
a single physical entity, (peer or user), to participate in it, under several different identities. 
This fact poses a set of security challenges, related to access control, authentication (or 
verifiable identification), and reliability of identity management.  
 
These security issues may have an especially negative impact on P2P systems which 
employ content replication or fragmentation schemes, for the distribution of content, across 
multiple nodes, for security and availability. 
 
The use of multiple identities by a single physical entity for nefarious purposes or to engage 
in selfish behaviour is known as a “Sybil Attack". Given its relevance, this problem has 
received a fair deal of attention, and some solutions have been proposed. 
 
Some solutions are based on the consumption of identification challenges, for the deterrence 
of identity forging. These however are considered unrealistic and impractical [48], seen as 
they presuppose that: 
• all peers operate under nearly identical resource constraints; 
• all identities presented by peers are validated simultaneously by all the participating 
peers; 
• when accepting identities that are not directly validated, the required number of 
vouching peers exceeds the number of system wide failure. 
 
Other proposals exist, for enabling P2P systems to support peer registration (and 
subsequently, some anonymity provision, content authenticity verifiability and content 
availability), which are generally based on distributed algorithms, more or less independent 
from any fixed central entity. The most robust of such proposals employ some form of 
collective/mutual authentication between peers. Some of these are: 
• threshold cryptography [49], (which is not purely distributed as it requires a trusted 
third party); 
• PGP [50] (which requires human evaluation of trustworthiness); 
• “trusted peer group” based authentication [51]. 
 
Further solutions, yet, are proposed: 
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• in [52] a proposal is made for a self-registration based mechanism, where nodes 
calculate their identifier based on their IP address and port, and register it in the P2P 
network itself, at already successfully registered nodes; 
• in [53] a method is proposed to deal with flooding and DoS attacks, and thus deter 
inappropriate access, which is based in the issuing of a resource consuming 
cryptographic puzzle to the requesting peer, when the contacted peer suspects that it 
is under attack, so that the attacker spends more resources than the victim. This 
technique can be used to defend against “Sybil Attacks” by overburdening an 
attacker; 
• in [54] a system is presented which provides access control enforcing such 
capabilities as reading and writing restricting to only authorized users, through the 
employment of data encryption and the provision of updated keys to authorized 
recipients. 
 
Systems or proposals such as those presented in [55] and [56] employ one form or another 
of a central authority for the assignment of identities. 
 
In private P2P networks, given their smaller dimensions and the fact that the involved users 
typically know each other, it is possible for users to safely exchange cryptographic keys and 
identifiers out-of-band. These parameters may then be employed to perform the mutual 
authentication of peers and users. 
 
Most of the above presented solutions (those which do not employ any trusted central 
authority for identity provision), however robust, still present considerable weaknesses in the 
face of sufficiently vast and sophisticated attacks, and (in the case of the collective/mutual 
authentication based ones) lead to a considerable operational overhead. In truth, it can be 
conclusively stated that an implicit, or explicit central certification or identification authority is 
inevitably necessary to assure that P2P systems are impervious to a “Sybil Attack", and thus 
provide access control, authentication and identity management [48]. 
2.2.8.3 Communication Security 
Communicational security provisions mean to assure the confidentiality, integrity, 
authenticity and anonymity of information packages exchanged between peers. 
2.2.8.3.1 Communication Confidentiality 
The confidentiality of inter-peer communications naturally implies some form of encoding of 
the exchanged messages, and this means that the communicating parties need to share 
some form of secret, so that the messages may be encoded and decoded. 
 
Different schemes exist to provide P2P systems with varying levels communicational 
confidentiality. Some of the most illustrative examples, of the current technical panorama in 
this area, are the following: 
• in [57] a “Trusted Computing” based solution is proposed, which employs tamper 
resistant security hardware. It presupposes the assistance of centralized provisions, 
be it the hardware provider or some other centralized trust providing entity; 
• in [58] a solution is proposed which employs a quorum based decentralized PKI, 
which is integrated in the P2P structure; 
• in private P2P networks, as users know one another, it is feasible for them to 
securely exchange cryptographic keys out-of-band. These keys may then be 
employed to cipher the exchanged messages. 
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2.2.8.3.2 Communication Integrity and Authenticity 
The provision of communication integrity and authenticity, in P2P systems, is a similar 
question to assurance of content integrity (see section 2.2.8.4.1). As such the developed 
solutions are very much the same. 
 
Furthermore, such provision also involves secure routing techniques, and protocols. The 
purpose of the latter is to prevent malicious peers from corrupting, deleting, or denying 
access to the data stored by, or exchanged through P2P systems. 
 
According to [59], for the provision of secure routing, in a P2P system, the fundamental 
issues that must be addressed are: 
• Secure assignment of IDs to nodes – which can be robustly achieved through the 
use of a trusted central authority. It may also be performed through distributed 
algorithms, which employ collective/mutual authentication between peers (see 
section 2.2.8.2). This alternative, however is less robust; 
• Secure maintenance of routing tables – this can be achieved, with relative 
robustness, by imposing strong constraints, and demands, on the set of nodes which 
can be allowed into the routing table [59]; 
• Secure forwarding of messages – this can be achieved, with relative robustness by 
verifying the proper delivery of messages and resorting to the use of diverse and 
redundant routing. 
2.2.8.3.3 Communication Anonymity 
Public interest in P2P anonymity has grown rapidly in the recent past. The main concern of 
P2P users/peers who wish to remain anonymous is not to be identifiable as a sender or 
receiver, of information. 
There are a variety of reasons for this, such as: 
• Preservation of privacy – The user does not wish for his activity to be tracked or for it 
to be known that he/she possesses or is looking for a specific informational content; 
• Censorship circumvention – The user wishes to evade local, organizational, or 
governmental censorship to the distribution or access to some information; 
• Avoiding social condemnation – The content that the user is distributing or searching 
for, is legal but it is socially condemned, embarrassing or unaccepted in the user’s 
social mean, workplace, religion, etc.; 
• Fear of reprisals – The user may which to distribute or consume content, which due 
to its nature, (activist, denunciatory, etc.), may lead to reprisals on the user if his 
identity is known. 
 
Anonymity, in P2P computing, is the network’s capability to hide the connection between an 
observable action (for instance, a query message traversing the network), and the identity of 
the entities involved in this action [60]. 
 
In such content distribution systems, anonymity can be of different types [60]:  
• Sender anonymity to any node or a global attacker; 
• Responder anonymity to any node or a global attacker; 
• Sender-responder anonymity to any node or a global attacker. 
 
Anonymity can also involve the identity of content storing nodes, details about content’s 
nature, and the specifics of queries. 
 
Furthermore the level of anonymity provided by a system can also vary between the 
following categories [60] [61]: 
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• Beyond suspicion (BS) – From the perspective of an observing node, the detected 
peer presents no greater probability of having being the source of an action than any 
other node; 
• Probable innocence (ProbI) – From the perspective of an observing node, the 
detected peer presents no greater probability of having being the source of an action 
than of not having being; 
• Possible innocence (PossI) – From the perspective of an observing node, there is a 
non-negligible probability that the detected peer did not originate a specific action. 
 
In anonymous P2P networks, the peers are identified by pseudonymous by default, and the 
fundamental difference between them and non-anonymous networks, lies in the way in 
which information is routed and transmitted through them. 
 
In such anonymity assuring networks, the information (queries, content, etc.), is not 
transmitted directly between the interested nodes, but through a series of intermediary 
peers, thus abstracting the connection between sender and receiver, at the expense of 
overall efficiency. 
2.2.8.3.3.1 Relevant Proposed Schemes 
Some of the most noteworthy anonymity assuring protocols proposed, are presented next. 
The strategies employed by such protocols, to provide for peer anonymity generally belong 
to one off the following types [2]: 
 
• Disassociation of Content Source and Requestor – This strategy is based in the 
relaying of information by intermediary nodes, between content source and 
requestor, so that they can remain unknown to each other and other nodes. Some 
practical examples are: 
 
o Freenet [10] – Freenet defines (and implements), its specific anonymity 
providing protocol, which is based on this approach.  
Its main objective is to protect the anonymity of requestors and inserters of 
content, and also to preserve the privacy of content storing nodes [10], and 
users, by rendering impracticable the discovery of the initial origin or 
destination of any piece of information, found traversing the network. 
Freenet’s protocol is based on a mechanism which determines that a 
successfully discovered resource is transmitted to the requesting node not 
directly but instead through every node that forwarded the original search 
request. Also, any peer along the content retrieval path can present itself, or 
another randomly selected node, as the data source. Thus, no association 
exists between the content requestor and the content sending peer.  
Furthermore, the hops-to-live counter value, initially set for search messages, 
is arbitrarily chosen, so as to impede the determining of the distance of the 
message from the originator peer [2].  
With the execution of more and more searches, each peer will “perfect” its 
routing table which will render the search more efficient; 
 
o Return Address Spoofing – This is a practice which can also be used to hide 
the identity of data sending peer (query or content). It is based on the 
tampering the headers of IP messages. Every IP packet carries in itself the IP 
address of the source computer. Given that this information is not needed by 
the routers, it may be altered without harming the message’s routing through 
the network. That information is only necessary in the case of TCP for control 
reasons, but UDP can dispense it entirely. Therefore if the UDP protocol is 
used, and a random return address is inserted, a sender can thus distribute 
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data and hide its identity from other nodes. Still, given that this practice is 
associated with unlawful or illegitimate activities, it is frequently prohibited by 
ISPs; 
 
o The broadcasting of information can also be used for the provision of receiver 
anonymity, by multiplying the number of recipients and, thus, “diluting” the 
real receiver in a population of false ones. 
 
• Anonymous Connection Layers – Such schemes employ sub-infrastructures, within 
the overall network, in order to establish a specialized layer(s) of nodes for the 
provision of anonymity [2]. Examples of such protocols are: 
 
o Onion Routing [62] – This is a general purpose protocol for the provisioning of 
anonymous connectivity over public networks. The main requirement of this 
system is that all sender nodes know the public keys of all the other peers. All 
the messages exchanged in the network are randomly relayed through a 
layer of peers called “Core Onion Routers” (CORs). Whenever a connection 
is to be established, the initiating peer chooses an arbitrary path through the 
CORs, and creates a recursively layered and encrypted data structure 
carrying the necessary routing information called “onion”. Each of the layers 
of the onion is ciphered with the public key of the corresponding COR node. 
When such a node is to forward some information and, thus, is given the 
routing onion, it unwraps a layer (its corresponding layer), decrypting it with its 
private key. This way the COR node obtains the identity of the next COR 
node in the path and a new onion (with one less layer), to forward to that 
router. Given that the inner layers are ciphered with other node’s keys, no 
COR node has a full knowledge the path. Each router knows only the identity 
of the next and previous ones; 
 
o Mix networks [60] [63] – This scheme provides anonymity by forwarding 
messages from node to node. The specific characteristic of it, is that it does 
not relay each message as it arrives. The nodes first gather a number of 
messages and only then do they forward them, mixed up. Such a procedure 
can effectively hide the sender and the receiver of a transacted portion of 
information, from an attacker with full network surveillance capabilities. The 
main disadvantage, of this scheme, is that the message accumulation phase 
is difficult to implement, or at least introduces inefficiency in content 
distribution P2P systems, due to their heterogeneousness and inconstancy; 
 
o In [64], a system providing user, server and active-server document 
anonymity for a P2P infrastructure, is presented. The system presupposes 
the existence of a public key infrastructure, so any node can know any other 
peer's public key. In this mechanism the peers can fulfil four different roles: 
publisher, forwarder, storer and client. When a publisher wishes to distribute a 
document, it splits it into encrypted shares and uses an anonymizing layer of 
nodes (the forwarders), to determine the nodes which will store the shares 
(storers). The way in which the content is transported, and delivered, is 
similar to the onion routing protocol; 
 
o Crowds [61] – This protocol adopts the strategy of “blending into a crowd" for 
the provision of anonymity in web transactions. It groups peers into a large, 
and geographically distributed, set (crowd), which collectively performs 
requests on behalf of its constituting nodes. Each message that is to be sent 
to some server, or peers, is randomly routed through the crowd until one of 
the crowd’s peers decides to forward it to its destiny. In this way neither the 
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receiver, nor the forwarding peers in the crowd, know who the message’s 
originating peer was; 
 
o Tarzan [65] – This is a decentralized anonymizing protocol based on a 
network layer infrastructure, which provides anonymous IP tunnels between 
peers. Its operation is based on the routing of packets through tunnels of 
arbitrarily chosen Tarzan nodes, using mix-style layered encryption [2]. 
 
• Censorship Resistant Lookup – Such schemes provide anonymity as a means to 
assure censorship resistance. They do so by pursuing some specific goals [66]: 
 
o Data may be inserted into the system, without revealing the identity of the 
inserter. This way, attacking those who insert information will not be an 
effective means of censoring it; 
 
o Data may be retrieved from the system without revealing the identity of 
the recipient. This way, targeting those who request information will not be 
an effective means of censoring it; 
 
o It must be improbable or unfeasible to make a node responsible for a 
specific document, so that assuming responsibility for a resource and then 
destroying it will not be an effective means of censoring it; 
 
o The association between content, and the nodes which store it, must be 
difficult. This way identifying and attacking individual container nodes will 
not be an effective deterrent of the diffusion of those contents. 
 
In [66] a censorship proof mechanism, based on the Chord lookup service, is presented. It 
provides publisher, storer and retriever anonymity, and it makes it harder for a peer to 
deliberately take responsibility for any specific resource, under distribution in the system. 
2.2.8.4 Content Security 
The purpose of content security provisions is to enable the peers, in a P2P system, to be 
able to validate the integrity and authenticity of exchanged content. Furthermore, such 
provisions frequently also include tools to enable the assurance of content availability. 
2.2.8.4.1 Content Integrity 
In P2P systems, data integrity validation is typically assured though the employment of 
signatures or checksums. In such schemes (and in the context of content data integrity), at 
content insertion time, a checksum or signature of the content is calculated. Upon content 
retrieval, every node needs to recalculate that value, over the retrieved information object, 
and check it against the original one. Content integrity validation enabling schemes vary 
predominantly in the manner through which the content file and its checksum/signature are 
associated to each other. Some relevant such schemes are the following: 
 
• Data detached certification – in these schemes the content is distributed 
independently from its security signature. Upon (or prior to), content retrieval, the 
retrieving node obtains the value of the checksum from the content indexing node 
(structured networks), the content storing node (typically, in unstructured networks), 
or from some other provision involved in the process of content discovery and/or 
location (e.g. from the .torrent file in BitTorrent). It then proceeds to validate it against 
the one it calculates over the retrieved content. These schemes, though, generally 
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depend on the reliability of the inter-peer communication channels and on the 
honesty of peers, or on some external identification providing infrastructure (i.e. PKI); 
 
• Data Self-certification – in this mechanism (employed in structured networks), 
whenever a peer wishes to make a specific content available for distribution in the 
network, it computes a cryptographic hash of that content, using a universally known 
(throughout the network), hashing algorithm, and thus produces the content’s specific 
location key. When the content is retrieved, from the network, resorting to its specific 
location key, the retrieving node performs the same hashing algorithm, on the 
content, to check if the resulting value is the same as the location key, and, thus, to 
validate the data’s integrity. A general proposal for such a mechanism can be found 
at [67]; 
2.2.8.4.2 Content Integrity and Availability 
Several proposals exist for schemes which mean to assure both content integrity as well as 
availability. Some of the most relevant are: 
 
• Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme based – the algorithm described in [70] is 
frequently employed in provisions meant to assure the availability and integrity of 
distributed content. It is based on the encryption of content with a key, which is split 
into several portions that are distributed between several servers or peers. The key 
can be recreated from any (sufficiently big), subset of portions of the original key. The 
content is distributed together with a portion of the key. For the content to become 
unavailable a large number of the servers/peers must fail; 
 
• Anonymous Cryptographic Relays – this scheme [64] is based on the abstraction of 
the connection between the final user and the content storing nodes, through the 
anonymity of his location, in order to make the system the least subjectable possible 
to censorship. According to this scheme’s operation mode (which depends on the 
assistance of a PKI), a publisher first chooses several forwarding nodes to which he 
sends (via anonymous connections), fractions of the encrypted resource. These 
nodes, in their turn, will select other peers, to play the role of content storers, and 
hand them (anonymously), the data to be stored. After this phase, the publisher 
announces the content and the associated forwarders. For a client to have access to 
content, it will have to access the forwarders and retrieve, through their efforts, the 
content saved at the storers; 
 
• Erasure coding – this mechanism is similar to the information dispersal algorithm. 
The difference is that the distributed portions of information are named using a 
secure hash over the object contents, providing these portions of data with unique 
identifiers, which contributes to a better assurance of data integrity.  
2.2.8.4.3 Content Authenticity 
The existing distributed schemes to assure content authenticity may be divided into the 
following categories [69]: 
 
• Oldest document based – In this type of scheme, the first object to be submitted with 
a specific identification is considered to be an authentic match for a query looking for 
that specific identification. Time-stamping systems as the one present in [68] can be 
employed in the implementation of such schemes; 
 
• Expert based – In this approach, an object is deemed authentic by an “expert” or 
authoritative node N, which keeps track of signatures for all objects/files ever 
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authored by any user of N. If at any time it is necessary to verify the authenticity of a 
file, supposedly, authored by any of N’s users, node N can be consulted. If and when 
node N is unavailable the scheme fails to function; 
 
• Voting based – To deal with the possible failure of N, another possible authenticity 
assuring scheme, takes into account the “votes” of many experts. The expert nodes 
may be operated by human experts or regular users which simply vote on the 
authenticity of a file by deciding to store a copy of it or not. This scheme may be 
augmented through the weighing of experts’ opinions by their reputations (as 
maintained by such reputation systems as those presented in [34]  [35]). The key 
issues with this scheme are how to prevent spoofing of votes, of nodes, and of files. 
2.3 Noteworthy Systems 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Since the rise of Napster, (the first notorious P2P network), P2P technology has endured a 
prolific evolution (mostly in a non-commercial context), which has resulted in the technical 
panorama described in section 2.2. As such, numerous P2P protocols and systems coexist 
in today’s Internet.  
 
An exhaustive description of all such systems would be both unnecessary and practically 
unfeasible for a presentation of the present scenario in the field of P2P content delivery. 
The exposition that follows, will focus on some the most noteworthy, (either due to their 
popularity or to their technical relevance), P2P networks in existence. These will be Gnutella, 
BitTorrent, eDonkey and FastTrack [71].  
 
It should be noted that, for many of these systems and applications, no exhaustive formal 
source of information exists, and, as such, information, must, on many occasions, be 
collected from multiple secondary sources, such as, scientific articles, Web sites, message 
boards, forums, etc. In the following sections the presented information, was in many 
instances obtained through this process. 
2.3.2 Gnutella 
Gnutella began as a fully decentralized protocol for distributed search on a flat topology of 
peers [15]. This leads to a lack of scalability in the search mechanisms which undermined 
the overall performance of the network. Gnutella has thus evolved into becoming a partially 
centralized system, which employs an overlay network. This system’s nodes are either leaf 
nodes or higher level nodes, called ultra-peers. Ultra-peers are high capacity nodes which 
behave as proxies for the network’s leaf nodes. 
 
When a node initially connects to the system it must discover the location, and connect to, at 
least one other node, of the ultra-peer type. Different procedures have been developed for 
this purpose, such as, shipping a list of addresses of working nodes with the software, 
employing updated web caches of known nodes (called GWebCaches), etc. [15]. 
 
Once connected to an ultra-peer, a Gnutella node requests an updated list of addresses of 
working peers with which it will interact. If it is a leaf node it then proceeds to publish its 
contents list to a number of known ultra-peers. 
 
Peers interact through the exchange of messages over TCP/IP. Each issued message 
possesses a 128 bit [47] unique and randomly generated identifier and all peers maintain a 
short term memory of the recently routed messages. This memory is used to prevent the re-
transmission and to implement back-propagation of messages. All messages have a 
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“TimeToLive” (TTL) and a ”HopsPassed” fields, which determine their lifespan within the 
system.  
 
The Gnutella protocol does not provide the system with any control over its topology or over 
content placement [15]. It is therefore an unstructured network. Thus, in order to locate a 
specific data item, a peer queries its neighbours.  
 
The initial data discovery method in Gnutella was flooding. The query was forwarded to all 
neighbours of the inquiring peer within a certain radius. If a peer, receiving a query, knew the 
location of the desired content, it would send back a response to the originating peer via the 
query’s incoming path. If it did not know the location of the content it would forward the query 
to its neighbourhood [17]. The described content location mechanism is highly resilient to 
peer population transience. Still it is not scalable and contributes to an overburdening of the 
network, especially in an architecture without ultra-peers. 
 
Later versions of the protocol and its peer implementations have attempted to deal with the 
system’s lack of scalability. Some changes were introduced such as: 
• search results are returned over UDP directly to the node which initiated a search. 
This diminishes the amount of traffic routed through the Gnutella network, increasing 
its scalability; 
• a number of techniques were adopted in order to reduce traffic overhead and make 
searches more efficient. The most relevant of these were QRP (Query Routing 
Protocol) and DQ (Dynamic Querying). When QRP is employed, a search arrives 
only at those peers who are likely to possess the desired content, this way the 
searches for rare data items grow in a more efficient way. When DQ is employed the 
search stops as soon as enough search results have been acquired. This greatly 
diminishes the amount of traffic caused by searches for popular content [72]. 
 
 
Figure 6 – Gnutella Structure and Content Search 
 
The, already mentioned, introduction of a layer of ultra-peers also contributed greatly for the 
increasing of the system’s scalability. In the new architecture, content discovery may be 
performed as an optimized “flooding” that occurs only in the Ultra-peer sub-structure as 
depicted in Figure 6. 
 
In the Gnutella network, content transfer is performed over HTTP, in a direct connection 
between the content supplier and content requester. The retrieving node establishes a 
connection to the serving host and makes a standard HTTP request for the desired content. 
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If the serving peer is behind a firewall the procedure is altered. The serving peer is instructed 
to push the content to the content requiring peer. The protocol also supports simultaneous 
downloading from multiple sources [73].  
 
The strategy employed by Gnutella for content replication throughout the system is that of 
passive replication. Only the peers who download a specific content become its distributors. 
 
The Gnutella system has no provisions or incentive mechanisms for the enforcement of fair 
use, on the part of the constituting peers. Requests are to be served in order of arrival, for as 
long as there are upload slots available at the serving peer. If a specific implementation 
(peer) is to behave in a systemically damaging selfish way, the system is not able to prevent 
such behaviour [73]. 
 
Gnutella allows for the checking of the validity of retrieved content, but only after download 
completion. This means that a corrupted chunk of the retrieved file will imply the 
downloading of the entire content again [73]. 
2.3.3 BitTorrent 
BitTorrent [74] is a centralized P2P system. It employs central nodes called “trackers” for the 
managing of users' downloads. A tracker is contacted whenever a network node wishes to 
download a file. Trackers maintain and update an index of torrents. That is, they keep track 
of all the nodes which at a specific moment are participating in the downloading of each 
specific file (both partially and completely). They thus handle the facilitation of the connection 
between peers for the downloading and uploading of content. 
 
The main BitTorrent architecture is an unstructured one. Still with the evolution of its 
implementations (peers), trackerless torrents are now also supported through means which 
render the resulting system a structured one. Trackerless operation is supported through the 
employment of a Distributed Hash Table (DHT). This is a layer which is added on the top of 
the BitTorrent network. The strict BitTorrent network and its DHT enabled portion operate 
independently. Each DHT enabled node is responsible for indexing a certain percentage of 
hash files on the network thus building a distributed indexing system [73], where each peer 
behaves as a tracker. 
 
Azureus [75] [76], and the official BitTorrent client have been the first to add a DHT layer. 
Both employ the Kademlia [77] structured overlay, but the two resulting networks are not 
compatible [73]. 
 
For content retrieval, BitTorrent supports the simultaneous downloading from multiple 
sources of fractions of the same content, and also the sharing of partially downloaded files. 
BitTorrent peers can thus upload a file while still downloading it.  
 
The BitTorrent system divides files into fragments of fixed size (256 Kbytes), and the content 
of each peer is tracked on a block basis [17]. 
 
A peer distributing a data file, handles the file as a number of identically-sized blocks. The 
peer calculates a checksum for each of the blocks, using the SHA1 hashing algorithm. The 
calculated hashes are stored in a .torrent file. When another node, later retrieves a particular 
fragment, its checksum is computed and compared to the recorded one to test the 
fragment’s validity. A peer which provides an entire file is called a seeder, and that which 
delivers the initial copy is the initial seeder [74]. 
 
Torrent files are composed by: 
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• "announce" section, specifying the URL of the tracker which is responsible for the 
tracking of the specific content’s diffusion throughout the system, that is, the Torrent; 
 
• "info" section, containing the file’s names, its length, the fragment size used, and a 
SHA-1 hash code for each of the fragments 
 
Torrent files are generally made available online (via websites for instance), and registered 
with a tracker (the tracker specified inside). The selected tracker maintains updated lists of 
the peers currently involved in the torrent. 
 
For content retrieval to take place users must somehow (browsing the web) obtain the 
torrent information for the desired content (the .torrent file). After it is downloaded and 
supplied to a BitTorrent client, it connects to the tracker(s) indicated in the torrent file. The 
tracker(s) delivers to the BitTorrent client a list of peers which are at that time transferring 
fractions of the file(s) specified in the torrent. The peer then proceeds to connect to those 
nodes to retrieve the various pieces. This content retrieval procedure is depicted in Figure 7. 
The group of peers participating in a torrent is called a swarm. If only the initial seeder is 
included in the swarm, further peers will directly connect to it and request pieces of the 
fragment from it. As the swarm increases, the new peers begin trading fragments with one 
another, instead of downloading them from the seeder. 
 
This digital content distribution system employs a strict reciprocity strategy for content 
diffusion. That way, a peer responds with the same action that its other collaborating peer 
performed previously. They upload to those peers who have uploaded to them and they 
download from those which have downloaded from them. This bartering scheme is a trade-
based incentive mechanism designed to discourage free-riding, by making peers select 
other peers from which data has been previously received. Nodes with high upload capacity 
will most likely also be able to download content with a high speed and the average 
download capacity for a peer will be reduced if its upload speed is limited [17].  
 
 
Figure 7 – BitTorrent Protocol Operation 
 
The bartering procedure also contributes to a better spreading of content among the peers 
thus improving reliability [17]. Given the implications of the reciprocity strategy employed by 
BitTorrent, its content replication scheme is quite efficient as it forces peers to participate in it 
for their own interests. Nonetheless it may be considered to be a form of passive content 
replication. 
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A strict bartering policy may nonetheless have negative effects on the system (for instance 
newly joined peers would in many cases be unable to receive data because they do not 
possess any fragments yet to trade themselves). To compensate for such negative effects 
the protocol employs an “optimistic unchoking” mechanism.  According to it, peers reserve a 
portion of their available bandwidth for sending content fragments to random peers (not only 
preferential partners, but also others). This allows for the discovery of more advantageous 
partners but also ensures that new nodes on the network have the opportunity to join in [74]. 
 
Choking is a temporary refusal from a peer to upload content. At that time content 
downloading may still occur and the connection does not need to be renegotiated when the 
choking terminates. A peer may perform choking for several reasons, such as to get a better 
congestion control or performing a more advantageous bartering scheme for content trading 
[17]. 
For optimal efficiency the choking algorithm should [17]: 
• reduce the number of simultaneous uploads for good TCP performance; 
• avoid fibrillation, which is a rapid choking and unchoking; 
• supply the download service to peers who supply (are supplying) it back; 
• periodically experiment unused connections to determine their possible usefulness. 
 
The BitTorrent protocol (through the official peer implementation) avoids fibrillation by only 
changing the chocked peer every ten seconds. It performs reciprocation and limits the 
number of uploads by unchoking the four peers with the best download rates.  
If a downloading peer possesses a complete file, it uses its upload rate rather than its 
download rate to decide which peer to unchoke. Peers which are optimistically unchoked 
change every 30 seconds [17]. 
 
BitTorrent employs “Info hashes” for the identification of files or portions of data. The .torrent 
files carry a list of such block hashes in order for the peers to be able to verify that the 
individual downloaded blocks of a file are not corrupted. Corrupted blocks must be re-
downloaded [73]. 
2.3.4 eDonkey 
MetaMachine Inc. was the original developer of the eDonkey protocol and peer, the eDonkey 
2000 (or ED2K). Still, their software was reverse engineered and several other clients were 
developed. In 2005, due to legal pressure from RIAA, MetaMachine discontinued the 
distribution of their software [78] [79].  
 
This change, however, has had little impact on the overall network’s operationally.  
Alternative peers, such as the open source eMule, long before the distribution of the eD2K 
client was ceased, had already become common place in the network, and have continued 
operating and thus implementing, the eDonkey network. 
 
The network relies on highly capable central servers which are loosely connected and are 
run by users and the “community”. The servers perform the role of communication hubs and 
content indexes, allowing users to locate files within the network. Given the fact that the 
network is composed by two functionally different types of peers, (client and server), it is 
thus a hybrid decentralized P2P system.  
 
The central servers can be subject to heavy traffic and, thus are more vulnerable to attacks 
and constitute a potential bottleneck. To deal with this issue, the Overnet protocol was 
developed as an evolution of eDonkey. It employed a Kademlia [77] resource placement 
scheme. This Kademlia enabled part of the network is thus a structured decentralized P2P 
system. 
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To initially connect to the network, a peer (client) must have a priori knowledge of the IP 
address, and port, of at least one other peer (of the server type) in the network. After 
connecting, a peer must register the content files, that it possesses, and that it is able of 
sharing, by providing the meta-data describing the files, to the server peer [17]. 
 
Content files, within the eDonkey system, are divided into blocks. A checksum is computed 
for each of the blocks and they are propagated between clients on demand. A checksum of 
all the checksums is employed by the system as the file identifier [80]. During content 
retrieval time, if a corrupted block is detected it is discharged and retransmitted [73]. 
 
Content may be located either by querying the servers with values that will be matched to 
the descriptive meta-data that the servers host, or by requesting a particular file through its 
unique network identifier. Servers deliver, to clients, the locations where the desired files 
may be obtained. The files are directly exchanged between client peers [17]. EDonkey 
queries support fields such as name, size, extension and bitrate [80]. Clients peers may also 
browse the listings of contents of other client peers [80]. 
 
The eDonkey network (the set of eD2K peers, more specifically), uses Multisource File 
Transmission Protocol (MFTP), to enable the simultaneous downloading from multiple 
sources, and the sharing of partially downloaded files. An eDonkey peer can thus upload a 
file while still downloading it [73]. This fact agilizes the overall distribution of large files.  
 
In what regards the enforcement of fair use, in the eDonkey system, the employed measures 
vary with the implementation of the protocol (peer). The official peer (ED2K) uses a basic 
queue system to attend to requests and employs the proprietary Horde system. Shareaza 
permits the users to specify their own criteria. The eMule’s peers employ a credit system 
where the more a peer uploads to another peer, the faster the first peer advances in the 
second’s waiting queue [73].  
2.3.5 FastTrack 
FastTrack [81] is a proprietary protocol. It appeared at the end of the first generation of P2P 
networks in 2001. In time it has forked into a number of different and mutually incompatible 
networks.  
 
The FastTrack protocol defines a semi-centralized P2P network. Its constituting peers fall 
under the category of ordinary nodes (ONs) or supernodes (SNs). The SNs occupy a more 
central position in the network, and handle a greater and more relevant set of tasks. They 
perform the role of temporary index servers. Any of the FastTrack’s nodes, with sufficient 
CPU capability and network connectivity, can become an SN. These central nodes are 
elected by the system through a decentralized process [73]. The fulfilment of the role is 
voluntary. 
 
When a FastTrack ON application is initiated it selects a parent SN, with which it establishes 
a semi-permanent TCP connection. The procedures employed, for the ON to know where to 
connect, are somewhat similar to those used by Gnutella. 
 
The FastTrack system is unstructured. Content discovery is performed through the 
employment of query diffusion. The SNs (also called super-peers) store the metadata about 
the contents, shared by the ONs under their responsibility, in an index. When a node wishes 
to obtain a specific content, a query is issued to its respective SN, containing the user 
defined keywords. After that, a, Gnutella like, broadcast based search is performed in a 
highly pruned overlay network of SNs. For each match at an SN database, the respective 
SN returns the IP address, server port number, and metadata corresponding to the match. 
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Figure 8 presents a view of FastTracks’s architecture. 
 
 
Figure 8 – FastTrack Architecture 
 
FastTrack can still operate without the presence of SNs but its performance is degraded. 
The maintaining of the SNs’ indexes, and the broadcasting of queries between them, are, 
nonetheless bandwidth consuming [17] strategies. 
 
The indexes stored at the SNs are built from information received from the ONs. The 
information about the content files, that an ON is harbouring, which it shares with the SN 
includes [82]:  
• the file name; 
• the file size; 
• the ContentHash – a hash is calculated for every file, and it is used as its signature. 
The ContentHash is the only identifier used to identify a file in an HTTP download 
request. If a download, from a specific peer fails, the Content-Hash allows a 
FastTrack peer to automatically search for the specific file, without having to emit a 
new keyword query; 
• file descriptors (such as artist name, album name, and text entered by users). These 
are used for keyword matches during querying. 
 
The TCP traffic that FastTrack peers exchange, serves four main functional purposes [82]: 
• Signaling traffic – includes handshaking traffic for the establishment of connections 
between nodes, metadata uploaded from ONs to SNs, supernode lists and queries 
and replies. Signaling traffic is encrypted; 
• File transfer traffic (e.g., MP3s, videos, etc.) – takes place directly between the end 
peers without passing through intermediate SNs. File transfers are not encrypted and 
are sent within HTTP messages; 
• Commercial advertisements – sent over HTTP; 
• Instant messaging traffic – encoded as Base64. 
 
This protocol supports multi-source downloading, but not partial sharing of files [73]. 
The specific implementation of this protocol, done by the KaZaA client, employs unencrypted 
HTTP transfers for content retrieval. And all transfers, when using this peer technology, 
include KaZaA-specific HTTP headers [17]. 
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The strategy employed by FastTrack for content replication throughout the system is similar 
to that employed by the Gnutella protocol. 
 
The Kazaa variant, of the FastTrack system, implements an incentives mechanism to reward 
fair use of the network’s resources. The mechanism involves the evaluation of the 
”Participation Level” of peers, which relies only on a locally computed value. The formula 
used for its calculation, is proportional to the ratio of uploaded megabytes of data to the 
network, by a peer, over the downloaded megabytes from the network, by a peer. A 
maximum value for such level is also defined. The participation level value is sent to each 
peer that a given node wants to download from, where it determines its position in the 
remote node’s download queue. 
 
As the value of the participation level is calculated, and stored, locally, the incentives system 
defined by FastTrack is, obviously, of little robustness. It was eventually cracked and some 
clients were developed which present a modified participation level, which is constantly set 
at the maximum value [73]. 
 
The FastTrack protocol is not very resilient to polluting. This is so because the employed 
hashing algorithm performs only incomplete file hashes [73], and no other system wide 
provision exist to assure content validity. The hashing protocol has, nonetheless, been 
subjected to some recent improvements. 
2.4 Summary 
As exposed in the previous sections, the technical landscape of P2P content distribution is a 
very diverse one. It encompasses a vast group of tools and proposals for a varied set of 
different purposes. 
 
The first notorious P2P system, of relatively recent times, was Napster. This system had a 
hybrid decentralized architecture (as explained in section 2.2.2 of the present chapter), and 
thus, a central coordinating entity. This entity granted it a good operational performance, but 
it was also a legally targetable point. Napster was, thus, targeted with lawsuits and, 
eventually, shut down. 
 
P2P systems then progressed in the direction of increasing decentralization. This was 
triggered by the desire to make P2P systems more independent and resilient to node failure 
and attack, but also, to eliminate provisions, of such systems, that where legally targetable 
(the central or coordinating ones). This evolution, however, brought scalability and islanding 
problems. Thus, in time, a return as occurred to more centrally coordinated modes of 
operation, (BitTorrent, FastTrack), in order to increase operational efficiency. 
 
Globally, the available technologies, for P2P content distribution, provide more or less robust 
means for: 
• In the context of operational reliability: 
 
o relatively robust content location – structured systems generally provide the 
means for a relatively efficient location, once a content object’s specific ID is 
known; 
 
o efficient content exchange – as peers, typically, exchange content directly, 
they eliminate the need for any central repository, and distribute the content 
delivery workload though the peer tissue. Protocols which enable a 
fragmented content exchange are more efficient as they enable the 
immediate discarding of corrupted fragments. Furthermore, protocols (e.g. 
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BitTorrent), which have some form of coordination of the content exchange 
process are more efficient that those which do not; 
 
o relatively high resilience to the topological transience which characterizes 
P2P networks in the context of content availability – unstructured networks 
have the best performance, in this regard, as in such systems there is no 
mapping of content objects to peer. If some peer goes offline, its content may, 
generally, be obtained from other peers; 
 
o some effective fair use enforcement, through bartering – this is achieved by 
BitTorrent [40];  
 
• In the context of security: 
o some content integrity validation – most of the predominant P2P systems 
enable the validation of the exchanged content objects’ integrity. These 
provisions are however of relative robustness as they generally depend on 
the safety of the communication channel, between peers, through which the 
content checksum is exchanged; 
 
However, the defined technologies, protocols and platforms, typical lack, or presuppose the 
absence, of any centrally coordinating or absolutely trusted provision. There is thus no point 
of ”high ground”, in such systems, which can: maintain a coherent global vision of the 
system; enforce some form of globally aware coordination or resource management; or be 
the source of ultimately and absolutely trustable information. 
 
Given the transience, and the inherent unreliability, of the tissue that composes P2P 
networks, the above mentioned characteristic, of the currently predominant P2P 
technologies, is at the root of most of said technology’s shortcomings. These are; 
• In the context of operational reliability: 
 
o content discovery and location – as, typically, no entity exists with a global 
and coherent view of the entire content object repository, the discovery and 
location of such content requires the execution of distributed algorithms. In 
unstructured networks said discovery is performed either by query diffusion 
though the network’s peers or by inquiring a super peer. The earlier 
alternative is inefficient, unscalable and prone to flooding the network. The 
latter is more scalable but still does not enable a search over the content in its 
entirety. In structured networks, content location is fairly robust if the exact 
identifier of the target content is known. This however means that said 
identifier must first be, somehow discovered. This is a pending problem of 
these networks as their supporting of keyword based searches is, at best, 
very fragile. Furthermore the coherence of the mapping of resources to peers, 
and consequently, content availability, is difficult to maintain, given the 
transience of the peer collective and the existence of malicious peers; 
 
o content exchange/retrieval – the way that content is distributed/diffused 
across P2P systems is generally efficient, in the sense that its exchange 
depends on no central server and the content distribution workload is diluted 
across the entire peer collective. However, there is still room for improvement 
in terms of the coordination of the exchanges, that is, in terms of determining 
which peers retrieve which object from which other peer and making sure that 
they all contribute. In this regard the BitTorrent protocol presents a higher 
efficiency. Nonetheless, if, in a P2P system, a global overseeing entity exists, 
it may enforce global content diffusion patterns, throughout said system, with 
optimal efficiency; 
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o connectivity of the system’s tissue and content availability – given the 
decentralized and transient nature of P2P networks, the occurrence of 
islanding is frequent, especially in completely decentralized (with no super 
nodes) systems. This consists of sections of a same system (e.g. Gnutella), 
loosing contact with each other. This leads to the systemic behavioural 
variability and inconstant content availability; 
 
o content management - most P2P systems present little content management 
capabilities (e.g. deletion, update, validity expiration, versioning, etc) or none 
at all. When such capabilities are present they are generally not very reliable 
given the lack of overseeing provisions to guarantee their adequate 
enforcement; 
 
• In the context of security – all shortcomings in this field, ultimately, result from the 
typical lack of a central trusted entity. These basically consist of: 
 
o insecure identification of peers and users – the predominant proposals for the 
identification of peers and users, in P2P systems, avoid resorting to any 
central trust providing authority and, instead, employ distributed, frequently 
quorum based, algorithms  [49] [50] [51]. These are vulnerable to vast and 
sophisticated attacks and imply a considerable operational overhead. These 
mechanisms are therefore not really reliable; 
 
o insecure communication – in line with the reality exposed in the above bullet, 
the predominant mechanisms for assuring communicational integrity 
authenticity and un-deniability are fragile at best. In terms of anonymity 
assurance, however, some of the developed schemes present some 
satisfactory robustness; 
 
o fragile media object integrity and authenticity assurance – the few integrity 
assuring measures enforced by the predominant P2P systems in operation, 
are very fragile as they depend on the security of the communication channel, 
(frequently inexistent) and on the honesty of peers. Authenticity assuring 
mechanisms are even more fragile and subjective; 
 
o generally inefficient enforcement of fair use – fair use is enforced either 
through the employment of peer reputation maintenance mechanisms, or 
through trade based mechanisms. The latter can further be divided into those 
which are resource trading based and those which are micro payment based. 
Resource trading based (or barter based) mechanisms are the most efficient 
and less prone to fraud. These, nonetheless, present some issues as they 
can have a negative impact on the efficiency and flexibility of content 
exchange, given their frequently rigid demands for reciprocity; 
 
o virtually absent rights management provisions. 
 
In light of the content above exposed, it can be concluded that the weak spot of P2P 
technologies are its security related aspects. 
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3 DRM Technology Survey 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of Digital Rights Management (DRM) solutions is to provide content 
producers/distributors with the capability to govern and administrate the usage of their 
information goods, throughout the entire on-line digital value chain. DRM is composed by all 
the activities and procedures involved in the electronic and informatics related management 
and marketing of usage rights over digital content.  
 
DRM tools may be embedded in physical support backed media as well as in digital goods 
which are distributed online, such as music files, e-books, games, videos, etc. The 
development of DRM solutions has been underway for some time and some solutions and 
practical implementations have been put forward. Still, this technological field has been 
characterized by some relatively difficult progress for technical reasons as well as for social, 
legal and economical ones. Thus, as a whole the field is yet in a state of maturing, and the 
existing systems are mostly proprietary and are generally unable to inter-operate, what many 
times renders their usage uncomfortable to consumers. 
 
The possibilities of DRM application, the scope of DRM concepts and their global 
implications, (technical, legal, etc), are very vast, rendering the elaboration of an all-
encompassing study unpractical. This overview will focus on the technological aspects of 
DRM, that is, on the management of usage rights over digital goods by control systems and 
on the most relevant of such systems. 
3.2 Technological Description 
DRM systems consist of a set of information technology components and services, 
supported upon copyright related law, whose aim is to provide the necessary tools for the 
creation of a controlled environment for digital goods distribution and consumption. 
 
The core operation of on-line DRM technology consists of protecting and facilitating the 
selling of usage licenses for digital content. Such licenses are portions of digital data that 
express specific usage rules and rights over digital content. These rules can be crafted so as 
to implement various business models, such as rental, subscription, pay-per-use, etc [83].  
 
DRM technology is generally divided into the two following operational areas [84]: 
• rights expression – includes the identification and expression of the rights pertaining 
to works and to the parties involved in their creation, distribution and consumption; 
• rights enforcement – includes the technical enforcement of usage restrictions due to 
the rights in context. 
 
The first operational area is generally dealt with through the employment of metadata tools. 
The second one is handled through the usage of encryption schemes and software or 
hardware provisions. 
3.2.1 Main Logical Mechanisms 
3.2.1.1 Content Identification 
Identification is the process by which a unique universal identifier is linked to a specific 
media object, allowing its unambiguous distinction from all its peers. If identifiers are not 
universal, their uniqueness and meaningfulness will only be assured within the context of 
their corresponding namespace (its naming authority and all entities which can interpret the 
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naming protocol) [84]. For instance, the uniqueness of id “ISBN-13: 978-1587052576”, is 
assured by the entity managing the International Standard Book Number namespace. 
Some of the most relevant content identification standards are presented below in Figure 9 
[85]. 
 
 
Figure 9 – Content Identification Schemes and Standards (data obtained from [85]) 
3.2.1.2 Content Metadata 
Content metadata, in the present context, is information pertaining to digital content. It is, 
generally, not directly connected to the security provisions of DRM systems. It usually serves 
auxiliary, or user experience augmenting, purposes. 
Such content metadata may carry information about a variety of subjects such as: 
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• semantic description of media content; 
• the product’s origin; 
• business or commercial exchange related data; 
• etc. 
  
Metadata formats are generally intimately connected to the type of content which they were 
crafted to describe, and thus, are frequently not suited for other types of content. 
3.2.1.3 Rights Expression Language 
Rights Expression Languages (RELs) are tools that allow the expression of rights and 
restraints on the usage of digital goods, in a language that is commonly understandable in 
some digital context.  
 
RELs are generally required to be: 
• Fully expressive – They must enable rights holders (or their proxies) to express their 
rights and interests in content, as well as to specify contractual agreements related to 
it, pertaining to a variety of usage and business models; 
• Unambiguous – They must be precise in a way that they are interpreted in the exact 
way that the rights owner intended; 
• Machine readable – REL metadata must be interpretable by automated devices; 
• Secure – Instances of REL data (licenses) must be of a nature which assures that 
any tampering can be detected. 
 
XML is employed as a base syntax by most of these languages. 
 
RELs require extremely semantically precise terms so as to provide unambiguous 
expressions. Natural language is far from precise, and thus, unsuitable. REL languages 
therefore require the development of specific sets of highly precise terms so that they may 
express rights and permissions, without ambiguity and in a common understandable way. 
Rights data dictionaries are the instances which group these necessary terms [84].  
 
Some of the most relevant examples of REL initiatives or standards are the following: 
• Open Digital Rights Language [86] (ODRL) REL – this standard is meant for open 
use and is under cooperative development. Version 1.0 of ODRL merges Nokia's  
Mobile  Rights  Voucher  (MRV)  and  Real  Networks'  Extensible  Media Commerce  
Language  (XMCL) [87]. Current version is 2.0. ODRL is subjected to no license 
requirements and is available in the same model of "open source" software. It is part 
of the W3C standards [85]; 
• The Extensible Rights Markup Language [88] (XRML) – an XML-based usage 
grammar for specifying rights and conditions governing the access to digital content 
and services (e.g. digital works, Internet-based services, fragments of information 
such as an email address, etc [89]), which is owned by ContentGuard; 
• MPEG-21 Rights Expression Language (REL) (and the corresponding Rights Data 
Dictionary) – at its basis is XrML. REL contracts bind together one or several 
principals (entities), a set of rights that are possessed over a digital resource, and the 
conditions to which those rights are subjected. Furthermore the object of the contract, 
(the resource), may be a rights expression itself. Thus MPEG-21’s REL may be 
employed to perform the transfer of rights along the chain of digital goods production 
and consumption [90]; 
• Creative Commons (CC) [91] – this standard provides a legal structure and 
expression language which allows the development of a "some rights reserved" 
context for digital resource sharing on the Internet. The goal of the CC initiative is to 
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foster creativity by building a vast base of material that can be re-used for the 
production of new digital goods; 
• The Extensible Access Control Markup Language(XACML) – it was developed by 
OASIS [92]. It is an XML based declarative rights expression language and a 
processing model which describes how to interpret the policies. It defines a core 
schema, and corresponding namespace, for the specification of authorization policies 
over data objects [93]. 
3.2.1.4 User and Device Authentication 
An important functionality in any DRM architecture is User or Device Authentication.  User 
authentication is needed to allow the creation of a connection between the user, the content 
and the rights the user has over the content. 
 
Device authentication performs the assignment of unique identifiers to content consuming 
devices. Such identifiers are employed to assert the device’s permission to perform the 
consumption of the digital asset. 
 
Several technical alternatives for device identification exist: 
• employment of the MAC or IP address, on Internet connected devices; 
• employment of the CPU ID  for Intel machines; 
• employment of the IMEI number on mobile devices. In these cases the SIM card can 
in parallel, be used for User identification. 
 
Some relevant initiatives in this area are: 
• Palladium (now known as Next-Generation Secure Computing Base) [94], which is a 
Microsoft developed system, that employs both software and hardware controls to 
build a "trusted" computing environment; 
• Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA). This is an open alliance, which was 
constituted for the goal of creating of a new computing platform capable of providing 
trust in the PC platform. TPCA is currently designated by TCG - Trusted Computing 
Group [95]. 
 
Some of the most relevant alternatives and initiatives for on-line user identification are the 
following: 
• Microsoft Account [96] (formerly Windows Live ID) – this is a, broadly deployed, 
online authentication system developed by Microsoft. Its single sign-in service 
permits a user to develop a single set of credentials and use it throughout all sites 
that support said service; 
• OpenID [97] – this is a decentralized, free and open standard managed by the not-
for-profit OpenID Foundation [98]. It enables Internet users to authenticate 
themselves with many different web sites using a single digital identity; 
• Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [100] – this is an XML based 
framework, which was developed by the Security Services Technical Committee of 
OASIS, for the exchange of authentication and authorization information between 
security domains (between Identity Providers, which produce assertions, and Service 
Providers which consume assertions); 
• Shibboleth [99] – this is an Internet2 Middleware Initiative which has developed a 
standards based architecture, and an open source implementation (Apache Software 
License), for a federated identity-based authentication and authorization 
infrastructure based on OASIS' SAML. 
II P2P Content Delivery Survey  42 
 
 
 
3.2.1.5 Event Reporting 
All the steps of a typical eCommerce transaction, and the usages to which the delivered 
content is subjected, constitute an event. For instance, the online purchase of a musical 
content and its consumption implies events such as ordering, transfering, listening and 
paying for content.  
 
Therefore, the notification of these events to some central system entity(s) is useful for such 
purposes as: 
• the monitoring of the usage of copyrighted material; 
• the monitoring of technical grandeurs which characterize the system and determine 
its performance, such as the connectivity between devices of different system actors; 
• the collecting of revenues; 
• the collecting of statistics. 
 
Typically, on-line content distribution systems can generate two types of notifications (or 
Event Reports) [101]: 
• Object Action Notification (OAN) – carries information pertaining to the actions that 
an actor of the digital value chain has performed over a digital object; 
• System Action Notification (SAN) – carries information pertaining to the actions 
performed over any system module but not over an object. 
 
A relevant example of a technical platform for Event Reporting is the MPEG-21 Event 
Reporting (MPEG-21 ER) standard. It delivers the necessary provisions for, amongst other 
things, Digital Item producers and distributors to be able to estimate or monitor the usage of 
their products. It provides a standardized structure for “reportable events” to be specified, 
detected and acted upon. The comprised reportable events may be connected either with 
the usage of a Digital Item by a Peer, or with the occurrence of Events connected to the 
Peer itself [102]. 
 
The key concepts at the base MPEG-21 ER are the Event Report Request (ER-R) and the 
Event Report (ER).   
 
 
Figure 10 – Model of ER-R Processing and ER Generation (adapted from [102]) 
 
The purpose of an ER-R is to define [102]: 
• the conditions that must be verified so that the reportable Event is considered to 
occur; 
• the syntax/format of the information which is be supplied, within the payload of the 
ER, when the reportable Event occurs; 
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• the intended recipient(s) of the Event Report, (the entities that need to be notified 
when the reportable Event occurs); 
• parameters specific to ER delivery aspects, (such as the transport mechanism and 
protocol, delivery timing constraints, priority, etc.). 
 
Figure 10 presents a general (non-normative) model which depicts the functional 
characteristics of ER-R handling and the related generation of ER’s. 
 
Within the defined model, the operation begins with the delivery of an ER-R to an MPEG-21 
Peer. The ER-R is processed and the Peer waits for Events to “occur”. When such an event 
occurs, it is detected by the Event Watchdog module, which determines if the Event should 
be reported on, or not, according to the ER-R defined parameters. If all of the Event 
conditions defined in an ER-R are verified, the Peer builds an ER carrying the data fields 
specified in the corresponding ER-R. Finally the generated ER is sent, by the Peer, to the 
ER-R’s defined recipient Peer(s) [102]. 
3.2.1.6 Content Protection 
Content protection is a key element of a DRM system, as it provides the technical support 
basis for content accessing denial and for the enforcing of content usage restrictions. 
 
Content protection standards directly handle the physical protection/encoding of content. 
Such standards may be of a low-level type, such as cryptographic algorithms and 
watermarking standards, of an intermediate level, such as the smart media protection 
standards, and of a high-level type such as MPEG-4 IPMP (which in turn employ low level 
features of the low level type). 
 
Some relevant examples of content protection technologies are; 
• the Content Scramble System (“CSS”), which is employed to protect the media 
content DVD video disks; 
• the High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP) whose goal is to protect high 
definition content during transmission from a source device to a display device; 
• the Digital Transmission Content Protection, (DTCP) whose objective is to restrict the 
capabilities of “home based” digital technologies, such as DVD players and 
televisions, through the encryption of interconnections between devices. 
3.2.2 Basic Topology 
DRM systems may present multiple technical variations between them. Their structures may 
differ, the base technologies they use may vary, the employed content encoding schemes 
may differ and these systems may have overall different aims. Still there are a number of 
basic characteristics which are generally common to all DRM systems, and thus these 
comprise a relatively standard set of necessary logical components.  
 
DRM systems may be analysed according to two different perspectives [85]:  
• an architectural and entity bound perspective; 
• a functional and procedural perspective; 
 
From the architectural and entity bound perspective, a generic DRM system will comprise 
the following entities and components [89] (as presented in Figure 11): 
• Content Owner – The content owner is the entity which inserts the consumable 
content into the system. It provides the digital goods to the packaging entity, and the 
contracts and rights related information to the License Server. This latter data will 
determine the type of content usages which are allowed; 
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• Packager – The packager handles the packaging and encrypting of the original 
content. It takes care of the following tasks: 
o Data compression – certain types of digital goods dispense with compression, 
and thus this task is optional; 
o Content protection – this includes encryption, watermarking, etc. 
o Key Supplying – supplies the content decryption keys to the Key Distribution 
Server; 
o Protected Content Supplying – supplies the protected goods to the Content 
Distribution Server/System; 
 
• Key Distribution Server – The Key Distribution Server distributes the content 
decryption keys, (received from the Packager), to authorized users/clients. 
User/client authorization for key reception is obtained from the License Server; 
 
• Content Distribution Server/Systems – The Content Distribution System/Server 
makes available the actual consumable digital goods as well as information about 
those goods (products or services). These systems may employ many different 
means to perform the distribution of goods; 
 
• License Server – The License Server: 
o manages licensing information. It produces and delivers licenses expressing 
rights, and permissions, over digital goods for users/clients based on:  
• Information received from the AAA (Authorization, Authentication and 
Access control) Server and/or Payment; 
• Contracts and rights related data received from the Content Owner. 
o supplies user/client authorization information to the Key Distribution Server; 
 
• AAA (Authorization, Authentication and Access Control) Server and/or Payment – 
The AAA Server handles authorization, authentication and access control aspects.  
Upon user purchase of rights it informs the License Server to provide the user/client 
with the respective license; 
 
• Usage Tracking Server – This server gathers content usage information received 
from the License Server, and possibly the client side, and supplies it to the Usage 
Clearinghouse; 
 
• Usage Clearinghouse – The Usage Clearinghouse surveys content usage and 
handles the processing and distribution of that data to all involved parties e.g. 
Content Owner, Financial Clearing House; 
 
• Financial Clearinghouse – The Financial Clearinghouse enables financial 
transactions to be performed. It collects the revenues and performs the distribution to 
all involved parties, e.g. Content Owner, etc.; 
 
• Users, Devices and Clients – Content usage rights are more appropriately associated 
with users, than with devices. This is so because more than one device may be 
associated with a given user, and also because devices may be connected in either a 
permanent or intermittent way. 
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Figure 11 – Basic DRM Architecture (adapted from [89]) 
 
 
Figure 12 – Basic Client Structure (adapted from [85]) 
 
The client side of the system should supply the following functionalities [85]. 
• DRM controller – assures the enforcement of both user and Content Owner rights 
over content; 
• Content, metadata, cryptographic; 
• Content rendering; 
• User authentication. 
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Figure 12 presents a graphical overview of the generic client architecture. 
 
The steps involved in the accessing of content typically include [89]:  
• The reception of the content in a protected form by the user/client, resorting to any of 
the methods of delivery supported by the content distribution system; 
• The accessing of the AAA server, by the user, to obtain authorization, authentication 
and access permission and/or to proceed to fee payment. The subsequent signalling, 
by the AAA server, of the License Server, so that the latter delivers the license to the 
user, and also authorizes the Key Distribution Server to deliver keys; 
• The delivery of keys by the Key Distribution Server so that the user (client side) may 
begin content consumption; 
• The decryption of content, its consumption and the related usage control at the client 
application. 
 
 
Figure 13 – Typical DRM Functional Architecture (adapted from [85]) 
 
From a functional perspective, the key functions of any DRM architecture are (as presented 
in Figure 13) [85]: 
• Content Creation and Capture: Managing the creation of content to optimize trading. 
This function of DRM systems includes provisions for: 
o Rights validation – to ensure that content developed from existing content 
includes is being generated in accordance with the appropriate rights to do so 
and that such rights are consistent; 
o Rights creation – to assign rights to new content; 
o Rights workflow – to process content for review and/or approval of rights. 
 
• Content Management – Managing and enabling the trade of content. This functional 
aspect of DRM systems should include provisions for: 
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o Repository functions – to assure the access to content and its descriptive and 
rights related “metadata”; 
o Trading functions – assigning licenses to actors who fulfil the necessary 
conditions to have assigned onto them specific rights over content. 
 
• Content Usage – Managing the usage of content after access to it has been granted. 
This function of DRM systems includes provisions for: 
o Permissions management – enforcement of rights associated with the 
content; 
o Tracking management – content usage monitoring where such tracking is a 
requirement of the user’s agreement. 
 
3.3 Specifications and Implementations 
3.3.1 Specification Initiatives 
3.3.1.1 OMA DRM 
The OMA DRM specification was created by the Open Mobile Alliance [103]. This DRM 
scheme, meant for use with mobile-centric content types, was developed to allow mobile 
content providers to add DRM to their products.  
 
OMA DRM 1.0 consisted of a basic DRM standard without strong protection measures. It 
manly defined three key methods:  
• Forward Lock – focuses on the delivery of digital goods that must not be forwarded. It 
frequently applies to subscription-based services, were the involved devices are 
allowed to play, display or execute, but cannot forward the media object [104]; 
 
• Combined Delivery (combined rights/media objects in the DRM message) – enables 
the setting of specific usage rights over the digital good. This method extends the 
Forward-lock method by allowing a more refined definition of rights, which can be 
restricted by using both time and count constraints [104]; 
 
• Separate Delivery (separated Rights Object (RO) + encrypted media object in the 
DRM message) – provides the necessary provision to protect higher value media and 
enable the superdistribution of digital goods, by permitting the client devices to 
forward the media, but not the associated rights. According to this method the media 
and rights are distributed via separate channels. The media is encrypted employing a 
symmetric cipher, while the rights hold the encryption/decryption key [104]. 
 
OMA DRM 2.0 is an extension of the 1.0 separate delivery mechanism. Each device taking 
part in an OMA DRM 2.0 system possesses an individual DRM PKI certificate with a public 
key, and the corresponding private key. Rights Objects, which carry the content decryption 
keys, are individually protected for a specific receiving device by encrypting them with the 
device’s public key. 
 
For a device to be eligible to receive a RO, it must first register with a Rights Issuer entity so 
that its certificate is validated. Devices known to be hacked can be impeded from accessing 
content. 
 
The overall operation of an OMA DRM compliant system is as follows [105]: 
II P2P Content Delivery Survey  48 
 
 
 
• The content is packaged and protected from unauthorised access, by the Content 
Issuer, and the corresponding RO is produced by the Rights Issuer. Content and 
rights data is then inserted into the system; 
• The content is delivered to the terminal side under any means, but the rights data is 
distributed by the rights issuer in a safe and controlled fashion; 
• At the consumption device a trusted DRM Agent is installed which enforces the rights 
objects, which cryptographically are bound to it. 
 
The basic steps undertaken by the OMA DRM architecture to assure the secure distribution 
of content preventing unauthorized access are [105]: 
• Content packaging – content is packaged in a secure content container, and 
encrypted with a symmetric content encryption key (CEK); 
• DRM Agent authentication – DRM Agents have a unique private/public key pair and a 
certificate which allow their secure identification; 
• Rights Object generation – Rights Object are XML documents which express the 
permissions and constraints associated with the content’s usage. They carry the 
CEKs; 
• Rights Object protection – sensitive parts of the Rights Objects are encrypted before 
delivery (the CEK for instance), and the object itself is cryptographically linked to the 
target DRM Agent. Furthermore the Rights Issuer digitally signs the RO; 
• Delivery – the RO and protected content package, being inherently secure, can be 
delivered using any transport mechanism, either together or separately. 
 
OMA DRM employs its own rights expression language (OMA REL) for rights expression. 
 
This DRM specification has been implemented on numerous cell phones. Furthermore, 
multiple mobile operators (such as Vodafone [106], Vivo [107], etc) use OMA DRM for their 
content delivery services. Commercial suppliers of OMA DRM solutions include, for instance, 
Beep Science, CoreMedia DRM, Discretix, Mutable OMA DRM, SafeNet and Viaccess. 
3.3.1.2 OpenSDRM 
OpenSDRM specification defines an adaptable DRM system which may be employed for 
various different business models and for the protection of different types of content. The 
adopted security architecture is based on the OPIMA [108] international specifications, on 
MPEG-4 IPMP Extensions, on MPEG-21 IPMP architecture and on some of the proposals 
for JPEG2000 standard Part 8 [85]. 
 
OpenSDRM was initially developed within the scope of the FP5 EC project MOSES. This 
project focused explicitly on the MPEG-4 file format for the protected content. Still this 
system was conceived so that it can handle all types of content and various business models 
(both for download, streaming or even broadcasting). 
 
Figure 14 presents a graphical overview of the OpenSDRM platform architecture. 
 
The components and actors that interact externally with the Open SDRM architecture are 
[85]:  
• User – human individual who wishes to consume some content. The user will interact 
with Open SDRM in order to, identify himself, acquire licenses and play multimedia; 
  
• IPMP Tools Provider – organization that creates tools for encryption, scrambling, 
watermarking, etc, for content protection and makes them available to the Open 
SDRM system. This supplying of tools implies the existence of business relationships 
between Content Provider and specific IPMP Tools Providers, since that producers 
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and/or distributors of content will specify which type of protection the content will 
have and which tools can be applied to the content and from which supplier; 
 
• Content Provider – multimedia assets supplier that feeds Open SDRM with content 
and/or metadata; 
 
• Payment Infrastructure – structure which facilitates Open SDRM e-commerce 
features through the provision of services for handling electronic payments; 
 
• Certification Authority – entity which is responsible for the reception of requests for 
and issuing credentials to, other entities in the system. These credentials will be 
utilized by system entities to authenticate themselves before each other, enabling the 
establishment of secure and authenticated communication channels between them. 
The components in the Open SDRM architecture communicate with each other 
through the channel security provided by the SSL/TLS protocol. This Certification 
Authority can also be internal to Open SDRM, and thus entirely managed by some 
entity, or it may be an external commercial Certification. 
 
 
 
Figure 14 – OpenSDRM Solution Architecture (adapted from [85]) 
 
The internal components of the Open SDRM system include [85]: 
 
• Content Preparation server – this server side component handles content 
preparation. It receives raw content from a specified source or sources and encodes 
it on a specified format, adds metadata and protects it; 
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• Commerce server – this component handles the trading of the content with the users; 
 
• Media Delivery server – this module handles the delivery of digital assets to the 
client. This Media Delivery server will implement a specific protocol (download (FTP, 
HTTP, or other), streaming (RTSP, other), broadcast) to exchange protected content 
with the client application; 
 
• Registration server – the role of this component within the system is to assign unique 
identifiers to content and to register metadata information for that specific content. 
The content identification scheme employed follows the MPEG-21 directives about 
Digital Item Identification (DII), using a reduced version of the MPEG-21 DII Digital 
Object Identifiers (DOI); 
 
• Authentication server – this module handles the authentication of all internal and 
external entities to the DRM system. It’s role is to validate the access rights of all the 
entities and components in the system working as a SSO point, registering and 
managing components and users on the system. It employs cryptographic XML 
credentials for the authentication of both components and users in order to 
authenticate the transactions exchanged between them (XML Encryption and XML 
Signatures); 
 
• License server – this component is responsible for house-keeping the rules 
associating a user, the content and his/her corresponding access rights. It accepts 
connections from authenticated client Media Players for downloading of licenses, 
which will be applied to the protected content through an appropriate IPMP tool. The 
licenses are XML formatted and employ Open Digital Rights Language, (and, in the 
future, possibly the Rights Expression Language by MPEG-21; 
 
• IPMP tools server – this server component handles the registration of new IPMP 
tools and the reception of the authenticated client Media Player requests for the 
downloading of specific IPMP tools. It is also a part of its role to make IPMP tools 
available to the Content Preparation Server to allow the protection of content; 
 
• Media Application – this represents the applications that will be utilized to consume 
the digital assets. This generic component is able to display/playback the appropriate 
content. It may work with one or several IPMP tools in order to control how the 
content is accessed by a particular user. 
3.3.1.3 ISMA/DRM 
The Internet Streaming Media Alliance [109] is composed by companies from multiple areas. 
Its founding members are Apple Computer, Cisco, IBM, Kasenna, Philips and Sun 
Microsystems Inc [89]. 
ISMA's protocols are based on open specifications for media formats and transport of media 
content to the receiver over IP networks. This specification conforms to the ISO/IEC 14496 
(MPEG-4) standards over Real Time Transport Protocol (RTP) [89].   
 
ISMA has undertaken work to add DRM support to its provisions. ISMA/DRM preserves 
ISMA’s interoperability goals, employing standard encryption, authentication and integrity 
validation for ISMA conforming media and protocols.  
 
Figure 15 presents a succinct view of the interactions flow within the ISMA DRM 
architecture. 
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Figure 15 – ISMA DRM Architecture (adapted from [110]) 
 
ISMA DRM’s components and their roles are [110]: 
• The Mastering entity handles content preparation and publication; 
• The Key/License Management entity manages and delivers the licensing and 
decryption data; 
• The Sender entity handles the delivery of the content to the ISMA Receiver via an 
open-standard protocol called ISMACryp; 
• The ISMA Receiver processes the ISMACryp encrypted streams, authenticated 
messages, and signalling. 
 
More recently ISMA has merged with MPEG Industry Forum (MPEGIF), under the name 
MPEGIF. Its assets (and thus ISMA DRM), passed to the control of MPEGIF [111]. 
3.3.1.4 MPEG IPMP 
3.3.1.4.1 MPEG IPMP Extensions 
Intellectual Property Management and Protection Extension (IPMP-X) is a DRM architecture 
developed by the MPEG working group. This architecture provides a normative framework to 
support requirements such as: renewability, secure communications, verification of trust, 
granular and flexible governance at well-defined points in the processing chain, etc. 
 
Two types of IPMP Extensions exist [85]:  
• MPEG-2 IPMP-X which is meant to be applied to MPEG-2 based systems; 
• MPEG-4 IPMP-X which is intended to be applied to MPEG-4 based systems. 
 
MPEG-4 IPMP Extension specifies five key elements [112]: 
• IPMP Tools – modules which handle (one or more) IPMP tasks such as 
authentication, decryption, watermarking, etc. A specific IPMP Tool may coordinate 
other IPMP Tools. Each such tool possesses a unique IPMP Tool ID that identifies it 
an unambiguous way, either at a presentation level or at a universal level; 
 
• IPMP Descriptors – subsection of the MPEG-4 object descriptors (OD) which 
describe how to access and decode an object. These Descriptors are used to 
describe the IPMP Tool that is used to protect the object. An independent registration 
authority (RA) is utilised so that any party may register its own IPMP Tool and identify 
this without conflicts; 
 
• IPMP Elementary Stream (ES) – transports IPMP specific data such as key and 
rights data. All MPEG objects are represented by elementary streams, which can 
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reference each other. These special elementary streams may be employed to deliver 
IPMP specific data; 
 
• IPMP Tool List – this list carries information pertaining to the tools required by the 
terminal so that it can consume the content. It is conveyed in the Initial Object 
Descriptor (IOD) of the MPEG-4 system stream. Using this mechanism the terminal 
is able to select and manage the tools, or to retrieve them when they are missing; 
 
• Secure Messaging Framework – this framework does not specify functional 
interfaces. It is instead based on secure message communication and mutual 
authentication. Interaction between the terminal side and the IPMP Tools is 
performed through messages via a conceptual entity called “Message Router”. 
3.3.1.4.2 MPEG-21 IPMP 
A key goal of the MPEG-21, multimedia framework is to enable transparent and augmented 
use of multimedia resources across a wide range of networks and devices. MPEG-21 Part-4 
defines an interoperable framework for Intellectual Property Management and Protection 
(IPMP). 
This framework includes standardized provisions for: 
• retrieving IPMP tools from remote locations; 
• exchanging messages between IPMP tools and between these tools and the 
terminal; 
• authentication of IPMP tools; 
• integrating Rights Expressions according to the Rights Data Dictionary and the 
Rights Expression Language [113]. 
 
It does not, however, define protection measures, keys, key management, trust 
management, encryption algorithms, certification infrastructures or other components. 
This part of MPEG-21 defines how to include IPMP information and protected parts of Digital 
Items into a DIDL (MPEG-21 Digital Item Declaration) document. The IPMP DIDL 
encapsulates and protects a portion of the hierarchy of a Digital Item, and associates 
appropriate identification and protection information with it.  
 
MPEG-21 IPMP consists of two parts: 
• The IPMP Digital Item Declaration Language – provides the tools for a protected 
Representation of the DID model. It permits the expressing of an encrypted DID 
hierarchy which is digitally signed or otherwise governed to be included in a DID 
document in a schematically correct manner; 
• IPMP Information schemas – defines structures for the specification of information 
pertaining to the protection of content, including tools, mechanisms and licenses. 
3.3.1.5 DMP DRM 
The Digital Media Project (DMP) was established with the purpose of promoting the 
deployment and use of Digital Media in ways that respect the rights of creators and rights 
holders to exploit their works [114]. In that regard it has performed the specification of a 
standard for “Interoperable DRM”. 
 
DMP DRM attends to the issue of DRM Interoperability through the specification of individual 
technologies (called Tools within DMP context) necessary for the implementation of, DMP 
termed, “Primitive Functions”. Such tools are to be “smaller” functions obtained by breaking 
down into atomic procedures the actions performed by value-chain users when they do 
interact between themselves. While more general functions may undergo substantial 
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changes as a consequence of the evolution of the media business in the value-chain, these 
more “Primitive Functions” will remain more stable and be more easily augmented. 
 
Therefore, the DMP DRM is not meant as a universal “DRM standard”. This project specifies 
tools for enabling Primitive Functions [115]. Its development is a progressive process which 
is opened to exterior contribution. In that regard, calls for proposals for additional necessary 
tools to support new primitive functions or additional functionalities of existing tools are 
periodically issued. 
3.3.2 Implementation Initiatives 
3.3.2.1 Windows Media DRM 
Microsoft’s Windows Media DRM (WMDRM), is a Digital Rights Management service for 
the Windows Media platform. It is based on a Microsoft proprietary specification which was 
designed to provide safe delivery of audio and/or video content over an IP network to PCs or 
other devices, enabling distributors to control content usage.  
3.3.2.1.1 WMDRM Operational Overview 
Figure 16 presents an overview of the architecture of the Windows Media DRM system 
(more specifically the Windows Media Rights Manager part of WMDRM). It also highlights 
the main differences of that architecture when compared to the typical one presented in 
chapter 3.2.2. 
 
Digital goods protected by the WMRM system, are distributed, over the Internet, in a 
protected and encrypted file format. 
 
The characteristic WMDRM action flow is as follows [116]: 
 
• Packaging – The media content files are encrypted with a key. That key is stored in 
an encrypted license, which is distributed separately. The media file also carries 
other information such as the location (URL), where its respective license can be 
purchased; 
 
• Content Distribution – The packaged files may be distributed by whatever means 
available, because their protection scheme assures that (in principle) no illegitimate 
access take place; 
 
• Establishing a License Server – A License Clearing House (LCH) is selected by the 
content provider (or content owner). The LCH will store the specific rights or rules 
associated with the licenses and implement the WMDRM license services. The LCH 
is responsible for the authentication of consumer's requests for licenses. In Figure 16 
the LCH is represented as the association between License Server and Key 
Distribution Server; 
 
• License Acquisition – For the consumption of a WMRM protected digital good to take 
place, the consumer must first obtain the appropriate license key to unlock the file 
and access its media content. For the license acquisition process to take place the 
WMDRM system sends the consumer to a registration page (AAA Server) where 
information is requested or payment is required, or "silently" retrieves a license from 
a clearing house; 
 
• Playing the Media File – WMDRM protected files must be rendered by a WMDRM 
supporting media player. Employing such tools, the consumer can access the media 
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content according to the specific rules or rights that are included in the respective 
license. Licenses are not transferable. They are valid for a single PC, or device. 
 
 
Figure 16 - Windows Media Rights Manager Architecture (adapted from [89]) 
 
Content usage rights are associated with devices instead of users. Still, moving content to a 
mobile device is possible, but there is no general support for multiple devices. 
3.3.2.1.2 WMDRM Content Protection Scheme 
The content producer (and packager) packages the media content into a key protected 
(encrypted) file. The encoding is performed using Windows Media Encoder [85]. In order to 
be able to use Windows Media Encoder, a content owner must possess a DRM profile 
obtained at a LCH. That profile allows a content owner to generate keys for content 
encryption as well as to define the terms for the protected content’s usage.  
 
During the content protection process, a key is generated. That key is employed in the 
content ciphering operations. The key is produced using a specific algorithm which employs 
a license key seed (which is conveyed to the content owner and packager by the mentioned 
DRM profile) and a key ID. This way, the license key seed is shared between the content 
owner and the LCH. The key ID is generated by the content owner and it is included in the 
header of the protected file/stream.  
 
Furthermore the content header also carries other information such as [85]: 
• The URL of the LCH; 
• A unique content ID which identifies the content, and content related information (for 
instance artist name, date of recording, etc.); 
• The version of the individualized DRM component; 
• Attributes of type “name-value” defined by the content owner to carry other 
necessary information. 
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Additionally, the header, of the protected content, is digitally signed, using a public/private 
key par, in order to ensure the legitimacy of the header and its information. 
 
To issue licenses for specific contents, the LCH, regenerates the appropriate key by 
retrieving the key ID from the packaged file and the key seed and performing the previously 
mentioned algorithm. The key is then included in the license file sent to the consumer's 
computer.  
 
Using the key enclosed in the license, the WMDRM compliant player on the consumer's PC 
may then access the protected digital goods. 
When protected content consumption is attempted, via Windows Media Player for instance, 
this application will search the local PC for a valid license. If the latter isn’t available, the 
player analyses the content header in order to retrieve the URL of the responsible LCH and 
the key ID. Using these two values the client application obtains a valid license containing 
the decryption key. 
Still, if the content is to be paid, the end-user will first be directed to a virtual location where 
he must proceed to purchase the license [85]. 
 
Once a valid license is available, the terminal device rendering software can them render the 
content, but in accordance to the rights and permissions defined in the license. 
3.3.2.1.3 WMRM Licenses 
Licenses contain the keys to unlock the Windows Media files. Furthermore the licenses are 
the vehicles which convey the rights, or rules information related the governing of content 
usage, from the content owner side to the consumer side. The WMDRM system can support 
licenses describing a wide variety of different usage rules, such as:  
• the number of times a digital good can be consumed; 
• the devices which can render or process a content; 
• the time at which the user can start accessing the file and it expiration date; 
• if the file can be transferred to a CD recorder; 
• if the user can back up and restore the license; 
• the security level required to have on the client to access the Windows Media file; 
• etc. 
3.3.2.2 Helix DRM  
Helix DRM (formerly RealSystem Media Commerce Suite) is a DRM system developed by 
RealNetworks. This system adds DRM functionality to a number of other RealNetworks 
media components, such as Real player and Real streamer. 
 
Figure 17 presents an overview of this system’s architecture. It also highlights the main 
differences of that architecture when compared to the typical architecture of a DRM system 
as presented in chapter 3.2.2. 
 
This DRM system consists of the following main components [89]: 
 
• Packager – handles the content packaging and encryption measures. It receives as 
input data the unprotected media files, the public key of the License Server at stake 
and the URL for the Retail Server. It produces the encryption keys, unique content 
IDs and delivers the packaged and secured media files. The secured files include, 
besides the encrypted media, the relevant media related metadata such as the 
retailer URL and content ID generated by the packager [89]. No usage rules are 
included into the protected media file by the packager. The public key of the License 
Server is used for the secure transmission of the content encryption key [89]; 
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• Client application – is composed by the Real player with a DRM plug-in. It handles 
the usage tracking and usage clearing procedures. When the consumption of a 
protected media asset is desired, the Real player searches for a local license for the 
content at stake. If it is not available, the player invokes a web browser and calls the 
retailer URL (which is included in the protected file as metadata) [89]. If all license 
acquisition procedures go well, the retailer provides a valid license to the client side. 
Such a license contains usage rules, which will be interpreted and enforced by the 
plug-in; 
 
• License Server – offers an http interface and a set of procedures for the creation of 
licenses. It receives as input the content ID, the content encryption key, the usage 
rules, and the client's public key (which enforces the personalization of the client). 
Employing those parameters, the License Server generates a license containing the 
usage rules and the encryption key, encrypted by the client's public key [89]. The 
License Server does not interact directly with the consumer. The Retail Server will be 
the intermediary between the two. 
 
 
Figure 17 - RealSystem Media Commerce Suite Architecture (adapted from [89]) 
 
The full functionality of the Helix DRM system requires the existence of a Retail Server. Such 
a component functions as the gateway to the payment system and to the license server, 
completing the business workflow. Still it is not included in the system. Nonetheless, it is to 
link with the interfaces of the packager and the license server [89].  
 
The Retail server should operate in close association to a database which stores content IDs 
and their respective content encryption keys[89]. 
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A typical behaviour for the Retail Server is for it to call a payment system (under the request 
of the user side), and, after a successful financial transaction, to proceed to license creation.  
For license creation to take place, the Retail Server is responsible for the definition of the 
usage rules, and for forwarding them, together with the content ID, the content encryption 
key, and the client's public key (delivered at content purchase time by the client side DRM 
plug-in) to the license server [89]. 
After a valid and client specific license is created it is forwarded to the client plug-in so that 
content consumption can take place. 
3.3.2.3 DMDFusion 
DMDFusion is an open, flexible and scalable DRM solution for carrier grade servers. It is a 
complete DRM solution as it includes rights creation, management, delivery and 
enforcement of usage rules [85]. It also integrates multiple proprietary DRM solutions such 
as those from Microsoft, Adobe and Real Networks [89], which can interact with it through a 
language-independent API. 
 
The DMDFusion system is entirely server based, and thus, vastly different types of clients, 
such as set-top boxes, mobile devices, etc., can consume DMDFusion compatible content 
without the need for any 3rd party DRM solutions. 
 
 
Figure 18 – DMDFusion Architecture (adapted from [89]) 
 
The DMDFusion architecture is composed by three main components as presented in Figure 
18 [89]: 
• The protection component (fulfils the role of a Packager) – protects content, 
employing specified technology and delivers the protected assets to a client specified 
location. It permits both push and pull protection models [89], that is, the request for 
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content protection may originate from the content owner or from the requester of the 
content, (for instance the end-user); 
 
• The license component (fulfils the role of a License Server) – handles the creation 
and issuing of licenses, for a specified technology. For instance, a request from a 
Windows Media player will provoke the issuing of a Windows Media license; 
 
• The business intelligence component (or rights management component) – stores 
and manages the business information that the protection and license components 
need for their operations. It is responsible for handling all the aspects related to rights 
management, and it provides a web based GUI, that enables content owners to 
define usage rights, server side conditions and contracts. 
 
Keys for content owners are DRM-specific. They are generated by the protection component 
employing the appropriate DRM technology. These keys are then stored in the business 
intelligence component. 
The key pairs (public and private) for the Content Distributors, on the other hand, are 
generated by the Content Distributors themselves. The public keys are stored in the 
business intelligence component. 
Given that the business intelligence component handles the storing and management of 
keys, it thus fulfils also the role of a Key Distribution Server [89]. 
 
The requirements for terminal devices depend on the type of DRM technology being 
employed for content protection. Generally, PCs, PDAs, etc., equipped with the appropriate 
player/reader software running the appropriate DRM components may be used. The set of 
players (and respective DRM schemes) for which this system has support includes Adobe 
Reader, Windows Media Player and Real Networks Player [89]. 
 
In what concerns Authorization, Authentication and Access Control (AAA), besides enforcing 
rights using licenses, the DMDfusion system also possesses the capacity to restrict the 
issuing of licenses. For instance, license issuing may be restricted based on the 
geographical location of the license requester which is determined by checking its IP 
address. License issuing can also be restricted to a maximum number per product and/or to 
various time intervals. The verifications involved in the imposing of the previous restrictions 
are performed by the license component, which queries the business intelligence component 
for details about the required good, at the time of a license request [89]. 
 
Within the DMDfusion system, the only usage tracking that takes place is the recording of 
the delivery of licenses for particular contents. Reports can be provided on the issuing of 
licenses for specific contents, time intervals, geographical territories, etc. The usage that a 
content is subjected to once the user has acquired a license is not tracked by DMDfusion 
[89]. 
 
DMDfusion does not include a payment system of its own (something like a Financial 
Clearing House). Nonetheless a content distributor may request information from  the  
business  intelligence  component  on  orders  (licenses  requested  and  issued)  and  use  
this data to produce invoices or request payments [89]. 
3.3.2.4 Secure Digital Container DRM 
Secure Digital Container (SDC) DRM is provided by SDC AG [117]. This technology is 
approved by all key Recording Labels as Mobile DRM Technology for full length music 
tracks [85]. The SDC architecture [118] is composed by a server (packager) software and a 
client software. 
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This solution employs Java DRM technology and is based on a mobile code architecture. 
Because of this, the system is capable of packaging content together with code in a 
"container". This object works as a transport unit for content, software and code. The client 
application is carried within the container and is interpreted by the Java Virtual Machine at 
the terminal side [85]. 
 
Some of the most relevant aspects of this system are the following [85]: 
 
• No client installation is necessary – the system packages content together with code 
inside a single object. This way the container object can contain the client application 
required to decrypt and render the content, thus no client installation is required. The 
client device needs only a Java Virtual Machine; 
 
• Fractioned content – the content is spliced into two separate containers (the specific 
characteristics of this fractioning make it advantageous for superdistribution): 
o Container A – Holds 95% of the content payload. The content can still be 
somewhat accessed, but the remaining space is filled with advertisement or 
promotion information. This container can be freely shared; 
o Container B – Container B holds the remaining portion of the content, 
(missing in container A), in an encrypted and watermarked form. 
 
Figure 19 presents an overview of SDC DRM’s architecture. 
 
 
Figure 19 – SDC DRM Architecture 
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The SDC packager, (implemented at the server software application), handles the splicing of 
content into Container A and Container B. The content usage related rights information is 
inserted in Container B. The content splicing method may be configured for a given 
application [89]. 
 
In what regards the roles of a License Server and of a Key Distribution Server, this system’s 
server side handles the distribution of Container B as well as keys and licenses to terminal 
side. The distribution of this data is secure, and a unique key is associated for each device 
[89]. 
 
On the terminal side, the usage rights are associated with devices instead of users. Within 
the operation mode of this system the client software is downloaded with the content. It 
performs the content decryption based on PKI, and it also handles the merging of Containers 
A and B using its interpretation module. During the interpretation process the content’s 
fingerprint is matched against the device ID. This permits the tracking of unauthorized 
content copying [89].  
 
More recently this DRM scheme has evolved and some changes where performed to it. An 
independent client now exists, the Secure Download Manager, which must be installed at 
the client machine and which mediates the interaction with the system’s server provisions. 
3.3.2.5 OpenIPMP 
The OpenIPMP system [119] is an open source implementation of the OMA DRM 
specification. It employs only open standards, one of the most the relevant of which is the 
MPEG-4 format. OpenIPMP encompasses user management and identification, content 
encryption algorithms and distribution channel protection. 
 
The main concepts of the OpenIPMP system are [119]: 
 
• User Management – The cornerstone of the system's security structure are the User 
Management mechanisms. OpenIPMP issues each user a Digital Certificate (or 
Digital Id) at registering time. The Digital Id, is issued and signed by the OpenIPMP 
Certificate Authority. It is a standards-based electronic file that uniquely identifies the 
user within the system, specifying the group(s) to which the user belongs. The 
employment of this ID also permits the establishment of secure and confidential 
communications with the OpenIPMP server components; 
 
• Rights Management – OpenIPMP enforces a robust usages permission and 
constraint model that permits content owners to specify a wide variety of rights and 
respective constraints. For the expression of such rights and restraints OpenIPMP 
supports Open Digital Rights Language and MPEG REL; 
 
• Content Identification and Management – The OpenIPMP system provides measures 
for the unique identification of content. The system implements one of the 
identification schemes proposed by the MPEG-21 standard. The unique identification 
of content allows the system to provide protection and tracking mechanisms during 
the entire lifetime of a digital good; 
 
• Content Protection – For content protection and overall security, this system employs 
several open cryptography standards such as [85]: 
o Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) – used to ensure encryption and digital 
signature for securing digital contents over networked environments. The 
security and extensibleness of the PKI framework allows for OpenIPMP 
installations to seamlessly cooperate; 
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o X.509 Certificates – used to implement licenses. Each digital certificate is 
signed by the OpenIPMP Certificate Authority service for authenticity, and 
thus ensures that each OpenIPMP transaction is cryptographically certified; 
o Asymmetric Encryption (e.g. RSA) – employed to protect licences and other 
key sensitive data. In the case of RSA it supports configurable RSA key sizes; 
o Symmetric encryption – employed to secure the digital assets. The two main 
algorithms used are AES and BlowFish; 
o Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) – employed for critical transactions such as 
License Acquisition and Content Registration, thus ensuring that information 
remains authentic during transit; 
o Secure Storage (RSA Security's PKCS #12) – employed to assure that all 
user-specific information (Private Key, User Certificate or Certificate Authority 
list) is safely stored. 
 
 
Figure 20 – OpenIPMP Components Diagram (adapted from [85]) 
 
The main components of the OpenIPMP platform are depicted in Figure 20. In operational 
terms, different sets of OpenIPMP’s components combine or interact to constitute the 
following main tools or services [85]: 
• Media Encoding tool – Employed for content protection. It handles all the necessary 
client side cryptographic algorithms to provide persistent protection of the digital 
goods; 
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• Media Player tool – This tool is used to playback OpenIPMP protected content. It 
deals with all the communication aspects with the server side components for license 
acquisition and also enforces usage rights; 
• User Registration service – It is through this service that new users are registered in 
the system. When the registration process is successfully finished, the user is given 
its credentials which uniquely identify him and grant access to system resources; 
• Content Management service – This service supplies registered users with the 
necessary tools to manage their contents. Upon completion of the content 
registration processes, a digital good is under the protection of the system. All 
communications between the OpenIPMP client side components and the Content 
Management Service take place through a safe communication channel; 
• Rights Authorization service – Registered users resort to this service to define all the 
permissions for their registered contents; 
• License Management service – This service handles all license requests from 
registered clients and deliver the respective authorizations; 
• Administration tool – This tool allows an administrator to configure the system 
according to an organization’s specific needs. 
3.3.2.6 AXMEDIS DRM 
The "Automating Production of Cross Media Content for Multi-channel Distribution" 
(AXMEDIS) [120] initiative is a research project, partially supported by the European 
Commission. 
 
Besides other tools, AXMEDIS also delivers a multifaceted and interoperable DRM solution 
for employment with both B2B and B2C scenarios through traditional and P2P distribution 
structures. 
 
This DRM solution focuses on the protection and management of rights for a vast set of 
different types of content, such as single files or complex cross media and multimedia, 
distributed on different channels to different kinds of terminal devices [121].  
 
AXMEDIS DRM employs and extends the MPEG-21 framework in order to enable [121]: 
• the protection of content of various formats and types; 
• the controlling of the exploitation of rights of the above contents, using formal 
metadata licenses expressed in the MPEG-21 REL standard; 
• the collecting and reporting of information about consumption of rights for accounting, 
billing and/or statistical analysis; 
 
The DRM system delivers [121]: 
• tools for content packaging and protection (simple manual tools, GRID technology 
based automated tools, AXMEDIS Content Processing); 
• DRM servers for: 
o controlling the exploitation of rights of protected content; 
o data gathering on the exploitation of rights; 
o interacting with an intellectual property ontology to ease the production and 
verification of licenses. 
• players for protected content rendering on PC, PDA, STB/PVR, and AXMEDIS Java 
based Mobile. AXMEDIS players can be customized and hosted in WEB pages; 
• tools for manual and automated production of licenses. 
 
For integration of AXMEDIS DRM premises into a system, that system’s content usage 
licenses are required to be supplied to the AXMEDIS DRM Servers via a Web Service call. 
Alternatively the system may delegate the license production activities to the AXCP GRID.  
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AXMEDIS content packages (also called AXMEDIS Objects), contain a variety of simple and 
complex media objects (or references to them) containing various forms of metadata and 
dynamic scripts. These may be produced with the employment of AXMEDIS Editor tools for 
MPEG-21 and AXMEDIS authoring (SMIL, HTML, MPEG-4, or any other kinds of digital 
resources), DRM, licensing, protection, packaging, workflow, playing, etc [121]. 
3.4 Summary 
The technical landscape in the field of DRM technology is a very diverse one. Several 
standards have been developed and various implementations have been completed. These 
solutions generally provide robust levels of security and their operation focuses on a 
restrictive governance of content usage.  
 
In spite of their security capabilities, these systems have, nonetheless, been frequently 
broken and circumvented by users [122], and subsequently patched in an iterative cat-and-
mouse game. 
 
Developments, in this technological area, have begun some time ago, still, their reception, 
on the part of consumers, has been very negative, and, consequently, their employment by 
on-line content delivery initiatives has been problematic. 
4 Commercial P2P Distribution Survey 
4.1 Introduction 
In spite of considerable initial hesitation, several initiatives have begun to appear in the field 
of commercial, on-line content distribution, which employ (or have employed) a P2P 
operation mode. In the following sub-sections we expose some of the most relevant such 
initiatives. 
4.2 Veoh 
Veoh [123] was an Internet Television service run by a California based company. This 
service employed P2P technology (among other means), for the diffusion of commercial and 
user generated content. 
 
The Veoh system offered its users two possible options for the consumption of the available 
video content. Viewers could obtain the content directly from the Veoh.com site via 
streaming, or they could use the VeohTV application. This was a P2P based software 
application that enabled the downloading and viewing of content of potentially much bigger 
sizes. Content publishers could use their PC to upload videos for distribution. 
 
In regards to security provision, Veoh distributed both DRM protected and unprotected 
content. That is, it employed a parallel DRM structure, to enable user and peer 
authentication, content integrity and authenticity validation, and access control on some of its 
content. 
 
It searched for years for a successful BM, but ultimately, and under legal pressure from 
Universal Music Group [124], declared bankruptcy in 2010. 
4.3 Babelgum 
Babelgum [125] is a free Internet TV service. Originally it employed a proprietary P2P 
streaming technology, but has eventually dropped it in favour of a client-server operation. 
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The platform employs DRM protective measures which include the encryption of the 
exchanged content data streams, time-limited licenses and PPV [126]. 
 
Babelgum is a privately backed project which focuses on professionally produced content. It 
enforces some content access restrictions based on user geographical location. Its BM is 
advertisement based, employing advertising revenue-sharing. Content owners receive a 
portion of advertising revenues. If no advertisement is associated to the content this system 
guarantees producers a minimum of $5 for each 1000 unique views [127] . 
4.4 JOOST 
Joost is an Internet based system for the distribution of TV content (and other forms of 
video), developed by the founders of Skype and Kazaa. 
 
 
Figure 21 – P2PTV overlay network serving several video streams 
 
It employs a P2P strategy (or did so initially), for the delivery of content, under proprietary 
DRM protection. The P2P technical layer was provided by the Joltid company, which also 
supplied the P2P infrastructure of Skype. Figure 21 presents a simplified image of Joost’s 
P2P content diffusion network. 
 
Content is distributed with the help of the nodes participating in the system, by taking 
advantage of their uplink capability, in a way similar to that of BitTorrent, and over a 
proprietary DRM connection, using a Joost specific encryption scheme.  
 
Joost’s employs an ad-supported BM, in a similar manner to that of regular TV, exposing 
users to both injected video-advertisements as well as additional interactive advertisements 
via overlays and short clickable pop-ups [128]. It was eventually faced with economic 
difficulties and remade itself as a “cost-effective” white-label video provider [129].  
4.5 PPLive 
PPLive [130] is a P2P network for the streaming of video content. It was develop in 
Huazhong University of Science and Technology in People's Republic of China. 
 
The contents delivered by PPLive are generally targeted to Chinese mainland audiences. 
This service enforces no DRM measures and employs an add-supported business model. 
4.6 ReelTime 
ReelTime.com [131] was a video on demand provider that delivered movies and television 
shows over the Internet.  
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Content was delivered through a proprietary software system called Intelligent Rapid 
Delivery System. This employed some P2P networking to reduce the bandwidth demands on 
its servers. To this end, while the most part of the content files are delivered to the users by 
the system’s servers, a fraction of such files are transferred between the system’s terminal 
machines (i.e., peers). The delivered content was DRM protected. 
 
ReelTime employed a subscription and pay-per-view BM. It has subsequently ceased to 
operate. 
4.7 LiveStation 
Livestation [132] is a platform for distributing live television and radio broadcasts, as well as 
on demand video, over the Internet.  
It originally used P2P technology for said distribution, employing Microsoft Research 
technology [133]. The system divided a video stream into multiple stripes, each of which was 
shared independently among peers [134]. 
Livestation’s business model is based on both advertising and fees [135]. 
4.8 Imeem 
The original Imeem system begun as a distributed and peer-to-peer social network [136] for 
the sharing of files, photos and blogging data. 
 
A client application was distributed as the primary platform, and the website was basically 
the means for users to obtain the client. Every client had its own database for the indexing of 
references to media content shared on the network. This contributed to facilitating the 
location of content. Users who wished to consume a specific content would access it through 
a direct exchange with the publishing peer. 
 
Access to content was done on a permission base, and communication in the Imeem 
network was secured by the AES advanced encryption standard [136]. 
Its business model was predominantly ad-supported [137]. 
 
With time the service underwent many changes. Further features were added to the website 
and the client software ceased to be functional. The distributed database model was 
centralized, and all of Imeem's features became available without requiring a client 
download. The P2P architecture was annulled. 
 
Finally, in 2009, after having been bought out by MySpace Music, it was shut down [138]. 
4.9 BBC iPLayer 
iPlayer [139] is a service made available by BBC via Internet access (terminal application 
supported on Windows, Macs and Linux), cable television, iPhone, Nintendo Wii and iPod 
Touch [141], for the delivery of video and audio content. 
 
The system originally employed P2P technology for the distribution of rich media content 
[142], but has since move away from it. When P2P technology was still employed, the 
network’s peers where the iPlayer applications and the actual P2P infrastructure used was 
Kontiki [140]. 
 
For the protection of intellectual property rights, the system originally used Microsoft's 
Windows Media DRM [143] but has since moved to Adobe’s DRM system. This technology 
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allows BBC to have a relatively fine control over the use of distributed content even after it 
has been transferred to the terminal iPlayer applications. 
4.10 Qtrax 
Qtrax [146] supplies a legal P2P music delivery service, built upon the Gnutella network 
[144]. It employs Microsoft’s Janus DRM technology for content protection and access 
control and to enforce advertisement consumption. 
 
It, originally, offered a two tiered service [145]: 
• the first was a free, advertisement-supported tier designed to work with, and filter 
copyrighted content, from existing peer-to-peer networks; 
• the second tier was a premium subscription based service which would require a 
monthly fee.  
 
In time Qtrax has, however, moved to a strictly advertisement based BM. 
 
Large music industry companies, such as EMI [145], have announced deals with Qtrax 
regarding music rights and publishing. 
 
It has also faced legal and financial problems that have forced it to restart its operation, after 
a pause period [147].  
4.11 Sky Anytime 
Sky Anytime [148] is a package of services made available by BSkyB [149] for the delivery 
of video content. 
 
One of the services, in that package, is a PC version of Sky Anytime which employs a 
broadband, Internet based, peer-to-peer structure (the Kontiki infrastructure), for content 
diffusion. 
 
Content may be viewed for a certain number of days, and it is protected by digital rights 
management software provided by Microsoft [151]. 
 
The service is available at no extra cost to Sky subscribers and under a subscription fee for 
non-clients [150]. 
4.12 iMesh 
iMesh [152] is a media content delivery system and an online social network. It employs a, 
Gnutella based, centralized P2P strategy for content distribution. For content protection the 
system uses Microsoft Digital Rights Management technology [154]. 
 
The system allows users to access large amounts of "non-copyrighted" content (video or 
audio) for free and makes copyrighted content available for a monthly fee in the form of 
either an iMesh Premium subscription or an iMesh ToGo (portable music) subscription. 
Users may also permanently purchase tracks [153]. 
4.13 TVUNetworks 
The TVU Networks Corporation [155] operates an Internet based television broadcasting 
network which uses P2P technology. 
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Users download a freeware software application, called TVUPlayer, and may then join the 
P2P community and watch a varied number of channels.  
 
TVU’s solution includes monetization capabilities for content owners such as geo-filtering, 
subscription services and personalized in-stream ad insertion tools [156]. 
4.14 Zattoo 
Zattoo [157] is an Internet based P2PIPTV content distributing system. It employs a 
proprietary peer-to-peer protocol. The terminal application (peer) runs on Mac OS X, Linux 
and Windows [158]. 
 
Zattoo current focuses on European channels. It delivers licensed content [157] under Digital 
Rights Management protection [158]. Zattoo ensures that [159]: 
• Streams are protected by encryption; 
• Streams cannot be copied as no copy of the stream is stored on the network; 
• Streams cannot be retransmitted as sources would not be authenticated. 
 
Zattoo employs an advertising based business model (through the use of banner ads, 
targeted text ads and inserted video clips) [158] as well as paid subscriptions [160]. 
5 Considerations 
This P2P technology survey reveals that the field of P2P content delivery (typically in the 
non-commercial sector), is a very diverse one. 
 
The general evolutive trend, initially, was towards growingly decentralized solutions. In time 
a return as occurred to more centrally coordinated modes of operation, (BitTorrent, 
FastTrack), in order to regain some operational efficiency in terms of content discovery and 
location and overall network connectivity. 
 
In what concerns security, the majority of P2P solutions is very poor. Those including such 
provisions are not really robust. Provisions expressively designed and intended for the 
enforcement of content usage rights and the protection of copyright, are practically 
universally absent. 
 
Commercial, P2P based, media delivering initiatives, generally employ either proprietary 
P2P solutions or pre-existing ones. The technical details of the earlier solutions are typically 
not disclosed. Still, from the few that have been disclosed, it may be concluded that such 
solutions employ some form of partially centralized operation. 
 
The latter solutions are predominantly based on Gnutella. This is a purely distributed P2P 
protocol which is very robust, in terms of fault tolerance, but also considerably inefficient in 
terms of content discovery and distribution. 
 
In the studied initiatives, the P2P delivery mode frequently performs a parallel, or even just, 
auxiliary role to client/server delivery mode. 
 
These initiatives, have generally sought to maintain their business and legal (copyright 
related), operational legacy. This means that they have strived to maintain control over their 
content’s usage throughout its lifecycle, that is, after it has been distributed. To attain such a 
control, (and given the lack of adequate security and copyright protection facilities, 
predominant in P2P content distribution platforms), they have typically teamed the P2P 
distribution systems with content protective DRM technologies. 
II P2P Content Delivery Survey  68 
 
 
 
 
Thus, most commercial P2P content delivery initiatives employ (or, at least, did so originally), 
classical DRM technology. Given the tasks it has had to perform, this technology focuses 
mostly, if not exclusively, in a restrictive governance of content usages.  
 
The internal characteristics, operation and capabilities of the solutions specified by the 
initiatives presented in section 3.3.1 or implemented by the platforms described in section 
3.3.2, may vary somewhat. However, overall, they are very similar in terms of their global 
operational logic and of their impact in content usage and usability, as their design was 
guided by the same requirement: content manipulation restriction throughout its lifecycle.  
 
In P2P terminology, this DRM assistance, in security matters, (to the P2P delivery structure), 
may be described as a form of Trusted Third Party (TTP) solution. There is thus a visible 
decoupling of the content delivery structure from the security structure, where the latter 
performs the mentioned TTP role, and the potential synergies between the TTP structure 
and the P2P content delivery structure are left unexploited. 
 
The typical resulting P2P+DRM structure may be depicted, albeit in a simplified manner, by 
Figure 22, (taking into consideration the notation defined in Table 1).  
 
Its operation is as follows: At an initial moment (not displayed in the diagram), clients will 
authenticate with the TTP components agreeing on a common secret key ( sessionSK ), which 
will be used for a client/TTP interaction session. 
 
From that point on, all communication between a client and any TTP component will be 
encrypted with the agreed upon secret key (as represented by )(secmsg xsession
SK
). When the 
session terminates, the key is discarded. 
 
Before a user (e.g. Au ) can be attended/hosted by a specific client/peer (e.g. Ac ), he must 
first be authenticated. To do so, the user supplies his username and password, 
and Ac packages it into AuahsdAuthDat , by performing some hash function on that information 
(the case of employment of digest access authentication). The latter information package is 
sent (arrow 1) to the User Authentication Server (UAuthS). After validating the user’s 
credentials, UAuthS sends Ac  (arrow 2), a user hosting certificate ( uhcS ), signed with 
UAuthS private key ( 1−UASK ). uhcS proves that Ac  is hosting Au . If a user (e.g. Au ) wishes to 
consume some media object (e.g. Ao ), Ac  may retrieve it from the Content Server 
(client/server operation, arrow 3), or from another client/peer, such as Bc  (P2P operation, 
arrow 3a). The content is obtained in its protected form, (
Ao
P ), which is encrypted with a 
secret symmetric key AoSK  . 
The client than contacts the License Server (LS), to inquire it about au ’s usage rights over Ao , 
by sending it (arrow 5), uhcS , (proving that Ac  is indeed hosting Au ), and the identification of 
the media object in question. The LS then responds (arrow 6), with the signed license ( Ao
Au
SL ) 
that specifies Au ’s rights over Ao  (assuming Au  previously purchased such a license). Ao AuSL  is 
signed by the LS so that its validity may be checked. Ac  then sends A
o
Au
SL  (arrow 7) to the 
Key Server (KS). KS assesses the validity of Ao
Au
SL  and the rights that it grants to Au . If all is 
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ok, it returns (arrow 8), Ao ’s decryption key ( AoSK ). Ac  is then ready to access and render Ao  for 
Au ’s consumption. 
Table 1 – Notation for Figure 22 
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Figure 22 – Typical Commercial P2P Content Delivery System Architecture 
 
In spite of their complexity and sophistication, the security services provided by the TTPs, 
have frequently been broken and circumvented by users [122], as this is incentivized by the 
uncomfortable content usage conditions that result from the operation of such security 
measures. 
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A currently observable trend, in the context of Commercial, P2P based, media delivering 
initiatives, is the abandonment of the DRM aspects of the platform, in favour of unprotected 
content. Also, the very P2P mode of distribution is also frequently being dropped in favour of 
a more traditional, (and less efficient), client/server mode. 
 
In economic terms, the initiatives in scope have been trying a variety of BMs, such as 
subscription, purchase or advertisement based ones. They have frequently jumped between 
several BMs in their search for a suitable one and also frequently failed altogether. There is 
thus no globally predominant BM in this area and the attained economical results are also 
unremarkable. 
 
For all of the above it is apparent that commercial employment of P2P content distribution, 
has been, and continues to be, considerably less successful that its non-commercial 
counterpart, at least in terms of its widespread employment.  
 
The development of the earlier sector has been slow and hesitant. User captivation has 
been unremarkable, DRM provisions have frequently failed and P2P content delivery, in 
spite of its promises, has not yet been made to deliver on them. 
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III Present Scenario Analysis 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter we examine the employment of the Internet for commercial content 
distribution, focusing on its present situation. That situation is examined so that its key 
problems and shortcomings are identified and a path to deal with such issues is delineated. 
Section 2 thus carries a broad depiction of the present state of commercial on-line content 
delivery. Section 3 deepens the earlier description, analyses the described situation and 
identifies its subjacent causes. Section 4 further explores the causes of the problems 
currently facing commercial on-line content distribution, and defines the means by which 
they may be overcome. 
 
2 Overview 
The P2P content distribution technologies that have been developed have achieved 
significant success in the field of free content sharing. They include sufficient tools to enable 
a “good enough” content discovery and distribution capability. We describe them as “good 
enough” because it is satisfactory within a free content sharing context. However for 
commercial purposes, they can still benefit from performance improvements. This is so 
because, (as explained in section 2.4 of chapter II), the current typical P2P solutions are 
more or less distributed and typically have no provisions with anything close to a global 
systemic view. Lacking that oversight capability, the currently predominant P2P systems can 
provide for content discovery, locating and retrieval only through more or less distributed 
algorithms which are only of relative efficiency and consistency of results. 
 
Furthermore, even if P2P content delivery systems/technologies include provisions to enable 
a minimally robust validation of content integrity (through checksum or signature calculation), 
they nonetheless present considerable shortcomings in the field of security and trust 
assurance, for even basic aspects, such as robust content integrity and authenticity 
assurance and data and communication confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiability. 
 
On the other hand, the security-wise insufficiencies of the predominant P2P technologies 
can be effectively counterbalanced by the security-wise capabilities of existing DRM 
systems, if they are directed to that task. 
 
The existing DRM technologies include robust tools to enable the, earlier mentioned, basic 
security measures. However, what has typically been demanded, from these systems, goes 
well beyond such requirements. They are asked to deliver, to content owners, almost 
complete control, over their content’s usage, throughout its lifecycle, regardless of said 
content’s location. Even so, DRM systems have managed to partially provide that, at the 
cost of imposing stifling content usage restrictions on consumers. 
 
That provision was only partial, because, fuelled by consumer dissatisfaction, DRM schemes 
have been frequently broken or circumvented. After such events, they are then patched but 
only to be circumvented and re-patched at a later time, and so on [161], [162], [163].  
 
Some shortcomings are thus visible, both in the current P2P content delivery and DRM 
technologies. Nonetheless, they are really not fundamentally hindering ones, especially 
considering the joint employment of the two technologies.  
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However, in spite of the proven results of the technologies in scope, and the success of non-
commercial P2P content distribution platforms, the results of, commercial on-line content 
distribution initiatives (specifically P2P), have been dismal. This is demonstrated by the 
frequent cases of economical failure (e.g. Veoh or ReelTime), of change of activity area (e.g. 
Joost), and of the abandonment of P2P content exchange for a more traditional client/server 
one (e.g. BBC iPlayer). 
3 Analysis 
The current panorama in the field of P2P on-line content distribution from a business 
viewpoint (see section 5 of chapter II), is one of failure and of technological retreat (e.g. from 
P2P). However, this state of things does not fundamentally result from the technical 
insufficiencies of the involved technologies. It is the fruit of an historical process of technical 
evolution, which is changing the way we deal with information goods, as well as of the 
reaction to that evolution (on the part of the established CDists). In the next paragraphs we 
explain the mentioned process and associated reaction. 
 
In the “Brick-and-Mortar” era, CDists controlled the content distribution structure (stores, 
CDs and DVDs production, etc). This structure was both socially useful and inescapable for 
consumer access to Information Goods (IGs). It was the scarcity and controllability, inherent 
to the materiality of the distribution structure that secured a useful and profitable role for 
CDists. 
 
The Internet, given the automaticity and immateriality associated to it, is by far a more cost 
effective alternative, which eliminated the need for such a material structure. In this context, 
P2P content distribution technologies have played a crucial role, as they further reduce the 
costs of on-line content replication and distribution. Their employment and massive 
popularization, which started in the non-commercial sector, have thus experienced an 
explosive growth. 
 
The main concern driving the development of (non-commercial) Internet-based content 
distribution initiatives was to take maximum advantage of the costs reduction possibilities 
offered by this medium. They thus focused on building distributed structures (typically P2P), 
capable of enabling a “good-enough” content discovery and an efficient content exchange 
between peripheral equipment. Guarantying content authenticity, copyright protection, or 
other security related aspects, was never the goal. These systems have thus often been 
connected to copyright infringing activities (copyright owners allege). 
 
According to the Recording Industry Association of America, the music industry loses about 
$12.5 billion per year from all types of piracy activities [164]. The accuracy of these numbers 
is disputed [165], but it’s still plausible that considerable revenue losses have occurred as a 
result of the rapid increase in the free exchange of copyrighted content over the Internet. 
 
Therefore, as the materiality of media content distribution is eroded, so is the control 
producers used to have over content use. All this is rendering the CDists’ traditional role, 
obsolete. 
 
CDists have thus reacted by endorsing measures along two main courses of action. The first 
was legislative and punitive action against alleged copyright infringers. The second was the 
employment of technological measures, known as Digital Rights Management (DRM), to 
secure the control of the usage of their content throughout its lifecycle [166].  
Simply put, the industry’s response has been to resist or attempt to reverse the on-going 
social and technological development with respect to the free flow of information. 
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In the legal sphere, CDists’ efforts have led to the enactment of tighter intellectual property 
protection laws in some countries (for example, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in the 
US). Furthermore, their frequent legal actions against alleged copyright infringers led to the 
closure of some content sharing initiatives (e.g. shutting down of P2P content sharing 
system Napster).  
 
In the technical sphere, the content production and distribution industry has pushed hard for 
the adoption of DRM technologies, for the protection of all their content, regardless of the 
distribution medium. Furthermore CDists have also (allegedly), hired the services of some 
companies to mount poisoning attacks on P2P networks [125]. 
 
Nevertheless, CDists, even if reluctantly, have also begun to adopt on-line content 
distribution and to employ P2P technology. However, even though they are apparently 
moving in a progressive way, CDists are still trying to preserve their age-old reliable BMs. 
These initiatives have predominantly employed BMs which are based on (or close to) the 
direct sale of media goods (e.g. iTunes Store, 7digital, eMusic, Google Play, etc), and thus, 
depend on the restriction of access to such goods [167]. CDists are thus employing, 
apparently, technically progressive means but with regressive objectives. 
 
The same applies to P2P commercial media initiatives that have started to appear, even 
though in an initial phase, alternative BMs were experimented with. Furthermore, given that 
P2P distribution was regarded as no more than an auxiliary aspect of their operation, these 
initiatives made no relevant efforts to enhance existing P2P structures. Already existing P2P 
structures (e.g. Gnutella), were, thus, simply used as they were. This typically meant that 
such structures were outside of CDists’ control and presented unreliable performance.  
 
In light of the above it can be concluded that CDists are holding on to BMs based on the 
exploitation of content scarcity in a medium, (the Internet), which is adverse to the 
preservation of such scarcity. To secure such BMs, DRM technologies are employed in an 
attempt to artificially maintain the necessary IGs scarcity. 
 
The industry’s overall conservative response has produced little or no results. In the legal 
field, the obtained results have failed to deter content sharing [5] [168], and have created 
considerable dissatisfaction from the consumer and small-creator/producer communities, 
causing costly damages to the industry’s public perception [167].  
 
In the technical field, end-user circumvention and rejection of DRM, has been a near 
constant, with digital piracy only increasing, despite the prevalence of new and increasingly 
elaborate DRM strategies [169].  
 
The failure of DRM, to fulfil all that was demanded of it, is the result of the unrealistic level of 
that demand, and of an intrinsic vulnerability of DRM, which consists of the fact that users 
(the principal DRM violators), must inevitably be given access to the very content-encoding 
keys, whose secrecy is at the core of the operation of these systems. 
 
As a result, all mainstream DRM systems (such as Apple’s FairPlay, Microsoft’s Windows 
Media DRM, and so forth) have been circumvented [161], [163]. In addition, DRM imposes 
usage restrictions that devalue the content and push consumers away. Finally, DRM isolates 
users because, in spite of much propagated interoperability, DRM systems typically lack 
interoperability [170], which means users are confined to the vendor’s software and/or 
hardware. 
 
DRM’s failure means that the producers must still bear the fixed costs of information 
production, but their monetization schemes are losing efficiency. Their privileged foundation 
is thus, rapidly eroding and, the countermeasures employed by the producers have 
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backfired, earning them widespread animosity from the very people they are trying to win 
over as customers.  
 
Also, these countermeasures have spurred the development of even more decentralized 
content-sharing systems (such as Gnutella), which are more resilient to legal and technical 
counteraction. In Michael Porter’s terminology [171], these measures have merely built 
barriers to the entry of new legal competitors.  
 
In this context, the overall results of on-line commercial content distribution (specifically 
P2P), have been unremarkable. In spite of the success of non-commercial P2P content 
distribution initiatives, the corresponding commercial counterparts have fared quite poorly, 
as shown by the frequent cases of economical failure (e.g. Veoh or ReelTime). Furthermore, 
the inevitable loss of control over content, that P2P content delivery implies, is in 
contradiction with the control levels required by the chosen BMs (by CDists). This is the 
reason why P2P content exchange has frequently been abandoned, in the initiatives 
exposed in section 4 of chapter II (e.g. Joost or Babelgum). 
 
From a global perspective, commercial on-line content distribution (P2P or otherwise) is 
lagging far behind its once promised performance in terms of impact and adoption. 
Furthermore, under the pressure of the ”free” content distribution, commercial distribution 
has frequently abandoned DRM altogether, in favour of unprotected content so as to offer a 
product which is not hampered by a lack of usability (which inevitably comes with DRM) in its 
competition with “pirate” or “free” content [172] [173]. 
 
The approach adopted by CDists has thus failed. Their control over information commodities 
continues to rapidly decrease and this is debasing the business methods that they still cling 
on to. In spite of all the potential of on-line content delivery (especially P2P based one), they 
have, thus far, failed to make it live up to its full potential, and the resulting panorama is, as 
described at the beginning of this section, one of failure and technological retreat. 
 
Said failure fundamentally results, not from the above mentioned relative technical 
insufficiencies of P2P and DRM tools, but instead, as argued in [166], from the non-
observation, on the part of CDists, that the Internet medium has come to radically alter the 
technical, economic and social premises underlining IGs production, distribution and 
consumption.  
 
The low or negligible storage, reproduction and distribution costs that characterize this new 
medium mean that the occurrence of such activities, in mass, is inevitable. Content scarcity 
is, consequently, not a characteristic of the Internet. These factors and the failures of DRM 
show that such scarcity cannot be artificially imposed either. This medium’s establishment, 
thus, represents the rise of a new technical and economical paradigm in the field of 
information goods’ exchange and manipulation [166]. 
 
In such a paradigm information good scarcity is progressively annulled as they become 
pervasively accessible and manipulable. The access to and distribution of these goods is, 
thus, not something that may be restrained, and therefore, their monetization can no longer 
be approached in the same way of physically bound information commodities. 
 
The immature state of development of commercial on-line content distribution, especially in 
the case of P2P employment, has thus resulted from CDists’ anachronic attitude towards the 
on-going changes and towards the employment of this technology.  
 
The reacquisition of a useful social role, by CDists and, consequently, the maturing of 
commercial on-line P2P content distribution, require that these entities accept and embrace 
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the changes brought by the Internet revolution. They must, thus, accept that, in the Internet 
medium, content scarcity is mostly a thing of the past. 
4 Conclusion 
Accepting the earlier conclusion, CDists must, therefore, replace the hitherto reliable value 
chain in which information commodities have been traded (on an access restrictive basis), 
with the employment of radical new BMs. These must not depend on content scarcity. They 
must enable CDists to relinquish having absolute control over their information goods and to 
make the most of the Internet’s cost reduction capabilities. 
 
For progress to occur, in the field of commercial P2P content delivery, it is thus, primarily, 
necessary that the mentioned new BMs are identified and validated. P2P content delivery 
technologies and associated DRM tools must then be made to support such BMs, by 
equipping them with any necessary capabilities. 
 
The BMs, to be employed by commercial P2P content delivery initiatives, should typically be 
based on open content access. The extraction of gains should be performed in a lateral 
manner [166], which is more dependent on user voluntarism. This dependence means that 
the captivation and satisfaction of users will become even more important aspects then 
before. 
 
To achieve such attractiveness and fidelization of users, the actual content exchange and 
consumption activities, in novel commercial P2P content delivery initiatives, should be 
inscribed in a virtual environment of socialization, which enables users to interact with each 
other and the media objects in secure, comfortable and reliable ways (i.e. social networks). 
 
This demands that the platforms supporting these initiatives provide a content access 
service which is regular, consistent and reliable. They must thus assure content discovery, 
location and retrieval services, at a quality level equal or superior to that of centralized 
platforms (e.g. Google, in what regards content discovery and location). Furthermore, they 
must also assure peer and user identity, and data transaction security in order to guaranty 
communicational privacy and authenticity, and to assure monetary resource security. They 
must also assure media object integrity and authenticity. 
 
As exposed throughout section 2 of chapter II (and summarized in section 2.4 of the same 
chapter), the predominant P2P networks and technologies present a number of 
insufficiencies, which meant that they are not yet at the operational reliability and security 
levels which are necessary to support the BMs in scope. 
 
Current DRM technologies are powerful and may efficiently support a number of basic and 
sound security capabilities. However they are typically focussed on much more complex and 
encompassing objectives than the enforcement of the mentioned capabilities. 
 
In light of the requirements that the platforms, supporting the initiatives in scope, must fulfil, it 
becomes evident that the state of the art in the involved technologies needs to be advanced. 
P2P content distribution systems/technologies must be equipped with the necessary tools for 
them to reach a higher level of overall operational constancy and reliability. These systems 
must also be given the capacity to assure peer and user identification, inter-peer 
communicational security, integrity and authenticity and to guaranty the integrity and 
authenticity of the distributed media objects. 
 
The latter capabilities are within the responsibility scope of a DRM system. This means that 
such tools (DRM tools), should be added to P2P content distribution platforms. However, 
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DRM tools should have a different focus than their current “incarnation”. They should move 
from a situation where their key purpose is to enforce content access restriction, to a new 
one where rights management is interpreted in a more flexible way, and where their main 
goal is to ensure that security, reliability and trust pervade throughout the content exchange 
and consumption environment. 
 
Summarizing: we may conclude that the specific problem that needs to be addressed to 
enable successful commercial, P2P based, content distribution, and hence, a safe 
distribution of rich media content, is to combine and appropriately adapt the different 
components that make up such systems, not just the technologies used.  
 
The first component to be addressed are the BMs employed by commercial P2P content 
distributors, given the general inadequacy of the presently predominant ones. For that we 
must precisely assess the limitations of current BMs and identify the adequate BMs to 
overcome such limitations in a context of on-line content delivery. This is done in chapter IV. 
 
Once this first component is solved, the second aspect that needs to be addressed consists 
of the operational and security shortcomings of present P2P technologies and of the current 
focus of DRM technologies. To address the earlier, a reliable and secure P2P infrastructure 
must be defined. The latter can be addressed through novel DRM/security tools that focus 
on providing support for security within the P2P infrastructure, whilst further assisting the 
previously identified business models, unlike the traditional tools, which focus on content 
access restrictions. This second aspect is addressed in chapter V. 
 
Furthermore, the development of richer, semantically empowered and security supportive 
media object formats will also contribute to advancing the operational and security related 
capabilities of P2P technologies, at the same time providing additional value to the identified 
BMs. Addressing this aspect is, thus, also relevant. 
Given the complementary nature of this later component, the manner in which it was 
addressed will not be exposed, in this dissertation, with the same level of detail as that of 
other components. The solutions devised in its scope will be laterally approached, as a part 
of the solutions devised to address the operational and security shortcomings of present 
P2P technologies, in chapter V. However, the contributions to the advancement of the state-
of-the-art, which were achieved within this context
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IV Adequate BMs for the New 
Paradigm 
1 Introduction 
The Internet revolution and the exponential progress of the associated digital technologies, 
is causing a paradigm shift in the way we manipulate exchange and consume 
information/media content. These changes are now profound and deeply rooted in our 
Internet usage habits and expectations. 
 
Reversing the occurred developments would require the enforcing of draconian legal and 
technical measures, which would, profoundly, impoverish the way we access and exchange 
information over the Internet. Furthermore, the development of social practices based on the 
free flow of information, that is currently happening, is a continuation of a longstanding trend 
that is shifting the socioeconomic support, for this field of human activity (intellectual goods 
production and exchange), from voluntary upstream support (patronage) to voluntary 
downstream support (user voluntary contribution). 
 
To succeed, information goods producers and distributors should not fight these changes but 
instead embrace them by altering their operational paradigm. CDists need to realise that the 
controlling gatekeeper role that they occupied, for a very long time, was only a temporary 
one. It served its “purpose” of enabling the transitioning, of this field of activity, from the 
preindustrial patronage era to the information-industry era, and is now, considerably 
exhausted. 
 
The role of the CDists, in the ensuing era, should be to maximize content distribution and 
access, to support captivating virtual social spaces, to promote artist and consumer bonding, 
and to foster voluntary consumer contribution to the sustainment of media content 
production. 
 
In chapter III we exposed that the lack of adequacy of the BMs traditionally employed for on-
line content distribution (P2P), stems precisely, from the fact that they generally go against 
the on-going changes. More specifically, traditional BMs depend on the maintenance of 
content scarcity in an environment (the Internet), which virtually eliminates such scarcity. 
 
The new BMs, for on-line operation should not depend on the maintenance of content 
scarcity. As argued in [166], the scarce resource to be exploited, is no longer the information 
commodity but the user’s attention and fidelity. The earlier should be regarded as an 
investment that is made in order to obtain the latter. BMs should thus be based on open 
content access, enabling the free retrieval and consumption of information products by the 
user community, while exploiting the Internet’s capacity to eliminate costs in reproduction 
and distribution.  
 
The actual extraction of gains should be performed in a lateral manner [166], predominantly, 
through the harnessing of user attention and good will. Accordingly, the BMs in scope, 
should seek to ensure that content manipulating activities take place, primarily in a CDist-
managed virtual space of social interaction, where a culture of proximity and 
interdependency, (already on the rise), between consumers, artists and CDists can be 
fostered. This culture will then enable and sustain a collection of revenues based on 
voluntary funding and voluntary/accepted advertisement viewing by users. 
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BMs of this type, will, release CDists’ technical infrastructures from the excess of content 
access control tasks that presently overburden them. These structures will thus be able to 
operate in much freer and more innovative ways, enabling commercial P2P content delivery 
initiatives to succeed and achieve the reliability that has, thus far, eluded them – content 
delivery reliability, content governing reliability and economical reliability. 
2 Business Models 
In light of what we have exposed previously, we have identified and defined the following 
BMs that are specifically suitable to support commercial, on-line. P2P based, content 
distribution, can be mainly identified as the following: 
 
• user donation – in a donation-based business model, information/media items are 
voluntarily, and freely, delivered by artists, typically, expecting to be monetarily 
rewarded. Consumers will freely access such items and reward the creators they 
deem meritorious. In this context, CDists may obtain their revenue by taxing such 
donation transactions. Some real world examples where content production, and 
distribution, was/is supported by this BM (or a similar one), are, for instance, The 
Real News Network, Radiohead’s and Nine Inch Nails’ experiments with voluntary 
user donations or Wikipedia; 
 
• ransom – in a ransom-based BM, the content producer (or the CDist on the 
producer’s behalf), conditions the release of a specific content item to the prior 
reception of a specific amount of donations. Once that amount is reached, the 
content becomes available for all users, free of charge. In this context, again, CDists 
may obtain their revenue by taxing the donations; 
 
• advertisement – in an advertisement-based business model, information/media items 
are voluntarily delivered by content producers. Users freely consume them, together 
with some advertisement messages. In this manner they supply their attention 
(advertisement viewing) in exchange for content access. That attention is sold to the 
advertisers for money, which is then employed to reward the content producers. In 
this context CDists typically obtain their revenue by retaining a portion of the amounts 
paid by the advertisers. This BM may take two different forms: 
o mandatory unrewarded advertisement viewing – in this mode the user is 
made to watch some commercial message before being given access to the 
desired content. The advertiser’s payment is invisible to the user; 
o voluntary rewarded advertisement viewing – in this mode the user voluntarily 
proceeds to the consumption of advertisement messages. The value paid by 
the advertiser is shared between the CDist (which operates the user, 
advertiser and media interaction space), and the user.  
 
These three BMs ultimately enable the free access to content and thus, do not depend on 
the existence or enforcement of content scarcity. This places fewer constraints on the 
management of content and enables a fuller exploitation of the Internet’s cost reduction 
potentials. Those BMs are therefore appropriate for sustaining on-line content delivery 
initiatives. 
 
These BMs do not represent a final and only choice for the Internet-era. They are the basic 
models. Others may, hypothetically, be developed, which are also inline with the guidelines 
of section 1 of the present chapter.  
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3 Validation 
The validation of the proposed BMs is, first and foremost, a logical validation, based on the 
analysis of the technical characteristics of the Internet, (in the context of content distribution), 
and on the economic consequences of such characteristics. That logical backing was 
expressed in chapter III and approached again in section 1 of the present chapter. 
 
To complement this validation an inquiry was performed to assess user receptivity to open 
media delivery and to the BMs described earlier. It was performed on a general population of 
users consisting of 88% content consumers and 12% content producers. The contents of the 
inquiry and the obtained results are presented in Annex C. 
 
The inquiry was composed of four query groups. Such query groups had the following 
intents: 
• Query group 1: evaluate user acceptance of the correctness of rewarding content 
producers and CDists; and assess user awareness of the fact that if such rewarding 
does not take place the content will cease to be produced; 
 
• Query group 2: evaluate user receptivity to a total dematerialization of content 
distribution (i.e. distribution performed completely on-line); 
 
• Query group 3: assess user general  receptivity/preference relatively to content 
accessing modes supported though a lateral extraction of gains in opposition to those 
which imply a direct and mandatory payment for content access; 
 
• Query group 4: evaluate user receptivity to three specific open content accessing 
modes based on lateral gain extraction. Such modes are: voluntary donation 
supported mode; advertisement viewing supported mode; and ransom supported 
mode. 
 
From the obtained results the following facts, regarding user preferences and attitudes, may 
be concluded to be effective: 
• the responses to query group 1 enable us to conclude that: 
o media users clearly acknowledge the justness of rewarding content producers 
and CDists; 
o media users recognize the need for such a reward, so that content continues 
to be produced, and acknowledge the unfairness of the lack of such a reward; 
 
• the responses to query group 2 enable us to conclude that: 
o media users consider that on-line content delivery is more convenient, to 
them, than the traditional, physical distribution; 
o media users tend to accept that media goods be distributed, predominantly, 
on-line; 
 
• the responses to query group 3 enable us to conclude that: 
o media users predominantly prefer models, of media content access on-line, 
which are based on indirect and/or voluntary payment over those which are 
based on direct payment for content access. This is so even if considering 
that they are to spend the same amount; 
 
• the responses to query group 4 enable us to conclude that: 
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o media users are receptive to an open content access mode which is 
supported through a donation based BM, however most of them have not yet 
made any on-line donation; 
o media users predominantly believe that a donation based BM, where they 
decide to whom donate, enables a fairer rewarding of content producers; 
o media users are very receptive to an open content access mode supported 
through an advertisement based BM, especially so, in the modality where 
they are rewarded for consuming advertisement messages and may then 
employ such resources to reward content producers of their preference; 
o users are also somewhat receptive to a ransom base BM, but to a smaller 
degree than previous models; 
 
The verified facts regarding general user attitude and their receptivity to the content access 
modes, and associated BM, that we propose, mean that there is a clear conscience, on the 
part of users of the need and justness of rewarding content producers/distributors. Users 
reveal great receptivity for an open content access mode and show a clear willingness to 
cooperate in the economical supporting of content production/distribution by way of voluntary 
donations. 
 
Media users are also very receptive to advertisement viewing and show some receptivity 
towards the payment of “ransoms” for content access. 
 
These results give additional credibility to the BMs we have proposed. 
Further backing of our views is provided by the acknowledgement of their value by scientific 
peers. This was attained by means of paper publications in scientific venues. This subject, 
however, is more extensively approached in sections 2 and 5 of chapter VI were we focus on 
exposing the effective novel contributions made by this PhD work. 
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V A Reliable P2P Architecture 
for the New Paradigm 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter we describe a P2P content delivery architecture which is tailored to reliably 
support the BMs identified in chapter IV, which are fully inline with the emerging paradigm in 
media replication and distribution. To provide that support this architecture must address the 
requirements identified in section 2.1 of the present chapter.  
The resulting architecture provides the BMs in scope with capabilities that the present state 
of the art in P2P technologies fails to do, in the fields of operational reliability and security 
assurance. 
 
For ease of referencing, this architecture will be regarded as a system that shall be named 
P2PTube. 
 
In the following sections, the precise requirements placed on P2PTube are identified, as well 
as the overall technical implications of supporting such requirements (section 2). 
Subsequently, the structure (section 3), data structure (section 4), and operation (section 5), 
of P2PTube are explained, as well as its inter-system cooperation capabilities (section 6). 
We then present the structure and content of the most relevant data objects, employed in 
P2PTube (section 7). Finally we explain how the system’s base operational capabilities may 
be employed to support its commercial exploitation in accordance with the BMs identified in 
chapter IV  (section 8).  
2 Requirements and Implications 
2.1 Requirements 
2.1.1 Introduction 
The ultimate requirement placed on the P2PTube architecture is that it be able to provide the 
necessary tools to support the deployment of the BMs identified in chapter IV. It must 
therefore enable an efficient and open P2P content distribution and securely support a 
lateral extraction of gains. 
The system’s global operation should be integrated and seamless so that a fluid and rich 
inter-user and user-media interaction is possible, in order for a dynamic, robust and reliable 
interaction environment to be maintained, which facilitates social interaction and the offering 
of rewards. 
 
These overall requirements, in their turn, imply a set of base technical requirements such as 
a safe and optimal operation. The next sections explore the requirements in scope, in 
greater detail. 
2.1.2 Overall Requirements 
2.1.2.1 Business Requirements 
The system operating (a CDist) entity and the content producers (if they so desire), should 
be rewarded for their work. The latter should be rewarded by means of user donations and 
V A Reliable P2P Architecture for the New Paradigm 82 
 
 
 
the earlier, by taxing such donations. In said donations, consumer users reward, producer 
users, with monetary amounts which the earlier injected into the system, or which they 
acquired by selling their attention (advertisement viewing). 
 
The system must, thus, deliver the necessary provisions to enable the sale of consumer user 
attention and its purchase by advertiser users. It must also be the mediator of all rewarding 
transactions and tax such transactions. 
Furthermore, the system must be capable of performing the monitoring of content usage 
activities, on the part of consumers, both on and off line, at the “client” side, so that value 
may be extracted from that information.  
2.1.2.2 Rights Protection Requirements 
The system should protect the authorship rights of content creators. It should assure the 
ineludible binding between each specific media item and the identity of its owner.  
 
Any kind of rights usurpation or infraction should be impeded. No user may be able to claim 
ownership or collect rewards for an item which is not truly his. Abusive actions over contents, 
such as unauthorized changes or removals (by the original author), insertions or diffusions of 
corrupted versions or unauthorized copies (of items already in the system), should also be 
prevented or undone by the system. 
2.1.2.3 Usage Requirements 
2.1.2.3.1 Usage Roles 
The system participating agents (users) should be able to access the system, in a secure 
and authenticated fashion, from any of the system’s peers, employing the same identity 
which must be globally recognized.  
 
Said agents should have clear usage roles (or user roles), attributed to them so that their 
specific rights and duties and respected and upheld, in what regards interaction with both 
content and other users. Given that both professional and amateur content is desired, user 
roles should be accordingly defined.  
 
Simple, or consumer, users are those who are mostly involved in the consumption of content 
and in the delivery of amateur information objects, for which they expect no reward. 
Producing users, are those that supply the system with professional content for which they 
generally expect an economic reward. 
 
One other type of actor in this system is the advertiser or sponsor. These actors insert into 
the system, information objects with advertisement contents. Advertisers pay the system’s 
operating entity for the exposure of users to their advertisements. It is up to the system to 
perform the exposition of individual users to advertisement messages. 
2.1.2.3.2 Content Usage 
Once adequately authenticated, system users should be allowed to search for, consume, 
insert, remove, comment or version information items in accordance with their specific 
access privileges (e.g. a specific user cannot remove an information item which is not his). 
 
The searching of content should be simple, expeditious and actualized. The system should 
enable the user to perform searches over the totality of the system’s content. 
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2.1.2.3.3 Monetary Resource Usage 
The system must provide the necessary technical and financial provisions to enable users to 
securely inject (into the system), donate and retrieve (from the system), monetary resources. 
It must thus securely maintain user accounts, where the users’ monetary resources are 
stored. And enable users to seamlessly and securely access those resources. 
2.1.3 Base Requirements 
2.1.3.1 Operational Requirements 
The system should guaranty an efficient and smooth global operation in face of a transient, 
and sometimes sabotaging, peer population. It should assure such aspects as: 
 
• overall scalability – the system should remain efficient and governable in the face of 
a growing amount of available content, of a growing number of participating users 
and of a growing number of linked peers; 
• reliable content availability – every and any media item, stored in the system, should 
be, at all times, available for retrieval, by the peers; 
• efficient and universal content discovery – content searches should be performed 
expeditiously and over the entire content repository; 
• efficient content location – the placement of media items over the peer tissue should 
be robustly know or efficiently discovered whenever necessary;   
• optimal content distribution – content should be diffused throughout the system’s 
tissue in an optimal manner, minimizing the overall data transmission expenditure, 
distributing the workload homogeneously throughout the system and pre-emptively 
delivering content to areas where it is predicted to be desired; 
• efficient content retrieval – content should be exchanged, between peers, in an 
efficient manner, so that its retrieval is expeditious and does not overburden any 
system peer; 
• reliable content management – content insertion, removal, updating and versioning 
should be supported; 
• credible enforcing of cooperative behaviour of peers – the system’s peers should be 
compelled to maintain a cooperative and honest behaviour. Inadequate such 
behaviour should be detected and adequate measures taken to deal with it; 
2.1.3.2 Security Requirements 
2.1.3.2.1 Secure Identification 
All system peers, users and media items should have a unique, global, verifiable and non-
falsifiable identifier.  
 
This identity should be employed: 
• in the case of peers: 
o to identify the peer in every interaction it participates in, with other peers, so 
that peers are accountable for their actions, the permissions of each 
individual peer may be respected and so the fulfilment of their incumbents is 
verified; 
• in the case of users: 
o to identify the user in every interaction it participates in, with the system, its 
content or other users, so that users are accountable for their actions, the 
rights of each individual user may be respected and so the fulfilment of their 
obligations verified; 
• in the case of media items: 
V A Reliable P2P Architecture for the New Paradigm 84 
 
 
 
o to unequivocally identify the media item so that it may be universally 
referenced, and so that it is manipulated in accordance with its specific rights 
context; 
 
The system is thus responsible for guarantying that the above mentioned identities are not 
misused, and for enabling their global accessibility and verifiability.  
2.1.3.2.2 Secure Communication 
The system must operate in manner which guarantees that all data exchanges between 
peers are confidential. It should preserve the integrity of said data, guaranty its undeniability 
and enable the validation of its authenticity. 
2.1.3.2.3 Secure Content 
The system must guaranty the integrity of all media items exchanged though its tissue. It 
must enable the validation of said items’ authenticity and guarantee the undeniability of their 
authorship. 
2.2 Architectural Implications 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The satisfaction of the requirements, outlaid in section 2.1, has a number of specific, basic, 
technical implications on P2PTube’s architecture, which are translatable into a set of 
architectural options. These are exposed in the next sub-sections. 
2.2.2 Overall Implications 
The design of the overall architecture of P2PTube is primarily conditioned by the security 
requirements of the BMs to be supported, as the satisfaction of such needs is fundamental 
to guaranty the feasibility and sustainability of said BMs. The satisfaction of the operational 
requirements is conditioned to the satisfaction of the earlier. 
 
For this reason at the base of the P2PTube architecture, providing the necessary security 
and trust, should be a PKI-like infrastructure, as these are robust means of guarantying 
security in distributed informatic systems. 
 
Different types of PKIs (in a broad sense), exist. Such types and their most relevant 
characteristics are the following [58]: 
 
• Centralized PKI – this is formed by a confederation of trusted entities, (called 
certification authorities, or CAs). These structures typically exist independently from 
other systems and merely provide security services to them. It is a tried and tested 
robust solution; 
 
• Decentralized PKI – the PKI is maintained by the actual entities which need its 
services (the clients themselves). No central entities (CAs) are employed. This 
approach may be divided into the following three main sub types: 
 
o Web of trust based – in this scheme, every system node (peer) trusts (under 
the operating user’s instructions), a specific set of other nodes, whose public 
keys it knows. Furthermore, every node relies on its trusted peers to certify 
the public key of yet other peers, and so on. Thus a web of trust is formed, 
where each peer may confidently discover the public key of another peer by 
finding a path, to it, in the peer acquaintance (trust) graph. This scheme 
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implicitly exploits the small world phenomenon of social acquaintance. Within 
that “small world” context it eliminates the need for central authorities. 
However, every trust chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and such 
links are typically subjective and transitive. Hence, this scheme, especially for 
large networks, is not without reliability issues; 
 
o Statistical (quorum) based – in this scheme every peer’s public key 
information is stored at multiple random other peers. This information is 
retrieved by obtaining a subset of these replicas from a subset of the peers. If 
a sufficient number of the peers behaves honestly it will be possible to 
securely obtain the public key. This scheme is thus dependent on the 
predominance of honest peers and implies an operational overhead in 
injecting, storing and retrieving the public key information; 
 
o Hybrid – in a hybrid scheme, public key information replicas are stored and 
obtained from many peers. To validate the retrieved information, each replica 
is weighted against the trust the retrieving peer places on the replica 
supplying peer, and the global trust on the received information is calculated. 
This scheme is, potentially, more robust and efficient (in terms of information 
discovery), than the previous two alternatives, but is still short of reaching the 
robustness level of centralized PKI solutions. 
 
In light of the above, and considering that, as argued in [48], some form of central 
certification authority is necessary to guaranty security in a distributed system, regardless of 
the honesty of the participating peer majority, the best security option, for P2P systems, is to 
employ some form of centralized PKI or similar security means.  
 
As explained in section 2.4 of chapter II, P2P architectures have evolved to avoid having any 
coordinating central provision. This was done to avoid the costs of maintaining such an 
entity, but mostly, for legal reasons (avoid the legal targeting of that entity), and has resulted 
in operational shortcomings.  
 
Many solutions and schemes have been devised, throughout time, to compensate for the 
lack of a coordinating entity, in P2P systems. However, these have never truly managed to 
provide the operational and security performances that central coordinating entities do. 
 
The P2PTube architecture is specifically conceived to be employed by commercial and 
legally operating CDists, which derive the necessary revenue to sustain their activity. Such 
CDists can thus support the costs of maintaining said coordinating entities, and they are not 
at the risk of any legal attack. 
 
There is thus a need for P2PTube architecture to have centralized coordination, in light of 
the security and operational demands that it must live up to. There is also a capability, of the 
P2PTube architecture to support such central provisions. For these reasons, the P2PTube 
architecture should therefore be equipped with central coordinating provisions which are to 
be responsible for the maintenance of trust and security, throughout its tissue, and for the 
coordination and optimization of that tissue’s overall operation. 
 
P2PTube’s architecture should thus be a hybrid decentralized structure, which revisits and 
greatly enhances Napster’s architecture, by fusing it with PKI-like capabilities. This 
architecture provides superior content manipulation and security capabilities because: 
• its hybrid P2P structure – combines the security and coordinative capacities of a 
centralized system with the (reproduction and distribution), costs reduction properties 
of P2P content distribution; 
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• the integration of its robust security provisions with the hybrid content delivery 
structure – enables the exploitation of synergies between the two; 
 
Furthermore, in order to empower the lateral extraction of gains, the system must also 
include provisions for monitoring user actions at the terminal side. These are also to be 
coordinated by the system’s core. 
 
The central part of the system, (the system core), should be the ultimate source of trust and 
security in the system. It thus is the ultimate source of identification information for all system 
entities, and of all other information, regarding such entities, as well. It is also to handle all 
tasks which require a global view of the system. 
 
The peripheral part of the system (composed by the collective of user owned peers), is to 
employ a predominantly P2P mode of operation, under the coordination of the system 
centre. 
It provides the users with an interface to the global system and its contents. Peers enable 
users to perform content searches, insertions, versionings and removals and a number of 
other user-system interactions. 
2.2.3 Implications Upon the Core  
The satisfaction, of the previously specified requirements, has a number of technical and 
operational implications, specifically, upon the system core. Said core must thus: 
 
• attribute, manage, deliver and guaranty the uniqueness and un-falsifiability, of the 
identities of the users, peers and  media items involved in the system; 
• collect, maintain and securely deliver public key information pertaining to all the 
entities in the system; 
• collect, maintain and deliver information mapping peer identifiers to the 
corresponding IP address; 
• function as the global registry, and ultimate validator, of media content and 
respective semantic and security related metadata. It must thus handle the original 
injection of media items, perform their backup storage and their original seeding. It 
must also prevent, or undo, the insertion of content whose authorship is incorrectly 
claimed; 
• collect, maintain and deliver information regarding the location of media items over 
the peer tissue, and coordinate their retrieval from such locations, by content 
retrieving peers; 
• enable and coordinate the updating, versioning and removal of media objects;  
• support the execution of semantic content searches over all the content that the 
system makes available; 
• maintain and manage user accounts and intermediate the transactions in which such 
accounts take part; 
• attribute roles to system users and oversee their maintenance of such roles, and the 
actions they perform in the fulfilment of such roles; 
• supply the necessary mechanisms to enable the exposing of users to advertisement 
content, the rewarding of users for the sale of their attention and the charging of the 
advertisers for that same fact; 
• supply the necessary mechanisms to enable users to perform donations to producer 
users; 
• coordinate the monitoring of user activities, at the terminal side, by the peripheral 
peers and collection of resulting information; 
• handle the maintenance and coordination of “spaces” or means through which the 
interaction between users and content, takes place. 
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Given the operational and security demands placed upon the system’s core, its constituting 
provisions should be maintained (economically), and managed by the, commercial, system 
operating entity. Only this way will it be possible for it to deliver the necessary trust, to the 
rest of the system, and maintain the necessary operational performance. 
2.2.4 Implications Upon the Peripheral Peers 
The satisfaction, of the specified requirements, has several technical and operational 
implications, specifically, upon the system periphery, that is, upon the peripheral peers. A 
peripheral peer must thus: 
 
• be able to securely, and in an authenticated manner, access the services of the 
system core and to answer its solicitations; 
 
• be capable of securely, and in an authenticated manner, interacting with other peers 
by performing solicitations to them and by answering those peers’ solicitations (e.g. 
participating in the inter-peer distribution of media items); 
 
• follow the instructions of the system core regarding the servicing or shunning of other 
peers and their requests, so that a globally coherent strategy may be enforced for the 
curtailing of nefarious peer behaviour; 
 
• comply to the monitoring requests received from the core;  
 
• be able to validate media item integrity and authenticity, upon their retrieval, and to 
reliably store them; 
 
• perform the interfacing between the users and the overall system. This means that 
the peer must possess the necessary provisions to: 
o enable the user to login to the system; 
o enable the user to perform global content searches, content insertions, 
removals, versionings and consumptions; 
o allow the user to enjoy the social interaction capabilities made available by 
the system; 
o enable users to manipulate the monetary resources stored in their accounts; 
 
2.2.5 Summary 
Table 2 performs a summarizing mapping between the main identified requirements and 
their architectural implications. 
Table 2 – Requirements to Implications Mapping 
Requirements 
Implications 
Overall 
On the Core 
Core peer(s) 
On the Periphery 
Peripheral peer(s) 
Business 
Enable user 
donations 
Hybrid 
decentralized 
structure 
Manage user accounts 
 
Intermediate all 
transactions 
 
Enable users to 
securely interface the 
core services which 
enable them to inject 
money into their 
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Enable user 
attention sale 
Enable the secure 
insertion of money 
 
Coordinate and 
intermediate 
advertisement 
exposure and the 
associated advertiser 
payment 
 
Enable secure 
donations amongst 
users 
 
Support secure 
extraction of money 
 
Coordinate the 
monitoring of user 
activities, and collect 
the resulting 
information 
accounts, donate, sell 
attention and extract 
money from their 
account 
 
Perform the monitoring 
of user activity and the 
collection of related 
data at the request of 
the system core 
Tax user 
donations 
Enable 
monetary 
withdrawals 
Support user 
action 
monitoring 
Rights 
Protection 
Prevent 
authorship theft 
Collect user reports on 
illegitimate content 
 
Intermediate insertion 
of media objects 
preventing or undoing 
the insertion of content 
with illegitimate 
authorship declaration 
Enable users to submit 
reports, to the system 
core, regarding 
suspected infringing 
content 
Usage 
Support 
different user 
roles 
Attribute different roles 
to users 
 
Intermediate all 
relevant user requests 
managing them in 
accordance with the 
user’s role 
Enable users to access 
the services that the 
system provides for 
them, in accordance 
with their role 
Enable 
comprehensive 
search 
Maintain global 
registry of all media 
objects 
 
Intermediate or 
coordinate searches 
so that they operate 
over the entire content 
set 
Cooperate with other 
peripheral peers in 
their content searches 
in accordance to core 
instructions 
Operational 
Possess overall 
scalability 
Coordinate the 
retrieval of media 
objects 
 
Coordinate the 
distribution of 
peripheral peer 
servicing 
responsibilities over 
the core tissue 
Follow the core’s 
instruction pertaining to 
the retrieval of media 
objects and to the 
solicitation of services 
from the core tissue 
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Maintain a 
reliable content 
availability 
Handle the original 
injection, backup 
storage and seeding 
of media objects 
 
Maintain global 
registry of media 
objects, and their 
semantic metadata 
 
Support semantic 
content searches over 
all the content 
 
Manage and deliver 
media item location 
information 
 
Coordinate and track 
media object 
distribution amongst 
peripheral peers 
 
Coordinate media item 
retrieval 
 
Intermediate and 
coordinate the 
updating, versioning 
and removal of media 
objects 
 
Be the ultimate 
validator of media 
objects and their 
associated information 
Adequately respond to 
service solicitations by 
other peers 
 
Adequately store and 
redistribute the media 
objects that the core 
instructs it to 
redistribute 
 
Assist other peripheral 
peers in semantic 
content searches 
 
Assist other peripheral 
peers in the location of 
media items within the 
system’s tissue 
 
Be able to perform the 
insertion, search, 
location, retrieval, and 
removal solicitation of 
media objects, 
resorting to the 
assistance of the core 
or of other peripheral 
peers 
 
Enable users to 
perform content 
searches, insertions, 
removals, versionings, 
retrievals and 
consumptions 
Enable an 
efficient and 
universal 
content 
discovery 
Maintain an 
efficient content 
location 
Enforce an 
optimal content 
distribution 
Enable an 
efficient content 
retrieval 
Enforce a 
reliable content 
management 
Maintain a 
credible 
enforcing of 
cooperative 
behaviour of 
peers 
Coordinate, instruct 
and track peer 
cooperation 
 
Collect peer reports on 
other peers’ 
inadequate behaviour 
 
Expel uncooperative 
or sabotaging peers 
Report inadequate 
peer behaviour to the 
core 
 
Follow the core’s 
instructions pertaining 
to the shunning of 
peers and users 
Security 
Secure 
identification 
Maintain a global 
registry of all media 
object, user and peer 
identification or 
security information 
(e.g. public key 
information) 
 
Attribute, manage and 
guaranty the validity of 
user, peer and media 
item identifiers and 
Be able to securely 
authenticate and to 
establish secure 
communication 
sessions with the 
system core (login) and 
with other peers (inter-
peer session) 
 
Access the services of 
the system core and of 
other peers within the 
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Secure 
communication 
security credentials 
 
Manage the mapping 
of peer IDs to their IP 
addresses 
 
Enable the 
establishment of 
secure communication 
sessions for peers and 
users 
 
Grant access to media 
object validation 
information 
context of secure 
communication 
sessions 
 
Enable users to 
establish secure 
communication 
sessions with the 
system (login) 
 
Be able to validate 
media object integrity 
and authenticity (with 
the assistance of the 
system core and other 
peripheral peers), upon 
their retrieval, and to 
reliably store them 
 
Submit reports, to the 
system core, if and 
when corrupted or 
invalid content is 
detected 
 
Be able to adequately 
authenticate media 
objects at insertion 
time 
Secure content 
3 Structure 
3.1 Introduction 
Section 3 presents the structure of the P2PTube system. Section 3.2 presents the system’s 
overall structure. It begins by presenting that structure from a horizontal perspective, looking 
at the system as a whole, regardless of its vertical differentiation (layers), paying attention to 
the different types of peers that make up that system and, thus, constitute its horizontal 
differences. In the subsequent part of section 3.2 the structure in question is presented from 
a vertical perspective, therefore, focusing on its different layers and on the services that they 
provide each other. Section 3.3 presents the structure of individual peers and section 3.4 
defines the structural roles that peers may play within the system. 
3.2 Structure Overview 
3.2.1 Horizontal (or Peer Based) Perspective 
The P2PTube’s structure is composed by a collective of different types of peers organized in 
a hybrid decentralized architecture. That collective is composed of a single coordinating 
Central Core Peer (CCP), a group of coordination assisting Outer Core Peers (OCPs), and 
any number of, user hosting, Peripheral Peers (pp), as presented in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23 – P2PTube Structural Overview 
 
The core section of the system’s structure will be occupied by highly reliable and trustworthy 
peers, which are controlled by the system’s operating entity and are always on-line. The 
system’s peripheral section is more heterogeneous. It is composed by (regular user owned), 
peers with varying computational capabilities, communicational bandwidth, trustworthiness, 
reliability, and with an intermittent availability (as they connect and disconnect from the 
system). This section will thus present a very variable composition and topology. 
3.2.2 Vertical (or Layer Based) Perspective 
The P2PTube’s architecture is divided into horizontal layers. Each such layer provides 
services to the one above it and employs the services of the one bellow it. 
 
More specifically, the P2PTube architecture is horizontally divided into the following layers: 
• The Usage Environment Layer (UEL) – handles all aspects related to the interfacing 
of the user with the system and to the accommodation of the system core’s user 
action monitoring requests; 
• Peer Link Layer (PLL) – handles the resolution of peer contact endpoints and the 
securing of all inter-peer communication; 
• Inter-Peer Communication Layer (IPCL) – handles the actual exchanging of 
communication messages between different peers. 
 
 
Figure 24 – P2PTube Horizontal Layers Traversing Peers 
 
All three layers traverse all of the system’s peers, that is, all peers are horizontally divided 
into their own particular instances of the UEL, PLL and IPCL. The P2PTube architecture may 
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thus be depicted, in what regards its horizontal division, in the manner presented in Figure 
24. 
3.3 Peer Structure 
 
Figure 25 – Peer Architecture 
 
All of the system’s peers have the same internal structure (presented in Figure 25). As 
explained in the previous section, each peer’s structure is divided into three layers: 
• Inter-Peer Communication Layer – at each peer, this layer comprises the following 
component: 
o IPC Manager (IPCM) – receives internal, outbound, messages (from the 
top layers), and sends them to remote peers. Receives external, inbound, 
messages and sends them to the top layers; 
 
• Peer Link Layer (PLL) – at each peer, this layer comprises the following components: 
o CMode PL Manager (CMPLM) – manages the client side of the PLL’s 
operation. It receives outbound, request messages, from UEL, which it 
authenticates and encrypts. Obtains the IP address of the target remote 
peers and passes, that information, along with the processed message, to 
the IPCL. It also receives external, inbound, response messages. It 
deciphers and validates the authenticity of such messages and passes 
them to the top layers; 
o SMode PL Manager (SMPLM) – manages the server side of the PLL’s 
operation. It receives inbound, request messages, (from remote peers), 
which it deciphers and validates. If the messages are destined to the UEL, 
it forwards them to the Inner Environment Manager. If not, the SMPLM 
processes the messages itself. It also authenticates and encrypts 
outbound response messages. At the CCP It handles the PLL monitoring 
and managing operations; 
o PLL Peer Info Manager (PLLPIM) – handles the manipulation of peer 
related information (e.g. peer identification, public key, IP), for PLL 
purposes; 
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o PLL Crypto Tool (PLLCT) – handles all encryption, decryption and 
signature calculation activities at the PLL; 
o DB – the PLL Database; 
 
• Usage Environment Layer (UEL) – at each peer, this layer comprises the following 
components: 
o Outer Environment Manager (OEM) – receives, and handles the servicing 
of, all the requests coming from the exterior of the local peer, that is, from 
the user. It does so resorting to the User Info Manager, the Media Item 
Info Manager, and the UEL Peer Info Manager; 
o Inner Environment Manager (IEM) – receives, and handles the servicing 
of, all the requests coming from the system’s interior, that is, from other 
peers. It does so resorting to the User Info Manager,  the Media Item Info 
Manager, the UEL Peer Info Manager and the Monitoring Manager. At the 
CPP, It also handles the UEL monitoring and managing operations; 
o User Info Manager (UIM) – handles all affairs related to the manipulation 
of user related information, such as user identification, user public key, 
user profile info, user media property info, user peer property info, user 
account and corresponding monetary resources info, etc. It also handles 
the authentication (signing) of data objects in behalf of users and 
validation of data objects origin authenticity (signature validation) in what 
regards to users; 
o Media Item Info Manager (MIIM) – handles all affairs related to the 
manipulation of media item related information, such as identification and 
authentication (signature) information, semantic characteristics 
information, location (on the system’s tissue) information, ownership 
information, etc.; 
o UEL Peer Info Manager (UELPIM) – handles all affairs which involve the 
manipulation of peer related information (e.g. peer identification, peer 
ownership, etc.) for UEL purposes; 
o Monitoring Manager (MM) – handles all user action monitoring 
procedures. It registers event report requests, issued by the system core. 
The OEM informs the MM about every user action that takes place. The 
MM matches that information against the monitoring requests. If a match 
occurs a report is produced and sent to the system core; 
o UEL Crypto Tool (UELCT) – handles all encryption, decryption and 
signature calculation activities; 
o DB – is the UEL’s database. It is employed by the UIM, the MIIM and the 
UELPIM. It stores information on users, peers and media items. 
 
Given the P2P nature of the system, a peer may receive requests from the system’s exterior 
(the user), or from its interior (other peers). The OEM thus handles exterior requests, which 
lead the peer to resort to the services of other peers, that is, to be a client of other peers; 
The IEM handles interior requests, which lead the peer to provide services to other peers, 
that is, to be a server to other peers; 
3.4 Peer Structural Roles 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The CCP, and all the OCPs, are to be owned and operated by the system’s operating entity. 
All core peers run on high capacity hardware and have at their disposal large data 
transmission capacities. These peers are invariantly reliable and trustworthy. 
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The PPs are, typically, owned and operated by regular users, and, thus, commonly run on 
household PCs. These peers present varying degrees of reliability and trustworthiness. 
 
The different types of peer’s, with their different characteristics, present unequal levels of 
capacity, and trustworthiness. For this reason they perform roles with different levels of 
responsibility, authority and knowledge, at all of the system’s layers. 
3.4.2 Central Core Peer Role 
At all of the system’s levels, the CCP is the ultimate authority in the system and should be 
fully trusted by all the peers. It is the base source of the system’s integrated PKI-like 
capabilities. The CCP coordinates the system’s entire operation and all the interactions that 
it comprises, for the servicing of the peripheral peer collective.  
 
The CCP is the only peer in the system which contains the system’s data structure in its 
entirety at all times. It is, thus, the ultimate source of all information, at all system levels, and 
the sole handler of all peripheral requests which imply some change or addition to the 
system’s overall data structure. 
 
As it is the root of all trust, in the system, the CCP, is, therefore, the ultimate assurer of the 
system’s operational reliability, provider of the necessary functionalities for the maintenance 
of an environment of trust within the system, and deliverer of the necessary means to assure 
identity verifiability to all peers, users and media objects. 
 
More specifically, the CCP’s responsibilities include: 
• at the PLL: 
o storing the PLL part of the system’s data structure (information on all peers), 
in its entirety; 
o monitoring the system’s internal context, (by monitoring the requests received 
from the peripheral tissue and the information pertaining the interactions 
between the peripheral peers), in order to optimize the system’s internal 
operation and the cooperation between its peers. 
• at the UEL: 
o storing the UEL part of the system’s data structure (information on all users 
and media items and the media items themselves), in its entirety; 
• at both levels: 
o providing and/or coordinating (reading) access to the system’s data structure, 
for PPs and OCPs; 
o providing the capability to, and controlling, the alteration the system’s data 
structure; 
o guaranteeing the validity, coherence and correctness of the information 
contained in the systems data structure; 
3.4.3 Outer Core Peer Role 
The OCPs assist the CCP in the servicing of the peripheral peer collective. Each OCP is a 
trustworthy alternative (to the CCP), for access to the system’s data structure which they 
store, most of the time, in its entirety. 
 
At the three system levels, the OCPs handle peripheral requests which imply only reading 
operations on the system’s data structure. 
 
Each OCP is, therefore, responsible for the delivery, of the information it stores, to the PPs 
or other OCPs. They are not, however, to service all and every PP. Whenever a PP logs into 
the system (comes on-line), the responsibility for handling its requests is attributed, by the 
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CCP, to one specific OCP. From that point on, the PP’s “reading” requests should be sent to 
the specified OCP. 
 
There is thus a division of responsibilities, regarding the attending of the peripheral peer 
collective’s requests, amongst the OCPs, which is coordinated by the CCP. Each OCP is 
responsible for the handling of the requests coming from a subsection of the set of all 
peripheral peers. 
 
Figure 26 – Example Distribution of OCP Servicing Responsibilities over the PP Collective 
 
Figure 26 presents a possible example of such a responsibility distribution. In it, the following 
assignments are in place: 
• OCP 1 is responsible for servicing all “reading” requests from peripheral peers AAPP  
to AZPP ; 
• OCP 2 is responsible for servicing all “reading” requests from peripheral peers BAPP  
to BZPP ; 
• OCP m is responsible for servicing all “reading” requests from peripheral peers ZAPP  
to ZZPP ; 
 
For simplicity’s sake the peer identifiers employed were only composed of two letters, thus 
enabling a total set of peripheral peers from AAPP to ZZPP . In reality this set will be much 
larger. 
3.4.4 Peripheral Peer Role 
The PPs host the system users and service other peers in the system. 
 
In specific terms the PPs: 
• at the PLL: 
o attend to the requests coming from the UEL; 
o attend to requests, from other peers, for information on specific peers’ 
information; 
• at the UEL: 
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o perform the interfacing of users with the system by servicing their requests. 
This service typically implies the reading and/or righting of the system’s data 
structure, which is achieved by resorting to the services of CCP, OCPs or of 
other peripheral peers; 
o attend to monitoring requests from the system core; 
o attend to requests, from other peers, for information on specific users or 
media items; 
3.4.5 Summary 
Table 3 summarizes the main responsibilities of each type of peer. 
Table 3 – Peer Responsibilities 
Responsibility 
Types 
Peer Type Responsibilities 
Central Core 
Peer Resp. 
Outer Core 
Peer Resp. 
Peripheral Peer 
Resp. 
ICPL 
Resp. 
IPCL Manager 
Resp. Receive incoming and send outgoing messages 
PLL  
Resp. 
PLL DB 
Resp. 
Storing the entire 
PLL data structure 
at all times 
Store all or part of 
the PLL data 
structure 
Store core signed 
fragments of the 
PLL data structure 
PLL Peer Info 
Manager 
Resp. 
Monitor PLL’s 
overall operation 
 
Provide and/or 
coordinate access 
to the PLL data 
structure, for PPs 
and OCPs 
 
Provide the 
capability to, and 
control, the 
alteration of the 
PLL data structure 
 
Guaranty the 
validity, coherence 
and correctness of 
the PLL data 
structure 
Provide reading 
access to the PLL 
data structure to 
some specific 
subset of the PPs 
Read and right to 
the PLL data 
structure (resorting 
to the CCP or 
OCPs), to perform 
its regular operation 
in service of the 
CMode or SMode 
PL Managers 
 
Redistribute core 
signed fragments of 
the PLL data 
structure, to other, 
PPs, under CCP or 
OCP coordination 
CMode PL Manager 
Resp. 
Handle outgoing requests (coming from the local UEL instance) 
and incoming request responses (coming from remote peers) 
SMode PL Manager 
Resp. 
Handle incoming requests (coming from remote peers) and 
outgoing request responses 
PLL Crypto Tool 
Resp. 
Perform encryption, decryption, signing, signature validation and 
hashing operations 
UEL 
Resp. 
UEL DB 
Storing the entire 
UEL data structure 
at all times 
Store all or part of 
the UEL data 
structure 
Store core signed 
fragments of the 
UEL data structure 
Outer Environment 
Manager 
Handle requests coming from the hosted users. Inform the 
Monitoring Manager about relevant user actions 
Inner Environment 
Manager Handle requests coming from remote peers 
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User Info Manager 
Monitor UEL’s 
overall operation 
 
Provide and/or 
coordinate access 
to the UEL data 
structure, for PPs 
and OCPs 
 
Provide the 
capability to, and 
control, the 
alteration of the 
UEL data structure 
 
Guaranty the 
validity, coherence 
and correctness of 
the UEL data 
Provide reading 
access to the UEL 
data structure to 
some specific 
subset of the PPs 
Read and right to 
the UEL data 
structure (resorting 
to the CCP or 
OCPs), to perform 
its regular operation 
in service the 
Environment 
Managers 
 
Redistribute core 
signed fragments of 
the UEL data 
structure, to other, 
PPs, under CCP or 
OCP coordination 
UEL Peer Info 
Manager 
Media Item Info 
Manager 
UEL Crypto Tool Perform encryption, decryption, signing, signature validation and hashing operations 
Monitoring Manager 
Coordinate all 
monitoring 
procedures and 
registered the 
gathered 
information  
Register event 
report requests, 
issued by the 
system core 
 
Report to the core 
when relevant 
Register event 
report requests, 
issued by the 
system core 
 
Report to the core 
when relevant 
 
4 Data Structure and Model 
4.1 Introduction 
The set of all the information, regarding system participating entities (e.g. peers, information 
objects and users), system occurring events (e.g. media object insertions, consumption, inter 
user monetary donations, etc.), and system occurring relationships (the relationships 
between system entities and events, etc.), that the P2PTube architecture requires for its 
operation, collectively constitutes its data structure.  
 
This structure is distributedly and redundantly stored throughout the system. It is redundantly 
held, in its entirety, by the CCP and the OCPs. The PPs store only fragments of it. 
 
The data structure may logically be divided into UEL and PLL sections. However, 
operationally, it is one single coherent and interrelated structure. 
 
The characteristics of data structure in scope, depend on the actual business model(s) 
supported and on the services to be delivered by this architecture. Said data structure must, 
thus, be able to support the description of realities of varying levels of complexity. 
 
In the following sub-sections, we define the minimal necessary data model (to be embodied 
by the P2PTube’s data structure), to support this architecture’s operation and the business 
models outlined in chapter IV. 
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4.2 Rationale 
Reality is made up of “things” which exist under involvement in relationships with other 
“things”. Each individual “thing”, in its turn, is also composed by interior “things”, which also 
exist under involvement in relationships with each other, and so forth, unlimitedly.  
 
All of existence is transitory and is in permanent change. That way, with time, all things 
which had a beginning, as a relational aggregation of interior “things”, also have an end, that 
is, a disaggregation or alteration of the sub relationships and sub “things” that compose 
them. All things may thus be seen as events. 
 
A car is an event composed by all of its parts and components under a specific set of 
interrelationships. If destroyed or disassembled, it ceases to be a car, that is, the car event is 
terminated. In the same manner, a storm is an event composed by air and water vapour 
masses maintaining a specific set of relationships amongst them and with the outer world. 
When those relationships change, or, for instance, the water vapour is removed from the 
storm (by way of the rain), the storm ceases to exist. 
 
Relationships between “things” only exist when instantiated. That is, a relationship exists 
only when the two related “things” exist in a way so as to maintain it. This way, relationships 
are realized as occurrences, and are thus relational events. Relationships are therefore the 
most basic events. They are those which are closest to a mere logical existence. 
 
Relational events consist of “predicates” and are thus connected to two other events of any 
type. One of these plays the role of the “subject” of the connection and the other one, the 
role of the “object” of the connection. 
 
Oppositely to relational (or basic) events, the remaining events may be designated as 
complex events. These may be divided into two sub-types: 
• Procedural events – these events consist of processes or actions (e.g. a flight, a 
collision). They are composed of only relational events and other procedural complex 
events. Ultimately, a procedural event composed of only one relational event is 
logically equivalent to it; 
• Entitary events – these events consist of realities that may be seen as entities (e.g. a 
car, a person). They are composed by relational, procedural complex and entitary 
complex events. 
 
The P2PTube system and its internal operation, as any other reality, may thus be described 
as a set of relational, procedural and entitary events. 
 
For every reality a great number of entitary, procedural and relational events may be 
identified, at different levels of complexity. Depending on the context, not all of them, 
however, are of relevance to the representation or comprehension of the reality in scope. 
The aspects of reality that are to be effectively captured must be selected in accordance with 
the needs of every different situation.  
 
In the specific context of P2PTube: 
• the main complex events are: 
o entitary events: peers; users; and the information objects; 
o procedural events: 
 events pertaining to user interactions with the system, (e.g. user 
registration, insertion of media objects, donations);  
 events pertaining to internal, autonomously initiated, system activities; 
• the main relational events are all those inter-webbing the tissue of complex events; 
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P2PTube’s data model is therefore defined around these three basic types of phenomena 
and their most relevant instances. Given that procedural events represent complex 
occurrences in the system, they thus play the main structural role in the system’s data 
model. The core of the model is therefore a continuous string of interrelated complex 
procedural events, which contain (or are somehow related to), a vast set of events of all 
types that describe the rest of the system’s activity. 
 
The richness and complexity of the data model, and its alignment with reality, makes it 
extremely versatile and, therefore, able to record any aspect of it, to any level of detail. 
 
Traditional data models are conceived so as to perform a consistent registry of very specific 
aspects of certain domains. These models, are typically confined to registering a continuous 
succession of states in a given domain of reality, and, often, the registration of new states 
involves the loss of information about previous states. One might think of the information 
recorded in these structures, at any given moment, as a picture of the most relevant aspects 
of the state of reality, at that moment. At each relevant change, of the state of reality, so 
does the "photo" necessarily change, being that the changed aspect may, or may not, be 
recorded, in the same way that the context of alteration, in question, is generally not saved. 
 
In an opposite manner, P2PTube’s data model, does not record only the current state of 
reality. Instead, it registers the entire sequence of relevant procedural events, which occur, 
as well as their interrelationships, and thus, their context. It, therefore, captures a whole 
contextualized evolution of reality (and, thus, of its states) over time. 
For example, in the case of a media item insertion, P2PTube’s data model does not only 
register that said item is now available and some further details regarding it (e.g. its owner 
user). Instead, it registers the entire procedural event of the item’s insertion, as well as its 
relationships with other relevant procedural and entitary events, such as the relationship with 
the procedural event consisting of the hosting of the owner user, at some peer, in the system 
and the events that consist of the hosting of the media item at various different peers, as a 
result of its insertion process. The information related to the availability of the media item or 
to the identity of its owner is present, all the same, but distributed across the recorded 
events and relationships. It comes, however, enriched by a whole, chronologically organized, 
context. 
 
Given the way that P2PTube’s data model is structured, it inevitably stores a more complex 
data structure. This means that retrieving information from it requires more complex 
operations. However, this is a trade-of, which enables, on the reverse side, an immense 
increase of the data model’s versatility and of the wealth and contextualization of the 
recorded information. It also facilitates the continuous expansion of the model, so that the 
capture that it performs of reality, can evolve over time so as to meet ever-changing needs. 
 
A more versatile, detailed and contextualized capture of reality, and with less information 
loss, means that more information, and more valuable information, is available to be 
accessed and exploited by both the system itself and by users. The system can thus, for 
example, correlate: 
• a procedural event consisting of the insertion of a media item A; 
• with a procedural event consisting of the hosting of its owner user at a given peer at 
given time interval; 
• with a "commenting" relational event linking media item A with other media item B; 
• with a procedural event corresponding to a consumption of a media item C in a given 
time interval; 
• with a "commenting" relational event linking media item C and media item B; 
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and, therefore, determine that the referred user, inserted a comment to media item B, after 
having consumed a media Item C which also contained a comment to media item B, when 
he was hosted on a given peer at a given time interval. 
 
Users, in turn, can make much more complex searches such as: what is the number of users 
that, after consuming a particular item A, consumed, immediately afterwards, a media item 
B. 
4.3 Registered Information 
The information registered by the system’s provisions may be divided into two parts: 
• The information that composes the global data model – this is the information which 
is permanently stored at the core data structure, and whose registry and knowledge 
is necessary for the system’s global operations; 
• The information that composes the individual peer data model – this is information 
which is stored at every peer, independently from each other, which translates the 
peer’s individual experience and is necessary only for the proper operation of the 
actual peer. 
 
For the sake of preventing the dissertation’s main body of reaching an excessive size, the 
specification of the information which is registered in the system’s data model is described in 
Annex D. In said annex the registered information is presented on an event-oriented basis 
that delivers a disassembled view of the overall resulting data structure. 
 
The best way to understand the overall system’s data structure, is to interpret it in an object 
oriented manner, as a complex mesh of interconnected events which is structured, and built 
around, a chain of procedural events in an hierarchical manner, starting from the core 
procedural events and then proceeding to all others. 
 
Said core/structuring procedural events are: 
• At the PLL – the Peer Participation Session Events; 
• At the UEL – the User Attending Session Events; 
 
From the above presented perspective the system’s data structure consists of a series of 
events connected by relationships, where each event may “contain” (be bound to by 
inclusion relationships), relationships or further series of relationship connected events, and 
so forth.  
 
Figure 27 presents a depiction of an exemplifying section of the data structure, from the 
above-mentioned perspective. In it, procedural and entitary complex events and entities are 
represented as green and purple boxes, interconnected by yellow relationship boxes. 
 
From that image we may see that: 
• the top level events are the Peer Participation Session Events. These can be seen as 
PLL events that consist of a peer being connected to the system for some time 
interval.  Peer Participation Session Events are initiated, by Peer Connection Events, 
and terminated by Peer Disconnection Events, which in turn are triggered by Peer-
loginTo-System and Peer-loggoffFrom-System relational events, respectively. 
 
• Peer Participation Session Events, may include (be connected to, by inclusionOf 
relationships) other events, such as a Peer Reporting Event. 
 
• Peer Participation Session Events are also bound, by supportingOf relationships to 
UEL levels events, such as the User Attending Session Events; 
V A Reliable P2P Architecture for the New Paradigm 101 
 
 
 
 
• User Attending Session Events consist of user participation sessions. They are 
initiated by User Connection Events and terminated by User Disconnection Events, 
which, in turn, are triggered by User-loginTo-System and User-loggoffFrom-System 
relational events, respectively; 
• User Attending Session Events include all events pertaining to user interaction with 
the system. As such they may include events such as MO Search Events, MO 
Responding Events, MO Commenting Events, etc; 
 
 
Figure 27 – Example of Data Structure Section 
 
All mentioned procedural and entitary events are stored as entries in their corresponding 
tables, along with any other specific, relevant, information about them. They are webbed into 
the overall data tissue through their referral by the relational events that they are involved in. 
 
All the explicitly mentioned relationships in the above text, as well as those implicitly defined, 
(when we say that some event includes some other event or relationship), are registered in 
the data structure as entries in the appropriate relational event table. In such entries there is 
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a field indicating the subject phenomenon, another referencing the object one and a third 
one indicating the “predicate” of the relationship, that is, the actual type of the relationship.  
 
Furthermore, said entries, also carry an indication of the time instant at which the 
relationship “came into existence” and an indication of the time instant at which is became 
invalid. 
 
As it can be concluded, the data structure will be an intricate mesh of information nodes 
(procedural and entitary events), interconnected by relational events, were no past 
information is ever lost. Procedural, entitary or relational events, which are no longer 
occurring or valid, have their end date introduced, and are marked as inactive. The present 
state of the system is described by the set of all the procedural, entitary and relational events 
that are still active. All other entries constitute the registry of the system’s past. 
4.4 Data Model 
In accordance with the rationale presented in section 4.2 and the information set that the 
system’s data structure needs to register (presented in section 4.3), three different types of 
aspects of reality (identified in section 4.2) are mapped into the system’s data model: 
• Entitary Complex Events – real or abstract “things” like peers, users and information 
objects; 
• Procedural Complex Events – occurrences that take place within reality and are 
manifested through the initiation and/or termination of relationships; 
• Relational Events – logical bonds between different segments of reality (e.g. between 
entities). 
 
The data structure’s model (presented in Figure 28), is defined in terms of those three 
aspects of reality. 
 
All system events are registered at the EVENT table. This table carries the information fields, 
pertaining to events, which are common to all types of events. As such, each of its rows 
contain: 
• EvID – the system wide unique identifier of its represented event; 
• EvType – the specific type of the event (accepted values are RelEv, ProcCompEv 
and EntCompEv); 
• BeggDate – the event’s beginning time; 
• EndDate – the event’s end time (when available); 
• IsActive – a boolean filed indicating if the event in scope is still effectively in 
occurrence and part of the system. 
 
However, given that there are three main sub types of events, the latter table is “extended” 
by additional ones, in order to carry the information fields specific to each main type of event. 
This way: 
• the RELEV table extends the EVENT table. It registers all Relational Events. Its 
entries carry the following fields: 
o RelEvID – the system wide unique identifier of the relational event (foreign 
key imported from the EVENT  table); 
o RelType – the identification of the “predicate” of the relationship represented 
by the entry. It may take as value the name of any of the relational events 
defined in Annex D; 
o SubjectEvID – the identification of event which plays the role of “subject” in 
the relationship represented by the entry; 
o ObjectEvID – the identification of event which plays the role of “object” in the 
relationship represented by the entry; 
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• the COMPEV table extends the EVENT table. It registers all Complex Events. Its 
entries carry the following fields: 
o CompEvID – the system wide unique identifier of the complex event (foreign 
key imported from the EVENT  table); 
o EvType – the identification of the type of complex event at stake. Said field 
may thus take as value either ProcCompEv or EntCompEv.  
 
This table is “extended” by the following ones: 
o PROCCOMPEV – this table registers all Procedural Complex Events. Its 
entries carry the following fields: 
 PocCompEvID – the system wide unique identifier of the procedural 
complex event (foreign key imported from the COMPEV table); 
 EvType – the identification of the type of procedural complex event at 
stake. It may take as value the name of any of the procedural complex 
events defined in Annex D; 
o ENTCOMPEV – this table registers all Entitary Complex Events. Its entries 
carry the following fields: 
 PocCompEvID – the system wide unique identifier of the entitary 
complex event (foreign key imported from the COMPEV table); 
 EvType – the identification of the type of entitary complex event at 
stake.  It may take as value the name of any of the entitary complex 
events defined in Annex D. 
 
All specific types of entitary, procedural and relational events whose registry requires the 
storage of some specific extra data field, besides the ones registered at their corresponding 
base tables (ENCOMPEV, PROCCOMPEV and RELEV), have their registry extended by 
specific tables, which store said extra information. Thus, if, for instance, the registry of 
entities of type “peer” needs to store some extra field, not available in the ENTCOMPEV 
table, then, for each registered peer, there will be an entry in the ENTCOMPEV table 
pertaining to said instance (peer). Furthermore, there will also be a PEER table (extension 
table), with a specific entry for the peer in question, which carries the additional, peer 
specific, information fields. 
 
As it was implicitly shown above, in the extension tables, the primary key is a foreign key 
received from their corresponding base tables, which corresponds to the primary key of the 
latter tables. In the base tables, the field indicating the specific type of the event described in 
each entry, functions as a pointer to the specific extension table (if any), with further 
information about that event. 
 
In more specific terms the basic data model contains the following extension tables: 
• In the context of the registry of entitary complex events, the following tables extend 
the ENTCOMPEV table: 
o PEER – each table row contains peer-specific information pertaining to a 
specific peer; 
o USER – each table row contains user-specific information pertaining to a 
specific user; 
o UACCOUNT – each table row contains user-account-specific information 
pertaining to a specific user account; 
o PEERIP – each table row contains peer-IP-specific information pertaining to a 
specific peer IP address; 
o IO – each table row contains IO-specific information pertaining to a specific 
information object. This table is extended by the following ones, which pertain 
to different types of IOs: 
 MO – each table row contains MO-specific information pertaining to a 
specific media information object; 
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 MOFRAG – each table row contains MO-fragment-specific information 
pertaining to a specific media object fragment; 
 MORNSMANCMNT – each table row contains 
MORansonAnnouncement-specific information pertaining to a specific 
MORansonAnnouncement; 
 KEYPAIR – each table row contains a specific private and public 
asymmetric key pair; 
 OPERATIONALO – each table row contains operational-IO-specific 
information pertaining to a specific operational information object. This 
table is extended by the following ones, which pertain to different 
types of operational IOs: 
• SEARCHQIO – each table row contains SearchQuery-IO-
specific information pertaining to a specific SearchQIO object;  
o SEMCONCEPT – each table row contains semantic-concept-specific 
information pertaining to a specific semantic concept; 
o SYSTEM – each table row contains system-specific information pertaining to 
a specific system. In this particular case the table will carry one entry that 
pertains to the actual system that the model belongs to; 
o TRUSTEDSYSTEM – each table row contains system-specific information 
pertaining to a specific trusted outer system; 
 
• In the context of the registry of procedural complex events, the following tables 
extend the PROCCOMPEV table: 
o UDONATIONEV – each table row contains user-donation-event-specific 
information pertaining to a specific user donation event; 
o UATTSALEEV – each table row contains user-attention-sale-event-specific 
information pertaining to a specific user attention sale event; 
o UELOPEV – each table row contains UEL-Operational-Event-specific 
information pertaining to a specific UEL Operational Event; 
o UELCOOPEV – each table row contains UEL-Coooperational-Event-specific 
information pertaining to a specific UEL Coooperational Event; 
o UELMSGSENDEV – each table row contains UEL-Message-Sending-Event-
specific information pertaining to a specific UEL Message Sending Event; 
o UELMSRECEPTEV – each table row contains UEL-Message-Reception-
Event-specific information pertaining to a specific UEL Message Reception 
Event; 
o PLLCOOPEV – each table row contains PLL-Coooperational-Event-specific 
information pertaining to a specific PLL Coooperational Event; 
o PLLMSGSENDEV – each table row contains PLL-Message-Sending-Event-
specific information pertaining to a specific PLL Message Sending Event; 
o PLLMSRECEPTEV – each table row contains PLL-Message-Reception-
Event-specific information pertaining to a specific PLL Message Reception 
Event; 
o PCOMMSESSEV – each table row contains peer-communication-session-
event specific information pertaining to a specific peer communication session 
event; 
 
• In the context of the registry of relational events, the following tables extend the 
RELEV table: 
o UREWARDOFU_RELEV – each table row contains User-rewardingOf-User-
specific information pertaining to a specific User-rewardingOf-User 
relationship; 
o UPAYOFU_RELEV – each table row contains User-paymentOf-User-specific 
information pertaining to a specific User-paymentOf-User relationship; 
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o UUNLOADOFUACCNTEV – each table row contains User-unloadingOf-User-
specific information pertaining to a specific User-unloadingOf-User 
relationship; 
o ULOADOFUACCNTEV – each table row contains User-loadingOf-User-
specific information pertaining to a specific User-loadingOf-User relationship; 
o STAXOF_UREWARDOFU_RELEV – each table row contains System-
taxationOf-(User-rewardingOf-User)-specific information pertaining to a 
specific System-taxationOf-(User-rewardingOf-User) relationship; 
o STAXOF_UPAYOFU_RELEV – each table row contains System-taxationOf-
(User-paymentOf-User)-specific information pertaining to a specific System-
taxationOf-(User-paymentOf-User) relationship; 
 
As it can be seen, the relational events tables play a crucial role in the interconnection of the 
data model. Each row/tuple in each such table represents one instance of a relationship. The 
information collectively carried by these tables describes relational events as subject-
predicate-object constructs. It contains one foreign key for the subject event, one foreign key 
for the object event and whatever data fields are relevant to characterize the relationship. 
 
This structural scheme of the data model grants it a great deal of versatility and makes it 
easily extensible, through the addition of extra event types (entitary, procedural and 
relational), and corresponding extension tables (if necessary), which build on the tables 
already present in the model. 
4.5 Data Structure Distribution Over the System’s Tissue 
The system’s data structure may be seen as having two scope-wise different sections. The 
main part is the global one (global scoped part of the data structure), which registers the 
events which describe the system’s global operation. This knowledge is necessary to enable 
a proper global operation of the system, under the coordination of the core (CCP and 
OCPs). 
 
At all system levels (PLL and UEL), the CCP and all the OCPs contain the core part of the 
data structure in its entirety. PPs contain only fragments of it.  
 
However, given the system’s distributed and P2P nature, this is not all the data in the 
system’s collective data structure. In the course of their operation both the OCPs and the 
PPs will accumulate data that is not shared with the CCP (and does not need to be). This 
constitutes the locally scoped part of the data structure. For instance, they will register 
information on “Peer Operation Events”, “Peer Cooperation Events” or “Peer Communication 
Session Events”, pertaining to their regular operation and interactions with other peers, 
which is only relevant to them and does not need to be delivered to the CCP. This section of 
the data structure is thus particular to every peer and will not be stored at the CCP, thus 
being perishable. 
 
The main access gateway to the global part of the data structure is the CCP. It intermediates 
all “writing” accesses to it, and takes care of timely updating the data structure copies 
located at the OCPs. The “reading” accesses to that section of the data structure are 
delegated by the CCP to the OCPs. These handle the distribution of the information and 
data objects contained in the system’s data structure, throughout the PPs. As this 
distribution takes place, the PPs end up accumulating some knowledge of the information in 
scope (e.g. knowledge of Media Objects (MOs), answers to specific search queries, 
authentication information about specific peers or users, etc.), and the OCPs take note of 
this acquisition. In order to exploit that diffusion of knowledge, the OCPs distribute some of 
the PP servicing workload throughout the actual PP collective, by entrusting some PPs with 
the responsibility to service some specific requests of other PPs (see section 5.5.8.2.2). 
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Figure 28 – Basic Data Model 
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This way, the system’s data structure (or the relevant parts of it), is originally maintained and 
expanded by the CCP. It is then progressively diffused throughout the system’s tissue, first 
to the outer core and then to the periphery. The responsibility of distributing that data (or 
parts of it), is also progressively entrusted to larger sections of the system, first to the outer 
core and then to the periphery. 
5 Operation 
5.1 Introduction 
Section 5 explains the operation of the P2PTube architecture with a special focus on the 
security and reliability assuring aspects. In section 5.2 an overview is given of its main cross 
layer operational aspects. Section 5.3 presents the operation of the IPCL. Section 5.4 
presents the operation of the PLL and section 5.5 presents the operation of the UEL. 
 
In said sections the notation presented in Table 4 will be employed. 
 
Table 4 – Notation Definition 
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5.2 Cross Layer Aspects 
5.2.1 Base Operation Types 
From a vertical perspective, the system’s overall operation is composed by the overall 
operation of each of its layers. The overall operation of each layer is composed by a myriad 
of different individual operations that concurrently take place within the layer’s tissue. Each 
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such individual operation is composed of multiple interactions/cooperations between 
homologous layer instances of different peers. 
 
From a horizontal perspective, the system’s overall operation is composed by the overall 
operation of each of its peer. The overall operation of each peer is composed by a myriad of 
different individual operations that concurrently take place within the peer. As a peer is 
divided into different layers, so are the operations that occur within it. Thus, an individual 
peer operation typically has a UEL a PLL and an IPCL component. 
 
If the two perspectives are integrated an individual system operation may be seen as a 
vertically integrated construct with the typical following structure: 
• UEL level operation – composed of spanning tree of inter-peer interactions at the 
UEL level. At the root of that tree, is an inter-UEL interaction which has as its client 
the UEL instance at the peer which is triggering the entire operation. All other inter-
UEL interactions occur in service to that originating one; 
• PLL level operation – composed of multiple spanning trees of inter-peer interactions 
at the PLL level. At the root of each such tree, is an inter-PLL interaction which exists 
to service a superior inter-UEL interaction. All other inter-PLL interactions, in the 
same tree, occur in service to that originating one; 
• IPCL level operation – composed of multiple inter-peer interactions at the IPCL level. 
Each such inter-IPCL interaction exists to service a superior inter-PLL interaction; 
 
Individual system operations may be triggered by the attending of user requests or by the 
issuing of requests or instructions by the CCP. 
 
An operation, originated by a user request, will cause a system-wide intra-UEL operation (as 
his request is picked up by the UEL instance at his hosting peer, which will typically resort to 
the UEL instances in other peers). This UEL level operation (set of inter-UEL interactions) 
will cause a PLL level operation (set of sets of inter-PLL interactions), which, in its turn will 
cause an IPCL operation (set of sets of inter-IPCL interactions). Therefore, a user-originated 
operation will be composed of sub operations occurring at each of the system’s layers. 
 
The CCP may trigger operations: 
• at the UEL: 
o to request, from an OCP the updating of its copy of the system’s data 
structure, pertaining to the UEL; 
o to request from a PP the monitoring of some user actions; 
o etc; 
• at the PLL: 
o to request, from an OCP the updating of its copy of the system’s data 
structure, pertaining to the PLL; 
o etc; 
 
Operations triggered, by the CCP, at the UEL or PLL will also imply the occurrence of 
system-wide operations at the inferior layers. 
 
The possible types of inter-peer interactions at every layer, composing the above-described 
operations, are the following: 
• PP-to-PP – in this type of interaction a peripheral peer resorts to the services of 
another PP. Such an interaction may typically be considered a P2P interaction as it 
occurs between hierarchically equal peers and is bidirectional (what APP may 
request from BPP may also be requested by the latter from the earlier); 
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• PP-to-OCP – in this type of interaction a peripheral peer resorts to the services of an 
OCP. Such an interaction may typically be considered a client/server interaction as it 
occurs between hierarchically different peers and is not bidirectional (what APP may 
request from BOCP , typically cannot be requested by the latter from the earlier);  
 
• PP-to-CCP – in this type of interaction a peripheral peer resorts to the services of the 
CCP. Such an interaction may typically be considered a client/server interaction, 
given the hierarchical difference between the peers and the fact that the information 
that a APP may require from CCP cannot also be delivered from the earlier to the 
latter; 
 
• OCP-to-OCP – in this type of interaction an outer core peer resorts to the services of 
another OCP. Such an interaction may typically be considered a P2P interaction, 
given the hierarchical equality between the participating peers and the bi-
directionality of the involved types of requests; 
 
• OCP-to-CCP – in this type of interaction an outer core peer resorts to the services of 
the CCP. Such an interaction may typically be considered a client/server interaction, 
given the broad hierarchical inequality between the participating peers and the lack of 
bidirectionality of the involved types of requests; 
 
• CCP-to-OCP – in this type of interaction the CCP requests something from an OCP 
(e.g. the updating of the information that the OCP is storing). Such an interaction may 
be considered a client/server interaction, given the broad hierarchical inequality 
between the participating peers and the fact that the latter cannot request the same 
from the earlier; 
 
• CCP-to-PP – in this type of interaction the CCP requests something from a PP (e.g. 
the monitoring and reporting of some user activity). Such an interaction may be 
considered a client/server interaction, given the broad hierarchical inequality between 
the participating peers and the fact that the latter cannot request the same from the 
earlier; 
 
Depending on the specific interactions that compose an operation, it may be predominately 
client/server or P2P.  
 
In terms of the involved peer types, the main types of inter-peer interaction sets, (operations) 
that will take place in the system, regardless of the level, are presented in Figure 29. Such 
sets are the following: 
• User triggered interaction sets: 
 
• Type 1 interaction sets – a user submits a request to its hosting PP. If the user’s 
request implies only the reading of (some part of) the system’s overall data 
structure, the handling PP directs the adequate request to the appropriate OCP. 
For instance, if 12
  PPRPPOCP ⊂  (as is exemplified in Figure 26), and 1PP needs 
some information, it will direct a request, (for the needed information), to 2OCP . 
The contacted OCP will respond with the requested information; 
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• Type 2 interaction sets – this interaction set is very similar to the type 1 
interaction set. The difference is that the contacted OCP,( 3OCP ), is for some 
reason, overburdened and thus redirects the PP  to some other OCP ; 
 
• Type 3 interaction sets – a user submits a request to its hosting PP. If the user’s 
request implies only the reading of (a part of) the system’s overall data structure, 
but the request (or some of the sub-procedures it implies) needs to be registered, 
the inter-peer interaction sequence will be similar to a type 1 interaction, except 
for the fact, that the contacted OCP will notify the CCP of the request received 
from the PP; 
 
• Type 4 interaction sets – a user submits a request to its hosting PP. If the user’s 
request implies some change or addition to the system’s global data structure, 
the PP will have to direct the request to the CCP, as the latter is the overall 
maintainer of the system’s global data structure and the gatekeeper of that 
structure in what regards changes made to it. In this situation (exemplified in 
boxed area 4 of Figure 29), the PP will then send the request to CCP. The latter 
evaluates its validity and if everything is ok, it performs the necessary changes to 
the data structure and sends a confirmation to the calling PP. In a parallel 
manner, given the (redundant), distribution of the data structure over the OCPs, 
the CCP will need to update the affected information in all the OCPs. It will thus 
issue update requests to all of them, with the new information, which these will 
store (exemplified by steps 2’ and 3 in boxed area 4 of Figure 29); 
 
• Type 5 interaction sets – this interaction set is very similar to the type 1 
interaction set. The difference (as exemplified in boxed area 5 of Figure 29), is 
that the contacted OCP, 2OCP , hybridizes the operation by redirecting the 
original requesting PP ( 1PP ) to another PP ( 2PP ); 
 
• CCP triggered interaction sets: 
 
• Type 6 interaction sets – due to the occurrence of some change or addition to the 
system’s data structure, the CCP instructs the OCPs to update the data that they 
are storing (as exemplified in boxed area 6 of Figure 29, for a single OCP); 
 
• Type 7 interaction sets – the CCP needs some monitoring information to be 
obtained by some PP. In that regard (as exemplified in boxed area 7 of Figure 
29), it sends a monitoring request to the target PP (step 1). The latter sends an 
acknowledgement and proceeds to perform the capture of the desired 
information. Whenever relevant, the PP sends back to the CCP, event reports 
containing its monitoring activity results. 
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Figure 29 – Basic Inter-Peer Interaction Sequences  
5.2.2 Operation Identification 
In the course of the system’s operation, each of its peers will need to process numerous 
simultaneous operations, handling both user requests and the requests from other peers. 
This results in an overall scenario characterized by an intricate and concurrent set of global 
operations, where each such operation “traverses” multiple peers on multiple layers of the 
system, as it is composed of numerous inter-peer cooperations at multiple levels. 
As all cooperations are performed through the exchanging of messages between the 
cooperating peers, the above-mentioned scenario translates into a complex and concurrent 
mesh of inter-peer message exchanges. 
 
For the system to operate coherently it is necessary that no inadequate cross-
communication occurs, that is, that the procedures and the exchanged messages of different 
operations and cooperations are not confused or mixed up. Operations must thus be clearly 
distinguishable from each other, and so must their internal composing inter-peer interactions, 
and, hence, their supporting messages. 
 
In light of the above, operations must be attributed a system-wide unique identifier at the 
time of their initiation. To do so, whenever a peer (be it a PP, an OCP or the CCP), initiates 
an operation it builds a unique identifier for it, composed of the following parts: 
• the operation initiating peer’s identifier (which is per se system-wide unique); 
• the operation’s initiating time; 
• the operation’s sequence number, within the context of the peer and of the time of its 
initiation. For instance, an operation which is the 12th operation to be initiated by the 
peer (at some specific level, e.g. UEL), since the beginning of the last millisecond, 
will have “12” as its serial identifier; 
 
For instance, if a PP is identified as “p2ptube:ppeer:xpto001”, if the current time in 
milliseconds is “1341227480331”, and if the operation is the “12th” to be initiated by the peer 
in the current millisecond, than the operation’s id is 
“p2ptube:ppeer:xpto001:1341227480331:12”. 
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In order to correctly perform the operations that it starts, a peer will typically have to resort to 
the services of other peers, i.e., establish cooperations with them. These must also be 
uniquely identified. To do so, whenever a peer initiates an inter-peer cooperation, in the 
service of a specific operation, it will produce a unique identifier for it, composed of the 
following parts: 
• the identifier of the encompassing operation; 
• the identifier of the target cooperating peer; 
• the cooperation’s sequence number, within the context of its encompassing operation 
and of the target cooperating peer. For instance, a cooperation which is the 2nd 
cooperation to be initiated within the context (at the service) of the same operation, 
with the same target cooperating peer, will have “2” as its serial identifier; 
 
For instance, if an operation is identified as “p2ptube:ppeer:xpto001:1341227480331:12”, if 
the target cooperating peer is identified as “p2ptube:ppeer:abc1”, and if the cooperation is 
the “2nd” to be initiated in the context of the above mentioned operation with the above 
mentioned peer, than the cooperation’s id is  
 “p2ptube:ppeer:xpto001:1341227480331:12:p2ptube:ppeer:abc1:2”. 
 
Peers may also become involved in operations that they did not start by servicing 
cooperation requests coming from other peers. In order to handle such cooperations, said 
peers may need to initiate further cooperations with other peers, and will, thus, need to 
adequately identify such new cooperations. To do so, whenever a peer initiates an inter-peer 
cooperation, in the service of a specific another cooperation (where it plays the server role), 
it will produce a unique identifier for the new cooperation, composed of the following parts: 
• the identifier of the cooperation request that the new cooperation is servicing, and 
which is, thus, its originating cooperation; 
• the identifier of the target cooperating peer; 
• the cooperation’s sequence number, within the context of its originating cooperation 
and of the target cooperating peer. For instance, a cooperation which is the 3rd 
cooperation to be initiated within the context (at the service) of the same originating 
cooperation, with the same target cooperating peer, will have “3” as its serial 
identifier; 
 
For instance, if an originating cooperation is identified as 
 “p2ptube:ppeer:xpto001:1341227480331:12:p2ptube:ppeer:abc1:2”, if the target 
cooperating peer is identified as “p2ptube:ppeer:abc2”, and if the cooperation is the “3rd” to 
be initiated in the context of the above mentioned cooperation with the above mentioned 
peer, than the cooperation’s id is: 
 “p2ptube:ppeer:xpto001:1341227480331:12:p2ptube:ppeer:abc1:2:p2ptube:ppeer:abc2:3”. 
 
As stated earlier, all cooperations are performed through the exchanging of messages 
between the cooperating peers. These messages must be properly exchanged and 
managed to ensure the correct execution of operations and cooperations. Thus, the 
operation and cooperation identification scheme, presented before, is to be employed in the 
identification of said messages. 
 
Every cooperation comprises the bidirectional exchange of one or more messages between 
two peers (the client peer and the server peer). The identifiers used in those messages are 
composed by the following parts: 
• cooperation ID – the identifier of the comprising cooperation; 
• cooperation side – a string which indicates if the message is coming from the client 
or server side of the interaction. In the earlier case its value is “req”. In the latter case 
said value is “resp”; 
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• counter – a numeric value indicating the cumulative number of messages sent from 
the message’s sender peer to its receiver peer, in the context of the cooperation in 
scope. It is thus a counter of such messages. 
 
 
Figure 30 – Cooperation Mesh Constituting an Operation 
 
Figure 30 presents an example of a mesh of inter-peer cooperations resulting from a single 
operation, illustrating the identifiers of the involved cooperations. That operation (identified 
as 12:3311341227480:p1=opID ), is initiated by peer 1P . To adequately perform it, 
1P solicits cooperations from peers 2P , 6P , 14P  and 9P . From the latter one it actually 
requests two different cooperations, in the scope of the same operation. These are therefore 
identified as 1:p9:opID and 2:p9:opID , respectively. 
The peers initially contacted by 1P  eventually solicit the cooperation of further peers, and so 
on, and thus, the operational mesh of cooperations expands throughout the system’s tissue. 
 
Two of the cooperation chains (sequences of cooperations were each is caused by the 
previous one, and causes the next one, in the chain), are highlighted with different colours to 
emphasise a specific possible operational occurrence. That occurrence consists of a peer 
14P , being involved in two different cooperation chains (of the same operation), at different 
depths of those chains. In the “red” chain 14P  is directly contacted by 1P , and in the “blue” 
chain, it is reached, by the cooperation mesh of operation 12:3311341227480:p1=opID , 
via 2P . 14P  is thus part of the two following cooperation chains: 
• 1:p14:opID  1:p16:1:p14:opID  
• 1:p2:opID   1:p14:1:p2:opID  1:p12:1:p14:1:p2:opID  
 
However, in spite of the possible complexity of the cooperation mesh that results of the 
execution of an operation, once the above defined scheme of operation and cooperation 
identification is employed, (for the identification of the exchanged messages), no cross-
communication or message switching will occur and the operations will unfold successfully. 
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5.2.3 Peer Identification 
Every system peer has a system-wide unique identifier. It is composed of the following parts: 
• the identifier of the system; 
• the identifier of the type of peer; 
• the peer’s unique alphanumeric serial; 
 
Thus, for instance, in a system identified as p2ptube, a peripheral peer with serial xpto001 
will be identified p2ptube:ppeer:xpto001. 
5.3 IPCL Operation 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The IPCL, operates in a purely P2P fashion. It provides the upper layers with communication 
services, through the exchanging of information packets directly between peers. 
5.3.2 Interfacing 
IPCL instances interface with the local PLL instance “above” them, and with remote other 
IPCL instances. As such an IPCL instance exchanges information with both those entities, in 
both directions and (given the P2P nature of the system), in both the client and server roles. 
 
The purpose of the IPCL is to attend to the requests of the PLL. Doing so, basically consists 
only of relaying internal outbound PLL messages to external PLL instances (PLL instances 
of remote peers), and external inbound PLL messages to the local PLL. 
 
To supply such a service, the IPCL requires the delivery of the following parameters: 
• from the local PLL instance, (in the case of an outbound internal PLL message): 
o the IP address of the destination peer; 
o the PLL message to be sent; 
• from a remote IPCL instance, (in the case of an inbound external PLL message): 
o the actual exchanged IPCL message (from which the PLL message is 
extracted and passed up to the PLL); 
 
Outbound messages are sent over TCP/IP to the destination peer. Inbound ones are relayed 
to the local PLL. 
5.4 PLL Operation 
5.4.1 Introduction 
The PLL offers a set of core functionalities to enable: 
• the security (confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and non-repudiatiability), of all 
messages exchanged between peers; 
• the registration, removal, login and logoff of peripheral peers from the system (in a 
client/server manner); 
• the registration and removal of outer core peers (client/server manner); 
• the resolution of peer contact endpoints and authentication info, (in a hybrid manner); 
• the shunning and readmission of peripheral and outer core peers (client/server 
manner). 
 
Every peer has a unique identifier as well as a unique asymmetrical key pair composed of a 
public key, (
iP
K ), and a private key ( 1−
iP
K ), which it employs for its authentication. The 
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ultimate register of the public part of this authentication information, ( ,,
iPi
Kp ), and of the 
contact endpoints of peers is the CCP ’s PLL. It is assumed that the PLL of all peripheral 
and outer core peers “knows” CCP ’s public key. 
 
The following sections explain, in detail, how the PLL provides the above mentioned 
functionalities. 
5.4.2 Secure Messaging 
Inter PLL communication security is assured by the PLL itself. It thus assures the 
confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and non-repudiatiability of all messages involved in that 
communication.  
 
The procedure employed to assure communicational security varies slightly depending on 
whether the communicating peers have already established a communication session or not. 
5.4.2.1 Pre-Connection Secure Messaging 
The procedure employed to assure that two peers may communicate securely, before they 
have established a communication session between them, is always the same regardless of 
the types of conversing peers and of the role they play in the interaction (“client” or “server”).  
 
 
Figure 31 – Pre-Connection Secure Messaging Procedure 
 
Figure 31 exemplifies the procedure in scope (taking into consideration the notation defined 
in section 5.1 of the present chapter), with generic peer iP playing the client role and generic 
peer kP playing the server role. 
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The interaction initiating peer, iP , begins by sending the message 
( )infoinforeqMsg sk
P
iP
kP
iP
,ProdFpreConnMsg=  to kP  expressing its request (step 1), where 
( ) 






−
=
1
, ,,,Ø,, ftrf,ProdFpreConnMsg
iPkP
s
kP
iP
KSigInfoKEncInfoserial
s
infoinfoinfo . That 
message contains a transformed (by function  ...ftrf ), version of the information to be sent. 
 
That function takes as parameters the following set: 
• 
s
info  – is the sensitive information being transmitted. It must always carry, besides 
other information, the specification of the type the request; 
 
• info  – in the non-sensitive information being transmitted, which, in this case, is null; 
 
• serial  – is a serial identifier that enables the logical binding between messages and 
the operations and cooperations that they pertain to (see section 5.2.2). It also 
performs the unique differentiation between all exchanged messages so that no two 
messages are ever alike. If a repetition is ever detected, it is either an error or a 
replay attack and the message must be discarded. The serial carries the following 
data: 
o the identifier of the overall operation which encompasses the cooperation to 
which the message pertains; 
o the identifier of the inter-peer cooperation to which the message pertains. 
Given the way its structure is defined, (see section 5.2.2), this identifier 
carries the identification of all the previous cooperations in the cooperation 
chain that lead to the current cooperation. It is the last link in the chain that 
actually defines the present cooperation. It includes in its structure the 
identification of the sender and receiver peers; 
o 
kP
iP
cntr – a cumulative counter of all the messages sent from iP  to kP in the 
course of the present cooperation, preceded by the “req” or “resp” string if the 
comprising message is coming from the “client” or “server” peer; 
o a timestamp indicating the message’s creation time; 
The set composed by the identifier of the inter-peer cooperation and 
kP
iP
cntr constitutes 
the comprising message’s identifier, in accordance with what was defined in section 
5.2.2 
 
• EncInfo  - carries the necessary information to enable the authorized receiving party 
to decode the message. It thus contains: the identification of the peer whose public 
key was employed to cipher the overall message ( kP ), so that only such peer may 
decipher it; the definition of the ciphering algorithm; the identifier of said public key; 
 
• the public key of the destination peer (it is employed to encrypt the message’s secure 
content); 
 
• SigInfo  - carries the necessary information to enable the authorized receiving party 
to validate the signature of message’s contents. It thus contains: the identification of 
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the peer whose private key was employed to sign the overall message ( iP ); the 
definition of the signing algorithm; the identifier of the employed private key; the 
identifier of the corresponding public key; and the actual public key. SigInfo , which 
will be sent to the receiving peer, includes the public key, of the sender peer, in the 
cases were the peer is performing its initial connection to the CCP (registering), as in 
that case the CCP (receiving peer) does not yet know that information. In all other 
cases, the value of the public key will not be sent as the destination peer must 
discover it through the adequately reliable means – asking the CCP (or some OCP); 
 
• the private key of the source peer (it is employed to sign the message’s content); 
 
Function 






BA KSigInfoKEncInfoserialyx ,,,,,,ftrf , performs its work by concatenating the 
SigInfo parameter with the serial identifier, with 
s
info and with the signature (by iP ) of info , 
and by signing that set with iP ’s private key, and ciphering the result with kP ’s public key. The 
ciphered result is then concatenated with EncInfo . The information block resulting from the 
previous operations is them concatenated with info . 
The signing process, enables the receiving peer to verify the integrity and origin authenticity 
of the ( )








−
infosignature
s
infoserialSigInfo
iP
K 1
 set and, consequently, of info . It also 
guarantees the non-repudiability, by iP , of that information. The ciphering process ensures 
the confidentiality of the exchanged information, as only kP may decipher it. The presence of 
the EncInfo , in plain text, concatenated with the ciphering result is necessary in order to 
enable the receiving peer, at the PLL, to know how to proceed to unpack it (what keys to 
employ). The fact that EncInfo  is in plain text poses no security problems, as it does not 
carry any secret key. 
 
In the next step of the interaction (step 2), kP responds to iP , by sending it the message 
( )infoinforspMsg si
P
kP
iP
kP
,ProdFpreConnMsg= , expressing its response, where 








−
=
1
, ,,,Ø,,ftrfProdFpreConnMsg
kPiPs
iP
kP
KSigInfoKEncInfoserialinfo . The structure of this 
message, and the way it is produced, is similar to the structure and production mode of 
kP
iP
reqMsg . The only differences are the following: 
• sinfo must, now, always carry, besides other information, the specification of the type 
of response; 
• the employed serial identifier (








=
iP
kP
j
kP
iP
j serialserialserial ), is now composed by two 
parts. The first one is the serial that was received in the request message. The 
second part is the actual serial of the kP -> iP direction. The latter construct, carries 
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the same data as the previous with the exception that the counter value may be 
different and that the timestamp’s value is necessarily different; 
• the ( )








−
infosignature
s
infoserialSigInfo
kP
K 1
information set now contains the 
signature of info  by kP  (instead of iP ), and is now signed with kP ’s private key and 
ciphered with iP ’s public key. 
 
The structure of the response serial enables: 
• the unique identification of the message and thus, its differentiation from all others; 
• the logical association, at the receiving end, of the response message to the original 
request message to which its responds; 
• the proving, by kP , that it, in fact possesses kP ’s private key ( 1−kPK ), and thus is kP - 
This is so because the ( )








−
infosignature
s
infoserialSigInfo
kP
K 1
 information set is 
signed with 1−
kP
K . That set contains (inside serial ) the serial of the request message. 
This serial was never produced before, and thus, its inclusion, in the response serial, 
and signing, proves that the response message cannot be a repetition of any kind 
and that kP  has therefore just now produced it, employing 1−kPK . 
Obviously, the interaction between kP and iP , may continue with further requests from iP and 
responses from kP . The employed messages would have the same structure, and production 
mode as explained above, but, from this point (step 2) on, the serial in the request 
messages would also include the new part of the serial of the previous response messages 
in the interaction. Thus, for instance, in a hypothetical next request 1+j , (from iP  to kP ), 
which is following up on the previous response j  (from kP  to iP ), we would have that 








= +
kP
iP
j
iP
kP
j serialserialserial 1 . 
 
This chaining of serials enables that which was described in the previous bullets. 
 
The procedure above described, (pre-connection secure messaging), is only employed when 
a peer is in the process of registering (see section 5.4.3 of the present chapter), with the 
system (communication withCCP ), or in the (post-registering) process of establishing a 
communication session (see section 5.4.5 of the present chapter) with another peer.  
5.4.2.2 Post-Connection Secure Messaging 
The procedure employed to assure that two peers may communicate securely, after they 
have established a communication session between themselves, is always the same 
regardless of the types of conversing peers and of the role (“client” or “server”), that they 
play in the interaction. 
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Figure 32 exemplifies said procedure (taking into consideration the notation defined in 
section 5.1 of the present chapter), with generic peer iP playing the client role and generic 
peer kP  playing the server role. 
 
Figure 32 – Post-Connection Secure Messaging Procedure 
 
In step 1, iP  sends a ( )infoinforeqMsg sk
P
iP
kP
iP
,gProdFpostConnMs=
 message to kP expressing its 
request, where 










−
−
= 1,,,,,,ftrfgProdFpostConnMs ,
kP
kPiP
g
ss
iP
kP
KSigInfosKEncInfoserialinfoinfo . 
That message contains a transformed version of the information to be sent (achieved by 
function .....ftrf ). That function takes as parameters the following set: 
• sinfo  – is the sensitive part of the information being transmitted. It must always carry, 
besides other information, the specification the type of the request; 
 
• info  – is the non-sensitive part of the information being transmitted; 
 
• serial  – is a serial identifier that enables the unique differentiation between all 
exchanged messages so that no two messages are ever alike. If a repetition is ever 
detected, it is either an error or a replay attack and the message must be discarded. 
The serial carries the following data: 
o the identifier of the overall operation which encompasses the cooperation to 
which the message pertains; 
o the identifier of the inter-peer cooperation to which the message pertains. 
Given the way its structure is defined, (see section 5.2.2), this identifier 
carries the identification of all the previous cooperations in the cooperation 
chain that lead to the current cooperation. It is the last link in the chain that 
actually defines the present cooperation. It includes in its structure the 
identification of the sender and receiver peers; 
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o 
kP
iP
cntr – a cumulative counter of all the messages sent from iP  to kP in the 
course of the present cooperation, preceded by the “req” or “resp” string if the 
comprising message is coming from the “client” or “server” peer; 
o a timestamp indicating the message’s creation time; 
The set composed by the identifier of the inter-peer cooperation and 
kP
iP
cntr constitutes 
the comprising message’s identifier, in accordance with what was defined in section 
5.2.2 
 
• EncInfo  - carries the necessary information to enable the authorized receiving party 
to decode the message. It carries only kPiPgs
− (the identifier of the communication 
session, between iP  and kP , in which takes place the inter peer cooperation that the 
message belongs to), as that information suffices for the receiving peer to be able to 
contextualise the message and know how to decode it; 
• the secret session key
kPiP
g
s
s
K
−
, (it is employed in the message’s ciphering); 
 
• SigInfo  - carries the necessary information to enable the authorized receiving party 
to validate the signature of message’s contents. It thus contains: the identification of 
the peer whose private key was employed to sign the overall message ( iP ); the 
definition of the signing algorithm; the identifier of the employed private key; the 
identifier of the corresponding public key; and the actual public key; 
 
• the private key of the source peer; 
 
Function 






BA KSigInfoKEncInfoserialyx ,,,,,,ftrf , performs its work by concatenating 
SigInfo  with the serial identifier, with sinfo , and with the signature (by iP ) of info , and by 
signing that set with iP ’s private key, and ciphering the result with the secret session 
key,
kPiP
gs
sK
−
.  It then concatenates the ciphering result with EncInfo . The information block 
resulting from the previous operations is them concatenated with info . 
 
The signing processes enables the receiving peer to verify the integrity and origin 
authenticity of the ( )








−
infosignature
s
infoserialSigInfo
iP
K 1
set and, consequently, of info . It 
also guarantees the non-repudiability, by kP , of that information. The ciphering process 
ensures the confidentiality of the sensitive exchanged information, 
( )








−
infosignature
s
infoserialSigInfo
iP
K 1
, as only kP  knows 
kPiP
gs
sK
−
. The presence of the 
communication session’s identifier, in plain text (inside EncInfo ), concatenated with the 
ciphering result is necessary in order to enable the receiving peer, at the PLL, to know the 
message’s context, and thus, how to proceed to unpack it (what keys to employ). 
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In the next step of the interaction (step 2), kP  responds to iP , by sending it the message 
( )infoinforspMsg si
P
kP
iP
kP
,gProdFpostConnMs= , expressing its response, where 










−
−
= 1,,,,,,ftrfgProdFpostConnMs
kP
kPiP
gs
s
iP
kP
KSigInfoKEncInfoserialinfo
s
info . The structure of this 
message, and the way it is produced, is similar to the structure and production mode 
of
kP
iP
reqMsg . The only differences are the following: 
• sinfo , must, now, always carry, besides other information, the specification the type 
of the response; 
• the employed serial identifier (












=
−− kPiP
gs
j
iP
kP
KPiP
gs
j
kP
iP
serialserialserial ), is now composed 
by two parts. The first one is the serial that was received in the request message. 
The second part is the actual serial of the kP -> iP direction. The latter construct, 
carries the same data as the previous with the exception that the counter value may 
be different and that the timestamp’s value is mandatorily different; 
• the ( )








−
infosignature
s
infoserialSigInfo
kP
K 1
 information set is now signed with kP ’s, 
and not iP ’s, private key. 
 
The structure of the response serial enables: 
• the unique and authenticated identification of the message and thus, its 
differentiation from all others and its binding to its comprising operation and 
cooperation; 
• the logical association, at the receiving end, of the response message to the request 
message to which its responds; 
 
Obviously, the interaction between kP and iP , may continue with further requests from iP and 
responses from kP . The employed messages would have the same structure and production 
mode as explained above, but, from this point on (step 2), the serial  in the request 
messages would also include the new part of the serial  of the previous response message 
in the interaction. Thus, for instance, in a hypothetical next request 1+j , (from iP  to kP ), 
which is following up on the previous response j  (from kP  to iP ), we would have that 












=
−
+
− kPiP
gs
j
iP
kP
KPiP
gs
j
kP
iP
serialserialserial
1
. 
 
This chaining of serials enables that which was described in the previous bullets. 
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5.4.3 Peer Registration 
Before a peripheral or outer core peer is ready to start its participation in the system, it must 
first go through an initialization or registration phase (that takes place at the PLL).   
 
If at a given moment, (such as the moment of their original start-up), a specific peer knew 
nothing about any other system peers, it would be impossible for it to ever become 
connected to the system. To prevent such situations a bootstrapping procedure is employed: 
all system peers have hardcoded into them, the unchanging IP address of the CCP and its 
authentication information (public key).  
5.4.3.1 Peripheral Peer Registration 
This process is performed in a client/server manner, (between the PP and the CCP 
respectively), the first time a peripheral peer interacts with the system. The process, 
occurring at the PPL, is depicted in Figure 33 (taking into consideration the notation defined 
in section 5.1 of the present chapter). 
 
The registering peripheral peer, iPP, begins by sending CCP the message 
( )infoinforegreqmsg sCCP
iPP
CCP
iPP
,ProdFpreConnMsg= , where ( ) Ø,regreq == infosidinfo
iPPs
 (step 1). 
In accordance with what was specified in section 5.4.2.1, 
CCP
iPP
regreqmsg  will contain the 
information block 





iPP
sidserialSigInfo regreq , signed with iPP’s private key (assuring its 
integrity and authenticity of origin), and encrypted with the CCP’s  public key ( CCPK ), so that 
only CCP may read it (assuring confidentiality).  
 
regreq  is the identifier of the type of message. 
iPP
sid  is a signed package 
( 






−
iPP
iPP
K
id1signed ) containing iPP’s identification information 
( 






−
=
iPPiPPiPPiiPP
KkkoAlgrthmInfppid 1 ). It is signed by iPP so that any system peer can 
assert that iPP validates that information (its thus cannot be faked, even by CCP). It is 
signed independently from (and redundantly to) the overall message so that it may latter be 
independently redistributed.  
 
CCP then verifies the validity of the received message. If all is correct, it sends back (step 2) 
a challenge message to iPP, to check if it truly possesses the private key corresponding to 
iPP
K , (that iPP specified in iPPsid ), as the message received in step 1, even if signed with 
said private key, may be a repetition attack. In the challenge message 
Ø, == inforegchlginfos . Said message, (in accordance with the process described in 
section 5.4.2.1), contains the ( )regchlgserialSigInfo  set. SigInfo  carries the necessary 
information to enable the validation of message content’s signature (mentioned next in the 
text),  regchlg  is the identification of the type of message. serial  carries a composed serial, 
consisting of a concatenation of the serial received in the request message, plus a new 
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serial 
iPP
CCP
jserial . This content is signed byCCP, and is encrypted with iPPK  so that only iPP 
may read it (assuring confidentiality). By containing the older serial it proves thatCCP is who 
it claims to be, as it has signed a random unique peace of data, generated and delivered by 
iPP. iPP will fully prove its possession of 
1−
iPP
K  by signing the newer (CCPgenerated) serial 
(which, in accordance with what was specified in section 5.4.2.1, it has to do). 
iPP thus proceeds to produce a third serial, concatenate it with the one received from CCP, 
and sign the set of serials, which it then sends to CCP (step 3). 
 
 
Figure 33 – Peripheral Peer Registration Process 
 
Finally CCP validates the signature of the received serials. If all is ok, at this point, both iPP 
and CCP are assured that their partner, in the interaction, is in fact in possession of the 
private key it claims to be, and thus, is who it claims to be.  As such, CCP produces iPP’s  
registration certificate, (










−
= vtermperiphsidSigInfoidrcertif
iPPCCPKi
PP 1signed ),  
and sends it to iPP (step 4). This certificate contains its identifier ( id ), SigInfo (carries the 
necessary information to enable the validation of the certificate’s signature, where ( )CCPCCPCCP KkkoAlgrthmInfccpSigInfo 1−= ), iPPsid , the indication of the role that iPP plays 
in the system (peripheral peer), and the validity term after which it expires. It is signed 
independently from (and redundantly to) the overall message so that it may latter be 
independently redistributed. It may be freely exchanged amongst the peer community as a 
proof of iPP’s andCCP’s mutual acceptance of iPP’s participation in the system, (as a 
peripheral peer), and of its public authentication credentials.  
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5.4.3.2 Outer Core Peer Registration 
The initialization of an outer core peer consists of its registration withCCP, its retrieval, 
fromCCPof the system’s data structure and of the definition of its interval of servicing 
responsibility, over the peripheral peer collective. 
 
The registration procedure of outer core peers is in all similar to the homologous procedure 
for peripheral peers (explained in 5.4.3.1 of the present chapter). The main differences are 
the following: 
• given the sensitive role that OCPs  play in the system, they are not to be simple user 
owned peers. Instead, just as is the case for theCCP, OCPsare especially powerful 
peers owned and operated by the system’s operating entity. This way the 
acceptance, byCCP, of a specific iOCP , does not depend only on iOCP proving its 
possession of its claimed original key pair. Whenever an OCP adhesion request is 
received by theCCP, the latter will require user (system operating entity), input 
accepting theOCP’s adhesion. Thus, an OCP’s registration is a user assisted 
process; 
• the registering outer core peer, iOCP , is given a registration certificate, iOCPrcertif , 
which validates its role as an outer core peer, instead of as a peripheral peer. 
 
After an OCP registers, it will then open a communication session with CCP (in the manner 
explained in section 5.4.5), which will remain opened indefinitely. Once the above defined 
process is completed the CCP will automatically, instruct the OCP , to store the system’s 
data structure (in the manned described in section 5.4.8.6) and also instruct it about its 
interval of servicing responsibility (in the manner described in section 5.4.8.7). 
5.4.3.3 Post Registration Actions 
The registration of a new peer means that the system’s data model needs to be updated to 
account for said peer. The CCP updates its own copy (the main copy), of said structure, as it 
is processing the request of the prospective new peer (if the request is accepted). It later 
proceeds to the updating of the data structures, at allCCPs, in the manner described in 
section 5.4.8.6 of the present chapter. 
5.4.4 Peer Registration Update 
Once a peer’s registration certificate expires or if, for some reason, a peer’s key pair is 
compromised, the peer must update its registration. To do so (considering that the peer 
already has a communication session established with the CCP), it issues a registration 
update request (in the secure manner explained in section 5.4.2.2), 
where 




=
iPPs
sidinfo regupdreq , and 
iPP
sid contains the peer’s new identification 
parameters. If all is ok the CCP responds (in the secure manner explained in section 
5.4.2.2), with the peer’s new registration and connection certificates. 
 
If there is not even the possibility of securely establishing a communication session with the 
CCP, then, the registration update process will be in all similar to the one described in 
section 5.4.3, with the exception that 




=
iPPs
sidinfo regupdreq and not 





=
iPPs
sidinfo regreq . 
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5.4.5 Communication Session Establishment  
Before any two peers can communicate they must first establish a communication session 
between them. This is true for inter-peripheral, periphery to outer core, peripheral to central 
core and intra-core peer communication.  
 
This PLL process enables the combination, between the communicating peers, of a secret 
symmetric key, (
CCPiP
gs
sK
−
), to be employed in the ciphering of all later communication 
between them, within that session (the thg  session).  Taking into consideration the notation 
defined in section 5.1 (of the present chapter), this process, occurring at the PPL, is depicted 
in Figure 34, for the connection between a generic peer, iP  and CCP . 
 
 
Figure 34 – Inter-Peer Communication Session Establishment Process 
 
This processes’ initial step (step 1), is similar to the first step described in the registration 
process (section 5.4.3.1 of the present chapter). The difference being that the sent message 
contains the registration certificate (
iPP
rcertif ) of the communication initiating peer ( iP ) 
instead of its 
iP
sid . 
CCP
 obtains the identification information for iP  from its database, and validates the 
message and 
iP
rcertif (if the “server” peer, in this interaction was not CCP but a peripheral 
peer, it would obtain the requesting peer’s identification information in the manner explained 
in section 5.4.7 of the present chapter). If all is correct, it then proceeds to step 2, sending a 
challenge message to iP , to check the veracity of its claimed identity. That message, in 
accordance with what is defined in section 5.4.2.1, contains its SigInfo  field, the identifier 
of the type of message ( connchlg ) and the serial sent by iP , as well as a second new 
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unique serial generated by CCP , that iP  will have to sign to fully prove its identity. These 
contents of the challenge message are then signed by CCP , (which proves that CCP in 
fact possesses 1−CCPK , and thus is CCP ), encrypted with iPK so that only iP  may decipher it 
(assuring confidentiality), and concatenated with EncInfo .  
In a third step, iP  proceeds (in accordance with the procedure defined in section 5.4.2.1) to 
sign the CCP generated serial, plus a third new serial (plus pconnchlgrs ), and sends the 
result back to CCP (step 3). 
CCP
 then validates the signature of the serial it sent to iP  in step 2. If all is correct 
CCP produces the session identifier (
CCPiP
gs
−
), and the secret session encoding key 
(
CCPiP
gs
sK
−
). Employing those two objects, plus 
iPP
rcertif , CCPrcertif , the adequate 
SigInfo
 object, and a validity term, CCP  builds the connection certificate CCP
iP
ccertif
 (with 
a unique id  of its own), and sends it to iP  (step 4). CCPiPccertif  is signed by CCP , enabling 
the verification of its validity, throughout the system, in a distributed manner. From this point 
on, the communication session between the two peers is considered open. Communication, 
between the two peers will proceed in accordance with what is defined in section 5.4.2.2. 
 
In the case where the peer playing the server role is the CCP , (as in the provided example), 
this procedure is equivalent to the login of the client peer with the system, and the 
connection certificate may also be seen as a login certificate. 
 
The above presented description, exemplifies the establishing of a communication session, 
between a generic peer and the CCP . The actual specific types of communication session 
establishments that will occur in the system (in terms of the involved peers), and their 
relevant details are the following: 
• the establishment, by peripheral peers, of communication sessions with: 
o the CCP : 
 for a peripheral peer to be eligible to participate in the system it must 
have a opened communication session with CCP (the equivalent of 
login into the system). Thus, whenever a registered peripheral 
peer, iPP, comes on-line, it must first establish a new communication 
session  withCCP , which should remain open until iPP goes offline; 
 in step 4 the sent communication certificate will also include the 
identity of the OCP  which will be responsible for handling the “read-
only” requests of the peripheral peer, until the end of the session. 
Thus 










=











 −
−
−
CCPiPP
gs
s
K
iP
Kx
CCPiPP
g
CCPK
CCP
iPP
encocpsvtermrcertifsSigInfoidsignedccertif 1
 
o outer core peers: 
 in the step corresponding to step 1, (from Figure 34), the sent 
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certificate will be the connection certificate ( CCP
iPP
ccertif ) that iPP, 
obtained when it connected/logged in with the CCP ; 
o other peripheral peers; 
 in the step corresponding to step 1, (from Figure 34), the sent 
certificate will be the connection certificate ( CCP
iPP
ccertif ) that iPP, 
obtained when it connected/logged in with the CCP ; 
• the establishment, by outer core peers, of communication sessions with: 
o the CCP : 
 for an outer core peer to be eligible to participate in the system it must 
have a opened communication session with CCP (the equivalent of 
logging into the system). Peripheral peers will be intermittently 
connected to the system, and thus frequently establish new 
communication sessions with the peers that they need to 
communicate to. Thus, communication sessions established between 
peripheral peers and CCP will typically be of a relatively short 
duration. Oppositely, outer core peers are to be permanently 
available. The first time an outer core peer, iOCP , comes on-line, 
(once it has registered with CCP ), it will establish a communication 
session, with CCP , that will only end when iOCP ceases to operate, 
or if the session key is compromised and needs to be replaced; 
o other outer core peers; 
 in the step corresponding to step 1, (from Figure 34), the sent 
certificate will be the connection certificate ( CCP
iPP
ccertif ) that iOCP , 
obtained when it registered with the CCP . 
5.4.6 Peer Login 
Once a peer has registered with the system, every time it comes online, before it can 
actually begin interacting with it, said peer must first login. That process basically consists of 
the establishment of a communication session with theCCP , in the manner explained in 
section 5.4.5 of the present chapter. In the course of the process the peer, that is logging in, 
is given a connection certificate. Said certificate may, in this case be seen, also, as a login 
certificate. 
 
If the connecting peer is peripheral, the responsibility for servicing its login request must be 
attributed to some specificOCP . This is done through the procedure outlined in section 
5.4.8.7 of the present chapter. 
 
The login of a peer means that a new entity is now available to cooperate with the system. 
This is a relevant piece of information that needs to be stored in the system’s data structure, 
so that it may be coherently handled, accessed and updated. The CCP  updates its own 
copy of that structure, while processing the login request (if it is accepted). It later proceeds 
to the updating of the data structures, at all OCPs , in the manner described in section 
5.4.8.6 of the present chapter. 
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5.4.7 PLL Info Discovery  
The regular operation of any peer, at the PLL, implies that peripheral peers will frequently 
need to discover information on other peers (such as identifier, IP address, public key, 
whether it is quarantined or expelled, etc.), so that they can communicate in a reliable 
manner.  
 
The process, undertaken by peripheral peers, to obtain any PLL information is performed in 
a client/server or hybrid manner. This PLL process happens as follows (taking into 
consideration the notation defined in section 5.1 of the present chapter). 
 
Assuming that a communication session has already been established between the inquiring 
peripheral peer (e.g. iPP), and its servicing OCP , the earlier begins by sending (in the 
secure manner defined in section 5.4.2.2 of the present chapter), to the latter, a request 
message (  ,reqpllinfo 




 info
s
info
jOCP
iPP
), where the sensitive part of the information, 
( )infoDef
s
info reqpllinfo= , contains a parameter, ( reqpllinfo ), which identifies the 
message as a request for some PLL info, and a second parameter ( infoDef ), indicating the 
specific information that it wants. 
jOCP  may immediately send back a message, with the required data 
(  , 




 info
s
inforsppllinfoi
PP
jOCP
, ( )data desired thersppllinfo=
s
info ), or it may send back a message 
redirecting iPP  to some other peripheral peer jPP  (or outer core peer), where 






= s
iPP
pllInfo pllildoretrpermitsinfo rsppllinfo . That redirection message, contains, besides 
the message type identifier, an, OCP signed, PLL info retrieval permit ( iPPpllInforetrpermit ), 
enabling it to retrieve the desired information, and the spllildo object, which describes the 
location(s) from where iPP may retrieve said information. The retrieval permit may be 
described as  
 












−
=
s
pllildoi
jOCP
K
iPP
pllInfo idinfoDefvtermppSigInforetrpermit rPermpllInfoRetidsigned 1 . It 
contains the permit’s identifier, its type identifier, the permit’s adequate SigInfo (where 






=
−
jOCPjOCPjOCPj
KkkoAlgrthmInfocpSigInfo 1 ), the identifier of the peer to which the 
permit is granted, the permit’s validity term, the definition of the specific information which 
may be retrieved ( infoDef ) and the identifier of the spllildo object. 
 
As stated, infoDef , is the part of the original request, and of the permit, that identifies the 
type of information that is desired or which may be retrieved, respectively. It may bear the 
following values: 
• if the desired information is the identification (location and authentication), 
information on some specific peer (e.g. kPP ),  then ( )kpppIDInfoinfoDef = . In this 
case, the information object that will eventually be obtained is 
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





=
−
vtermIPrcertifSigInfoidppInfo kkPP
jOCP
Ks 1
signed , where vterm  is this 
object’s validity term date; 
• if the desired information is the quarantine or expulsion lists then 
( )quarListinfoDef =  or ( )expListinfoDef =  respectively. In this case, the 
information object that will eventually be obtained, will respectively be ( )tstampQListSigInfoquarList
jOCP
Ks 1
signed
−
= , or 
( )tstampXListSigInfoexpList
jOCP
K
s 1
signed
−
= , where tstamp  indicates the 
moment of creation of those objects, so that the peers employing them may know 
how recent that information is. 
 
In both such cases 





=
−
jOCPjOCPjOCPj
KkkoAlgrthmInfocpSigInfo 1 . 
 
The PLL Information Location Describing Object may be defined as 











=
−
n
PPiPP
jOCP
Ks
rcertifrcertifvterminfoDefSigInfoidpllildo ......signed 1 . It carries 
SigInfo (which takes the same form as the one that was just described above), the definition 
of the information set to who’s location it pertains ( infoDef ), its validity term and a list of the 
registration certificates of the peers from where the information, defined in infoDef , may be 
retrieved. 
 
The signing, by jOCP , of the retrieval permit and of spllildo , even if redundant (as the 
sensitive part of the PLL message is signed by the sending peer), is necessary to enable the 
latter independent reuse of those objects and their communication to other peers in an 
authenticable form. Both those objects carry inside the identification of their issuing peers, 
for much the same reason, so that any peer may authenticate said objects. 
 
If jOCP does redirect iPP, in the next step of the operation, the latter will then establish a 
communication session with one (or more), of the peers identified in spllildo (by their 
registration certificates), and obtain from it, the desired information. To do so, in its request 
for the desired information, iPP will need to send (amongst other fields), both the retrieval 
permit and spllildo , so that the contacted peer(s) may validate iPP’s right to retrieve the 
information in scope. 
 
As can be seen, from the above description, for a peer to be able to communicate with some 
other peer, it will need some information about it, which it, generally, can only obtain through 
communication with other peers. If at any moment a peer knew nothing about any other peer 
it would be stuck in a situation where it would never be able to communicate with any other 
peer. This is avoided because every peer “knows”, from the start, the IP and public key (and 
its identifier) of the CCP .This way, even if a peer knows nothing else, it may always contact 
CCP and obtain all the information it needs. Furthermore, if, for some reason, the 
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necessary jOCP , for obtaining the identification of a target peer, is not available, the request 
for that information is redirected to CCP or some other OCP .
5.4.8 Management  
5.4.8.1 Introduction 
The proper operation of the PLL demands that some management procedures are 
undertaken periodically, or in response to some event, to assure the overall integrity and 
cooperativeness of the peer tissue. 
 
These operations are centrally performed by the CCP , (based on notifications received form 
the periphery or outer core), which does all the necessary decision making, and translate 
into the issuing of CCP instructions to OCPs or PPs . 
 
Said notifications may be generally described as 
( )ntnotifcontenotiftypeSigInfonotif
iP
KiP
pll
1signed −= , where SigInfo  carries the necessary 
information to enable the validation of the notification, notiftype designates the type of 
notification, and ntnotifconte is the actual content of the notification. 
The mentioned instructions may be generally described as 
( )ntentinstructcopeinstructtySigInfoinstruct
CCPK
pll
iP
CCP 1signed −= , where SigInfo carries the 
necessary information to enable the validation of the instruction, peinstructty  designates the 
type of instruction, and ntentinstructco  is the actual content of the instruction.  
 
The main PLL management operations can basically be summed up as the redistribution of 
PP  servicing workload ofOCPs, the neutralization of infringing or faulty behaviour on the 
part of peers, and the updating of OCPdata structures 
5.4.8.2 OCP Workload Redistribution 
As peripheral peers log into the system, the CCP distributes the responsibility, to service 
such peers, in an even manner, through theOCPs. However, some PPs may represent 
higher servicing burdens than others. This means that the CCP must somehow obtain 
information on the work burden ofOCPs, and proceed to redistribute their servicing 
assignments, if necessary. 
 
For this reason, every OCP periodically sends (in the secure manner defined in section 
5.4.2.2), to CCP an activity notification which may be described as 
( )( )wrklistwrkldocptidSigInfonotifactiv i
iOCP
K
pll
tT
iOCP
activitysigned 1−
=
=  (in a message where 








=
=
pll
tT
iOCPs
notifactivinfo notifload ). This notification contains the adequate SigInfo  object, 
the definition of the type of notification, its unique identifier, the definition of the time instant 
which it purports to, the identification of the sending OCP, its total work burden (in terms of 
the percentage of CPU usage), and a list discriminating the division of that burden over the 
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peripheral peers that It is servicing 








= 








n
PPnPP wrkldppwrkldppwrklist ...11 . 
CCP acknowledges the reception of the notification with a PLL messages where 
( )cknotifloada=sinfo . 
The notification object is independently (and redundantly) signed so as to enable their 
independent treatment and aggregation in an authenticable form. 
 
The CCP collects the mentioned notifications, from all OCPs and, periodically, evaluates the 
overall situation. If the global workload distribution is uneven, the CCP determines which 
PPs must be reassigned to which other OCPs and proceeds to instruct those reassignments 
in the manner described in section 5.4.8.7 of the present chapter. 
5.4.8.3 Infringing or Faulty Peer Behaviour Neutralization 
The system is composed by a distributed mesh of independently controlled peers. Some are 
under the control of the system’s operating entity and others are controlled by regular users 
of varied levels of trustworthiness.  
There is thus a non-negligible possibility of failure and of infringing behaviour occurring 
amongst such peers, that the system must be prepared to deal with. 
 
This means that the CCP  must somehow obtain information about undesirable behaviour 
on the part of peers. For this to occur it must be the PPs  and OCPs to notify, to CCP , 
whenever some other peer behaves inappropriately towards them. Such reports must carry 
proof of the claimed misbehaviour. 
 
For the present time the system supports only the reporting of a misbehaviour where the 
misbehaving peer responds with signed but corrupted or forged information, such as, for 
instance, a corrupted version of a PLL info retrieval permit (see section 5.4.7). 
 
Thus whenever a peer iP  receives a request or reply message, signed by another peer kP , 
whose contents are undecipherable or (if it is the case that they are to be signed, for 
instance, by the CCP  or an OCP ), incorrectly signed, it proceeds to send (in the secure 
manner defined in section 5.4.2.2), a misbehaviour notification (pertaining to kP ) to CCP , 
which may be described as: 
 
( )




=
−
proofObjpptidSigInfoehavnotifmissb ki
iP
K
pll
CCP
iP
missbehavsigned 1 , where ip is 
the identifier of the sending peer and proofObj  is the received signed message. The 
notification is sent in a PLL message where 








=
pll
CCP
iPs
ehavnotifmissbinfo notifbehav , which 
the CCP  acknowledges with a response PLL message where  ( )acknotifbehav=sinfo . 
pll
CCP
iP
ehavnotifmissb is independently (and redundantly to the securing process described in 
section 5.4.2.2), signed to enable a more independent, and still authenticable, manipulation 
of it. 
 
The CCP  periodically analyses all pending reports and decides what to do regarding the 
“criticized” peers. It may do nothing, it may suspend or it may expel the peer. In the two latter 
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cases the CCP  proceeds in accordance with what is described in section 5.4.8.4 of the 
present chapter. 
 
On the other hand, the case of previously shunned peers is also periodically revisited. In 
such moments CCP  may decide to let the peer remain shunned, or re-enable its 
participation in the system. In the latter case it proceeds in accordance with what is 
described in section 5.4.8.5. 
5.4.8.4 Peer Shunning  
The system’s peers may, for whatever reason, engage in abnormal, uncooperative or 
sabotaging behaviour or be frequently employed (by users) for dishonest activities. In such 
cases, once the CCP  detects such patterns (in the manner described in the previous 
section), it proceeds to shun the infringing, or malfunctioning, peer from the system either in 
a temporary or permanent base, and to place in a quarantine or expulsion list, respectively. 
This applies to both peripheral and outer core peers. 
5.4.8.4.1 OCP Shunning  
To shun a specific OCP  (e.g. xOCP ), the CCP  proceeds (in the secure manner defined in 
section 5.4.2.2 of the present chapter) to: 
• instruct all OCPs  to place xOCP  in the peer quarantine or expulsion list if xOCP  
was suspended or permanently banned, respectively. Said instruction may be 
described as ( )( )x
CCPK
iOCP
CCP
pll
ocpQSigInfoninginstrpshun X    pshunningsigned 1 U−= , 
where the mentioned iOCP  is the instructed OCP. They are carried in PLL 
messages where 








=
iOCP
CCP
pll
s ninginstrpshuninfo instrsh , which are acknowledged, 
by the destination peers, by sending back a PLL message where 
( )instrshack=sinfo . From that point on, no requests from xOCP  will be attended, 
until further notice; 
• reattribute every peripheral peer under the care of xOCP  to other OCPs  and inform 
all relevant peripheral and outer core peers of servicing responsibility reattributions, 
(in the manner presented in section 5.4.8.7). From that point onward, the affected 
peripheral peers can no longer resort to the services of xOCP , until further notice. 
 
If it is possible to contact the shunned peer, it will be sent, to that peer as well, the 
iOCP
CCP
pll
ninginstrpshun instruction as a manner of informing it that it has been shunned or 
expelled. 
5.4.8.4.2 PP Shunning  
To shun a specific PP  (e.g. xPP ), the CCP  proceeds (in the secure manner defined in 
section 5.4.2.2 of the present chapter) to: 
• instruct all OCPs  to place xPP  in the peer quarantine or expulsion list if xPP  was 
suspended or permanently banned, respectively. Said instruction may be defined as 
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( )( )x
CCPK
pll
iOCP
CCP ppQSigInfoninginstrpshun Xor    pshunningsigned 1−= , where the 
mentioned (in the equation), iOCP  is the instructed OCP . They are carried in PLL 
messages where 








=
pll
iOCP
CCPs ninginstrpshuninfo instrsh , which are acknowledged, 
by the destination peers, by sending back a PLL message where 
( )instrshack=sinfo . From that point on, no requests from xPP  will be attended until 
further notice (including by the OCP , which was up until that time responsible for 
attending its requests). 
If it is possible, the shunned peer itself ( xPP ) will be sent the 
xPP
CCP
pll
ninginstrpshun instruction 
as a manner of informing it that it has been shunned or expelled. 
5.4.8.5 Peer Readmission  
To readmit a previously shunned peer (e.g. xP ), the CCP  does the following: 
• in the secure manner defined in section 5.4.2.2 of the present chapter, the CCP  
instruct all OCPs  to remove the readmitted peer, from the peer quarantine. The 
structure and contents of the readmission instruction may be described as 
( )( )x
CCPK
iOCP
CCP
pll
pQSigInfominstrpread Xor    minstrpreadsigned 1−= , where the 
mentioned iOCP  (in the equation), is the instructed OCP . They are carried in PLL 
messages where 








=
iOCP
CCP
pll
s minstrpreadinfo instrreadm , which are acknowledged, 
by the destination peers, by sending back a PLL message where 
( )instrshack=sinfo . From that point on, requests from xP  will again be attended; 
• If it is readmitting an OCP  (e.g. xOCP ): 
o CCP  then performs a peripheral peer servicing workload reassignment, so 
as to attribute to the readmitted peer a set of peripheral peers for it to service; 
• If it is readmitting a PP  (e.g. xPP ): 
o CCP  then assigns some OCP  to service xPP ’s requests and informs the 
earlier of that reassignment; 
• If the readmitted peer ( xP ) remained online: 
o it is sent the 
xP
CCP
pll
minstrpread instruction as a manner of informing it that it has 
been readmitted. 
• else: 
o when the peer attempts to re-establish a communication session with the 
CCP  (i.e. loggin), it will be allowed to do so. 
5.4.8.6 OCP Updating  
Whenever some change or addition needs to be made to the system’s data structure (at the 
PLL level), it is the CCP  that coordinates that activity. The CCP  performs such changes on 
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the version of the data structure which it locally stores, but it then becomes necessary to 
update all the other versions of the data structure, stored at the OCPs . Such an 
updating/initialization of anOCP’s data structure is also necessary when an OCP  first 
registers and connects to the system. 
 
To perform such an updating/initialization of the OCP  data structures, the CCP  issues 
instructions, to the relevant set of OCPs, (from one to all of them), commanding them to 
perform the necessary update. Said instructions may be defied as, 
( )updInfoidSigInfoedbinstrupdat
CCPK
iOCP
CCP
pll
edbinstrupdatsigned 1−=  (for an exemplifying 
iOCP target), where,  updInfo  is a set of one or more SQL commands and respective data 
parameters. They are carried in PLL messages where 








=
iOCP
CCP
pll
s edbinstrupdatinfo instrupd  
and info is an archive of whatever data objects need to be transferred. OPCs  proceed to 
do as they are instructed and, after that task is performed, they send back a success PLL 
message, to the CCP , where ( )kinstrupdac=sinfo . 
 
If the updating of any of the OPCs  fails, the CCP retries the operation, until it succeeds, up 
to a specific maximum amount of attempts. If it proves impossible to update a specific 
OCP , the CCP  proceeds to disconnect it from the system in the manner explained in 
section 5.4.8.4.1.  
5.4.8.7 PP Servicing Assignment  
The assignment of peripheral peer servicing responsibilities is done by the CCP. It consists 
of assigning the responsibility to service the requests of a specific PP  to a specific OCP .  
 
The CCP makes an assignment decision and then it informs the relevant affected peers, by 
sending, to which ever of them is necessary, the, appropriate instruction. That may be 
defined as 





=
−
CCP
iPCCPK
iOCP
CCP
pll
ccertifSigInfoiceassigninstrpserv signpserviceassigned 1 . It 
contains a fresh, CCP generated, login certificate (see section 5.4.6), which contains the 
identity of the serviced PP and of its handler OCP . That instruction is carried in a PLL 
message where 








=
iOCP
CCP
pll
s iceassigninstrpservinfo instrpserv . The targeted peers respond 
with a PLL message where ( )ackinstrpserv=sinfo . 
5.4.9 UEL Info Relaying 
The main purpose of the PLL, besides the servicing of inter-PLL requests, is to attend to the 
requests of the UEL. Doing so basically consists of relaying internal outbound UEL 
messages to external UEL instances (UEL instances of remote peers), and external inbound 
UEL messages to the local UEL. 
 
The outbound UEL messages are wrapped in PLL messages (see section 7.3.1 of the 
present chapter). This implies the signing (with the local peer’s private key) and ciphering 
(with the secret session key), of the earlier (together with some other content), their 
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wrapping in the latter message and the latter message’s delivery to the IPCL together with 
the IP address of the destination peer (the communication port could simply be a constant 
and universally established one). 
 
The inbound PLL messages are deciphered and their signature is validated. If all is ok, the 
UEL message is extracted and (if necessary), reconstituted, and then relayed to the local 
UEL, together with the validated identifier of the message’s sending peer (at the PLL). 
All of the above-mentioned PLL messages have a structure where ( )
s
UELInfoinfos uelmrelay= . 
5.5 UEL Operation 
5.5.1 Introduction 
The UEL handles, in a client/server manner all the operations related to: 
• the registration, login, logoff and removal of users; 
• the maintenance of user accounts and performing of currency transactions; 
• the injection, removal, updating and versioning of MOs; 
• the injection and removal of MO Ransom Announcements (see section 7.4.8); 
• the collection of information on user actions. 
 
In all such cases, the CCP ’s UEL plays the server role and the involved PP’s UEL, plays 
the client role. The clients will typically send their requests to the server side, which judges 
their legitimacy and, if adequate, enforces them or provides some required information, if 
that is the case. 
 
A mixed P2P and client/server operation mode is employed, by UEL, in: 
• the semantics based searching for MOs (and MO Ransom Announcements); 
• the retrieval/distribution of MOs (and MO Ransom Announcements); 
• the searching and retrieval/distribution of information objects pertaining to users or 
other aspects of the system.  
 
The CCP’s UEL instance holds a permanently updated copy of the system’s UEL global data 
structure. Furthermore, as explained in section 3.4.3, that information is also replicated over 
each of the outer core peers. 
 
Whenever some fragment of that information is needed, peripheral peers will request it from 
their handlingOCP , which may respond by handing it over directly or by informing the 
“client”, about the appropriate “server” )(sPP , for the acquisition of the desired information.  
5.5.2 Secure Messaging 
5.5.2.1 Introduction 
The division between sensitive and non-sensitive information, which exists in PLL 
messages, translates into a similar division in UEL messages. These, therefore, have a 
sensitive ( sUELinfo ), and a non-sensitive part (UELinfo ). The earlier part will be carried in 
the sensitive part of PLL messages, and the latter part will be carried in the non-sensitive 
part of PLL messages. 
 
The PLL’s regular operation guaranties the confidentiality and integrity of communications in 
the P2PTube architecture. Thus, in terms of its internal operations, the UEL does not need to 
perform any further information obfuscation procedures.  
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Users, however, are external and independent entities from the system, which have their 
own authentication credentials and whose involvement needs to be validated, in order for 
their requests to be fulfilled. For this reason, whenever an UEL interaction is caused by the 
attending (at a peer iPP ), of a user request, the emitted UEL message(s), must bare proof of 
the user’s involvement.  
5.5.2.2 Pre User Login Secure Messaging 
A peer will only engage in UEL cooperations before a user, hosted on it, logs into the system 
in the following situations (or without any user hosted on it): 
• it is registering a user to the system; 
• its is login a user into the system; 
• it is participating as a “server” in a UEL cooperation, where its services were 
requested by some remote peer. 
 
The procedure employed to securely exchange UEL messages in the situations were a user 
is involved is depicted in Figure 35 (taking into consideration the notation defined in section 
5.1 of the present chapter). The purpose of said procedure is to provide proof of the involved 
user’s (if any) involvement in the UEL cooperation. 
 
 
Figure 35 – Pre User Login Secure Messaging Procedure 
 
In said figure, a generic peer iP , is hosting user iU  and, thus, playing the client role. The 
server role is plaid by generic peer kP (in reality in pre-user login UEL cooperations involving 
users it will typically be the CCP to play the server role). 
 
At an initial moment iU  issues some specific request to his hosting peer iP . In doing so 
iU may deliver both sensitive and non-sensitive information. iP  performs whatever initial 
processing is necessary of the received information and builds, sUELinfo and UELinfo . The 
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earlier carries whatever sensitive information needs to transmitted (received from the user or 
otherwise). This information will always include the designation of the message’s type. The 
latter carries the non-sensitive information. 
iP  then builds the UEL message to be sent. Said message may be defined as 
( ) ( )1,,,,ftrf,ProdFpreULogMsg −==
iUss
kP
iP
kP
iP
KSigInfoserialUELinfoUELinfoUELinfoUELinforeqMsg . 
The execution of function 






AKSigInfoserialyx ,,,,ftrf , over the given arguments results in 
the production of two information blocks: 





− s
iU
K
UELinfoserialSigInfo1signed ; and UELinfo . 
The UEL message is logically composed of the two above mentioned information blocks. 
 
The serial  is an UEL level serial identifier. Such an independent serial (from the PLL level 
serial mentioned in earlier sections), is necessary to perform the unique identification of UEL 
messages. This identification enables the logical binding of those messages to the UEL 
operations and cooperations that they pertain to (see section 5.2.2). It also performs the 
unique differentiation between all exchanged UEL messages so that no two messages are 
ever alike. This uniqueness assurance is necessary also at the UEL level, in spite of the 
same already existing for the PLL messages, because UEL communication errors may 
occur, even between “honest peers”, and UEL messages be duplicated. If a repetition is ever 
detected, it is either an error or a replay attack and the message must be discarded. The 
serial carries the following data: 
• the identifier of the overall operation which encompasses the cooperation to which 
the message pertains; 
• the identifier of the inter-peer UEL cooperation to which the message pertains. Given 
the way its structure is defined, (see section 5.2.2), this identifier carries the 
identification of all the previous UEL cooperations in the cooperation chain that lead 
to the current cooperation. It is the last link in the chain that actually defines the 
present UEL cooperation. It includes in its structure the identification of the sender 
and receiver peers; 
• 
kP
iP
cntr – a cumulative counter of all the messages sent from iP  to kP  in the course of 
the present cooperation, preceded by the “req” or “resp” string if the comprising 
message is coming from the “client” or “server” peer; 
• a timestamp indicating the message’s creation time; 
The process of signing 





sUELinfoserialSigInfo , when it occurs, enables the receiving peer 
to verify that the integrity of that information set and serves as proof of iU ’s involvement. It 
thus guarantees the non-repudiability, by iU , of that information.  
 
Once the message is built, iP  sends it, (step 1), to kP . To do so, the UEL message is 
passed, as single object to the local PLL. At the PLL, however, the UEL message is split, 
sUELinfo  is carried in the sensitive part of the PLL message and UELinfo  in the non-
sensitive part of that message.  
 
In the next step of the cooperation (step 2), kP  responds to iP , by sending it the message 
( ) 




== ØØ,,,ftrf,ProdFpreULogMsg ,serialUELinfoUELinfoinfoinforspMsg
ss
iP
kP
iP
kP
, expressing 
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its response. The structure of this message, and the way it is produced, is similar to the 
structure and production mode of 
kP
iP
reqMsg . The only differences are the following: 
• sinfo  must, now, always carry, besides other information, the specification the type 
of the response instead of the specific type of the request; 
• the employed serial identifier (








=
iP
kP
j
kP
iP
j serialserialserial ), is now composed by two 
parts. The first one is the serial that was received in the request message. The 
second part is the actual serial of the kP -> iP direction. The latter construct, carries 
the same data as the previous with the exception that the counter value may be 
different and that the timestamp’s value is mandatorily different; 
• the 





sUELinfoserialSigInfo  information set is now only  sUELinfoserial  and it is 
no longer subjected to any signature, as there is no user on the responding side 
whose presence needs to be proven. 
 
The structure of the response serial enables: 
• the unique identification of the message and thus, its differentiation from all others; 
• the logical association, at the receiving end, of the response message to the original 
request message to which its responds; 
 
Obviously, the interaction between kP  and iP , may continue with further requests from iP  
and responses from kP . The employed messages would have the same structure, and 
production mode as explained above, but, from this point (step 2) on, the serial  in the 
request messages would also include the new part of the serial  of the previous response 
message in the interaction. Thus, for instance, in a hypothetical next request 1+j , (from iP  
to kP ), which is following up on the previous response j  (from kP  to iP ), we would have that 








= +
kP
iP
j
iP
kP
j serialserialserial 1 . 
 
This enables that which was described in the previous bullets. 
 
As it was implicitly shown above, the sUELinfo  parts of UEL messages which are originated 
as a response to UEL requests from other peers (response message from kP  to iP  in Figure 
35), will be signed only by the emitting peer’s private key. Given that the PLL already 
performs such a signing, it will not actually be done at the UEL, but at the PLL instead.  
The same will happen with the sUELinfo  parts of UEL request messages that do not involve 
any user, such as UEL messages containing commands (from the CCP ). 
 
The only exceptions to the above situations occur when the UEL information is to be later 
super-distributed. In such cases it will be redundantly signed, at the UEL, with the peer’s 
private key. 
V A Reliable P2P Architecture for the New Paradigm 139 
 
 
 
5.5.2.3 Post User Login Secure Messaging 
The overall procedure employed by the system to ensure messaging reliability, at the UEL, 
after a user has logged into the system, hosted at some peer, is practically the same as the 
one described in section 5.4.2.1 (pre user login secure messaging). The existing differences, 
which occur at the client side (when hosting a user and sending its request), are the 
following: 
• the user’s hosting certificate, iPP
iU
hostcertif , (see section 5.5.5), is an added 
parameter that is supplied to 






....ftrf , together with SigInfo . The combined presence 
of this certificate, and the signing of the 






s
iPP
iU
UELinfoserialhostcertifSigInfo  
parameter set, proves the user’s involvement dispensing a challenge-response 
procedure. 
5.5.3 User Registration 
This (pre user login) UEL process is performed in a client/server manner and is depicted 
(taking into consideration the notation defined in section 5.1), in Figure 36. 
The registering user, ( iU ), delivers, to her hosting peer, ( iPP), her public identification 
package, 
iU
id , (containing iu , iUuname , the identifiers of the user’s public and private keys, 
and the actual public key itself
iU
K ), and also her private key, 1−
iU
K  (step 1).  
iPP produces iUsid , (by concatenating the signing algorithm describing information with 
iU
id , and signing the set with 1−
iU
K ), and concatenates it with the identification of the type of 
request ( uregreq ). It thus builds sUELinfo .  iPP then performs (....)ftrf  on that set (in 
accordance with what was defined in section 5.5.2.2), and builds a UEL message, which it 
sends it to CCP (step 2). The signature of 
iU
id (which results in the production of 
iU
sid ), 
with 1−
iU
K , validates the origin of 
iU
sid , impedes any later repudiation of 
iU
sid  (by iU ), and 
enables a later, independent, distribution of that data object. The information in scope is then 
sent, within the sensitive part of the PLL message (in the secure manner defined in section 
5.4.2.2), thus assuring its confidentiality, integrity and origin authenticity. 
 
CCP then verifies the validity of the received message. If all is ok, the process continues. 
Given the upstream security level, provided by the PLL, and the signing, with the user’s 
private key, of the received message (which carries inside unique serial identifiers), one 
could think that the reception of this message (when correctly built), by the CCP, should be 
enough for the latter peer to accept the registration of iU . However, it may be that the PLL 
security provisions of iPP were compromised, and an attacker knows its private key (but not 
that of iU ), and is intercepting its communications. Such an attacker may be replaying some 
captured UEL messages to cause disruption in the system. It is for this reason that challenge 
and challenge response steps are necessary, i.e. to verify the validity of the specified user 
credentials.  
 
In light of the above, CCP sends back (step 3) a challenge message to iPP in order to check 
if it truly possesses the private key of iU .  
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In the challenge message Ø   ,uregchlg  == 



 UELinfoUELinfos . Said message, (in 
accordance with the process described in section 5.5.2.2), contains the 





 uregchlgserialSigInfo  set. uregchlg is the identification of the type of message. 
serial carries a composed serial, consisting of a concatenation of the serial received in the 
request message, plus a new serial 
iPP
CCP
jserial . iPP will have to sign the newer (CCP 
generated), UEL level, serial, (of which it could have no prior knowledge), with iU ’s private 
key to prove that it truly knows it. 
iPP proceeds, in accordance to what was defined in section 5.5.2.2, to produce a third serial, 
concatenate it with the one received from CCP, and sign the set of serials, which it then 
sends to CCP (step 4). 
 
 
Figure 36 – User Registration Procedure 
 
Finally CCP validates the signature of the received serials. If all is ok CCP  registers the 
new user, and produces a user registration certificate 
(










−
= vtermsidSigInfoidrcertif
iUCCPKi
U 1signed ), validating the user’s participation in 
the system, which it sends (step 5), to iPP, included in the sensitive part of a PLL message. 
The certificate is signed by the CCP  and contains, its identifier, SigInfo  (where ( )CCPCCPCCP KkkoAlgrthmInfccpSigInfo 1−= ), iUsid and the validity term after which it 
expires, (and a new one must be obtained by the user). 
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Finally iPP  delivers iUrcertif  to iU . 
Once the user registration is complete, the CCP  takes care of sending the relevant parts of 
the information, newly added to the system’s data structure, to all the OCPs  (in the manner 
presented in section 5.5.7.7), so that the latter may update their copy of the data structure. 
 
In the user registration process, the user’s public key is being delivered, for the first time, to 
the CCP, and the corresponding private key employed for the first time. Thus a man-in-the-
middle attack (from an attacker that, somehow, knows iPP’s private key but not iU ’s), may 
succeed in sending wrong information to the CCP. However the registration certificate 
produced by the CCP will contain those wrong values, and, when passed back to the 
original peer, this will detect the error and the operation will fail. 
5.5.4 User Registration Update 
Once a user’s registration certificate expires or if, for some reason, a user’s key pair is 
compromised, said user must update its registration. To do so (considering that the user is 
already logged into the system), it issues a registration update request (in the secure 
manner explained in section 5.5.2.3), where ( )
iUs
sidUELinfo uregupdreq = , and 
iU
sid  
contains the user’s new identification parameters. If all is ok the CCP responds (in the 
secure manner explained in section 5.5.2.3), with the user’s new registration and hosting 
certificates. 
 
If there is not even the possibility of securely logging the user into the system, then, the 
registration update process will be in all similar to the one described in section 5.5.3, with the 
exception that ( )
iUs
sidUELInfo uregupdreq =  and not ( )
iUs
sidUELInfo uregreq = . 
5.5.5 User Login 
A user authentication enables the user to enjoy of all the system’s services. This (pre user 
login), UEL process is performed in a client/server manner and is depicted (taking into 
consideration the notation defined in section 5.1), in Figure 37. 
 
iU  delivers her authentication data to her hosting peer, iPP (step 1). That package contains 
her registration certificate, and private key. 
iPP communicates with CCP (step 2), indicating that it wishes to login iU . The employed 
message has 






=
iUs
rcertifUELinfo uauthreq     , where uauthreq  is the designation of the 
type of request, and 
iU
rcertif  provides the full identification of the user that the peer wants 
to login. CCP  responds (step 3), with a challenge message, whose (UEL) serial iPP will 
have to sign (in the course of producing the challenge response message), with iU ’s private 
key, to prove that it is in fact hosting iU . 
iPP then returns to CCP , a signed package (see section 5.5.2.2) containing the designation 
of the message type ( spuauthchlgr ), as well as the mentioned serial, thus proving that it is 
indeed hosting iU  (step 4). 
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If all is correct, CCP  then returns a user hosting certificate (step 5), which may be described 
as 







−
= vtermpprcertifSigInfoidhostcertif iiUCCPK
iPP
iU 1
signed . It is signed by CCP  and 
contains 
iU
rcertif  (for the clear identification of the hosted user), its identifier, ipp  (for the 
identification of the hosting peer), and a validity term after which the certificate expires and a 
new one must be obtained.  
 
 
Figure 37 – User Authentication Procedure 
 
After the authentication process is completed the CCP performs the OCP  informing 
procedure explained in section 5.5.7.7. 
5.5.6 User Action Monitoring 
User treatment of different MOs will vary. After having retrieved the MO from the system for 
local consumption, the consuming user, iU , may for instance, watch it numerous times, only 
once or not at all. These different consumption behaviours indicate different preferences on 
the part of users.  
 
Information pertaining to such user behaviours may, for instance, be employed for directed 
marketing or targeted advertising.  Thus, in order to provide further support to the lateral 
extraction of gains, P2PTube also provides functionalities for the gathering of information on 
user behaviour. 
  
Operations regarding the gathering and submission of this type of data, are performed at the 
peripheral peers (as these are the ones hosting the users), but are requested, (to the latter), 
by the CCP . The typical procedure is the following. 
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Whenever CCP  needs such information about user iU , hosted at iPP, it sends, to iPP, a 
signed Event Report Request (ERR), (as the sensitive part of the UEL message), soliciting 
the monitoring of specific events on the part of iU . iPP validates the ERR. If all is correct, iPP 
sends a signed acknowledgment to CCP  and proceeds to perform the requested 
monitoring.  
 
If and whenever the targeted user action occurs, iPP prepares the corresponding Event 
Report (ER), signs it and sends it to CCP. 
Further information on the nature and structure of the ERRs and ERs is available in section 
7.4.9. 
5.5.7 Management  
5.5.7.1 Introduction 
The proper operation of the UEL demands that some management procedures are 
undertaken periodically, or in response to some event, to assure the overall trustworthiness 
of the user collective. 
 
These operations are centrally performed by the CCP, (based on notifications received form 
the periphery or outer core), which does all the necessary decision making, and translate 
into the issuing of CCP instructions to OCPs or PPs . 
 
Said notifications may be generally described as 
( )ntnotifcontenotiftypeSigInfonotif
iP
KiP
uel
1signed −= , where SigInfo  carries the necessary 
information to enable the validation of the notification, notiftype  designates the type of 
notification, and ntnotifconte  is the actual content of the notification. 
The mentioned instructions may be generally described as 
( )ntentinstructcopeinstructtySigInfoinstruct
CCPK
uel
iP
CCP 1signed −= , where SigInfo  carries the 
necessary information to enable the validation of the instruction, peinstructty  designates the 
type of instruction, and ntentinstructco  is the actual content of the instruction.  
 
The above introduced notifications and instructions are similar to those of the PLL 
(introduced in section 5.4.8.1). They have similar structure and are also signed by their 
emitting peers (hence, by the same keys as their PLL counterparts). However their logical 
role takes place at the UEL, and thus they are processed and exchanged at that level. 
 
The main UEL management operations can basically be summed up as the pro-active 
diffusion of MOs throughout the peer tissue, the neutralization of infringing behaviour on the 
part of peers and users, and the updating of OCP data structures. 
5.5.7.2 MO Diffusion 
When MOs are first injected into the system, they are stored only at the CCP  and become 
available for redistribution. To optimize the distribution process, once an MO is successfully 
injected, the CCP  immediately seeds it throughout the peer tissue. This process consists of 
sending it (in a fragmented manner), to every OCP  and also to several PPs , all of which 
will then take part in the distribution of CCPiMO . 
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Furthermore, at periodical intervals, the CCP evaluates the state of diffusion of all MOs, 
throughout the system’s periphery. If it deems necessary, it delivers the relevant MOs to 
additional peripheral peers, which will then also start to redistribute them. 
 
In order to “seed” an MO (e.g. CCPiMO ), the CCP  must first prepare its fragmented version. 
It thus breaks the MO file into a number of fragments, of predetermined size, which it 
concatenates with their identifiers and then signs (the set) with its private key. CCP  then 
packages each generated fragment (
CCP
iMO
iFrag ) of CCPiMO , by producing its corresponding 










=
CCP
iMO
i
CCP
iMO
i
CCP
iMO
i
CCP
FragfragFrag , where 
CCP
iMO
ifrag is the identifier of the fragment. 
To seed that content at some specific peer xP , CCP  then proceeds (in the secure manner 
defined in section 5.5.2.2 of the present chapter) to instruct xP  to store and redistribute 
CCP
iMO . Said instruction may be defined as 
( )fraglisttstampSigInfodinstrMOhol
CCPK
uel
x
P
CCP dinstrMOholsigned 1−= . It contains the 
adequate SigInfo  parameter, the instruction type definition, the time of the instruction’s 
emission and 








=
−
CCP
iMO
n
CCP
iMOCCP
i
CCPK
fragdeffragdefmoSigInfoidfraglist .......01signed . The latter 
carries the identifier of fraglist , its appropriate SigInfo  parameter, the identifier of CCPiMO  
( CCPimo ), and the definition of each of the fragments 
(






















=
−
CCP
iMOj
CCPK
CCP
iMOj
CCP
iMOj FragsignatureSigInfoseqnrsizefragfragdef 1 ), into 
which the MO is divided for redistribution (for further information see section 5.5.8.2.2). The 
fragdef  parameters carry the identifier, the size, the sequence number (within the context 
of its encompassing MO), and the signature (by CCP ), of their corresponding MO 
fragments. It contains, as well, the corresponding (to the latter signature) SigInfo  parameter.  
The instruction, in scope, is carried in UEL messages where 








=
uel
x
P
CCPs dinstrMOholUELinfo dinstrMOhol , and 










=
CCP
iMO
n
CCP
CCP
iMOCCP
FragFragUELinfo ....0 , 
which are acknowledged, by the destination peers, by sending back an UEL message where 
( )instrshack=sUELinfo .  
5.5.7.3 Infringing or Faulty Peer Behaviour Neutralization  
The same problems addressed in section 5.4.8.3, within the context of PLL operation, also 
occur at the UEL level. The system shall address the issues at the UEL in the manner 
already described in section 5.4.8.3. The mains differences are: 
• the procedure takes place at the UEL level, employing UEL messages; 
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• the employed misbehaviour notifications, sent from peripheral or outer core peers to 
the CCP , have the same structure as their UEL counterparts, but are designated as 
uel
CCP
iP
ehavnotifmissb . They too are signed by their issuing peers; 
• the system supports the reporting of misbehaviour in the same situation as those 
described in section 5.4.8.3, but dealing with UEL level information. It also reports 
requests which are not accompanied by the appropriate user hosting certificates or 
information retrieval permits. 
5.5.7.4 Infringing User Behaviour Neutralization  
May different users, with varying degrees of honesty, participate in the system. There is thus 
a non-negligible possibility of some users incurring in infringing behaviour, which the system 
must be prepared to deal with. 
 
This means that the CCP  must somehow obtain information about undesirable behaviour on 
the part of users. For this to occur, it must be users themselves to notify the CCP , whenever 
they feel that some other user is behaving inappropriately. Users may thus report: 
• injection of inappropriate content; 
• injection of corrupted content; 
• injection of low quality content; 
• injection of copyrighted content; 
• re-injection of their own content by unauthorized user. 
 
In all the above cases, the user hosting peer, iP , will prepare a user misbehaviour 
notification, (on behalf of some user), defined as 
( )




=
−
infractDefuutidSigInfoehavnotifmissb ki
iU
K
uel
CCP
iU
missbehavsigned 1 , where id is the 
notification’s identifier, t is the notification’s issuing time, iu is the identifier of the issuing (and 
thus, the signing), user (the user hosted at the peer), and ku  is the identifier of the user 
which is targeted by the complaint. infractDef  is the definition of the alleged infraction, it 
may take the following values: ( )CCPimoinnaproMO , ( )CCPimocorruptMO , 
( )CCPimolowqualMO , ( )CCPimoOcopyrightM , and ( )CCPimoedMOappropriat . 
uel
CCP
iU
ehavnotifmissb is signed by iU ,  to enable the validation of its integrity and origin 
authenticity and assure un-repudiability of the report. 
 
Once the notification is prepared, iP places it in the sensitive part of the UEL message 
(








=
uel
CCP
iUs
ehavnotifmissbUELinfo vnotifUbeha ) and proceeds to send it to CCP (in the 
secure manner defined in section 5.5.2.3). CCP then acknowledges it with a response UEL 
message where  ( )vacknotifUbeha=sUELinfo . 
 
The CCP (with the assistance of human agents), periodically analyses all pending reports 
and decides what to do regarding the “criticized” users. It may do nothing, it may suspend or 
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it may expel the user. In the two latter cases the CCP proceeds in accordance with what is 
described in section 5.5.7.5 of the present chapter. 
 
On the other hand, the case of previously shunned users is also periodically revisited. In 
such moments CCP may decide to let the user remain shunned, or re-enable its 
participation in the system. In the latter case it proceeds in accordance with what is 
described in section 5.5.7.6. 
5.5.7.5 User Shunning  
The system’s users may, for whatever reason, engage in inappropriate or sabotaging 
behaviour. In such cases, once the CCP detects such patterns (by way of notifications from 
users), it proceeds to shun the infringing user from the system either in a temporary or 
permanent base, and to place him in a quarantine or expulsion list, respectively.  
 
To shun a specific user (e.g. xU ), the CCP proceeds (in the secure manner defined in 
section 5.5.2.2 of the present chapter) to instruct all OCPs to place xU in the user 
quarantine or expulsion list if xU was suspended or permanently banned, respectively. Said 
instruction may be defined as 
( )( )x
CCPK
uel
iOCP
CCP uQninginstrushunSigInfoninginstrushun Xor    signed 1−= , where the 
mentioned iOCP (in the equation), is the instructed OCP . They are carried in UEL 
messages where 








=
uel
iOCP
CCPs ninginstrushunUELinfo instrsh , which are acknowledged, by 
the destination peers, by sending back an UEL message where ( )instrshackUELinfos = .  
 
If it is possible to contact the shunned user (via its hosting peer), he will be sent, as well, one 
of the 
uel
iOCP
CCPninginstrushun instructions, as a manner of informing him that he has been 
shunned or expelled. 
 
From that point on, no requests from xU will be attended, until further notice. Any peripheral 
peer that attempts to login xU will fail. 
5.5.7.6 User Readmission  
To readmit a specific user (e.g. xU ), the CCP proceeds (in the secure manner defined in 
section 5.4.2.2 of the present chapter), to instruct all OCPs to remove xU from the user 
quarantine list. Said instruction may be defined as 
( )( )x
CCPK
uel
iOCP
CCP uQSigInfominstruread Xor    minstrureadsigned 1−= , where the mentioned 
iOCP (in the expression), is the instructed OCP . They are carried in UEL messages where 








=
uel
iOCP
CCPs minstrureadUELinfo instrsh , which are acknowledged, by the destination peers, 
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by sending back an UEL message where ( )instrshack=sUELinfo . From that point on, 
requests from xU will again be attended. 
5.5.7.7 OCP Updating  
Whenever some change or addition needs to be made to the system’s data structure (at the 
UEL level), it is the CCP that coordinates that activity. The CCP performs such changes on 
the version of the data structure which it locally stores, but it then becomes necessary to 
update all the other versions of the data structure, stored at the OCPs . Such an 
updating/initialization of an OCP ’s data structure is also necessary when an OCP first 
registers and connects to the system. 
 
OCP updating, at the UEL, is in all similar to the same procedure at the PLL, which is 
described in section 5.4.8.6. The main differences are: 
• the updated part of the data structure pertains to UEL aspects of the system and not 
to PLL ones; 
• the procedure takes place at the UEL level, employing UEL messages; 
• the employed updating instructions, sent from the CCP to the relevant OCPs , have 
the same structure as their PLL counterparts, but are designated as 
iOCP
CCP
uel
edbinstrupdat . They too are signed by CCP . 
5.5.8 User Request Attending 
5.5.8.1 Introduction 
User request attending operations may be divided into the following main categories, in 
terms of their overall complexity: 
• Simple Operations – these operations perform the input or retrieval of some 
individual piece of information (e.g. the insertion of an MO, the retrieval of an MO, the 
insertion of a specific monetary amount into a user’s account, etc.). They may further 
be subdivided, in what pertains to their implications on the system’s global data 
structure, into: 
o Writing Operations – these operations imply the performing of changes to the 
system’s global data structure (e.g. monetary transactions, insertion and 
removal of MOs, etc.). They are of the client/server type; 
o Reading Operations – these operations imply only the reading of the system’s 
global data structure (such as the semantics based searching for MOs and 
the retrieval/distribution of MOs, among others). These operations will 
typically unfold in a hybrid P2P way; 
• Composed Operations – these operations are composed of simple and/or other 
composed operations. They may thus have client/server and hybrid P2P parts. 
5.5.8.2 Simple User Attending Operations 
5.5.8.2.1 Simple Writing User Attending Operations 
The handling of all user requests that imply a simple type of operation, and some change or 
addition to the system’s global data structure, will require the participation, (besides other 
peers), of the CCP as it is the gatekeeper to that structure. The handling of such user 
requests will thus be performed through client/server operations at the UEL. 
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Figure 38 – Client/Server User Attending Procedure 
 
Requests included in this group are those involving the following activities: 
• user abandonment of the system; 
• injection, removal, updating and versioning of MOs; 
• maintenance of user accounts and performing of currency transactions; 
 
User registration and login are also handled through simple, client server operations, but in 
the ways presented in sections 5.5.3 and 5.5.5 respectively. 
 
The typical simple client/server UEL operation is depicted in Figure 38, (taking into 
consideration the notation defined in section 5.1). 
 
iU delivers the sensitive and non-sensitive input parameters that make up its request, to his 
hosting peer, iPP (step 1). iPP builds sUELinfo  by concatenating the request type 
designation with the sensitive input parameter (or some function, 1f , of it). iPP builds, also, 
UELinfo as some function, 2f , of the non-sensitive user input information. 1f and 
2f represent possible changes or additions that the peer may need to operate on the 
received parameters before sending them. 
 
Given what is exposed in section 5.5.2.3, the UEL message will contain the user hosting 
certificate and will be signed with the user’s private key. That signature, the presence of this 
certificate, and the indication, (that said certificate carries), of the hosting peer, enables the 
receiving end to verify, (employing also the PLL delivered information about the message’s 
validated sending peer, mentioned in section 5.4.9), if the message sending peer is in fact 
the, CCP recognized, host of the user in scope, and thus, is authorized to issue the request 
at stake.  
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iPP, then, securely sends the produced UEL message to CCP (step 2), though the services 
of the PLL. The sensitive part of the UEL message is carried as the sensitive part of the PLL 
message, while the non-sensitive part of the earlier message is carried as the non-sensitive 
part of the latter. 
 
CCP produces the adequate response and securely sends it to iPP (step 3), which displays 
the relevant output to iU . 
 
After the user request has been handled, the CCP takes care of propagating the 
changes/additions, which were made to the system’s data structure, to the concerned 
OCPs (in the manner described in section 5.5.7.7.). 
 
The following sub sections present some examples of client/server user attending 
operations. 
5.5.8.2.1.1 MO Insertion Operation 
iPP builds  nreqmoinsertio 





=sUELinfo and  UELinfo . The latter object is a function of the 
non-sensitive input parameter, iUinput . This parameter consist of all the necessary data 
objects to build an MO.  UELinfo is, thus, the assembled MO, (identified as imo ), which iPP 
also signs with the user’s private key (exceptionally, in order to enable a later independent 
treatment of iMO while preserving the bond that connects it to the author user). 
 
The UEL message is then sent to CCP . CCP formally validates the MO and it may also 
perform some automated or user assisted content analysis to determine if the inserted MO 
does not violate the system’s terms of use (respects copyright, etc.). If all is ok, the CCP  
accepts iMO , and proceeds to its installation in the system. It thus signs iMO , with its own 
private key, to signal the system’s acceptance  of that object’s insertion into it, thus 
producing iMO ’s delivery-ready version, 
CCP
iMO . CCP then produces the fragmented 
version of CCPiMO  (see section 5.5.7.2). 
After that, CCP notifies iPP, of the acceptance of iMO , with an UEL response message 
which carries, in its non-sensitive part, the fragmented version of CCPiMO . 
Finally CCP  performs the initial seeding of CCPiMO  (see section 5.5.7.2), through the 
system’s tissue, by sending it (in a fragmented manner), for storage and redistribution, to 
some selected peripheral peer(s). 
 
Furthermore, CCP would also take care of propagating the changes/additions, which were 
made to the system’s data structure, to the OCPs . Thus, it would take care of divulging: 
• the CCPiMO and all the relevant information pertaining to it; 
• the information that iU is the owner of 
CCP
iMO ; 
• the identification of all the peripheral peers which are storing CCPiMO , and ready to 
redistribute it; 
• the information regarding any relationships between CCPiMO and other MOs or other 
operational objects. 
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5.5.8.2.1.2 Monetary Resource Insertion Operation 
In a simplistic manner this operation may be described as follows. iU  requests from the 
system a specific code to enable him to transfer some amount of many to his account in the 
system.  iPP, thus, builds  eqloadaccntr 





=sUELinfo , and, proceeding in accordance with 
what was explained in section 5.5.2.3, sends a UEL request message to the CCP. The latter 
peer validates the received message and if all is ok sends back an UEL message 
where  specfcodentreqackloadacc 






=sUELinfo , and specfcode is the specific reference for 
the user to employ, in the inter-banking transfer, to load his system account. 
 
iU  then proceeds to the out-of-band money transfer, by whatever means he prefers 
(typically employing the system’s publicly know bank account number and the given 
reference). Once the system (the CCP) detects that transfer, it proceeds to load the user’s 
system account with the received amount. 
 
From that point on the loaded monetary resources are available for the user to employ, 
within the system as he wishes. 
5.5.8.2.2 Simple Reading User Attending Operations 
The handling of user requests that imply simple operations and no changes or additions to 
the system’s data structure, may not require the participation of the CCP , as much of the 
information stored in it may also be accessed through the services of the OCPs or of PPs . 
The handling of such user requests will thus be performed through a mixed P2P and 
client/server operation at the UEL.  
 
Requests included in this group are those involving the following activities: 
• the semantics based searching for MOs; 
• the retrieval/distribution of MOs; 
• the searching and retrieval/distribution of information objects pertaining to users or 
other aspects of the system.  
 
To explain the inner workings of this type of system operations, the next sub-section  
presents he MO retrieval operation. 
5.5.8.2.2.1 MO Retrieval Operation 
The typical system procedure to retrieve a specific MO object, CCPiMO , is depicted in Figure 
39, (taking into consideration the notation defined in section 5.1). 
iU informs her hosting peer, iPP, that she wishes to consume
CCP
iMO  (step 1). iPP then 
sends an UEL request for CCPiMO , to iOCP  (step 2). That request message contains (as its 
sensitive part), the designation of the type of request ( requelinfo ) and the identifier of the 
desired MO.  
 
iOCP prepares an UELInfo retrieval permit ( i
PP
uelInforetrpermit ), enabling iPP to perform the 
retrieval of CCPiMO  from a number of other peripheral peers. The permit contains its 
identifier, the designation of the permit’s type ( rPermuelInfoRet ), the SigInfo  parameter 
which contains the necessary data to enable the validation of the permit’s signature, the 
identification of the peer to which it has been emitted ( ipp ), the specification of the permit’s 
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validity term date, the definition of the type of information that may be retrieved 
( ( )CCPimoinfoDef = ), and the identifier of the suelildo object (see section 7.4.5). 
 
 
Figure 39 – Hybrid Operation for MO retrieval 
 
The UEL Information Location Describing Object ( suelildo ), carries (in this specific case of 
the retrieval of an MO), its identifier, the SigInfo  parameter which contains the necessary 
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data to enable the validation of suelildo ’s signature, the fraglist object, a list of the peers 
( loclist ), from which iPP may retrieve CCPiMO (or fragments of it),  and a timestamp 
indicating the time at which suelildo was compiled (so that peers using that information may 
know how old it is). 
 
fraglist contains, its identifier, its adequate SigInfo  parameter, the MO’s id ( CCPimo ) and 
the 
CCP
iMOjfragdef objects that pertain to the fragments into which the MO was divided to 
enable its fragmented redistribution. Each 
CCP
iMOjfragdef carries the identification, size, 
sequence number and signature, (by the CCP ), of a specific fragment of CCPiMO , and the 
corresponding (to said signature) SigInfo  parameter. fraglist is signed by the CCP to 
assure its integrity and authenticity, as it was that peer (CCP ) that produced that object at 
MO insertion time. 
 
iPP
uelInforetrpermit  and suelildo are signed by iOCP (their issuingOCP ), to enable the 
validation of their authenticity, by any peer. The independent and redundant signing of 
iPP
uelInforetrpermit and suelildo , (in regards to the sensitive part of the PLL message that 
wraps the UEL message that contains them), enables the later independent P2P distribution 
of suelildo  amongst the peripheral peers and the presentation of i
PP
uelInforetrpermit , by, iPP, 
to other peers to prove the authorization of its requests.  
 
In the next step of this operation, iOCP sends i
PP
CCP
iMO
retrpermit  to iPP (step 3). After that, iPP 
proceeds (in a P2P fashion), to simultaneously retrieve CCPiMO ’s composing fragments, from 
its delivering peers (e.g. jPP and kPP ). It sends messages to kPP  and jPP  (steps 4), 
requesting fragments 
CCP
iMOFrag0 and 
CCP
iMOFrag1 respectively. In such messages it 
includes, (besides the designation of the type of request and the identification of the desired 
fragment), the permit and suelildo objects, received from iOCP , so that the jPP  and kPP can 
verify that iPP is indeed authorized to retrieve the requested MO fragment from them (the 
permit carries the identifier of the suelildo object, and so the connection between the two is 
established and may be verified). 
Finally kPP  and jPP  deliver said fragments (steps 5), to iPP  which validates their integrity 
(employing the information present in the suelildo object), reconstitutes CCPiMO , validates its 
overall integrity (as it carries its signature by the CCP) and renders it for user consumption. 
 
After it has answered iPP’s request, iOCP  reports to CCP , that iU  is consuming CCPiMO  
at iPP (step 3a). CCP then takes care of registering such information in the system’s data 
structure and of propagating those changes, to the data structure, to the OCPs . 
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This overall procedure thus enables an efficient P2P diffusion, of MOs, between peripheral 
peers. It may also be applied to other UEL information objects as user registration 
certificates (
iU
rcertif ), user hosting certificates, ( iPP
iU
hostcertif ), content search response 
objects (see sqro in section 7.4.4), or UEL Information Location Describing Objects 
( suelildo s).  
5.5.8.3 Composed User Attending Operations 
To explain the inner workings of composed user attending operations we present bellow an 
example of such an operation. 
5.5.8.3.1 User Attention Sale Operation 
As explained in section 2 of chapter IV, two main types of user attention sale procedures are 
to be supported by the P2PTube architecture. These are: mandatory unrewarded 
advertisement viewing; and voluntary rewarded advertisement viewing. 
 
The latter procedure is supported as a set of UEL operations, which may be described in the 
following manner: 
• At an initial time, a specific advertising user, addU , inserts into the system a number 
of advertising MOs and their corresponding Inquiry IOs and Inquiry Response IOs 
(see section 7.4.10). Amongst these is CCPaddMO , one of its corresponding inquiry IO, 
CCP
iinquiryIO and its respective Inquiry Response IO 
CCP
ipIOinquiryRes . These MO 
and IO insertion operations are supported in the client/server manner indicated in 
section 5.5.8.2.1; 
• Some time later, a regular user, iU , decides to “sell” some attention. For that she 
selects a list of available advertisement MOs from the system by performing a query. 
This operation is supported in a hybrid manner as explained in section 5.5.8.2.2; 
• iU then selects her preferred advertisement MO (e.g. CCPaddMO ), requesting its 
retrieval – this retrieval operation unfolds in the hybrid manner explained in section 
5.5.8.2.2; 
• iU then retrieves 
CCP
iinquiryIO , (in the hybrid manner explained in section 5.5.8.2.2), 
and answers its questions, pertaining to the contents of CCPaddMO . Said answers are 
then sent back to the CCP. The latter checks them against the information present in 
CCP
ipIOinquiryRes . If all is ok, a specific monetary amount is extracted from addU ’s 
account and a portion of it is deposited in iU ’s account. Another portion is deposited 
in the system’s operating entity’s account. 
 
The earlier procedure may be supported by the following set of UEL operations: 
• The initial step is the same as in the previous bullet list; 
• Some time later, a regular user, iU , selects some specific MO (e.g. CCPiMO ) for 
consumption, which is retrieved in the hybrid manner explained in section 5.5.8.2.2; 
• In its rights expressing metadata CCPiMO indicates that it should only be given access 
to, after the user consumes a specific advertisement MO (e.g. CCPaddMO ). Thus, the 
user hosting peer ( iPP ) retrieves CCPaddMO , from the system, in the hybrid manner 
explained in section 5.5.8.2.2; 
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• iPP  then renders 
CCP
addMO and only after that does it render 
CCP
iMO ; 
• After CCPaddMO has been rendered, iPP informs CCP (in the client server manner 
explained in section 5.5.8.2.1), with a signed (with the user’s private key) notification, 
of the advertisement consumption activity that has occurred; 
• CCP then proceeds to extract a specific monetary amount from addU ’s account and 
deposit it in the system’s operating entity’s account. 
5.5.9 DRM Enforcement 
The enforcing of DRM-like aspects is not handled in any isolated component or operations in 
the system. Instead said enforcement is logically included in numerous operations that take 
place within the system. 
 
 
Figure 40 – Logical DRM Functionalities in P2PTube Peer Structure 
 
All UEL (and the related PLL) security related measures are devoted to guarantying 
communicational confidentiality, data integrity, data origin authenticity and non-repudiability 
and user and peer identity. They thus contribute to a reliable and trustworthy identification of 
users, peers and media content, to the preservation of MO integrity and to the protection of 
the association between users and the media content that they own. 
Said measures, thus, protect the right of all users to privacy and to a secure access to their 
account and user data, and protect the rights of content owners as they guard against 
content corruption and wrongful ownership declaration (by way of user reports). 
 
The mechanisms supported, by the system, for the reporting, by system users, of user 
misbehaviour (described in section 5.5.7.4), basically consist of a distributed collaborative 
system for the detection of content whose authorship is being wrongfully claimed, that is, for 
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the detection of copyright infringement. Given the overall collaborative nature, intended for 
the system, and its interdependency-based business models, it is expectable that users will 
proactively aid in the detection of copyright infringement, and thus, this mechanism should 
be successful. 
 
Furthermore, the user action monitoring capabilities of the system (at the UEL), also enable 
the gathering of information on user behaviour with implication on the protection of content 
owner rights. The collected information may also be used for the purpose of making 
monetary gains, by the system’s operating entity, thus supporting its right to be rewarded for 
its operation. 
 
Revisiting Figure 25 (from section 3.3 of the present chapter), which describes the structure 
of a peer, one may thus visualize the DRM capacities of the system, as being logically 
distributed over the set of components signalled with a red circle in Figure 40. 
 
In accordance with the type of business models that are to be supported, the systems, thus, 
employs “light” DRM capabilities. 
6 Inter-System Cooperation 
6.1 Overview 
Systems, embodying this architecture, may cooperate with one another. Said architecture 
provides the necessary means to assure operational reliability and communicational security 
and confidentiality and informational authenticity. It achieves this through the employment of 
semi-centralized cryptographic means which are to be under the control of a trustworthy 
entity. 
 
The provision of the above stated guaranties, to peers and users, in the context of inter-
system interaction demands the existence of a solid context of trust between the interacting 
systems. Users and peers of system ASys can only interact with users and peers of 
system BSys , if ASys trusts BSys , that is, if the operating entity of the earlier system trusts 
the operating entity of the latter one. If this trust relationship, which can only be built through 
inter-human interaction in the real world, does not exist, the two systems cannot interact. 
 
Furthermore, for the correct operation of these systems, the trust relationships between 
them must be reciprocal. For instance, for a peer, AP , from system ASys , to be able to 
cooperate with some peer, BP ,  in system BSys , AP must know and trust the authentication 
information of BP and vice-versa. For said peers to be able to trust that information, about 
each other, ASys must trust BSys and vice-versa.  
 
The cooperation, between any two such systems, implies, thus, the existence of a mutual 
trust between their operating entities. 
The cooperation networks, collectively established by these systems, are therefore 
constituted as a form of web of trust [174]. That network is composed by a set of bilateral 
trust relationships between individual systems, where each system, in the relationship, will 
trust (and therefore cooperate with), the other system. 
 
In a typical web of trust approach if entity A trusts entity B, and B trusts entity C, then, it 
follows that A trusts C, that is, trust is a transitive relationship. However, given the 
demanding security requirements for a safe operation of the P2PTube architecture, in the 
context of the trust networks established between these systems, that relationship must not 
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be transitive. Thus, a P2PTube system trusts and cooperates only with the homologue 
systems that its operating entity directly instructs it to trust, and no others.  
The set of all (reciprocally) trusted systems of some specific system is defined as the latter’s 
trust sphere. 
 
 
Figure 41 – Inter System Trust Spheres Example 
 
Figure 41 presents an example of a possible trust context maintained by a set of 9 
independent systems. In the exemplified context three different trust spheres are highlighted: 
• The trust sphere of system 1 – includes all the systems with which it maintains a 
bidirectional trust relationship, that is, system 2, system 3, system 4 and system 5; 
• The trust sphere of system 2 – includes systems 1, 8 and 9; 
• The trust sphere of system 3 – includes systems 1, 6 and 7; 
 
As it can be seen, no transitivity exists, in inter-system trust relationships, as, for instance, 
while system 6 is part of system 3’s trust sphere, and the latter is part of system 1’s trust 
sphere, system 6 is not part of system 1’s trust sphere. 
 
The establishment of a mutual trust relationship between two P2PTube systems is involves 
the active participation of their operating entities. These entities must configure their 
systems’ CCPs to trust each other. Each CCP will then diffuse information describing and 
validating the established trust relationship throughout the system’s tissue. 
6.2 Trust Relationship Establishment 
The inter-system trust establishing process is performed at the UEL, and is exemplified in 
Figure 42. To initiate it, the operating entity of one of the systems takes the initiative to 
instruct its system’s CCP, ACCP , to trust the CCP of the target system, BCCP . To do so, 
said entity supplies its peer the identification, public key and present IP address of BCCP  
(step 1). 
 
ACCP  then prepares and signs the trust relationship describing info object, trustrel . This 
contains the identification, public and private key identifiers and the public key of each of the 
CCPs of both systems. It carries also a timestamp indicating the validity termination date of 
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the described trust relationship. The signed version of trustrel (concatenated with the 
adequate SigInfo ), is then sent to BCCP  (step 2). 
 
 
Figure 42 – Inter-System Trust Establishment 
 
In order to accept or refuse the received request to establish a trust relationship, BCCP must 
obtain the input of its operating entity. For that reason it requests (step 3), from said entity, 
an authorization to establish a trust relationship between the two systems. 
If system B’s operating entity does accept what was requested (step 4), BCCP produces the 
trust certificate object, BCCP
ACCP
ftrustcerti . This object contains the signatures of the 
( )trustrelSigInfo   set, by ACCP and BCCP , and trustrel itself. The two signatures prove the 
mutual acceptance of the trust relationship. BCCP
ACCP
ftrustcerti  is then sent to ACCP , (step 5), 
and the trust relationship is established. 
6.3 Trust Information Diffusion 
Whenever a peer, AP , from system ASys needs to interact (either at the PLL or at the UEL), 
with a peer, BP , from another system, BSys , it must first assess if the target peer’s system is 
trusted or not. To do so, AP must obtain from its CCP, ( ACCP ), a list of all the trust 
relationships in which its system participates with other systems 
( ( ) ( ) ( )nCCP
ACCPn
CCP
ACCPA
ftrustcertisysftrustcertisystrustlist ||.....||11= ). This object is a list of the trust 
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certificates of all the trust relationships in which the ASys  participates along with the 
identification of every trusted system. 
 
In possession of this information, AP may determine if BP  is part of a trusted system or not. 
This is possible because every peer’s identifier carries, as a prefix, the identification if its 
encompassing system (as explained in section 5.2.3). 
7 Data and Metadata Objects 
7.1 Introduction 
The regular operation of the system involves the production and exchange/distribution of a 
set of different information objects. To assure systemic reliability, these must be structured 
so as to guarantee their integrity, authenticity and temporal validity.  
In P2PTube, MPEG-21 is employed for the definition of most such objects, given the 
information structuring capabilities of that standard. The most relevant of these objects are 
presented in the following sub sections of section 7. 
7.2 IPCL Objects 
7.2.1 IPCL Message 
IPCL messages (the messages exchanged between IPCL instances in different peers), 
consist of TAR archives which have the following content: 
• IPCL Message Head File (IPCLMHFile) – contains the IPCL message’s metadata; 
• PLL Message File (PLLMFile) – consists of the PLL message which is being wrapped 
by the IPCL message. 
 
The contents of the IPCLMHFile may be defined 
as 




= fpllMFileRedstPIPsrcPIPipclMHFile , where srcPIP and dstPIP are the IP 
addresses of the source and destination peers, respectively, and fpllMFileRe is the ref to 
the PLL message carried inside the IPCL message file. In more precise terms it consists of 
an MPEG-21 DID with the structure depicted in Figure 43. 
 
 
Figure 43 – IPCLMHFile Structure 
 
Said structure consists of the following: 
• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the head file’s contents. This latter element carries: 
o a Descriptor element containing the IP address of the sending peer;  
o a Descriptor element containing the IP address of the destination peer;  
o an Item element (identified as ipclm_content), which carries a reference to the 
PLL message file which is wrapped inside the IPCL message object. 
 
An example of an IPCLMHFile may be found in section A.1.1 of Annex A. 
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7.3 PLL Objects 
7.3.1 PLL Message 
In section 5.4.2 a PLL message (sent from iP  to kP ) is logically defined as 
( ) ( )













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
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
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
−−
InfoInfoInfoserialSigInfoEncInfo
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KkP
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
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

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
=
−
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

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
− kPiP
giPiPiPi
sKkkoAlgrthmInfpEncInfo U1 , 










−
=
iPiPiPi
KkkoAlgrthmInfpSigInfo 1 .  
 
In more precise terms they consist of TAR archives with the following content: 
• PLL Sensitive Info File (PLLSIFile) – contains the PLL message’s sensitive 
information. It consists of a Tar archive containing: 
o PLL Sensitive Info Head File (PLLSIHFile) – contains the top, unprotected 
metadata of the PLLSFile; 
o PLL Protected Sensitive Info File (PLLPSIFile) – a TAR archive, (encoded 
with 
kP
K ), containing: 
 PLL Protected Sensitive Info Head File (PLLPSIHFile) – contains the 
signature of the content of the  following file; 
 PLL Protected Sensitive Info Core File (PLLPSICFile) – contains the 
signed part of the PLLPSIFile; 
• None or one PLL Non Sensitive Info File (PLLNSIFile) – carries non sensitive PLL 
information. It may wrap a UEL Non Sensitive Info File (UELNSIFile). 
 
The PLLSIHFile (which basically contains the EncInfo  part), consists of an MPEG-21 DID 
with the structure depicted in Figure 44. An example of the contents of a PLLSIHFile may be 
found in section A.2.1.1 of Annex A. 
 
 
Figure 44 – PLLSIHFile Structure 
 
Said structure consists of the following: 
• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the file’s contents. This latter element carries: 
o one of the following two options: 
 a Descriptor element containing the EncInfo parameter. This element 
carries a DIDL which may contains inside: 
• either: 
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o an Item element which carries the identifier of the peer 
that performed the encoding; 
o an Item element which carries the definition of the 
encoding algorithm; 
o an Item element which carries the peer’s public key and 
its identifier; 
o an Item element which carries the identifier of the 
peer’s private key; 
• or: 
o an Item element which carries the identifier of the 
communication session of which this PLL message is a 
part;  
o an Item element (identified as pllm_securecontent), which carries a reference 
to the file containing the ciphered contents of the PLL message. 
 
The PLLPSIFile consists of ( )




























−
−
InfoInfoserialSigInfo
iP
KS
iP
KkP
K 11 signaturesignedenc . 
The PLLPSIHFile (which contains ( )














−−
InfoInfoserialSigInfo
iP
KS
iP
K 11
signaturesignature ), 
consists of an MPEG-21 DID with the structure depicted in Figure 45. 
 
 
Figure 45 – PLLPSIHFile Structure 
 
Said structure consists of the following: 
• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the head file’s contents. This latter element carries: 
o a Descriptor element containing the signature of the file referenced in the item 
bellow;  
o an Item element (identified as pllm_pllpsic), which carries a reference to the 
PLL Protected Sensitive Info Core File (PLLPSICFile);  
 
An example of the contents of a PLLPSIHFile may be found in section A.2.1.2 of Annex A. 
 
The PLLPSICFile is a Tar archive containing the following files: 
• The PLLPSIC Top File (PLLPSICTopFile) – carries ( )serialSigInfo ; 
• The PLLPSIC Middle File (PLLPSICMiddleFile) – carries SInfo ; 
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• The PLLPSIC Bottom File (PLLPSICBottomFile) – carries ( )








−
Info
iP
K 1
signature . 
The PLLPSICTopFile (which contains 





serialSigInfo ), consists of an MPEG-21 DID with 
the structure depicted in Figure 46. 
 
 
Figure 46 – PLLPSICTopFile Structure 
 
Said structure consists of the following: 
• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the file’s contents. This latter element carries: 
o an Item element (identified as sigInfo), which carries the serial of SigInfo 
parameter;  
o an Item element (identified as serial), which carries the serial of the PLL 
message;  
 
An example of the contents of a PLLPSICTopFile may be found in section A.2.1.3 of 
Annex A. 
The PLLPSICBottomFile (which contains ( )








−
Info
iP
K 1
signature ), consists of an MPEG-21 
DID with a structure consisting of the following: 
• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the file’s contents. This latter element carries: 
o an Item element (identified as nonsensitiveinfosig), which carries the 
signature, (by the message sending peer) of the file carrying the Info part of 
the PLL message; 
 
The PLLPSICMiddleFile is a Tar archive that carries a concatenation of the following files: 
• PLLPSICMiddle Metadada File (PLLPSICMiddleMDFile) – carries the PLL level 
metadata of SInfo ; 
• None or one UEL Sensitive Info File (UELSIFile) – this file consists of the sensitive 
part of the UEL message file which is being wrapped by the PLL message; 
 
 
The PLLPSICMiddleMDFile consists of an MPEG-21 DID with a structure consisting of the 
following: 
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• an Item element (identified as pllSensitiveInfo), which carries the PLL specific 
metadata of the PLL message; 
• any number of Item elements carrying the remaining PLL level parameters of SInfo . 
7.3.2 Peer Registration Certificate 
Upon a successful completion of its registration with the system, a peripheral or outer core, 
peer, iP , is given a Registration Certificate by the CCP. In section 5.4.3 it is logically 
described as










−
= vtermpeerTypesidSigInfoidrcertif
iPCCPKi
P 1signed , where id is 
the certificate’s identifier, SigInfo  contains the necessary data to enable the validation of the 
certificate’s signature, peerType is the structural type of the peer (peripheral or outer core or 
central core), 






−
=
iP
iP
KiP
idsid 1signed and 






−
=
iPiPiPiiP
KkkoAlgrthmInfpid 1 . In more 
precise terms it consists of an MPEG-21 DID with the structure depicted in Figure 47. 
 
 
Figure 47 – Peer Registration Certificate Structure 
 
Said structure, (for a hypothetical peripheral peer iP ), consists of the following: 
• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the certificate. This latter element carries: 
o a Descriptor element containing CCP ’s signature of the remaining content of 
its parent Container element (the signature of its Item sibling); 
o an Item element (identified as prc_content), which carries the actual contents 
of the certificate. It contains: 
 a Descriptor containing the certificate’s identifier; 
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 a Descriptor containing the specification of the certificate’s validity 
term. 
 A Descriptor (identified as siginfodescr) which consists of 
the SigInfo parameter; 
 an Item (identified as sid) which consists of the
iP
sid parameter; 
 an Item containing the specification of the role played by iP in the 
system (either peripheral, outercore or centralcore); 
 
The SigInfo Descriptor contains (inside its Statement child) a root DIDL element carrying a 
Container element which functions as the top element of the rest of SigInfo ’s structure. 
This latter element carries: 
• an Item containing the identification of the siging peer ( iP ); 
• an Item containing the employed siging algorithm. 
• an Item containing iP ’s public key and its identifier; 
• an Item containing iP ’s private key identifier; 
 
The
iP
sid Item contains: 
• a Descriptor element containing iP ’s signature of the remaining content of its parent 
Item element (the signature of its Item sibling); 
• an Item which consists of the 
iP
id . It contains: 
o an Item containing iP ’s id; 
o an Item containing iP ’s siging algorithm. 
o an Item containing iP ’s public key and its identifier; 
o an Item containing iP ’s private key identifier; 
 
An example of a Peer Registration Certificate may be found in section A.2.2 of Annex A. 
7.3.3 Peer Connection Certificate 
Upon a successful establishing of a connection between two peers ( iP  and kP ), the “client” 
peer (the peer which requested the establishment of the connection e.g. iP ), is given a 
Connection Certificate by the “server” peer (the peer to whom the establishment of the 
connection was requested e.g. kP ).  
In section 5.4.5 said certificate is logically described as 


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s
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K
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KencsvtermrcertifrcertifSigInfoidccertif 1signed . In 
more precise terms it consists of an MPEG-21 DID with the structure depicted in Figure 48. 
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Figure 48 – Peer Connection Certificate Structure 
 
Said structure, (for a hypothetical peripheral peer iP initiating a communication session with 
peer kP ), consists of the following: 
o A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the certificate. This latter element carries:a Descriptor element 
containing the signature (by kP ), of the remaining content of its parent 
Container element (the signature of its Item sibling); 
o an Item element (identified as pcc_content), which carries the actual contents 
of the certificate. It contains: 
 a Descriptor containing the certificate’s identifier; 
 a Descriptor containing the SigInfo parameter; 
 a Descriptor containing the validity term of the connection certificate; 
 an Item (identified as rCertifPi) which contains 
iP
rcertif ; 
 an Item (identified as rCertifPk) which contains 
iP
rcertif ; 
 an Item (identified as sessionID) which contains CCPiPgs
−
; 
 an Item (identified as cipheredSessionKey) which contains 







 −CCPiP
gs
s
iP
K Kenc ; 
7.3.4 Peer Info Object 
In section 5.4.7 the Peer Info Object, of a specific peer iP , built by a specific jOCP , is 
logically described as 





=
−
vtermIPrcertifSigInfoidpInfo iiP
jOCP
Ks 1
signed . In more 
precise terms it consists of an MPEG-21 DID with the structure depicted in Figure 49. 
 
Said structure consists of the following: 
• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the object. This latter element carries: 
o a Descriptor element containing an OCP ’s signature of the remaining content 
of its parent Container element (the signature of its Item sibling); 
o an Item element (identified as pio_content), which carries the actual contents 
of the object. It contains: 
 a Descriptor containing the object’s identifier; 
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 a Descriptor element containing the object’s validity term; 
 a Descriptor element containing the SigInfo parameter; 
 an Item containing iP ’s IP address; 
 an Item containing iP ’s registration certificate. 
 
The last mentioned Item carries a Component which carries a Resource element. The latter 
contains, inline, iP ’s registration certificate. The structure of this certificate is the one 
presented in section 7.3.2. 
 
 
Figure 49 – Peer Info Object Structure 
 
An example of a Peer Info Object may be found in section A.2.3 of Annex A. 
7.3.5 Peer Quarantine and Expulsion Lists 
In section 5.4.7 the peer quarantine list (compiled by jOCP ), is logically defined as 
( )tstampQListSigInfoquarList
jOCP
Ks 1
signed
−
= . In more precise terms it consists of an 
MPEG-21 DID with the structure depicted in Figure 50. 
 
 
Figure 50 – Peer Quarantine List Structure 
 
Said structure consists of the following: 
• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the object. This latter element carries: 
o a Descriptor element containing an OCP ’s signature of the remaining content 
of its parent Container element (the signature of its Item sibling); 
o an Item element (identified as pql_content), which carries the actual contents 
of the object. It contains: 
 a Descriptor element containing the object’s validity term; 
 a Descriptor element containing the SigInfo parameter; 
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 any number of Item elements, each containing the identifier of a 
quarantined peer; 
 
The structure of a peer expulsion list, logically defined as ( )tstampXListSigInfoexpList
jOCP
K
s 1
signed
−
= , in section 5.4.7, is the same as that of the 
peer quarantine list. 
An example of a Peer Quarantine List may be found in section A.2.4 of Annex A. 
 
7.3.6 PLL Info Retrieval Permit 
In section 5.4.7 the Peer Info Retrieval Permit, (a permit, issued by a specific jOCP , 
enabling a specific peripheral peer iPP to retrieve some PLL level information from another 
peripheral peer, jPP ), is logically described as:  












−
=
s
pllildoi
jOCP
K
iPP
pllInfo idinfoDefvtermppSigInforetrpermit rPermpllInfoRetidsigned 1 , 
where. In more precise terms it consists of an MPEG-21 DID with the structure depicted in 
Figure 51. 
 
Figure 51 – Peer Info Retrieval Permit Structure 
 
Said structure consists of the following: 
• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the permit. This latter element carries: 
o a Descriptor element containing an OCP ’s signature of the remaining content 
of its parent Container element (the signature of its Item sibling); 
o an Item element (identified as piorp_content), which carries the actual 
contents of the permit. It contains: 
 a Descriptor element containing the permit’s identifier; 
 a Descriptor element containing the designation of the type of the 
object (PPL Info Retrieval permit); 
 a Descriptor element containing the permit’s validity term; 
 a Descriptor element containing the SigInfo parameter; 
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 an Item containing the relevant information about the peer to whom 
the permit has been issued ( iPP ). It contains an inner Item which 
carries (inside a Resource inside a Component), iPP ’s identifier; 
 an Item containing the information which iPP is allowed to retrieve. It 
corresponds to the infoDef parameter; 
 an Item containing the identifier of the permit’s corresponding 
s
pllildoid ; 
 
An example of a Peer Info Object Retrieval Permit may be found in section A.2.5 of Annex A. 
7.3.7 PLL Information Location Describing Object 
In section 5.4.7 the PLL Information Location Describing Object, is logically described as:  
 











=
−
n
PPiPP
jOCP
Ks
rcertifrcertifvterminfoDefSigInfoidpllildo ......signed 1 . 
 
In more precise terms it consists of an MPEG-21 DID with the structure depicted in Figure 
51. 
 
Figure 52 – PLL Information Location Describing Object 
 
Said structure consists of the following: 
• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the object. This latter element carries: 
o a Descriptor element containing an OCP ’s signature of the remaining content 
of its parent Container element (the signature of its Item sibling); 
o an Item element (identified as pllildo_content), which carries the actual 
contents of the object. It contains: 
 a Descriptor element containing the object’s identifier; 
 a Descriptor element containing the SigInfo parameter; 
 a Descriptor element containing the information which is located by 
this object. It corresponds to the infoDef parameter; 
 a Descriptor element containing the object’s validity term; 
 an Item containing the necessary registration certificates of the peers 
which hold the information defined in the infoDef parameter; 
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7.4 UEL Objects 
7.4.1 UEL Message 
In section 5.5.2 an UEL message (whose production involves user iU ) is, logically defined 
(in an implicit manner) as 














−
UELinfoUELinfoserialSigInfo s
iU
K 1
signed . 
In more precise terms they consist of a TAR archive with the following content: 
• UEL Sensitive Info File (UELSIFile) – contains the UEL message’s sensitive 
information.  
• None or one UEL Non Sensitive Info File (UELNSIFile) – carries non sensitive UEL 
information. It consists of a TAR archive containing: 
 
The UELSIFile (which basically contains the 




− s
iU
K
UELinfoserialSigInfo1signed part), 
consists of an MPEG-21 DID with the structure depicted in Figure 53.  
 
 
 
Figure 53 – UELSIFile Structure 
 
Said structure consists of the following: 
• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the file’s contents. This latter element carries: 
o a Descriptor element containing the user’s signature of the remaining content 
of its parent Container element (the signature of its Item sibling); 
o an Item element containing: 
 a Descriptor element containing the SigInfo parameter; 
 a Descriptor element containing the serial of the UEL message;  
 an Item element (identified as uels_info), which carries the sensitive 
UEL information of the message; 
 an Item element (identified as uelm_uelsi_ssinfo), which carries the 
sensitive UEL information of the message. It contains: 
• an Item element carrying the definition of the type of UEL 
message; 
• zero or more Item elements carrying futher sensitive UEL 
parameters; 
 
An example of the contents of a UELSIFile may be found in section A.3.1.1 of Annex A. 
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7.4.2 User Registration Certificate 
After a user, iU , successfully finishes his registration with the system, he is given a User 
Participation Certificate. In section 5.5.3 it is logically described by the following 
equation










−
= vtermsidSigInfoidrcertif
iUCCPKi
U 1signed . The definitions of some of the 
most relevant of its parameters are 





−
=
iU
iU
KiU
idsid 1signed  and 






=
−
iUiUiUiU
iiu
KkkoAlgrthmInfunameuid 1 . In more precise terms it consists of an 
MPEG-21 DID with the structure depicted in Figure 54. 
 
 
Figure 54 – User Registration Certificate Structure 
 
Said structure consists of the following: 
• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the certificate. This latter element carries: 
o a Descriptor element containing the CCP ’s signature of the remaining 
content of its parent Container element (the signature of its Item sibling); 
o an Item element which carries the actual content of the certificate. It contains: 
 a Descriptor containing the certificate’s identifier; 
 a Descriptor element containing the validity term of the certificate; 
 a Descriptor element containing the SigInfo parameter; 
 an Item element which carries the 
iU
sid . It contains a DID which 
carries the actual 
iU
sid . Said DID has at its root a DIDL element 
carrying a Container element which contains:  
• a Descriptor element containing iU ’s signature of the 
remaining content of its parent Item  element (the signature of 
its Item sibling); 
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• an Item which constitutes 
iU
id . It contains five inner Items 
which respectively carry: 
o iU ’s identifier; 
o iU ’s username; 
o iU ’s signing algorithm definition; 
o iU ’s public key and its identifier; 
o The identifier of iU ’s private key; 
 
An example of a User Registration Certificate may be found in section A.3.2 of Annex A. 
7.4.3 User Hosting Certificate 
After a user, iU , successfully logs into the system, his hosting peripheral peer, iPP , his 
given, by CCP , a certificate proving that iPP is in fact hosting user iU . In section 5.5.5 said 
certificate is logically described as 








−
= vtermpprcertifSigInfoidhostcertif iiUCCPK
iPP
iU 1
signed , where 










−
= vtermsidSigInfoidrcertif
iUCCPKi
U 1signed . In more precise terms it consists of an 
MPEG-21 DID with the structure depicted in Figure 55. 
 
 
Figure 55 – User Hosting Certificate Structure 
 
Said structure consists of the following: 
• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the certificate. This latter element carries: 
o a Descriptor element containing the CCP ’s signature of the remaining 
content of its parent Container element (the signature of its Item sibling); 
o an Item element which contains: 
 a Descriptor containing the certificate’s identifier; 
 a Descriptor element containing a timestamp with the certificate’s 
validity term; 
 a Descriptor element containing the SigInfo parameter; 
 an Item which contains the identification of the hosting peer; 
 an Item which constitutes the 
iU
rcertif . Its contents and structure are 
the same as those explained in section 7.4.2. 
 
An example of a User Hosting Certificate may be found in section A.3.3 of Annex A. 
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7.4.4 Search Query Response Objects 
Before a user decides to consume a specific Media Object (MO), he must first learn about 
the existence of such an object. That knowledge is typically obtained through content 
searches (e.g. googling). 
The user will thus specify a number of semantic criteria that his target MO(s) must respect 
and tell his hosting peer, iPP , to obtain a list with such MOs. The searching procedure that 
will then ensue (which will unfold in the manner presented in section 5.5.8.2.2), will ultimately 
result in the reception, by iPP , of a Search Query Response Object ( sqro ), (sent from 
theCCP , from an OCP or from another peripheral peer), originally produced by the CCP, or 
an OCP , which contains the response. An sqro may be logically described 
as 





−
= moListansweredQtstatmpSigInfoidsqro
CCPK
1signed (alternatively it may instead 
be signed by an OCP ), where ( )





=
−
querySigInfoidansweredQ
CCPK
1signed , and 


























=
n
MOnMO semcharsmosemcharsmomoList
.............
11
. In more precise terms it 
consists of an MPEG-21 DID with the structure depicted in Figure 56. 
 
 
Figure 56 – SQRO Structure 
 
Said structure consists of the following: 
• an inner Item – it carries: 
o the identifier of the object – within Descriptor “id”; 
o the SigInfo parameter – within Descriptor “siginfodescr”; 
o the emission date of the query response information – within Descriptor 
“sqro_emissiontime”; 
o the answered query – within Descriptor “sqro_answeredquery”: It carries an 
inner DID which constitutes the answered query object. It contains: 
 a Descriptor carrying the signature of the answered query object’s 
content; 
 an Item carrying the actual content of the object. It contains: 
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• a Descriptor carrying the objects identifier; 
• a Descriptor carrying the adequate SigInfo parameter; 
• a Component carrying, inline, the actual query string; 
o the actual query response information – within the “sqro:MIList” child of its 
Component child; 
• an outer Container – it carries: 
o the inner Item; 
o the security assuring provisions – consist of the digital signature, (by CCP or 
an OCP ), of the inner Item, expressed by a dsig:Signature element of 
Descriptor “sqro_signature”. 
 
The sqro:MOList element is structured in accordance with the schema depicted in Figure 57. 
 
 
Figure 57 – MOList Schema Depiction 
 
The signing of the inner item, (by the CCP or by an OCP , at sqro ’s original production 
time), assures sqro ’s integrity and authenticity during its propagation across the system’s 
tissue, thus enabling its P2P diffusion,  independently of the CCP or of the OCPs . 
SQRO’s emission date, contained within the “sqro_emissiontime” Descriptor, enables any 
peripheral peer to assess the freshness or staleness of the information. 
The signing of the “answered query object” assures that it has the same security and 
distribution related properties, as the contents of the above mentioned inner Item. 
 
An example of an sqro may be found in section A.3.4 of Annex A. 
7.4.5 UEL Information Location Describing Objects 
The UEL Information Location Describing Object contains the necessary information for a 
peer to know where to retrieve a specific portion of UEL information (which may be an MO, 
an sqro , etc.), from. It may be described by the following equation,  








−
= fospecificinloclisttstampSigInfoiduelildo
iOCP
iOCP
Ks 1
signed , where id is the object’s 
identifier, 
iOCP
SigInfo carries the necessary information to validate iOCP ’s signature of 
suelildo , tstamp is suelildo ’s emission time, ( )nPPPPloclist .....1= is the list of peers 
from where the target information object may be retrieved, and fospecificin is an optional 
parameter whose presence and contents depend on the type of the target UEL information. 
 
In section 5.5.8.2.2, an example of an MO retrieval operation is given. In that specific case, 
the employed suelildo takes the form  








−
= fraglistloclisttstampSigInfoiduelildo
iOCPOCPK
s 1signed , where   
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







=










−
CCP
iMO
n
CCP
iMOCCP
i
CCPK
fragdeffragdefmoSigInfoidfraglist .......01signed , and  






















=
−
CCP
iMOj
CCPK
CCP
iMOj
CCP
iMOj FragsignatureSigInfoseqnrsizefragfragdef 1 .  
That is, fraglistfospecificin = . fraglist is the list of fragments into which the media 
object, CCPiMO , is divided into. The rest of this section will use this specific instance of a 
suelildo to exemplify it.  
In precise terms, a suelildo consists of an MPEG-21 DID with the structure depicted in 
Figure 58.  
 
 
Figure 58 – UELILDO Structure 
 
Said structure consists of the following: 
• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the object. This latter element carries: 
o a Descriptor element containing the CCP ’s (or an OCP’s) signature of the 
remaining content of its parent Container element (the signature of its Item 
sibling); 
o an Item – it contains: 
 a Descriptor containing the object’s identifier; 
 a Descriptor element containing the SigInfo parameter, with the 
necessary data to enable the validation of the suelildo signature; 
 a Descriptor element containing the IOLDO’s emission timestamp; 
 an Item containing the loclist . It contains: 
• an Item element, for each of the peers hosting the MO. Each 
such Item contains the identification of a specific peer; 
 an Item containing the fraglist . It contains the fraglist carrying DID. 
It thus carries (inside the Resource child of a Component child): 
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• A top DIDL element carrying a Container element which 
functions as the top element of the fraglist . This latter 
element carries: 
• a Descriptor containing fraglist ’s signature; 
• an Item carrying fraglist ’s actual content. It contains: 
o a Descriptor containing the object’s identifier; 
o a Descriptor element containing the SigInfo parameter, 
with the necessary data to enable the validation of 
fraglist ’s signature; 
o an Item carrying the identification of the MO at stake; 
o an Item element, for each of the Fragdef objects 
describing MO fragments. Each such Item contains: 
 an Descriptor element carrying the fragment ID; 
 an Descriptor element specifying the fragment 
size; 
 a Descriptor element containing the 
SigInfo parameter, with the necessary data to 
enable the validation of fragment’s signature 
(bellow); 
 an Item element carrying the fragment’s 
signature; 
 a Component element which defines the 
fragment at stake.  
 
Said Components carry an Anchor element, which carries the identification of the fragment 
(within a Descriptor), and carries the fragment’s definition within a Fragment element [175]. 
 
The signing of Item “uelildo_content” by CCP  (or by some OCP) enables the validation 
of suelildo ’s integrity and of its origin authenticity. 
Besides the description of the location of MOs, suelildo may also be used, for instance, for 
the description of the location of 
iU
rcertif , iPP
iU
hostcertif , or other suelildo . In all such cases 
Ø=fospecificin . 
 
An example of a UELILDO, of the above exemplified type, may be found in section A.3.5 of 
Annex A. 
7.4.6 UEL Info Retrieval Permit 
A UEL Info Retrieval Permit is a permit enabling a specific peripheral peer iPP , to retrieve a 
specific piece of UEL information, from a number of other peers. It may logically be defined 
as 








−
=
suelildoiiOCP
iOCP
K
iPP
uelInfo idinfoDefvtermppSigInforetrpermit rPermuelInfoRetidsigned 1 . 
 
In section 5.5.8.2.1.1 such a permit is employed to enable the retrieval of an MO (e.g. 
CCP
iMO ). In the remainder of this section we shall exemplify the structure of the permit in 
scope, employing a permit of the latter type. Thus, in this particular case, ( )CCPimoinfoDef =  
is the identifier of the desired MO. 
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In precise terms a UEL Info Retrieval Permit consists of an MPEG-21 DID with the structure 
depicted in Figure 59. 
 
 
Figure 59 – MO Retrieval Permit Structure 
 
Said structure consists of the following: 
• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the permit. This latter element carries: 
o a Descriptor element containing CCP ’s, or an OCP ’s, signature of the 
remaining content of its parent Container element (the signature of its Item 
sibling); 
o an Item element (identified as uelrip_content), which carries the actual 
contents of the permit. It contains: 
 a Descriptor containing the certificate’s identifier; 
 a Descriptor element containing the definition of the certificate’s type; 
 a Descriptor element containing the certificate’s emission timestamp; 
 a Descriptor containing the SigInfo  parameter; 
 an Item containing the identification of the peer to which the permit is 
granted; 
 an Item containing the definition of the information to which the peer is 
being granted access to; 
 an Item containing the identifier of the suelildo  which specifies where 
the targeted information may be retrieved from; 
 
Besides the given example, this certificate may also be employed to enable a peer to 
retrieve other UEL information objects such as user registration certificates (
iU
rcertif ), user 
hosting certificates, ( iPP
iU
hostcertif ) or content search response objects (see SQRO in 
section 7.4.4).  
 
An example of an UEL Info Retrieval Permit may be found in section A.3.6 of Annex A. 
7.4.7 Media Objects 
P2PTube’s MOs consist of TAR archives which have the following content: 
• MO Top Head File (MOTHFile) – this file contains all of the CCP inserted metadata 
pertaining to the overall MO; 
• MO Inner File (MOIFile) – this is a TAR archive that basically consists of the user 
delivered MO object at insertion time. It contains: 
V A Reliable P2P Architecture for the New Paradigm 176 
 
 
 
o MO Inner Head File (MOIHFile) – this file contains all the metadata of the 
MOIFile; 
o One or more MO Inner Content File(s) (MOICFile) – each containing an 
actual media (video) content; 
 
The contents of the MOTHFile may be defined 
as ( )
























−
−
= i
CCPK
CCP
i
CCPK
CCP
i MOItstampSigInfomoMOTH 11 signaturesigned , where 
iMOI  corresponds to the MOIFile. It may be described 
as ( )nii MOICMOICMOIHMOI .....1= , where iMOIH corresponds to the MOIHFile 
and each iMOIC corresponds to a MOICFile. The earlier may be defined as 








= 





−
xrightssemanticsSigInfoMOIH
iU
Ki 1
signed , where the latter variable may be defined as 
( )


























=
−
−
n
iU
Kn
iU
K
MOICmoicMOICmoicx 1111 signature....)(signature and imoic is the 
identifier of iMOIC . 
In more precise terms, a MOTHFile consists of an MPEG-21 DID with the structure depicted 
in Figure 60. 
 
 
Figure 60 – MOTHFile Structure 
 
Said structure consists of the following: 
• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the object. This latter element carries: 
o a Descriptor carrying the digital signature, (byCCP ), of the remaining content 
of its parent Container element (the signature of its Item sibling); 
o an inner Item – it contains: 
 a Descriptor element carrying the identifier of the MO; 
 a Descriptor element carrying the SigInfo parameter; 
 a Descriptor element carrying the time stamp indicating the MO’s 
injection time, into the system; 
 a Descriptor element carrying the signature of the MOIFile TAR 
archive; 
 a Component element carrying a reference to the MOIFile TAR 
archive; 
 
V A Reliable P2P Architecture for the New Paradigm 177 
 
 
 
The signing, byCCP , of the MOTHFile’s contents and of the MOIFile enables any peer in 
the system to verify the integrity of those files as well as the veracity of its acceptance by the 
system. 
 
An example of a MOTHFile’s contents may be found in section A.3.7 of Annex A. 
 
A MOIHFile consists of an MPEG-21 DID with the structure depicted in Figure 61. 
 
 
Figure 61 – MOIHFILE Structure 
 
Said structure consists of the following: 
• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the object. This latter element carries: 
o a Descriptor carrying the digital signature, (by the MO’s issuing user, e.g. 
iU ), of the remaining content of its parent Container element (the signature of 
its Item sibling); 
o an Item element – it contains: 
 a Descriptor element carrying the SigInfo parameter; 
 a Descriptor element (identified as moih_ownerU) carrying the identity 
of the MO’s owner user ( iu ); 
 a Descriptor element (identified as moih_semantics) carrying the MO’s 
semantically describing metadata. This metadata describes the 
semantic characteristics of the MO and its relationships with other 
MOs. Said relationships are described employing MPEG-21’s 
relationship describing capabilities which were added to that work as a 
result of this PhD work (see section 4.3 of chapter VI). Semantic 
information is typically is expressed in the RDF format; 
 a Descriptor element (identified as moih_rights), carrying the rights 
information pertaining to the MO. This information is carried by an 
REL element rel:license [113]. In light of the nature of the business 
models that this architecture is meant to enforce (presented in chapter 
IV), and of its implications on MO access by users, the purpose of this 
rights information is merely to formalize the openness of content 
access; 
 an Item element carrying the information pertaining to the MO’s 
MOICFiles: It contains: 
• one or more Item elements. Each such element carries the 
information pertaining to a single MOICFile, and, thus, 
contains: 
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o a Descriptor (identified as moic1_u_signature), carrying 
the digital signature, (by iU ), of the corresponding 
MOICFile; 
o a Component carrying a reference to the MOICFile in 
scope; 
 
The signing, by iU , of each of the MO’s MOICFiles enables the validation of their integrity 
and of their origin authenticity. It also guarantees their non repudiability. Furthermore, the 
signing, by iU , of the moih_content  Item enables the same actions towards that Item, thus 
securing the semantic and rights metadata. 
 
In accordance with what was expressed in section 5.5.8.2.1.1, at the production time of an 
MO, iMO , iU produces the signatures of all MOICFiles, prepares the moih_content Item 
declaration, produces the signature of the latter Item and then finishes the production of the 
MOIHFile and of the MOIFile. 
 
This way iU produces an iMO which is effectively signed by him. iMO  is sent to CCP  
which calculates its own signature of the MOIFile, builds the MOTHFile, and then 
repackages the set (MOTHFile and MOIFile) into what then is its distribution ready form, 
CCP
iMO . 
 
An example of a MOIHFile’s contents may be found in section A.3.7 of Annex A. 
7.4.8 MO Ransom Announcement 
An MO Ransom Announcement may be defined as 
( )semanticsammountumoidRnsmAnn iCCPiCCPiMO = . It thus contains its own identifier, the 
identifier of the prospective MO, the identifier of the MOs producing user (which is to be the 
one to be donated to), the specification of the required ransom amount and the semantic 
characterization of the prospective MO. 
7.4.9 User Monitoring Requests and Responses 
The ERR and ER objects mentioned in section 5.5.6 may logically be described, respectively 
as 






−
= iA
iPP
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CCP
iPP
CCP PPerrSigInfoerriderr  of signed 1K , (where 
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−
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1 ). 
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In more precise terms, they are expressed as MPEG-21 DIDs carrying MPEG-21 ERRs and 
MPEG-21 ERs respectively [102]. Figure 62 depicts the structure of a P2PTube ERR and 
Figure 63 depicts the structure of a P2PTube ER. 
 
 
Figure 62 – ERR Structure 
 
An ERR’s structure consists of the following: 
• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the report. request This latter element carries: 
o a Descriptor carrying the digital signature, (byccp), of the remaining content 
of its parent Container element (the signature of its Item sibling); 
o an inner Item – it contains: 
 a Descriptor carrying the identification of the ERR; 
 a Descriptor carrying the SigInfo parameter; 
 an Item carrying the actual ERR information.  It carries that 
information as an erl:ERR element [102]; 
 an Item element carrying the identification  of the event report 
request’s target peer (e.g. ipp ); 
 
The presence of CCP’s signature of err_content Item’s (inside Descriptor err_cp_signature), 
enables the peer receiving the ERR to validate its origin authenticity. 
 
An example of a P2PTube’s ER may be found in section A.3.8 of Annex A. 
 
 
Figure 63 – ER Structure 
 
An ER’s structure consists of the following: 
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• A root DIDL element carrying a Container element which functions as the top 
element of the report. This latter element carries: 
o a Descriptor carrying the digital signature, (by iPP ), of its Item sibling; 
o an inner Item – it contains: 
 a Descriptor carrying the BSigInfo parameter; 
 a Descriptor carrying the digital signature, (by iU ), of its Item sibling; 
 an inner Item – it contains: 
• a Descriptor carrying the identification of the ER; 
• a Descriptor carrying the CSigInfo parameter; 
• an Item carrying the identifier of the original event eport 
request that caused the emission of this event repor; 
• an Item carrying the actual ER information as its inline 
resource.  It carries that information as an erl:ER element 
[102]; 
 
The presence of iPP ’s signature of er_content Item (inside Descriptors er_pp_signature), 
enables the CCP to check if the report was in fact sent by iPP . The presence of iU ’s 
signature of the er Item (inside Descriptor er_u_signature), enables CCP to determine if the 
involved user was in fact the targeted one. 
 
An example of a P2PTube’s ER may be found in section A.3.8 of Annex A. 
7.4.10 Inquiry and Inquiry Response Objects 
An Inquiry IO is associated to a specific advertisement MO. It carries a set of multiple choice 
style queries pertaining the semantic content of the associated advertisement MO. An 
Inquiry Response IO carries the indication of the correct response alternatives to the queries 
in its corresponding Inquiry IO. 
 
When an advertiser inserts an advertising MO he also supplies the associated Inquiry IOs 
and Inquiry Response IOs (potentially dozens of them). 
 
An Inquiry IO may be described as ( )xSigInfoinquiryIO
x
U
i 1K
signed
−
=  and 
( ) ( ) 

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

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An Inquiry Response IO may be described as ( )xSigInfopIOinquiryRes
x
U
i 1K
signed
−
=  where 
( ) ( )





=
??
11   toref  toref...  toref  toref nn nqRespAlterquerynqRespAlterqueryidx . Upon 
reception of these objects the CCP produces their distribution ready versions, which are 
( )iCCP
CCP
CCP
i inquiryIOSigInfoinquiryIO 1Ksigned −= , and 
( )iCCP
CCP
CCP
i pIOinquiryResSigInfopIOinquiryRes 1Ksigned −= , respectively. 
 
Examples of an Inquiry IO and of an Inquiry Response IO may be found in section A.3.9 of 
Annex A. 
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8  Exploitation 
8.1 Introduction 
The P2PTube architecture, described in previous sections, constitutes an efficient, 
distributed, reliable and secure platform for the interaction between users, and between 
these and media content or services.  
 
The PLL provides a versatile base platform on which a variety of different, independent, 
inter-peer interactions may take place, in a secure manner, under the security-wise 
coordination of the CCP’s PLL instance. This layer provides the UEL with the necessary 
services so that it may perform its role, also, in a secure manner and support the safe 
unfolding of complex distributed operations within its tissue. 
 
This architecture therefore provides a versatile and secure base platform on top of which (by 
building upon UEL capabilities), multiple different operational patterns may be supported. 
 
The P2PTube architecture may thus be employed by a variety of on-line media distributing 
entities, lending support to various different types of business models. Specifically, it 
provides the necessary tools and provisions to support the BMs identified in chapter IV, as 
the appropriate ones for an on-line media delivering initiative. 
 
The following sub-sections, of section 8, demonstrate how this architecture may effectively 
be exploited to support said business models and associated content delivery operations.  
8.2 Advertisement BM Support 
When employing an advertisement based BM, a media content delivering initiative obtains 
its revenue by selling captured user attention, to advertisers. The user’s attention is attracted 
by providing him with some interesting content. That attention is sold to advertisers by, 
somehow, linking the consumption of said content to the consumption of advertisement 
messages. 
 
The P2PTube architecture provides optimal support for the “Add supported BM” described in 
chapter IV, which is especially suited for an on-line medium. 
Said BM’s most relevant operation (in economic terms), is a user’s sale of his attention to an 
advertiser over the watching of some specific advertisement Media Object (MO). As 
explained in section 2 of chapter IV, there are two modes to this BM: mandatory unrewarded 
advertisement viewing; and voluntary rewarded advertisement viewing. 
 
The P2PTube architecture supports both such modes through two different sets of UEL 
operations which were already explained in section 5.5.8.3.1. In this manner this system 
enables a robust and secure economic exploitation, of the sale of user attention, to take 
place. 
8.3 Donation BM Support 
When employing a donation based BM, a media content delivering initiative obtains its 
revenue through the reception of voluntary donations, from content consuming users. Such 
initiatives strive to captivate user’s good will and translate it into donations. 
 
This type of BM, which is described in chapter IV, is perfectly supported by the P2PTube 
architecture. Its most relevant operation (in economic terms), is a user’s donation, of 
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monetary, funds to another user and the taxation of that donation, by the content delivering 
entity. 
 
This monetary funds donation scheme is supported as a set of UEL operations, which may 
be described in the following manner: 
• At an early time, a specific producer user, prodU , inserts into the system a specific 
MO CCPiMO . The MO insertion operation is supported in the simple client/server 
manner indicated in section 5.5.8.2.1. 
• Also at an early time, a specific regular user, iU , loads his system account with 
some amount of monetary funds. The monetary funds injection operation is 
supported in the simple client/server manner indicated in section 5.5.8.2.1, where the 
CCP  takes care of all necessary banking operations; 
• Some time later, iU  decides to consume 
CCP
iMO . His hosting peer retrieves 
CCP
iMO , from the system in the hybrid manner explained in section 5.5.8.2.2; 
• iU consumes 
CCP
iMO , likes it and decides to reward prodU . He specifies prodU  and 
CCP
iMO ’s identities and the amount to be donated. His hosting peer (e.g. iPP ), then 
proceeds in the client/server manner indicated in section 5.5.8.2.1. That is: 
o iPP  issues a secure request to CCP , informing it of the desired donation; 
o CCP checks if iU ’s account balance permits the desired donation. If all is ok, 
the CCP  extracts the indicated amount from iU ’s account, deposits a pre-
determined fraction of it in prodU ’s account and the rest of it in the operating 
entity’s account. It then sends acknowledgement response back to iPP  for 
user information. 
 
Through this set of operations the P2PTube architecture thus enables, in a secure fashion, 
the economic exploitation of inter-user monetary donations, over a hybrid P2P architecture. 
8.4 Ransom BM Support 
The ransom BM is merely a variant of the donation BM. In this variant, donations, from 
consumer users to producer ones, are performed before the actual MO is published, as a 
form of financing its production. 
 
The only difference from the set of operations presented in section 8.3, is that user iU will 
not initially be able to retrieve and consume CCPiMO . Instead he will only come into contact 
with a Ransom Announcement for CCPiMO  (
CCP
iMORnsmAnn ), published by prodU , 
proclaiming the possibility of CCPiMO ’s future existence, conditioned to it’s a priori financing 
(ransom payment). Furthermore, after a specific cumulative monetary amount (initially 
specified in
CCP
iMOrnsmAnn ), is achieved (i.e. the ransom is paid), through donations, it no 
longer is possible to donate to prodU , on the grounds of that MO ( CCPiMO ), and said 
producer is expected to deliver it, within reasonable time. 
 
The base, UEL, operational scheme supporting this BM is the following: 
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• At an early time, a specific producer user, prodU , inserts into the system a specific 
Ransom Announcement, 
CCP
iMORnsmAnn , publicizing the possible future existence 
of MO CCPiMO , if the system users donate a specific monetary amount ( Xamount ) to 
prodU on the grounds of 
CCP
iMO . The 
CCP
iMORnsmAnn insertion operation is 
supported in the client/server manner indicated in section 5.5.8.2.1. 
• Also at an early time, a specific regular user, iU , securely loads his system account 
with some amount of monetary funds. The monetary funds injection operation is 
supported in the client/server manner indicated in section 5.5.8.2.1, where the CCP  
takes care of all necessary banking operations; 
• Some time later, iU  comes across 
CCP
iMORnsmAnn  (through an MO search 
operation, supported in the hybrid manner explained in section 5.5.8.2.2), and 
decides to donate to prodU to finance the production of the 
CCP
iMO . He specifies 
prodU  and 
CCP
iMORnsmAnn , and identities and the amount to be donated. His 
hosting peer (e.g. iPP ), then proceeds in the client/server manner indicated in 
section 5.5.8.2.1. That is: 
o iPP  issues a secure request to CCP , informing it of the desired donation; 
o CCP  checks if iU ’s account balance permits the desired donation and if an 
Xammount of donations to prodU  on the grounds of 
CCP
iMO  
(
CCP
iMORnsmAnn ), as not yet been reached. If all is ok, the CCP  extracts the 
indicated amount from iU ’s account, deposits a pre-determined fraction of it 
in prodU ’s account and the rest of it in the operating entity’s account. It then 
sends acknowledgement response back to iPP  for user information. 
 
Through this set of operations the P2PTube architecture thus securely enables the economic 
exploitation of a MO ransoming, over a hybrid P2P architecture. 
8.5 Traditional BM Support 
The traditional BMs supporting the activities of real-world or on-line media content delivering 
initiatives are typically based on the direct sale of content access. As argued in chapter IV, 
such BMs are not truly suited for an on-line operation. Nonetheless, the P2PTube 
architecture is also capable of supporting such business models (if the data model, 
presented in section 4, is augmented to support the necessary extra event types). 
 
The basic, UEL, operational scheme to support a BM based on the direct sale of content 
access rights is the following: 
• At an early time, a specific producer user, prodU , inserts into the system a specific 
MO ( CCPiMO ). The MO’s media contents are ciphered with a specific secret key, 
xK . The delivery of the MO and associated key, to the system, is performed in the 
client/server manner indicated in section 5.5.8.2.1, where the key is included in the 
sensitive part (see section 5.5.2), of the UEL request message , and the ciphered 
MO is included in the non-sensitive part of said message; 
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• Also at an early time, a specific regular user, iU , loads his system account with 
some amount of monetary funds. The monetary funds injection operation is 
supported in the simple client/server manner indicated in section 5.5.8.2.1, where the 
CCP  takes care of all necessary banking operations; 
• Some time later, iU  decides to consume 
CCP
iMO . His hosting peer, iPP : 
o securely interacts with the CCP  (in the simple client/server manner explained 
in section 5.5.8.2.1), to acquire, for iU , access rights to CCPiMO . If all is ok the 
CCP  handles all the necessary monetary transactions, and sends back 
to iPP a data object (
CCP
iMO
iU
L ), containing a license granting iU the right to 
access CCPiMO and the necessary key to decrypt the MO’s media contents; 
o retrieves CCPiMO , from the system in the hybrid manner explained in section 
5.5.8.2.2; 
• iPP inspects the received license and 
CCP
iMO to verify iU ’s right to consume 
CCP
iMO , and if all is ok, (as it presumably should be), it proceeds to decipher 
CCP
iMO ’s ciphered parts, and  render it for iU ’s consumption. 
 
The mentioned license object may be defined as 
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, where parameter ensemomaniplic  is the identification of the type of the object, id is the 
license’s identifier, CCPSigInfo  carries the necessary information to enable the validation of 
CCP’s signature of the license, rightsdef is the definition of the specific rights to which the 
user is entitled, iu is the identification of the user being given the rights, 
CCP
imo is the 
identifier of the MO over which rights are being granted. The final part of the license is 
composed by 
iU
EncInfo (a parameter carrying the necessary information, other than the 
decryption key, to decode xK ), and by the decoding key which is encrypted with the user’s 
public key and may, thus, only be decrypted by the user (with his private key). 
 
Other BMs exist (such as the subscription based one, for instance), which are based on the 
sale of content access. P2PTube architecture may also enforce such BMs. The main 
differences between their supporting operational scheme, and the above presented one, are 
that: 
• access purchase (and thus, license emission), will be performed with different 
periodicity; 
• license
CCP
iMO
iU
L will grant different rights over different sets of MOs; 
 
The P2PTube thus, also, provides also the necessary tools for a secure exploitation of more 
traditional business models. 
8.6 Conclusions 
As demonstrated in the previous sections, the P2PTube architecture’s versatility enables it to 
securely support the business models identified in chapter IV, while harnessing all the 
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advantages of delivering content over a hybrid P2P architecture. It is thus equipped with the 
necessary tools to support successful on-line media delivering initiatives.
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VI Contributions  
1 Introduction 
In this chapter we explain, in a systematic and integrated way, the contributions brought in 
by the work developed during the course of this thesis and thoroughly described in the 
previous chapters. In particular we explain how they contribute to the advancement of the 
current state of the art in the field of safe P2P delivery of rich media content, and in related 
fields. We also show how the mentioned contributions were subjected to peer analysis and 
acceptance though scientific publication.  
 
Section 2 explains the value-added achieved by having clearly identified and characterized 
the on-going techno-economical paradigm change as well as its consequences in terms of 
the adequacy of new BMs for on-line content distribution, which may be profitable and 
simultaneously popular among consumers. 
 
Section 3 explains the advantages of the innovative P2PTube architecture, over the current 
alternatives, in supporting the above-mentioned BMs in a secure and efficient manner. It 
shows how said architecture combines and expands different pre-existing technologies and 
concepts to provide capabilities presently missing in the field of P2P content delivery. 
 
Section 4 explains the innovative work conducted towards the development of complex and 
rich information objects, which are better suited for the new BMs indicated in section 2 and 
which take better advantage of the potentialities of the P2PTube architecture. 
 
Section 5 lists and contextualizes the publications which resulted from the work that was 
carried out in the course of this thesis.  
 
Finally, section 6 presents this chapter’s concluding remarks. 
2 Adequate BM Identification 
The work exposed in chapter IV builds on the realization, laid out in chapter III, that the 
characteristics of the on-line medium and of on-line content delivery, are leading to an 
operational and economic paradigm change in the way media content is distributed. 
In chapter IV, we, thus, identify the optimal BMs to support on-line content delivery, within 
the conditions established by the mentioned emerging paradigm. 
 
The realization and definition that we have performed, of the on-going paradigm change is 
deeper and clearer than those that have come out of other researches and reflections in this 
field, and leads us to more radically new conclusions. 
 
In [176] it is realized that the characteristics of information goods production and distribution 
are different than those of material goods. They clearly understand that the main costs, in 
this context, are those involved in the production of the first copy of an information good, and 
that, reproduction costs, (i.e. marginal costs), are approaching zero. Furthermore, the 
authors of [176], recognize the economic importance of the capture and sale of user 
attention, especially in a context which is characterized by network effects. They also 
understand that copyright owners should focus on maximizing the value of their property, 
and not its access protection. 
In the view, of said authors, there are two main commercial strategies that information goods 
producers may follow: 
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• striving to become the dominant firm, in a specific product niche, and thus achieve a 
cost advantage over its competitors, by reducing the average costs of production 
though increased sales volume; 
• striving to maintain a differentiated product from its competitors: 
 
The study in scope, nonetheless, supports scarcity based BMs, were the revenue is 
predominantly derived though the direct sale of content. Thus, in spite of their recognition of 
the progressive disappearance of marginal costs, and hence, virtual scarcity, they do not 
take the next logical step, that we do, in their analysis of reality, and stop short of truly 
realizing, and appreciating the consequences of, the on-going techno-economical parading 
shift. 
 
In [177] it is also recognized that online distribution and retail is leading us to a world were 
media reproduction (copying) and distribution costs are almost non-existent and 
informational scarcity is annulled. Their conclusion is that the way forward, for content 
producers/distributors is to “sell less of more”. They argue, that online media stores should 
exploit the fact that virtual “shelf space” is unlimited, and, thus, greatly extend their offer in 
order to harness the profits of selling low priced and less demanded media goods, i.e. the 
“tail goods”. They maintain that such goods are, collectively, profitable enough to sustain 
distributors’ operations and competitive enough (price-wise), to compete with free 
distribution (typically pirate distribution).  
The authors thus identify the progressive annulment of virtual goods’ scarcity, but still cling 
onto scarcity dependent BMs, leaning on the use of low pricing schemes to keep the sold 
goods competitive. This way, the analysis presented in [177], does not really perceive, we 
believe, to its full extent, the consequences of the on-going paradigm change in the field of 
information goods’ production and distribution. 
 
In light of the above stated, it becomes evident that the analyses of present reality, in the 
field in scope, that are exposed in [176] or [177], (as many other similar works), are not as 
incisive and comprehensive as the one we espouse.  
The analysis that we have performed, and exposed in chapter IV, contributes, thus, to a 
clearer identification and to an expansion of the comprehension of the true dimensions and 
consequences, of the on-going changes in the area of information goods production and 
distribution, caused by the digitalization and virtualization of such activities. 
 
The conclusions that we derived have taken us a step beyond the views arguing for the 
exploitation of the “long tail“, “freemium” BMs, or dynamic pricing schemes, and have lead us 
to a fuller acceptance of the fact that the main commodity is user attention, fidelity and good 
will. 
 
Given the deeper, and more radical, realizations that are at their base, the BMs, that we 
have identified/devised (in chapter IV) for supporting on-line content delivery, are more 
realistic and better suited to their operational environment (on-line medium), and to the 
“information access culture” of the Internet, than the predominant BMs in current use in that 
context.  
 
The BMs, that we have defined, frontally accept the practical elimination of on-line scarcity. 
They are thus better prepared to deal with that fact than even service-oriented BMs such as 
subscription based ones.  
 
They also take into greater consideration the importance of user attention, as they perform a 
more explicit, aggressive, and user satisfactory, acquisition of user attention. 
 
Furthermore, the BM identification and definition work, presented in chapter IV, also 
contributes with the definition of BMs, which, more clearly, systematically, and unhesitantly 
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(than current alternatives in the field in scope), bet on donation and ransom based economic 
gain derivation. 
 
Supporting the above mentioned contributions are the inquiry results analysed in section 3 of 
chapter IV. Lending further validity, to such contributions, is their recognition by scientific 
peers by means of their publication, (by this work’s authors), in the papers referenced in 
[166], [178] and [179]. 
3 Necessary P2P Architecture Definition 
3.1 Introduction 
To provide the necessary technical support structure for the BMs described in chapter IV, we 
defined the P2PTube architecture (exposed in chapter V). It extends and optimizes the 
capabilities of current P2P technology, to achieve a better overall performance and to endow 
said technology with dependable reliability and security assuring provisions, which, 
presently, are typically missing or very poor (in the non-commercial sector), or over 
complicated, over intrusive and over stretched (in the commercial sector). 
 
The P2PTube architecture thus merges a hybrid P2P operation with PKI-like security 
provisions and rights management capabilities, to provide a superior support for said BMs. 
 
The added value of this architecture, its contribution to the supporting of the new BMs, 
resides, more than on any of its individual concepts or solutions, on the devised overall 
proposal that results from the conjunction of all said concepts and solutions. The P2PTube 
must thus be comparatively analysed in its entirety, and within the technical and economical 
context of its operation, so that its contribution becomes more apparent. 
 
Within the above defined context, when compared with the tools and systems exposed in 
section 2 of chapter II, (predominantly employed in non-commercial scenarios), the 
P2PTube’s advantages consist of a superior efficiency in content delivery and overall system 
performance, as well as of a greater level of operational security and reliability. 
 
When compared with the technologies exposed in section 3 of chapter II (typically employed 
in commercial scenarios), the P2PTube’s corresponding functionalities present much greater 
simplicity and are less intrusive on the user’s enjoyment of the information goods, while 
protecting the content owner’s contextual rights. 
 
In comparison to the overall technical solutions typically employed by commercial, P2P 
based, content delivery initiatives, the P2PTube architecture presents advantages in the 
fields of overall system performance, versatility, seamless integration of security provisions 
throughout all system sectors, non-intrusiveness, and exploitation of synergies between 
content delivery and security structures. 
 
Given its, overall, superior security capabilities, better operational performance and non-
intrusiveness, the P2PTube architecture is, thus, better equipped and more finely tuned to 
support the BMs identified in chapter IV, than existing alternatives. 
 
The next sub-sections present each of the above comparisons in a more detailed manner. 
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3.2 Comparison to Current P2P Technology 
When compared to the technical solutions approached in chapter II, (typically employed in 
non-commercial, P2P based, content delivery initiatives), the P2PTube architecture is much 
more reliable in the discovery and retrieval of content. 
 
Its centralized registry, (at the CCP, and at the CCP managed OCP  collective), of all the 
system’s Media Objects (MOs), of the semantic information that characterizes each of them, 
and of the availability for their redistribution by the peripheral peer collective (besides other 
information), enables: 
• semantic based content searches (equivalent to googling), to be performed over the 
entire set of available MOs in a rapid manner without flooding the network with 
queries and in a single inter-peer interaction (between a PP  and the CCP or an 
OCP); 
• the optimization of content discovery (locating the media files for retrieval). As the 
CCP , and all  OCPs , have a global view of the system, they are capable of 
directing downloading PPs to the most appropriate “server” peers, thus performing an 
optimized load balancing and eliminating free riding; 
• the optimization of content retrieval. For the reasons expressed in the previous bullet, 
the P2PTube architecture can efficiently distribute the burden of content redistribution 
over the peer collective thus enabling faster and more reliable media object 
retrievals; 
• the performing of more efficient, reliable and coherent searches over the entire data 
structure of the system, such as searches over users, peers, etc. 
  
Given the trustworthiness of the CCP, and of all OCPs, the system’s distributed core 
structure also enables it to provide a number of security facilities which are generally absent 
from the P2P platforms (especially those employed in the non-commercial sector), such as: 
• guaranteeing the confidentiality, authenticity, integrity and non-repudiability of all 
exchanged messages; 
• guaranteeing the authenticity, integrity and non-repudiability of all the MOs, and other 
information objects distributed across the system (either in a client/server or P2P 
fashion); 
• guaranteeing peer, user and MO identity. 
 
Endowed with the above stated security capabilities, the P2PTube is thus capable of 
supporting a secure management and transaction of monetary funds. 
 
Even if compared to technical solutions, which employ distributed collective/mutual 
authentication provisions, as those mentioned in chapter II (e.g. [49] [51]), P2PTube is at an 
advantage because such solutions (as explained in section 2.4 of chapter II): 
• imply a considerable operational overhead – multiple interactions between peers are 
necessary to achieve some security. In P2PTube this is achieved with far less 
interactions; 
• present considerable weaknesses in the face of sufficiently vast attacks – require that 
a minimum quorum of “honest” peers is present. No such necessity exists in 
P2PTube architecture; 
• frequently assume the reliability of the network – no such assumption exists in 
P2PTube architecture; 
 
It may be argued that, as the P2PTube architecture is coordinated by a central entity, it is 
less scalable than the typical P2P solution (especially in the non-commercial sector). 
However, this is not so. Fully distributed P2P systems present a vast range of scalability 
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problems, of their own, which are related to the inter-discovery of peers and to the discovery 
of content, as the number of peers in the system grows and no entity exists with a global and 
consistent view of the system’s state.  
In P2PTube architecture, the CCP  eliminates such problems, and, if enough resources are 
invested into CCP , it’s centrality will not be a problem, just like the centrality of Wikipedia’s 
and Google’s central server farms, is not a problem.  
 
A further advantage of the P2PTube solution resides in its employment of a powerful, 
versatile and standard tool in all its provisions which deal with serialized information 
expression. The tool in question is the MPEG-21 standard. It is employed in the expression 
(structuring) of: 
• the PLL and UEL messages exchanged between P2PTube peers; 
• all the operational information objects employed and distributed in the system; 
• the event report request and corresponding event reports; 
• the actual consumable MOs distributed throughout the P2PTube; 
 
MPEG-21’s extensive employment renders the P2PTube architecture more standard, than 
its current counterparts (which frequently do not even follow a clear and public 
communication standard), easier to expand (given the standard’s extensiveness, added 
capabilities and continuous evolution), and easier to interface with. 
 
For all this, the P2PTube architecture is capable of reliably and securely supporting a 
number of business models, for the delivery of media content, which the solutions employed 
in the non-commercial sector of P2P content delivery, clearly cannot, and which the 
commercial sector solutions are not optimally suited for. 
3.3 Comparison to Current DRM Capabilities 
As explained in section 5.5.9 of chapter V, in the P2PTube architecture, the enforcing of 
DRM aspects is not handled by isolated components or operations. Instead, its enforcement 
pervades the system’s overall structure and operation. 
 
The P2PTube architecture provides all the necessary security provisions to enable a reliable 
and trustworthy identification of users, peers and media content, the preservation of MO 
integrity, the protection of the association between users and the media content that they 
own, and the collection of information on user actions over content.  
It thus safeguards the rights of all users to privacy, to a secure access to their account and 
user data, and a to a reliable access to MOs. It also protects the rights of content owners as 
is guards against content corruption, misuse, and wrongful ownership declaration. 
 
In the present context, when compared with the tools and platforms exposed in section 2, of 
chapter II, the P2PTube architecture naturally presents much higher rights management 
capabilities, as it possesses much more solid and dependable security provisions (as 
explained in section 3.2 of the present chapter). 
 
When compared with the technologies exposed in section 3 of chapter II, P2PTube’s DRM 
provisions are lighter and intrude less into the users manipulation of content. 
Said provisions have less content access restriction capabilities, but this is really not a 
shortcoming. P2PTube’s DRM-like skills serve different immediate objectives (than those of 
most technologies presented in section 3 of chapter II) that are dictated by the BMs that the 
system must support, which do not depend on content access restriction (scarcity creation). 
 
For that, the provisions in scope are not focussed on access restriction but on the assurance 
of information integrity and of authorship declaration authenticity. Such more realistic 
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objectives are thus more fully achieved by P2PTube’s DRM provisions. These may therefore 
be simpler, and intrude less into the users’ enjoyment of content, without it being a 
disadvantage. To the contrary, it serves the BMs, defined in chapter IV, better than the 
solutions presented in section 3 of chapter II, and contributes to fomenting a more 
cooperative attitude, from users, which may thus be counted upon to actually contribute to 
the system’s DRM activities, by reporting illegitimate content. 
3.4 Comparison to Current Commercial Platforms 
When compared to the typical technical platforms employed in commercial, P2P based, 
content delivery initiatives (approached in section 4 of chapter II), the P2PTube architecture 
presents several technical and BM related advantages. 
 
The P2PTube architecture is tailored to support BMs that derive gains in a lateral manner to 
the actual consumption of media goods, (through advertisement and donations).  
In accordance with that, it, therefore, practically does not enforce access control. As already 
stated in the previous section, this enables the system to maintain a simpler and more 
efficient operation, and to provide a level of security which is, contextually, better than those 
of the systems presented in section 4 of chapter II (for instance, the access restrictive, Qtrax 
or ReelTime).  
 
Also, the P2PTube architecture does not rely on any pre-existing P2P structure (such as 
Qtrax and iMesh do), which globally is out of the system’s control and presents reliability 
issues. Instead it employs a hybrid structure of its own. Content object location and retrieval 
are, thus, performed in a P2P fashion, but under the optimizing coordination of the system’s, 
reliable, central provisions ( CCP andOCPs ), which also handle all trust and security 
demanding tasks and maintain a global and updated view of the system’s overall state.  
This dedicated structure and its hybridness, therefore, allow the P2PTube architecture to 
perform such content object location and retrieval tasks, more efficiently than most systems 
presented in section 4 of chapter II (e.g. Babelgum and Joost). Simultaneously, these 
characteristics of P2PTube architecture enable it to perform such tasks, in a more reliable 
way than most such systems (e.g. Qtrax and iMesh).  
 
Furthermore, the full integration between the architecture’s security and content delivery 
provisions enable it to take advantage of synergies between the two. It thus transforms the 
typical TTP security solutions, employed by commercial initiatives (for security provisioning), 
into an integral component of the overall architecture, which is able to exploit its P2P 
capabilities also for security purposes. 
For all of the above, the P2PTube architecture is much better equipped, than the technical 
solutions in scope, to take full advantage of data super-distribution, in a reliable manner.  
 
The P2PTube architecture, when compared to the technical solutions employed by existing 
commercial, P2P based, content delivery systems, thus presents: 
• more efficient and reliable content distributions capabilities; 
• more powerful content usage monitoring provisions; 
• more flexible content manipulation (by users) permissions;  
 
In light of the above, the P2PTube architecture, thus provides more adequate tools, than the 
existing, commercially employed, alternatives, to reliably support the opened BMs that we 
deem necessary (as explained in chapter IV), for a successful operation in the field of 
commercial P2P content delivery. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
Given what was argued in sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 of the present chapter, it may be 
concluded that the P2PTube architecture offers new and expanded capabilities when 
compared to existing alternatives in the field of P2P content distribution (both in the 
commercial and non-commercial sectors). 
 
Its advantages over its non-commercial counterparts stem, basically, from its employment of 
reliable and trusted central coordinating provisions and of a number of security tools, whose 
employment is rendered possible by said provisions. An added advantage is the 
normalization that results from P2PTube’s pervasive employment of MPEG-21. 
 
The advantages of P2PTube solution, over its commercial counterparts, stem from its 
employment of a specific and dedicated hybrid-P2P structure of its own, and the synergistic 
operation of this structure and of the architecture’s security provisions. 
 
Furthermore, the provisions, of the P2PTube architecture, described in section 6 of chapter 
V, enable the reliable, coherent and secure interoperation between any two, mutually 
trusted, systems which employ this architecture. This is also an advantage over existing 
alternatives, especially in the commercial sector, where interoperability problems are 
commonplace. 
 
For all the above, the P2PTube architecture contributes to the expansion of the state-of-the-
art in the field of secure P2P content distribution with opened BMs. 
 
The validation of the P2PTube architecture could, typically, be achieved by means of its 
implementation and test. That process was, indeed, approached and some of the system’s 
components were effectively developed (such as the cryptographic module for instance). 
However, the implementation of the entire architecture proved to be an immense task that 
would inevitably be excessively time consuming. Furthermore, the new mechanisms and 
architectural solutions, included in P2PTube, are based on some very well established 
technological building blocks and concepts (hybrid P2P, PKI, asymmetric cryptography, 
MPEG-21). This lends a basic credibility to our proposals. Therefore, P2PTube’s technical 
implementation is, we believe, not of fundamental importance to demonstrate its overall 
feasibility, as its basic building blocks are robustly established 
In light of the above, the full implementation of the P2PTube architecture was not pursued.  
 
Our validation efforts were, instead, focused on attaining scientific peer recognition of the 
value of the P2PTube architecture and of the view and concepts that it embodies. In that 
regard the papers referenced in [180] [181] were published. 
4 Complex MO Development 
4.1 Introduction 
As it was concluded in chapter IV, online content distribution initiatives, should employ open 
access BMs to capture user attention, interest and good will. In this context, the distribution 
of richer media objects will be advantageous as it contributes to such acquisitions. 
 
In accordance with this fact, we also performed innovative work in the development of rich 
and empowered information objects. This work, even if it is only lateral to the overall thesis 
exposed in this dissertation, did attain some relevance, and his, for that reason worth 
mentioning.  
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The work in scope comprises the definition of the file and (MPEG-21 based) metadata 
formats of the MOs, distributed though the P2PTube architecture, (presented in chapter V). It 
also comprises the definition of a (MPEG-21 based) mechanism for the expression of inter 
MO relationships, which has resulted in an extension to part 3 of the MPEG-21 standard. 
4.2 MO Format Definition 
The defined P2PTube MO format constitutes a novel, complex media object format, with 
added capabilities when compared to current media file formats, including those presently 
exchanged in P2P networks.  
 
Said format heavily employs the, open and widely known, MPEG-21 standard. This 
employment lends the standard’s versatility and power to P2PTube’s MOs, and facilitates 
the inclusion of other provisions, in said MOs, that are presented below. The use of MPEG-
21 for the structuring of P2P exchanged secure information objects is a novel contribution. 
 
The P2PTube MO format includes the necessary security provisions to enable the validation 
of the integrity and origin authenticity of such objects. It also includes the tools to enable the 
precise (RDF based) semantic definition of their content. These features, even if not 
exclusive to P2PTube’s MOs, are attained, in them, in a more powerful and organic way, 
given the value of the employed standards (MPEG-21 and RDF) and the systemic 
integration of the MO’s structure and the system’s overall operation. 
 
The P2PTube MO format thus permits the construction of secure, complex information 
(media) objects containing multiple different media resources, richly characterized and inter-
webbed with RDF based semantic metadata. It is, therefore, a more versatile, standard, self-
contained, richer, and more semantically contextualized, object, than those exchanged in 
current P2P platforms, both in the commercial and non-commercial sector, enabling a richer 
usage experience. 
 
The above mentioned work, (or its forerunning work), was successfully subjected to peer 
scrutiny which resulted in the publication of the paper referenced in [182]. 
4.3 Inter MO Relationships Expression Development 
In the course of the development of the P2PTube MO format, work was also done on the 
conception of means to perform the expression of inter-MO relationships. This work was 
done synergistically with that done within European project CONVERGENCE. 
 
A novel, RDF based, mechanism, was thus defined, to enable the expression of semantic 
relationships between MPEG-21 information objects. Said mechanism enables a self-
contained, clearer and less ambiguous expression of the relational context of MOs. It does 
so in a more effective and semantically informed manner, than alternate methods (e.g. 
HTML). Furthermore, it achieves it in alignment with emergent Semantic Web initiatives as 
the Linked-Data proposal. 
 
The mechanism in scope provides the means for the expression of information which can 
later be exploited for performing smarter searches over the interrelations between MOs. It 
also provides the means to trade query precision for recall and vice-versa, and facilitates the 
decoupling of content from location by replacing static links between object locations (the 
typical http links), with semantically rich relationships between information objects.  It, thus, 
semantically and relationally, empowers MPEG-21 enabling the development of a complex, 
yet precise and easily interpretable, overall MO fabric. 
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The, above described, work was validated by peer recognition by means of its publication in 
the papers referenced in [183] and [192]. It also originated the submission of a proposal, to 
the MPEG-21 consortium, for the extension of part 3 of the MPEG-21 standard, with the 
relational capabilities in scope. Said proposal has been accepted and is now part of an 
international standard. 
The specific MPEG-21 standardization contribution documents are those referenced in [184], 
[185], [186] and [187]. 
5 Publications 
In the context of the development of this PhD work, several publications were achieved, 
focusing on different aspects of said work. Those publications have already been briefly 
addressed in the previous sections of this chapter. It is, however, relevant to present them in 
a more detailed and contextualized manner. Below we include a table which lists the 
publications in question, in a contextualized manner. 
Table 5 – Publications 
Co
n
fe
re
n
ce
 
Pa
pe
r 
Paper Reference 
Helder Castro, A. Pimenta Alves, "Support for Media Content 
Production and Distribution in the Internet Era", First Workshop on 
Interdisciplinary Research in New Media, 2007. 
Focused Aspect 
of Phd Work 
This paper presents a long term analysis of the socio-economical 
evolution of the support structures for information content production. 
The realities that it reveals and the conclusions at which it arrives, 
helped guide and fuel the reflexion and analysis present in chapters III 
and IV. 
 
Co
n
fe
re
n
ce
 
Pa
pe
r 
Paper Reference 
H. Castro, M. T. Andrade, A. P. Alves, "Governed Media 
Distribution based on Nonrestrictive DRM", International 
Conference on Telecommunications and Multimedia, Ierapetra, 
Crete, Greece, 2008. 
Focused Aspect 
of Phd Work 
This paper presents work, developed synergistically with European 
project (ENTHRONE), which reflects the analysis presented in chapters III 
and IV and which provided some basic ideas for the for the P2PTube 
architecture, exposed in chapter V. 
 
Co
n
fe
re
n
ce
 
Pa
pe
r 
Paper Reference 
H. Castro, A. P. Alves, "Cognitive Object Format", International 
Conference on Knowledge Engineering and Ontology 
Development, Funchal, Madeira, Portugal, 2009. 
Focused Aspect 
of Phd Work 
This paper presents work pertaining to the development of complex and 
versatile information objects, to increase the attractiveness of all-digital, 
on-line content consumption. This work’s contributions are addressed in 
section 4 of chapter VI. 
 
Jo
u
rn
a
l P
a
pe
r Paper Reference 
Helder Castro, Artur P. Alves, Carlos Serrão, Brett Caraway, "A 
New Paradigm for Content Producers", IEEE MultiMedia, vol. 17, 
no. 2, pp. 90-93, Apr. 2010.  
Focused Aspect 
of Phd Work 
This paper presents the reflexion and analysis that we have performed, 
and the conclusions that we have derived, regarding the on-going 
changes, in the field of information distribution, with the development 
of on-line delivery. Its content is present in chapters III and IV. 
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Co
n
fe
re
n
ce
 
Pa
pe
r 
Paper Reference 
Helder Castro, Maria Teresa Andrade, Fernando Almeida, 
Giuseppe Tropea, Nicola Blefari Melazzi,Leonardo Chiariglione, 
Aziz S. Mousas and Dimitra I. Kaklaman, "Exploring Semantic 
Relationships Across Internet Resources", NWeSP 2011, Spain, 
2011. 
Focused Aspect 
of Phd Work 
This paper presents work pertaining to the development of complex and 
versatile information objects, to increase the attractiveness of all-digital, 
on-line content manipulation. It’s development was synergistic with the 
work done in the European project CONVERGENCE. The developed 
work’s contributions are addressed in section 4 of chapter VI. 
 
Co
n
fe
re
n
ce
 
Pa
pe
r Paper Reference Helder Castro, Artur P. Alves, "A P2P Content Delivery System for Alternative Business Models", NWeSP 2011, Spain, 2011. 
Focused Aspect 
of Phd Work 
This paper presents some of the analysis exposed in chapters III and IV. 
It then builds on said analysis in order to define a P2P content delivery 
system which is adequate for the BMs defined in chapter IV, and whose 
basic architectural options are reflected in chapter V. 
 
Jo
u
rn
a
l P
a
pe
r 
Paper Reference 
H. Castro, M.T. Andrade, F. Almeida, G. Troppea, N.B. Melazzi, 
A.S. Mousas, and D.I. Kaklamani, “Semantically Connected Web 
Resources with MPEG-21”, Springer Multimedia Tools and 
Applications (submitted). 
Focused Aspect 
of Phd Work 
This paper presents work pertaining to the development of complex and 
versatile information objects, to increase the attractiveness of all-digital, 
on-line content manipulation. It focuses on the definition and 
exploitation of a mechanism conceived to enable the explicit expression 
of inter-Digital Item relationships in MPEG-21. Said mechanism was 
accepted as an extension to the MPEG-21 DII and is now part of that 
international standard. It’s development was synergistic with the work 
done in the European project CONVERGENCE. This work’s contributions 
are addressed in section 4.3 of chapter VI. 
 
Jo
u
rn
a
l P
a
pe
r Paper Reference 
H. Castro, A. P. Alves and M. T. Andrade, "Reliable P2P Content 
Delivery for Alternative Business Models", International Journal of 
Computer Information Systems and Industrial Management 
Applications, vol. 5, pp. 11–29, 2013 (accepted). 
Focused Aspect 
of Phd Work 
This paper presents the key aspects of the P2P architecture that we have 
conceived to securely support the BMs, which, we argue, are adequate 
to sustain the on-line distribution of information content. Its contents 
are included in chapter V. 
6 Conclusions 
As the previous sections of the present chapter show, the overall contribution of this thesis, 
to the advancement of safe content delivery over P2P networks, is not a single, 
individualized, point or proposal. It is instead composed by a set of interrelated and 
interdependent parts, as depicted in Figure 64. 
 
At the root of the contribution is the realization, that was performed, of the true depth of the 
occurring changes (brought on by on-line, all-digital content delivery), in the world of 
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information content production and distribution. This realization shaped the posterior course 
of our work, as it revealed that safety, in a content distribution operation, is, first and 
foremost, dependent of the economical/business aspects of that operation. That is the 
reason why said realization, and the consequent identification of adequate BMs to operate in 
the on-line medium, play the root role, in our contributions. 
 
Building on the earlier contribution component, is a second such component which consists 
of the definition of a P2P architecture containing the necessary/missing security and 
coordination provisions to adequately support the enforcement of the above mentioned BMs. 
 
A third and final component, whose need and role is identified by the previous two, consists 
of the conception/development of a complex information object format, which enables a 
more powerful manipulation of such objects by the system, and a more pleasant usage, of 
them, by the users. 
 
 
Figure 64 – Contribution Interrelations and Publications 
 
Figure 64 also indicates (references) the papers which publish the work done on each of the 
contribution components. 
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VII Final Remarks 
Throughout the previous chapters we have presented an interrelated set of reflections, 
analyses and proposals, whose full value can best be appreciated only when they are 
observed collectively. This means that the defence of that value is not a simple matter as it 
requires validating each research component and their logical interconnection. 
 
This complex and broad reaching nature, that our work acquired, was not the fruit of choice 
but was, instead, demanded by the characteristics of the problems that we set ourselves to 
address. Our search for a safe P2P distribution of media content has thus leads us through 
various fields of research, which, we believe, we have managed to successfully traverse to 
reach valid and innovative solutions. 
 
In spite of all the work that was developed there is still ample room for further 
advancements. In our opinion the most relevant venues for the continuation and 
concretization of this work are the following: 
 
• Advancing the architectural solution, presented in chapter V: 
o so that the unique CCP, may be replaced by a group of CCPs, which divide 
the central core workload amongst themselves, and enable a more 
concurrent “writing” access to the system’s data structure, while preserving its 
coherence; 
 
o in order to enable a finer differentiation of the roles of core peers, so that finer 
grained responsibility and workload distributions can be achieved; 
 
o so as to further empower the system’s periphery so that it becomes able to 
distribute, amongst itself, progressively broader parts of the system’s data 
structure, whiteout breaching system security and that structure’s coherence; 
 
o in order for it to accommodate the temporary operation of the system (more 
accurately, the system’s periphery), in the advent of the (temporary) complete 
failure of the CCP or of the entire core; 
 
• Further enrichment of the MO format to enable a more fine grained binding of 
semantic concepts to specific “locations” of the media resources; 
 
• Continuation of the studies of user opinion on different on-line content access modes 
and BMs in order to further fine tune the BMs identified in chapter IV; 
 
• Implementation and testing of the P2PTube architecture. 
 
We hope that, in this dissertation, we have managed to communicate a clear idea of the 
problems that we addressed, of the solutions that we proposed and of the interdependencies 
between said problems and solutions. 
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Annex A – Data Objects 
A.1 IPCL Data Objects 
A.1.1 IPCLMHFile 
Figure 65 presents an example of an IPCL Message Head File. 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
            xmlns:pllm="urn:p2pt:pllm"  
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS  
            didl.xsd"> 
    <Container id="ipclm"> 
        <Descriptor id="ipclm_srcPIP"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                IP address of the source peer 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor> 
        <Descriptor id="ipclm_dstPIP"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                IP address of the destination peer 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor> 
        <Item id="ipclm_content"> 
            <Component> 
                <Resource mimeType="application/tar" ref="PLLMFile name"/> 
            </Component> 
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 65 – IPCLMHFile Example  
A.2 PLL Data Objects 
A.2.1 PLL Message 
A.2.1.1 PLLSIHFile 
Figure 66 presents an example of a PLL Sensitive Info Head File. 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
            xmlns:pllm="urn:p2pt:pllm"  
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS  
            didl.xsd"> 
    <Container id="pllm_pllsih"> 
        <Descriptor id="encinfodescr"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                <DIDL id="encinfo"> 
                    <Container> 
                        <Item id="pid"> 
                            <Component> 
                                <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                    identification of the encoding peer 
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                                </Resource> 
                            </Component> 
                        </Item> 
                        <Item id="algdef"> 
                            <Component> 
                                <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                    definition of the encoding algorithm 
                                </Resource> 
                            </Component> 
                        </Item> 
                        <Item id="pubk"> 
                            <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                    identifier of the public key 
                                </Statement> 
                            </Descriptor>     
                            <Component> 
                                <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                    public key 
                                </Resource> 
                            </Component> 
                        </Item> 
                        <Item id="privk"> 
                            <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                    identifier of the private key 
                                </Statement> 
                            </Descriptor> 
                        </Item> 
                        <Item id="commSessID"> 
                            <Component > 
                                <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                    id of the communication session 
                                </Resource> 
                            </Component>   
                        </Item>   
                    </Container> 
                </DIDL> 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor>     
        <Item id="pllm_securecontent"> 
            <Component> 
                <Resource mimeType="application/tar" ref="EncodedFileName"/> 
            </Component> 
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 66 – PLLSIHFile Example 
A.2.1.2 PLLPSIHFile 
Figure 67 presents an example of a PLL Protected Sensitive Info Head File. 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
            xmlns:pllm="urn:p2pt:pllm"  
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS  
            didl.xsd"> 
    <Container id="pllm_pllpsih"> 
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        <Descriptor id="signature"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                <dsig:Signature> 
                    ........................ 
                </dsig:Signature> 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor> 
        <Item id="pllm_pllpsi_signed_content"> 
            <Item id="pllm_pllpsic"> 
                <Component> 
                    <Resource mimeType="text/xml" ref="PLLPSICFileName"/> 
                </Component> 
            </Item> 
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 67 – PLLPSIHFile Example 
A.2.1.3 PLLPSICTopFile 
Figure 68 presents an example of a PLL Protected Sensitive Info Core Top File. 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
            xmlns:pllm="urn:p2pt:pllm"  
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS  
            didl.xsd"> 
    <Container id="pllm_pllsic"> 
        <Item id="siginfo"> 
            <Component> 
                <Resource> 
                    <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                        <Container> 
                            <Item id="pid"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identification of the signing peer 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="algdef"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        definition of the signing algorithm 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="pubk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the public key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor>     
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        public key 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
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                            <Item id="privk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the private key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                            </Item>  
                        </Container> 
                    </DIDL> 
                </Resource> 
            </Component> 
        </Item> 
        <Item id="serial"> 
            <Item id="previousSerialPart"> 
                <Item id="sessionID"> 
                    <Component> 
                        <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                            session id 
                        </Resource> 
                    </Component> 
                </Item>   
                <Item id="tstamp"> 
                    <Component> 
                        <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                            YYYY-MM-DDThh:mmTZD 
                        </Resource> 
                    </Component> 
                </Item> 
                <Item id="msgcount"> 
        <Item id=”type”> 
                       <Component> 
                           <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                               req 
                           </Resource> 
                       </Component> 
        </Item> 
        <Item id=”count”> 
                       <Component> 
                           <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                               value of the message counter 
                           </Resource> 
                       </Component> 
        </Item> 
                </Item> 
            </Item> 
            <Item id="newSerialPart"> 
                <Item id="sessionID"> 
                    <Component> 
                        <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                            session id 
                        </Resource> 
                    </Component> 
                </Item>   
                <Item id="tstamp"> 
                    <Component> 
                        <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                            YYYY-MM-DDThh:mmTZD 
                        </Resource> 
                    </Component> 
                </Item> 
Annex A  205 
 
 
 
                <Item id="msgcount"> 
        <Item id=”type”> 
                       <Component> 
                           <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                               resp 
                           </Resource> 
                       </Component> 
        </Item> 
        <Item id=”count”> 
                       <Component> 
                           <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                               value of the message counter 
                           </Resource> 
                       </Component> 
        </Item> 
                </Item> 
            </Item>             
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 68 – PLLPSICTopFile Example 
A.2.2 Peer Registration Certificate 
Figure 69 presents an example of a peripheral peer’s registration certificate. 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
            xmlns:prc="urn:p2pt:prc"  
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS  
            didl.xsd"> 
    <Container id="prc"> 
        <Descriptor id="prc_signature"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                <dsig:Signature> 
                    ........................ 
                </dsig:Signature> 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor> 
        <Item id="prc_content"> 
            <Descriptor id="id"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <dii:Identifier> 
                        p2ptube:io:rcertif001 
                    </dii:Identifier> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="prc_validTerm"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                    "YYYY-MM-DDThh:mmTZD" 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="siginfodescr"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                        <Container> 
                            <Item id="pid"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
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                                        identification of the signing peer 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="algdef"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        definition of the signing algorithm 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="pubk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the public key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor>     
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        public key 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="privk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the private key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                            </Item>  
                        </Container> 
                    </DIDL> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Item id="sid"> 
                <Descriptor id="peerIDInfo_signature"> 
                    <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                        <dsig:Signature> 
                            .... 
                        </dsig:Signature> 
                    </Statement> 
                </Descriptor> 
                <Item id="peerIDInfo"> 
                    <Item id="pid"> 
                        <Component> 
                            <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                identification of the peer 
                            </Resource> 
                        </Component> 
                    </Item> 
                    <Item id="algdef"> 
                        <Component> 
                            <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                definition of the peer's signing algorithm 
                            </Resource> 
                        </Component> 
                    </Item> 
                    <Item id="pubk"> 
                        <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                            <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
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                                identifier of the peer's public key 
                            </Statement> 
                        </Descriptor>     
                        <Component> 
                            <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                public key 
                            </Resource> 
                        </Component> 
                    </Item> 
                    <Item id="privk"> 
                        <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                            <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                identifier of the peer's private key 
                            </Statement> 
                        </Descriptor> 
                    </Item>                     
                </Item> 
            </Item> 
            <Item id="prc_peerRole"> 
                <Component> 
                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                        peripheral 
                    </Resource> 
                </Component> 
            </Item> 
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 69 – Peer Registration Certificate Example 
A.2.3 PLL Peer Info Object 
Figure 70 presents an example of a PLL Peer Info Object. 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
            xmlns:pio="urn:p2pt:pio"  
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS  
            didl.xsd"> 
    <Container id="pio"> 
        <Descriptor id="pio_signature"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                <dsig:Signature> 
                    .... 
                </dsig:Signature> 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor> 
        <Item id="pio_content"> 
            <Descriptor id="id"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <dii:Identifier> 
                        p2ptube:io:pio001 
                    </dii:Identifier> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="vTerm"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                    YYYY-MM-DDThh:mmTZD 
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                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
 <Descriptor id="siginfodescr"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                        <Container> 
                            <Item id="pid"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identification of the signing peer 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="algdef"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        definition of the signing algorithm 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="pubk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the public key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor>     
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        public key 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="privk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the private key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                            </Item>  
                        </Container> 
                    </DIDL> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Item id="peerIP"> 
                <Component> 
                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                        ........................ 
                    </Resource> 
                </Component> 
            </Item> 
            <Item id="peerRegCertif"> 
                <Component> 
                    <Resource mimeType="text/xml"> 
                        <DIDL> 
                            ........................ 
                        </DIDL> 
                    </Resource> 
                </Component> 
            </Item> 
        </Item> 
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    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 70 – Peer Info Object Example  
A.2.4 Peer Quarantine List 
Figure 71 presents an example of a Peer Quarantine List. 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
            xmlns:pql="urn:p2pt:pql"  
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS  
            didl.xsd"> 
    <Container id="pql"> 
        <Descriptor id="pql_signature"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                <dsig:Signature> 
                    .... 
                </dsig:Signature> 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor> 
        <Item id="pql_content"> 
            <Descriptor id="vTerm"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                    YYYY-MM-DDThh:mmTZD 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="siginfodescr"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                        <Container> 
                            <Item id="pid"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identification of the signing peer 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="algdef"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        definition of the signing algorithm 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="pubk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the public key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor>     
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        public key 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="privk"> 
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                                <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the private key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                            </Item>  
                        </Container> 
                    </DIDL> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Item id="quarantinedPeer1"> 
                <Component> 
                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                        peer 1 id 
                    </Resource> 
                </Component> 
            </Item> 
            .............. 
            <Item id="quarantinedPeerN"> 
                <Component> 
                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                        peer N id 
                    </Resource> 
                </Component> 
            </Item> 
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 71 – Peer Quarantine List Example  
A.2.5 PLL Info Retrieval Permit 
Figure 72 presents an example of a PLL Info Retrieval Permit. 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
            xmlns:plliorp="urn:p2pt: plliorp"  
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS  
            didl.xsd"> 
    <Container id="pirp"> 
        <Descriptor id="pirp_signature"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                <dsig:Signature> 
                    .... 
                </dsig:Signature> 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor> 
        <Item id="pirp_content"> 
            <Descriptor id="id"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <dii:Identifier> 
                        p2ptube:io:pirp001 
                    </dii:Identifier> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="objectType"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                    ppInfoRetrPermit                     
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                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="vTerm"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                    YYYY-MM-DDThh:mmTZD 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="siginfodescr"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                        <Container> 
                            <Item id="pid"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identification of the signing peer 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="algdef"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        definition of the signing algorithm 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="pubk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the public key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor>     
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        public key 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="privk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the private key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                            </Item>  
                        </Container> 
                    </DIDL> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor>             
            <Item id="queryingPeerInfo"> 
                <Item id="queryingPeerID"> 
                    <Component> 
                        <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                            p2ptube:ppeer:xpto001 
                        </Resource> 
                    </Component> 
                </Item> 
            </Item> 
            <Item id="searchedInfoDef"> 
                ........................ 
            </Item> 
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            <Item id="pllildoID"> 
                <Component> 
                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                        p2ptube:ppeer:pllildo001 
                    </Resource> 
                </Component> 
            </Item>             
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 72 – PLL Info Object Retrieval Permit Example  
A.3 UEL Data Objects 
A.3.1 UEL Message 
A.3.1.1 UELSIFile 
Figure 73 presents an example of a UEL Sensitive Info File. 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
            xmlns:uelsif="urn:p2pt:uelsif"  
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS  
            didl.xsd"> 
    <Container id="uelm_uelsi"> 
        <Descriptor id="usignature"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                <dsig:Signature> 
                    ........................ 
                </dsig:Signature> 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor> 
        <Item id="uelsif_content"> 
            <Descriptor id="siginfodescr"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                        <Container> 
                            <Item id="uid"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identification of the signing user 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="algdef"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        definition of the signing algorithm 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="pubk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the public key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor>     
                                <Component> 
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                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        public key 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="privk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the private key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                            </Item>  
                        </Container> 
                    </DIDL> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="serial"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    ........................ 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Item id="uels_info"> 
                <Item id="uelmsgtype"> 
                    <Component> 
                        <Resource mimeType="text/xml"> 
                            ........................ 
                        </Resource> 
                    </Component> 
                </Item> 
                <Item id="further_uels_info_param1"> 
                    <Component> 
                        <Resource mimeType="text/xml"> 
                            ........................ 
                        </Resource> 
                    </Component> 
                </Item> 
                ....... 
                <Item id="further_uels_info_paramn"> 
                    <Component> 
                        <Resource mimeType="text/xml"> 
                            ........................ 
                        </Resource> 
                    </Component> 
                </Item>                 
            </Item> 
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 73 – UELSIFile Example 
A.3.2 User Registration Certificate 
Figure 74 presents an example of a User Registration Certificate. 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
            xmlns:urc="urn:p2pt:urc"  
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS  
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            didl.xsd"> 
    <Container id="urc"> 
        <Descriptor id="urc_signature"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                <dsig:Signature> 
                    ........................ 
                </dsig:Signature> 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor> 
        <Item id="urc_content"> 
            <Descriptor id="id"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <dii:Identifier> 
                        p2ptube:io:rcertifu001 
                    </dii:Identifier> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor>             
            <Descriptor id="vTerm"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                    YYYY-MM-DDThh:mmTZD 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="siginfodescr"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                        <Container> 
                            <Item id="pid"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identification of the signing peer 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="algdef"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        definition of the signing algorithm 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="pubk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the public key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor>     
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        public key 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="privk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the private key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                            </Item>  
                        </Container> 
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                    </DIDL> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor>             
            <Item id="sidU_item"> 
                <Component> 
                    <Resource mimeType="text/xml"> 
                        <DIDL id="sidU"> 
                            <Container> 
                                <Descriptor id="uInfoSignature"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                        <dsig:Signature> 
                                            ........................ 
                                        </dsig:Signature> 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                                <Item id="userInfo"> 
                                    <Item id="uid"> 
                                        <Component> 
                                            <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                identification of the user 
                                            </Resource> 
                                        </Component> 
                                    </Item> 
                                    <Item id="uname"> 
                                        <Component> 
                                            <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                username 
                                            </Resource> 
                                        </Component> 
                                    </Item>                                     
                                    <Item id="algdef"> 
                                        <Component> 
                                            <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                definition of the user's signing algorithm 
                                            </Resource> 
                                        </Component> 
                                    </Item> 
                                    <Item id="pubk"> 
                                        <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                            <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                identifier of the user's public key 
                                            </Statement> 
                                        </Descriptor>     
                                        <Component> 
                                            <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                public key 
                                            </Resource> 
                                        </Component> 
                                    </Item> 
                                    <Item id="privk"> 
                                        <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                            <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                identifier of the user's private key 
                                            </Statement> 
                                        </Descriptor> 
                                    </Item>  
                                </Item> 
                            </Container> 
                        </DIDL> 
                    </Resource> 
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                </Component> 
            </Item> 
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 74 – User Registration Certificate Example  
A.3.3 User Hosting Certificate 
Figure 75 presents an example of a User Hosting Certificate. 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
            xmlns:upc="urn:p2pt:upc"  
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS  
            didl.xsd"> 
    <Container id="uhc"> 
        <Descriptor id="uhc_signature"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                <dsig:Signature> 
                    ........................ 
                </dsig:Signature> 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor> 
        <Item id="uhc_content"> 
            <Descriptor id="id"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <dii:Identifier> 
                        p2ptube:io:uhostcertif001 
                    </dii:Identifier> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="vTerm"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                    "YYYY-MM-DDThh:mmTZD" 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="siginfodescr"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                        <Container> 
                            <Item id="pid"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identification of the signing peer 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="algdef"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        definition of the signing algorithm 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="pubk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
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                                        identifier of the public key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor>     
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        public key 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="privk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the private key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                            </Item>  
                        </Container> 
                    </DIDL> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor>             
            <Item id="hostPeerInfo"> 
                <Item id="hostPeerID"> 
                    <Component> 
                        <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                            p2ptube:ppeer:xpto001 
                        </Resource> 
                    </Component> 
                </Item> 
            </Item> 
            <Item id="rcertifU"> 
                ........................ 
            </Item> 
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 75 – User Hosting Certificate Example  
A.3.4 Search Query Response Object 
Figure 76 presents an example of a Search Query Response Object. 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
            xmlns:sqro="urn:p2pt:sqro"  
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS  
            didl.xsd"> 
    <Container id="sqro"> 
        <Descriptor id="sqro_signature"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                <dsig:Signature> 
                    ........................ 
                </dsig:Signature> 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor> 
        <Item id="sqro_content"> 
            <Descriptor id="id"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <dii:Identifier> 
                        p2ptube:io:sqro001 
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                    </dii:Identifier> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
 <Descriptor id="siginfodescr"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                        <Container> 
                            <Item id="pid"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identification of the signing peer 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="algdef"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        definition of the signing algorithm 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="pubk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the public key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor>     
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        public key 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="privk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the private key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                            </Item>  
                        </Container> 
                    </DIDL> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="sqro_emissiontime"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                    YYYY-MM-DDThh:mmTZD 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="sqro_answeredquery"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
                    xmlns:sqro="urn:p2pt:sqro"  
                    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
                    xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
                    xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS  
                    didl.xsd"> 
                        <Container id="answeredQ"> 
                            <Descriptor id="answeredQ_signature"> 
                                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
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                                    <dsig:Signature> 
                                        ........................ 
                                    </dsig:Signature> 
                                </Statement> 
                            </Descriptor> 
                            <Item> 
                                <Descriptor id="id"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                        <dii:Identifier> 
                                            p2ptube:io:answeredQ001 
                                        </dii:Identifier> 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                    <Descriptor id="siginfodescr"> 
                                   <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                       <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                                           <Container> 
                                               <Item id="pid"> 
                                                   <Component> 
                                                       <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                           identification of the signing peer 
                                                       </Resource> 
                                                   </Component> 
                                               </Item> 
                                               <Item id="algdef"> 
                                                   <Component> 
                                                       <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                           definition of the signing algorithm 
                                                       </Resource> 
                                                   </Component> 
                                               </Item> 
                                               <Item id="pubk"> 
                                                   <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                                       <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                           identifier of the public key 
                                                       </Statement> 
                                                   </Descriptor>     
                                                   <Component> 
                                                       <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                           public key 
                                                       </Resource> 
                                                   </Component> 
                                               </Item> 
                                               <Item id="privk"> 
                                                   <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                                       <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                           identifier of the private key 
                                                       </Statement> 
                                                   </Descriptor> 
                                               </Item>  
                                           </Container> 
                                       </DIDL> 
                                   </Statement> 
                               </Descriptor> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        query string 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component>    
                            </Item>                             
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                        </Container> 
                     </DIDL>                        
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Component id="sqro_molist"> 
                <Resource mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <sqro:MOList> 
                        ........................ 
                    </sqro:MOList> 
                </Resource> 
            </Component> 
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 76 – SQRO Example  
A.3.5 UEL  Information Location Describing Object 
Figure 77 presents an example of a UELILDO Object. 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
            xmlns:uelildo="urn:p2pt:uelildo"  
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS  
            didl.xsd"> 
    <Container id="uelildo"> 
        <Descriptor id="uelildo_signature"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                <dsig:Signature>..........</dsig:Signature> 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor> 
        <Item id="uelildo_content"> 
            <Descriptor id="id"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <dii:Identifier> 
                        p2ptube:io:uelildo001 
                    </dii:Identifier> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="siginfodescr"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                        <Container> 
                            <Item id="pid"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identification of the signing peer 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="algdef"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        definition of the signing algorithm 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="pubk"> 
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                                <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the public key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor>     
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        public key 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="privk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the private key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                            </Item>  
                        </Container> 
                    </DIDL> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor>             
            <Descriptor id="uelildo_emissiontime"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                    YYYY-MM-DDThh:mmTZD 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Item id="uelildo_loclist"> 
                <Item id="hostPeer1Info"> 
                    <Item id="hostPeerID"> 
                        <Component> 
                            <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                p2ptube:ppeer:xpto001 
                            </Resource> 
                        </Component> 
                    </Item> 
                </Item> 
                ........... 
                <Item id="hostPeerNInfo"> 
                    <Item id="hostPeerID"> 
                        <Component> 
                            <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                p2ptube:ppeer:xpto00n 
                            </Resource> 
                        </Component> 
                    </Item> 
                </Item> 
            </Item> 
            <Item id="uelildo_fraglist"> 
                <Component> 
                    <Resource mimeType="text/xml"> 
                        <DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"  
                            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
                            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
                            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS didl.xsd"> 
                            <Container id="fraglist"> 
                                <Descriptor id="fraglist_signature"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        YYYY-MM-DDThh:mmTZD 
                                    </Statement> 
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                                </Descriptor> 
                                <Item id="fraglist_content"> 
                                    <Descriptor id="fraglist_id"> 
                                        <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                            <dii:Identifier> 
                                                p2ptube:io:fraglist001 
                                            </dii:Identifier> 
                                        </Statement> 
                                    </Descriptor> 
                                    <Descriptor id="siginfodescr"> 
                                        <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                            <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                                                <Container> 
                                                    <Item id="pid"> 
                                                        <Component> 
                                                            <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                                identification of the signing peer 
                                                            </Resource> 
                                                        </Component> 
                                                    </Item> 
                                                    <Item id="algdef"> 
                                                        <Component> 
                                                            <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                                definition of the signing algorithm 
                                                            </Resource> 
                                                        </Component> 
                                                    </Item> 
                                                    <Item id="pubk"> 
                                                        <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                                            <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                                identifier of the public key 
                                                            </Statement> 
                                                        </Descriptor>     
                                                        <Component> 
                                                            <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                                public key 
                                                            </Resource> 
                                                        </Component> 
                                                    </Item> 
                                                    <Item id="privk"> 
                                                        <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                                            <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                                identifier of the private key 
                                                            </Statement> 
                                                        </Descriptor> 
                                                    </Item>  
                                                </Container> 
                                            </DIDL> 
                                        </Statement> 
                                    </Descriptor>                                     
                                    <Item id="moID"> 
                                        <Component> 
                                            <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                p2ptube:mo:abc1 
                                            </Resource> 
                                        </Component> 
                                    </Item> 
                                    <Item id="fragDefs"> 
                                        <Item id="fragDef1"> 
                                            <Descriptor id="fragID"> 
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                                                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                                    p2ptube:mo:abc1:frag0 
                                                </Statement> 
                                            </Descriptor> 
                                            <Descriptor id="fragSize"> 
                                                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                                    size of the fragment 
                                                </Statement> 
                                            </Descriptor> 
                                            <Descriptor id="siginfodescr"> 
                                                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                                    <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                                                        <Container> 
                                                            <Item id="pid"> 
                                                                <Component> 
                                                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                                        identification of the signing peer 
                                                                    </Resource> 
                                                                </Component> 
                                                            </Item> 
                                                            <Item id="algdef"> 
                                                                <Component> 
                                                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                                        definition of the signing algorithm 
                                                                    </Resource> 
                                                                </Component> 
                                                            </Item> 
                                                            <Item id="pubk"> 
                                                                <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                                        identifier of the public key 
                                                                    </Statement> 
                                                                </Descriptor>     
                                                                <Component> 
                                                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                                        public key 
                                                                    </Resource> 
                                                                </Component> 
                                                            </Item> 
                                                            <Item id="privk"> 
                                                                <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                                        identifier of the private key 
                                                                    </Statement> 
                                                                </Descriptor> 
                                                            </Item>  
                                                        </Container> 
                                                    </DIDL> 
                                                </Statement> 
                                            </Descriptor>                                             
                                            <Descriptor id="fragSignature"> 
                                                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                                    <dsig:Signature> 
                                                        .......... 
                                                    </dsig:Signature> 
                                                </Statement> 
                                            </Descriptor>                         
                                            <Component> 
                                                <Resource mimeType="application/p2ptmo" ref="p2ptube:mo:abc1"/> 
                                                <Anchor> 
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                                                    <Descriptor> 
                                                        <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                            p2ptube:mo:abc1:frag0 
                                                        </Statement> 
                                                    </Descriptor>                         
                                                    <Fragment fragmentId="offset(0,100000)"/> 
                                                </Anchor> 
                                            </Component> 
                                        </Item> 
                                        ..... 
                                        <Item id="fragDefN"> 
                                            <Descriptor id="fragID"> 
                                                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                                    p2ptube:mo:abc1:fragN 
                                                </Statement> 
                                            </Descriptor> 
                                            <Descriptor id="fragSize"> 
                                                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                                    size of the fragment 
                                                </Statement> 
                                            </Descriptor> 
                                            <Descriptor id="fragSignature"> 
                                                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                                    <dsig:Signature> 
                                                        .......... 
                                                    </dsig:Signature> 
                                                </Statement> 
                                            </Descriptor>                         
                                            <Component> 
                                                <Resource mimeType="application/p2ptmo" ref="p2ptube:mo:abc1"/> 
                                                <Anchor> 
                                                    <Descriptor> 
                                                        <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                            p2ptube:mo:abc1:fragN 
                                                        </Statement> 
                                                    </Descriptor>                           
                                                    <Fragment fragmentId="offset(100000,200000)"/> 
                                                </Anchor> 
                                            </Component> 
                                        </Item>                     
                                    </Item> 
                                </Item>                                 
                            </Container> 
                        </DIDL> 
                    </Resource> 
                </Component> 
            </Item> 
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL>    
Figure 77 – UELILDO Example  
A.3.6 UEL Info Retrieval Permit 
Figure 78 presents an example of an UEL Info Retrieval Permit. 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
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            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS  
            didl.xsd"> 
    <Container id="uelirp"> 
        <Descriptor id="uelirp_signature"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                <dsig:Signature> 
                    ........................ 
                </dsig:Signature> 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor> 
        <Item id="uelirp_content"> 
            <Descriptor id="uelirp_permtype_declaration"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                    UEL Info Retrieval Permit 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor>             
            <Descriptor id="uelirp_tstamp"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                    YYYY-MM-DDThh:mmTZD 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="siginfodescr"> 
                    ........................ 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Item id="enabledPeerInfo"> 
                <Item id="enabledPeerID"> 
                    <Component> 
                        <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                            p2ptube:ppeer:xpto001 
                        </Resource> 
                    </Component> 
                </Item> 
            </Item> 
            <Item id="infodef"> 
                <Item id="moID"> 
                    <Component> 
                        <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                            p2ptube:mo:abc1 
                        </Resource> 
                    </Component> 
                </Item> 
            </Item>             
            <Item id="uelildo"> 
                <Component> 
                    <Resource mimeType="text/xml"> 
                        <DID> 
                            ........................ 
                        </DID> 
                    </Resource> 
                </Component> 
            </Item>             
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 78 – UEL Info Retrieval Permit Example  
A.3.7 Media Objects 
Figure 79 presents an example of a MOTHFile’s contents. 
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<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS  
            didl.xsd"> 
    <Container id="moth"> 
        <Descriptor id="moth_signature"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                <dsig:Signature> 
                    ........................ 
                </dsig:Signature> 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor> 
        <Item id="moth_content"> 
            <Descriptor id="moid"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <dii:Identifier> 
                        p2ptube:io:mo001 
                    </dii:Identifier> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="siginfodescr"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                        <Container> 
                            <Item id="pid"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identification of the signing peer 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="algdef"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        definition of the signing algorithm 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="pubk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the public key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor>     
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        public key 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="privk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the private key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                            </Item>  
                        </Container> 
                    </DIDL> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="tstamp"> 
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                <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                    YYYY-MM-DDThh:mmTZD 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="moi_signature"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <dsig:Signature> 
                        ........................ 
                    </dsig:Signature> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Component id="moiRef"> 
                <Resource mimeType="application/tar" ref="MOIFileName"/> 
            </Component> 
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 79 – MOTHFile Example 
 
Figure 80 presents an example of a MOIHFile’s contents. 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS  
            didl.xsd"> 
    <Container id="moih"> 
        <Descriptor id="moih_u_signature"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                <dsig:Signature> 
                    ........................ 
                </dsig:Signature> 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor> 
        <Item id="moih_content"> 
 <Descriptor id="siginfodescr"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                        <Container> 
                            <Item id="uid"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identification of the signing user 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="algdef"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        definition of the signing algorithm 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="pubk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the public key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor>     
                                <Component> 
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                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        public key 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="privk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the private key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                            </Item>  
                        </Container> 
                    </DIDL> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="ownerUserID"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                    p2ptube:user:abc1 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor>             
            <Descriptor id="moih_semantics"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <rdf:RDF> 
                        ........................ 
                    </rdf:RDF> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="moih_rights"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <r:license> 
                        ........................ 
                    </r:license> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Item id="moicFilesInfo"> 
                <Item id="moic1"> 
                    <Descriptor id="moic1_u_signature"> 
                        <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                            <dsig:Signature> 
                                ........................ 
                            </dsig:Signature> 
                        </Statement> 
                    </Descriptor>             
                    <Component> 
                        <Resource mimeType="video/mpeg" ref="MOIC1_FileName"/> 
                    </Component> 
                </Item> 
               ……. further Items 
                <Item id="moicn"> 
                    <Descriptor id="moicn_u_signature"> 
                        <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                            <dsig:Signature> 
                                ........................ 
                            </dsig:Signature> 
                        </Statement> 
                    </Descriptor>             
                    <Component> 
                        <Resource mimeType="video/mpeg" ref="MOICN_FileName"/> 
                    </Component> 
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                </Item> 
            </Item>             
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 80 – MOIHFile Example 
A.3.8 ERRs and ERs 
Figure 81 presents an example of a P2PTube DID carrying an ERR (the actual ERR content 
is adapted from [102]). 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
            xmlns:r="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2003:01-REL-R-NS" 
            xmlns:erl="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2005:01-ERL-NS" 
            xmlns:dii="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:01-DII-NS"> 
            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS didl.xsd"> 
    <Container id="err"> 
        <Descriptor id="err_cp_signature"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                <dsig:Signature> 
                    ........................ 
                </dsig:Signature> 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor> 
        <Item id="err_content"> 
            <Descriptor id="err_ID"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                    <dii:Identifier>p2ptube:err:0001</dii:Identifier> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor>             
            <Descriptor id="siginfodescr"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                        <Container> 
                            <Item id="pid"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identification of the signing peer 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="algdef"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        definition of the signing algorithm 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="pubk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the public key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor>     
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
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                                        public key 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="privk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the private key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                            </Item>  
                        </Container> 
                    </DIDL> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Item id="err_proper"> 
                <Component> 
                    <Resource mimeType="text/xml"> 
                        <erl:ERR xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2005:01-ERL-NS"  
                            xmlns:sx="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2003:01-REL-SX-NS" 
                            xmlns:dia="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2003:01-DIA-NS" 
                            xmlns:mpeg7="urn:mpeg:mpeg7:schema:2004"> 
                            <ERRDescriptor> 
                                <LifeTime> 
                                    <StartTime>2011-07-01T00:00:00</StartTime> 
                                    <EndTime>2011-07-08T00:00:00</EndTime> 
                                </LifeTime> 
                                <Modification> 
                                    <PeerId>........................</PeerId> 
                                    <UserId>........................</UserId> 
                                    <Time>2011-06-30T18:15:00</Time> 
                                    <Description>Creation of ER-R by Bob@acme.org</Description> 
                                </Modification> 
                                <Priority>1</Priority> 
                            </ERRDescriptor> 
                            <ERSpecification> 
                                <Identifier xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:01-DII-NS">urn:mpegRA:mpeg21:dii:eid:1702</Identifier> 
                                <ERDescription>This is a description of the ER</ERDescription> 
                                <AccessControl/> 
                                <ERPayloadSpecification> 
                                    <ERIdentifier baseId="true">p2ptube:err:0001:er</ERIdentifier> 
                                    <PeerId/> 
                                    <UserId/> 
                                    <Time/> 
                                    <Location/> 
                                    <DIOperation/> 
                                    <DomainData reportTag="Name" semantics="acme:PhoneName" syntax="xsd:String"/> 
                                    <DomainData semantics="AcmeFilm:length" syntax="xsd:Integer" value="155"/> 
                                    <DIMetadata> 
                                        <DISelection> 
                                            <DISelectionViaDII> 
                                                urn:mpegra:mpeg21:dii:isrc:BE-R45-98-03948576 
                                            </DISelectionViaDII> 
                                        </DISelection> 
                                        <DIMetadataElement tagName="Title"/> 
                                        <DIMetadataElement tagName="Artist"/> 
                                        <DIMetadataElement tagName="ISWC"/> 
                                    </DIMetadata> 
                                </ERPayloadSpecification> 
                                <ERFormatSpecification> 
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                                    <Ref>http://www.acme.org/schemas/phones.xsd</Ref> 
                                </ERFormatSpecification> 
                                <ERDeliverySpecification> 
                                    <Recipient> 
                                        <PeerId>p2ptube:ppeer:ccp</PeerId> 
                                        <UserId>........................</UserId> 
                                    </Recipient> 
                                    <DeliveryTime> 
                                        <SpecificTime> 
                                            <AfterOn>2012-07-06T00:00:00</AfterOn> 
                                            <BeforeOn>2012-09-06T00:00:00</BeforeOn> 
                                        </SpecificTime> 
                                    </DeliveryTime> 
                                    <DITransportService> 
                                        <r:serviceReference> 
                                            <sx:wsdlComplete> 
                                                <sx:wsdl> 
                                                    <nonSecureIndirect URI="http://www.acme.org/ER-wsdlfile.xml"/> 
                                                </sx:wsdl> 
                                                <sx:service>er:SendERService</sx:service> 
                                                <sx:portType>er:SendERPortType</sx:portType> 
                                            </sx:wsdlComplete> 
                                        </r:serviceReference> 
                                    </DITransportService> 
                                </ERDeliverySpecification> 
                                <EmbeddedERR> 
                                    <ERRReference>mpeg:mpeg21:dii:ERRID:010</ERRReference> 
                                </EmbeddedERR> 
                            </ERSpecification> 
                            <EventConditionDescriptor> 
                                <TimeCondition> 
                                    <TimeEvent> 
                                        <SpecificTime> 
                                            <AfterOn>2012-01-01T00:00:00</AfterOn> 
                                            <BeforeOn>2012-01-31T00:00:00</BeforeOn> 
                                        </SpecificTime> 
                                    </TimeEvent> 
                                    <Operator Name="OR"/> 
                                    <TimeEvent> 
                                        <PeriodicTime> 
                                            <Start>2012-07-06T00:00:00</Start> 
                                            <Period>P2M10D</Period> 
                                            <Duration>P1D</Duration> 
                                            <End>2013-07-06T00:00:00</End> 
                                        </PeriodicTime> 
                                    </TimeEvent> 
                                </TimeCondition> 
                                <Operator Name="AND"/> 
                                <DIOperationCondition> 
                                    <DIOperationEvent> 
                                        <Operation>REL:Play</Operation> 
                                        <DII>mpeg:mpeg21:dii:ID:ACME-010</DII> 
                                    </DIOperationEvent> 
                                </DIOperationCondition> 
                                <Operator Name="AND"/> 
                                <PeerCondition> 
                                    <PeerEvent Name="=" Location="infix"> 
                                        <mpeg7:Region>au</mpeg7:Region> 
                                    </PeerEvent> 
                                    <Operator Name="OR"/> 
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                                    <PeerEvent Name="=" Location="infix"> 
                                        <mpeg7:Region>kr</mpeg7:Region> 
                                    </PeerEvent> 
                                </PeerCondition> 
                            </EventConditionDescriptor> 
                        </erl:ERR> 
                    </Resource> 
                </Component> 
            </Item> 
            <Item id="peerInfo"> 
                <Item id="peerID"> 
                    <Component> 
                        <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                            p2ptube:ppeer:xpto001 
                        </Resource> 
                    </Component> 
                </Item> 
            </Item>             
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 81 – ERR DID Example 
 
Figure 82 presents an example of a P2PTube DID carrying an ER (the actual ER content is 
adapted from [102]). 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"    
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
            xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
            xmlns:r="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2003:01-REL-R-NS" 
            xmlns:erl="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2005:01-ERL-NS" 
            xmlns:dii="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:01-DII-NS"> 
            xsi:schemaLocation="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS didl.xsd"> 
    <Container id="er"> 
        <Descriptor id="er_pp_signature"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                <dsig:Signature> 
                    ........................ 
                </dsig:Signature> 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor>      
        <Item id="er_content"> 
            <Descriptor id="siginfodescrB"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                        <Container> 
                            <Item id="pid"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identification of the signing peer 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="algdef"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        definition of the signing algorithm 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
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                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="pubk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the public key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor>     
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        public key 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="privk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the private key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                            </Item>  
                        </Container> 
                    </DIDL> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Descriptor id="er_u_signature"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <dsig:Signature> 
                        ........................ 
                    </dsig:Signature> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Item id="er"> 
                <Descriptor id="id"> 
                    <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                        <dii:Identifier> 
                            p2ptube:io:er001 
                        </dii:Identifier> 
                    </Statement> 
                </Descriptor>                 
                <Descriptor id="siginfodescrC"> 
                    <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                        <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                            <Container> 
                                <Item id="pid"> 
                                    <Component> 
                                        <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                            identification of the signing user 
                                        </Resource> 
                                    </Component> 
                                </Item> 
                                <Item id="algdef"> 
                                    <Component> 
                                        <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                            definition of the signing algorithm 
                                        </Resource> 
                                    </Component> 
                                </Item> 
                                <Item id="pubk"> 
                                    <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                        <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
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                                            identifier of the public key 
                                        </Statement> 
                                    </Descriptor>     
                                    <Component> 
                                        <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                            public key 
                                        </Resource> 
                                    </Component> 
                                </Item> 
                                <Item id="privk"> 
                                    <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                        <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                            identifier of the private key 
                                        </Statement> 
                                    </Descriptor> 
                                </Item>  
                            </Container> 
                        </DIDL> 
                    </Statement> 
                </Descriptor> 
                <Item id="err_ID"> 
                    <Component> 
                        <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                            p2ptube:err:0001 
                        </Resource> 
                    </Component> 
                </Item>                 
                <Item> 
                    <Component> 
                        <Resource mimeType="text/xml"> 
                            <erl:ER xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2005:01-ERL-NS" 
                                xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
                                xmlns:mpeg7="urn:mpeg:mpeg7:schema:2004"> 
                                <ERDescriptor> 
                                    <Description> 
                                        A Free-text description of the ER 
                                    </Description> 
                                    <Recipient> 
                                        <PeerId>p2ptube:ppeer:xpto001</PeerId> 
                                        <UserId>........................</UserId> 
                                    </Recipient> 
                                    <Status value="true"/> 
                                    <Modification> 
                                        <PeerId>........................</PeerId> 
                                        <UserId>........................</UserId> 
                                        <Time>2005-11-03T01:22:30</Time> 
                                    </Modification> 
                                    <ERSource> 
                                        <ERRReference>mpeg:mpeg21:dii:ERRID:342</ERRReference> 
                                    </ERSource> 
                                </ERDescriptor> 
                                <ERData> 
                                    <PeerId>........................</PeerId> 
                                    <UserId>........................</UserId> 
                                    <Time>2005-11-02T05:11:32</Time> 
                                    <Location> 
                                        <mpeg7:Region>au</mpeg7:Region> 
                                    </Location> 
                                    <DIOperation>REL:Play</DIOperation>    
                                    <ReportedDomainData semantics="acme:PhoneName"> 
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                                        <Name>AcmeModel231-ANS</Name> 
                                    </ReportedDomainData>   
                                    <ReportedDomainData> 
                                        ........................ 
                                    </ReportedDomainData>  
                                    <ReportedDIMetadata> 
                                        <Title>A very catchy Tune</Title> 
                                        <Artist>The hippest guys on the Block</Artist> 
                                        <ISWC>T-345246800-1</ISWC> 
                                    </ReportedDIMetadata>   
                                </ERData> 
                            </erl:ER> 
                        </Resource> 
                    </Component> 
                </Item> 
            </Item> 
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 82 – ER DID Example 
A.3.9 Inquiry and Inquiry Response IOs 
 
Figure 83 presents an example of an Inquiry IO. 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"  
           xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
           xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
           xmlns:r="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2003:01-REL-R-NS" 
           xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
           xmlns:erl="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2005:01-ERL-NS" 
           xmlns:dii="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:01-DII-NS"> 
    <Container id="inqio_ccp"> 
        <Descriptor id="inqio_ccp_signature"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                <dsig:Signature>..........</dsig:Signature> 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor> 
        <Item id="inqio_ccp_content"> 
 <Descriptor id="siginfodescrCCP"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                        <Container> 
                            <Item id="pid"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identification of the signing peer 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="algdef"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        definition of the signing algorithm 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="pubk"> 
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                                <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the public key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor>     
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        public key 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="privk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the private key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                            </Item>  
                        </Container> 
                    </DIDL> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Component> 
                <Resource mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"  
                    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
                    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
                    xmlns:r="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2003:01-REL-R-NS" 
                    xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
                    xmlns:erl="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2005:01-ERL-NS" 
                    xmlns:dii="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:01-DII-NS"> 
                        <Container id="inqio"> 
                            <Descriptor id="inqio_signature"> 
                                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                    <dsig:Signature>..........</dsig:Signature> 
                                </Statement> 
                            </Descriptor> 
                            <Item id="inqio_content"> 
                                <Descriptor id="id"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                        <dii:Identifier> 
                                            p2ptube:io:inqio001 
                                        </dii:Identifier> 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                    <Descriptor id="siginfodescrU"> 
                                   <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                       <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                                           <Container> 
                                               <Item id="pid"> 
                                                   <Component> 
                                                       <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                           identification of the signing user 
                                                       </Resource> 
                                                   </Component> 
                                               </Item> 
                                               <Item id="algdef"> 
                                                   <Component> 
                                                       <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                           definition of the signing algorithm 
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                                                       </Resource> 
                                                   </Component> 
                                               </Item> 
                                               <Item id="pubk"> 
                                                   <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                                       <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                           identifier of the public key 
                                                       </Statement> 
                                                   </Descriptor>     
                                                   <Component> 
                                                       <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                           public key 
                                                       </Resource> 
                                                   </Component> 
                                               </Item> 
                                               <Item id="privk"> 
                                                   <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                                       <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                           identifier of the private key 
                                                       </Statement> 
                                                   </Descriptor> 
                                               </Item>  
                                           </Container> 
                                       </DIDL> 
                                   </Statement> 
                               </Descriptor> 
                                <Item id="p2ptube:io:inqio001:queryBlock1"> 
                                    <Item id="p2ptube:io:inqio001:queryBlock1:query"> 
                                        <Component> 
                                            <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                ..... query .... 
                                            </Resource> 
                                        </Component> 
                                    </Item> 
                                    <Item id="p2ptube:io:inqio001:queryBlock1:responseAlterns"> 
                                        <Item id="p2ptube:io:inqio001:queryBlock1:responseAlterns:respAltern1"> 
                                            <Component> 
                                                <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                    ..... resp altern 1 .... 
                                                </Resource> 
                                            </Component> 
                                        </Item> 
                                        ..... 
                                        <Item id="p2ptube:io:inqio001:queryBlock1:responseAlterns:respAlternN"> 
                                            <Component> 
                                                <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                    ..... resp altern N .... 
                                                </Resource> 
                                            </Component> 
                                        </Item>                                         
                                    </Item>                                     
                                </Item> 
                                ....... 
                                <Item id="p2ptube:io:inqio001:queryBlockN"> 
                                    <Item id="p2ptube:io:inqio001:queryBlockN:query"> 
                                        <Component> 
                                            <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                ..... query .... 
                                            </Resource> 
                                        </Component> 
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                                    </Item> 
                                    <Item id="p2ptube:io:inqio001:queryBlockN:responseAlternatives"> 
                                        <Item id="p2ptube:io:inqio001:queryBlockN:responseAlterns:respAltern1"> 
                                            <Component> 
                                                <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                    ..... resp altern 1 .... 
                                                </Resource> 
                                            </Component> 
                                        </Item> 
                                        ..... 
                                        <Item id="p2ptube:io:inqio001:queryBlockN:responseAlterns:respAlternN"> 
                                            <Component> 
                                                <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                    ..... resp altern N .... 
                                                </Resource> 
                                            </Component> 
                                        </Item> 
                                    </Item> 
                                </Item> 
                            </Item> 
                        </Container> 
                    </DIDL> 
                </Resource> 
            </Component> 
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 83 – Inquiry IO Example 
 
Figure 84 presents an example of an Inquiry Response IO. 
 
<DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"  
           xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
           xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
           xmlns:r="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2003:01-REL-R-NS" 
           xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
           xmlns:erl="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2005:01-ERL-NS" 
           xmlns:dii="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:01-DII-NS"> 
    <Container id="inqrio_ccp"> 
        <Descriptor id="inqrio_ccp_signature"> 
            <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                <dsig:Signature>..........</dsig:Signature> 
            </Statement> 
        </Descriptor> 
        <Item id="inqrio_ccp_content"> 
 <Descriptor id="siginfodescrCCP"> 
                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                        <Container> 
                            <Item id="pid"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identification of the signing peer 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="algdef"> 
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
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                                        definition of the signing algorithm 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="pubk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the public key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor>     
                                <Component> 
                                    <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        public key 
                                    </Resource> 
                                </Component> 
                            </Item> 
                            <Item id="privk"> 
                                <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                        identifier of the private key 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                            </Item>  
                        </Container> 
                    </DIDL> 
                </Statement> 
            </Descriptor> 
            <Component> 
                <Resource mimeType="text/xml"> 
                    <DIDL xmlns="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:02-DIDL-NS"  
                    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  
                    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
                    xmlns:r="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2003:01-REL-R-NS" 
                    xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"  
                    xmlns:erl="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2005:01-ERL-NS" 
                    xmlns:dii="urn:mpeg:mpeg21:2002:01-DII-NS"> 
                        <Container id="inqrio"> 
                            <Descriptor id="inqrio_signature"> 
                                <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                    <dsig:Signature>..........</dsig:Signature> 
                                </Statement> 
                            </Descriptor> 
                            <Item id="inqrio_content"> 
                                <Descriptor id="id"> 
                                    <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                        <dii:Identifier> 
                                            p2ptube:io:inqrio001 
                                        </dii:Identifier> 
                                    </Statement> 
                                </Descriptor> 
                    <Descriptor id="siginfodescrU"> 
                                   <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                       <DIDL id="siginfo"> 
                                           <Container> 
                                               <Item id="pid"> 
                                                   <Component> 
                                                       <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                           identification of the signing user 
                                                       </Resource> 
                                                   </Component> 
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                                               </Item> 
                                               <Item id="algdef"> 
                                                   <Component> 
                                                       <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                           definition of the signing algorithm 
                                                       </Resource> 
                                                   </Component> 
                                               </Item> 
                                               <Item id="pubk"> 
                                                   <Descriptor id="pubkid"> 
                                                       <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                           identifier of the public key 
                                                       </Statement> 
                                                   </Descriptor>     
                                                   <Component> 
                                                       <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                           public key 
                                                       </Resource> 
                                                   </Component> 
                                               </Item> 
                                               <Item id="privk"> 
                                                   <Descriptor id="privk"> 
                                                       <Statement mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                           identifier of the private key 
                                                       </Statement> 
                                                   </Descriptor> 
                                               </Item>  
                                           </Container> 
                                       </DIDL> 
                                   </Statement> 
                               </Descriptor> 
                                <Item id="p2ptube:io:inqrio001:resp1"> 
                                    <Descriptor id="p2ptube:io:inqrio001:resp1:answeredQueryID"> 
                                        <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                            <dii:Identifier> 
                                                p2ptube:io:inqio001:queryBlock1:query 
                                            </dii:Identifier> 
                                        </Statement> 
                                    </Descriptor> 
                                    <Item id="p2ptube:io:inqrio001:resp1:correctRespAlternID"> 
                                        <Component> 
                                            <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                p2ptube:io:inqio001:queryBlock1:responseAlterns:respAltern? 
                                            </Resource> 
                                        </Component> 
                                    </Item> 
                                </Item> 
                                ....... 
                                <Item id="p2ptube:io:inqrio001:respN"> 
                                    <Descriptor id="p2ptube:io:inqrio001:respN:answeredQueryID"> 
                                        <Statement mimeType="text/xml"> 
                                            <dii:Identifier> 
                                                p2ptube:io:inqio001:queryBlockN:query 
                                            </dii:Identifier> 
                                        </Statement> 
                                    </Descriptor> 
                                    <Item id="p2ptube:io:inqrio001:respN:correctRespAlternID"> 
                                        <Component> 
                                            <Resource mimeType="text/plain"> 
                                                p2ptube:io:inqio001:queryBlockN:responseAlterns:respAltern? 
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                                            </Resource> 
                                        </Component> 
                                    </Item> 
                                </Item> 
                            </Item> 
                        </Container> 
                    </DIDL> 
                </Resource> 
            </Component> 
        </Item> 
    </Container> 
</DIDL> 
Figure 84 – Inquiry Response IO Example
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Annex B – P2P Technologies 
B.1 Structured P2P Lookup Protocols 
B.1.1 Content Addressable Network 
CAN [188] is a distributed infrastructure that provides hash table-like functionality, on an 
Internet-like scale, for the mapping of file names to their location in the network. It does so 
by supporting the insertion, lookup, and deletion of (key, value) pairs in said table. 
The key space (and corresponding values), is divided into zones and individual CAN nodes 
store a part (a zone), of the hash table data (corresponding to a key sub-space), and also 
some information about the adjacent zones. 
 
 
Figure 85 – CAN Coordinate Space divided between 5 zones (left side image) and 6 zones (right side image) 
(adapted from [2]) 
 
CAN defines a virtual d-dimensional Cartesian coordinate space. Each hash table zone 
corresponds to a section of the coordinate space. Every key K in the key space is 
deterministically mapped onto a point P in the coordinate space. A (K, V) pair is then stored 
at the node which is responsible for handling the zone that point P belongs to (for instance in 
Figure 85, a (K,V) pair whose key is mapped to coordinate (0.1,0.2) would be stored in zone 
B, that is, in the peer handling that zone).  
 
CAN nodes may retrieve a (K, V) pair simply by applying the same deterministic function to 
K in order to obtain P and then retrieve the corresponding value V from the node handling 
the zone containing P.  
 
If P is not located in the requesting node’s zone, a request for the V stored at P must be 
routed through the system, from node to node until it reaches the node covering P.  
For the handling of such routing procedures, CAN nodes possess a routing table containing 
the IP addresses for the nodes handling the adjacent zones to their own.  
 
In the CAN system, the routing of requests is performed by following a straight line path 
through the Cartesian space from source to destination coordinates (for instance in Figure 
85, a request from node A for a key mapped to point P would be routed though nodes A, B, 
E, through the straight line represented by the arrow). Within this structure, requests to 
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insert, lookup or delete a particular (K, V) pair are routed via adjacent zones to the node 
handling the zone containing the P to which the involved key maps. 
 
When a new node joins the CAN system, it is attributed a portion of the coordinate space. 
That zone is defined by dividing in half the space allocated to an existing node (right side 
image of Figure 85). This procedure begins with the selection of an already existing node by 
the newcomer node (through a bootstrapped mechanism). Then, employing the CAN routing 
mechanism, the adhering node randomly selects a point P in the coordinate space and 
issues a JOIN request to the node handling that point. The zone handled by the latter node 
is then split, and half of it is attributed to the new node. 
The new node then proceeds to construct its routing table with the IP addresses of its 
neighbours. The nodes adjacent to the split zone are also informed of the division so that 
they update their routing tables to include the new node. 
 
Under ideal conditions, when a node leaves the CAN system, its handled zone and the 
associated hash table entries are explicitly handed over to one of its neighbouring nodes.  
Still, under normal conditions, what happens is that nodes send periodic update messages 
to all of their neighbouring nodes declaring their zone coordinates, their list of neighbours 
and the coordinates of their neighbour’s zones. When prolonged absences of such update 
messages occur, the neighbouring nodes assume that a failure has happened, and 
undertake a procedure for the taking over of the abandoned zone.  
In the case where several neighbouring nodes fail simultaneously, an expanding ring search 
mechanism is commenced by one of the operating neighbouring nodes, in order to identify 
other functioning nodes outside the abandoned region.  
 
The overall design of the CAN system may nonetheless be improved. The main envisioned 
improvements are: 
 
• Use of multi-dimensional coordinate space – If the number of dimensions of the CAN 
coordinate space is increased, the routing path length and latency is diminished; 
 
• Multiple coordinate spaces – Each node in the system is assigned a different zone in 
each coordinate space. Each coordinate space is a “reality”. Therefore, for a CAN 
system with r realities, a single node has r coordinate zones attributed to it, one on 
every reality and has r independent sets of neighbours. If the contents of the hash 
table are replicated on every reality, data availability and routing fault tolerance are 
greatly improved since that in the case of a routing or node failure on one reality, 
messages can continue to be routed and contents reached using the remaining 
realities; 
 
• Employment of more advanced CAN routing metrics – The request routing metric for 
the CAN system may be improved by taking into account the underlying IP topology 
by having peers measure the network-level round-trip-time to each of its neighbours. 
A message is then forwarded, for a specific destination, to the neighbour with the 
maximum ratio of progress to round-trip-time. This procedure would diminish path 
latency; 
 
• Overloading coordinate zones – This consists of permitting multiple nodes to share 
the same zone. In such a case a node maintains a list of its peers as well as a 
neighbour list. This offers such advantages as: reduced path length and latency, 
because increasing the number of nodes per zone results in the reduction of the 
number of nodes in the system; reduced per-hop latency; improved fault tolerance 
because a zone is only abandoned when all the nodes in it, leave simultaneously; 
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• Multiple hash functions – If k different hash functions are used to map a single key 
onto k points in the coordinate space and thus replicate the corresponding (key, 
value) pair at k distinct nodes in the system, the content’s availability will be 
increased. Furthermore queries for a specific hash table entry may also be 
simultaneously sent to all k nodes thus reducing the average query latency; 
 
• Topologically sensitive construction of the CAN overlay network – This consists of 
taking into account the underlying IP network topology for the allocation of nodes to 
zones; 
 
• Uniform Coordinate Space Partitioning – According to CAN, when a new node joins, 
some randomly selected existing node will split its zone in two, and one of the 
portions will be attributed to the new node. This may be improved if instead the 
existing occupant node first compares the volume of its zone with those of its 
immediate neighbours, and then the zone with the largest volume is split to 
accommodate the new node. This more uniform partitioning of the coordinate space 
permits a better load balancing; 
 
• Caching and Replication techniques for “hot spot” management – Popular (key, 
value) pairs in a CAN system may be made more widely available by employing 
some caching and replication techniques commonly applied to the Web: 
 
o Caching – Maintenance of a cache of the data keys most recently accessed 
by a CAN node. Before forwarding a request for a data key towards its 
destination, a node first checks its cache. This way the number of caches 
from which a data key may be retrieved from increases in direct proportion to 
its popularity and thus popular content becomes more widely available; 
 
o Replication – A CAN node overloaded with requests for a particular data key 
replicates it at each of its neighbouring nodes. 
B.1.2 Chord 
Chord [189] is a distributed lookup protocol for the efficient location of data objects in P2P 
structures. This protocol employs deterministically generated keys as file and node 
identifiers, and it performs the mapping of file keys into node keys in order to determine the 
location for the storage of the (key, file) pair, which is the mapped node. 
 
A node identifier is derived by hashing the node’s IP address. A key identifier is calculated 
by hashing the data key. 
 
The node identifying keys are ordered in a modulo m2 "identifier circle". File key k is 
attributed to the first node whose identifier is equal to or follows k in the identifier space. This 
is termed the successor node of key k. 
Figure 86, for instance, presents an identifier circle with m=3. The successor of the identifier 
6 is peer 0, so key 6 will be located at the node with an id value of 0. 
 
Within the Chord scheme, the only routing information that nodes need to possess is the 
location of its successor node on the circle. Queries are forwarded around the circle via 
these successor pointers up to the point where a node which possesses the key is 
encountered. This is the node the query maps to. 
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Upon adhesion of a new node n to the network, certain keys previously assigned to n’s 
successor will be assigned to n. Upon n’s removal from the network, all of its keys attributed 
are reassigned to its successor. 
 
 
Figure 86 – Chord identifier circle (m=3) (adapted from [2]) 
 
Chord nodes employ a stabilization protocol that periodically updates the successor pointers 
and the finger table. The correct operation of the Chord depends on the actualization of the 
routing data. To avoid the situation where a node fails and other peers are left without any 
way of locating their new successor, nodes maintain a successor list, which contains a 
number of the peer’s first successors. When a node’s successor does not respond, it simply 
contacts the next peer on its successor list. 
 
The performance of a Chord network degrades slowly as routing information loses validity, 
(due to node adhesion and abandonment), and availability remains high only as long as 
nodes fail independently. Given the fact that Chord’s topology does not take into account the 
underlying physical IP network topology, a small connectivity failure in the IP network may 
cause multiple, scattered link failures in the Chord overlay [2]. 
 
The previously described searching mechanism may in a worst case scenario require the 
traversal of all nodes in the overly. To increase this mechanism’s efficiency, Chord nodes 
are also to maintain additional routing information, in the form of a "finger table". Each table 
entry i points to the successor of node n+2i. For a node n to perform a lookup for key k, it 
consults the table to determine the highest node n¢ whose ID is between n and k. If node n¢ 
exists, the procedure is repeated starting from node n¢. If no such node exists, the 
successor of n is returned [2]. 
B.1.3 Tapestry 
Tapestry is a peer-to-peer overlay routing infrastructure which permits location-independent 
routing of messages directly to nearby replicas of an object or service resorting only to 
localized resources, It implements a self-repairing, soft-state-based routing layer that allows 
the bypassing of failed routes and nodes and the rapid adaptation of communication 
topologies to circumstances.  
 
Tapestry’s architecture employs a variation of the Plaxton [190] distributed search technique, 
combined with extra mechanisms to ensure availability, scalability, and adaptation in the 
case of failures and attacks. 
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The Plaxton mesh is a distributed data structure that allows peers to locate objects and 
reach them with messages through an arbitrarily-sized overlay network employing small and 
constant sized routing maps [2]. 
 
In a Plaxton mesh the nodes may perform three different roles:  
• Servers – which store data objects; 
• Routers – which forward messages between nodes ; 
• Clients – which originate requests for data objects and consume them. 
 
 
Figure 87 – Neighbour Map maintained by a Tapestry Node with ID 67493 (adapted from [2]) 
 
Each node maintains a neighbour map (as presented in Figure 87) composed by multiple 
levels. Each level l contains pointers to nodes whose ID must be matched with l digits, this 
way, each table entry is a pointer to the closest network node with an ID which matches the 
number in the neighbour map up to a digit position (the thl position). 
For instance, the 4th table entry for the 2nd level identifies the closest node to node 67493 in 
network distance whose ID ends in 43 [2]. 
 
 
Figure 88 – Tapestry/Plaxton Mesh Routing Example using 5 digit long IDs (adapted from [2]) 
 
Within the Tapestry overlay, messages are routed to the destination peer, in a “digit by digit” 
manner, from the nodes on the right to the nodes on the left of the neighbour table (as 
presented in Figure 87). 
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An example path followed by a message from node with an ID value of 67493 to a node with 
an ID value of 34567 is presented in Figure 88. The end node location is reached by 
resolving (into the closest peer location) the digits of the desired node, one at a time at every 
node hop, as follows: xxxx7  xxx67  xx567  x4567  34567. 
 
The Plaxton scheme makes use of root nodes for the location of data objects, in order to 
assure that some node from which the object can be located is available.  
Upon the object insertion of an object o in the system and its storage at an sn node, a root 
node rn is attributed through the employment of a globally consistent deterministic algorithm. 
Then, sn issues a message to rn , which triggers the storing at all nodes along the 
message’s path, of data mapping the object id o  to storer id sn .  
 
At content location time, messages destined for o are initially directed towards rn , up to the 
point were a node is encountered which contains the ( o , sn ) location mapping.  
 
The Plaxton mesh’s capability to route around a single link or node by selecting a node with 
a similar suffix provides the mesh with fault handling capabilities and the overall object 
location scheme provides it with scalability. On the other hand the need for a global or 
central knowledge for the attribution and identifying of root nodes is a possible point of failure 
for this system. 
 
Whilst the Plaxton mesh assumes a static population of nodes, Tapestry augments this 
design so that it can handle the typically transient populations of peer-to-peer networks and 
provide adaptability and fault tolerance and in order to provide further optimizations. Some of 
the main additions brought on by Tapestry consist of the following [2]: 
 
• Tapestry nodes maintain an additional list of back-pointers, which identifies nodes 
where they are pointed to as a neighbour. Such lists are employed in the procedures 
for the dynamic insertion of nodes, to allow the efficient creation of correct neighbour 
maps for new nodes; 
 
• Tapestry adds semantic flexibility to the concept of distance between nodes. More 
than one object replica are stored in the system permitting the architecture to more 
flexibly define how the "closest" node will be determined; 
 
• Cached content is maintained on a soft-state manner, based on an announce/listen 
approach. Tapestry employs this strategy to detect, circumvent and recover from 
failures in routing or object location. The caches maintained at the nodes are 
periodically updated by refreshment messages, or cleaned if no such messages are 
received. Furthermore the neighbour map is increased in order to maintain two 
backup neighbours in addition to the closest neighbour. When a node detects that a 
neighbour has for become unreachable, in order to avoid costly reinsertions, instead 
of removing the missing node’s pointer, it temporarily flags it as invalid, so that it may 
have time to come back online if that is the case, and directs messages through 
alternative paths in the meantime; 
 
• The root nodes constitute a single point of failure. In order to avoid this, Tapestry 
attributes multiple roots to each object. Tapestry employs surrogate routing to choose 
root peers incrementally, during the publishing process, to insert location information 
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into Tapestry. Surrogate allows the unique mapping of any identifier to an existing 
network node. The nodes selected to be the root or surrogate node for a data object 
is that which matches the data object’s ID, x. Given the sparse nature of Tapestry’s 
NodeID space the occurrence of such a node is unique. To verify the x node’s 
existence a message is routed to it. If it does not exist, the routing of the message 
terminates when a neighbour map is reached, where the only non-empty routing 
entry belongs to its holding node. In such a case, that node is designated to be the 
surrogate root for the data object; 
 
• Tapestry nodes optimize their neighbour pointers by periodically evaluating their 
network latency values. Algorithms are implemented to detect query hotspots and 
provide possible alternative locations for the storage of additional copies of objects 
so as to improve query response time. Nodes also maintain a "hotspot cache". 
B.1.4 Kademlia 
Kademlia [191] is a peer-to-peer (key, value) pair storage and lookup system. This 
decentralized overlay network, much to the similarity of Pastry and Tapestry, employs the 
basic technique of attributing a NodeID to each peer, in a 160-bit key space, and of storing 
(key, value) tuples at the peers bearing IDs which are close to the key (data keys are also 
160-bit identifiers). Within this system, tuple holding peers are located through a NodeID 
based routing algorithm which uses the keys as destination definers. 
 
One of the fundamental innovations of Kademlia’s architecture is its employment of an XOR 
metric for distance measuring between points in the key space. The symmetry of the XOR 
operation allows nodes to receive lookup queries from the same distribution of peers 
contained in their routing tables.  
A Kademlia node may issue a query to any node within an interval, using latency as criteria 
to choose routes or send parallel asynchronous queries. It employs a single routing 
algorithm throughout the process to locate peers near a particular ID. 
All messages transmitted by a Kademlia node include its NodeID. This allows the recipient 
node to apprehend the sender peer’s existence [17].  
 
The location of (key, value) pairs, by Kademlia nodes relies on the notion of distance 
between two identifiers. Such a distance is calculated as follows: 
 
The distance between two 160-bit identifiers, a and b, is defined as their bitwise 
exclusive OR (XOR), which is a non-Euclidean metric. XOR’s unidirectional nature 
assures that for any specific point x and distance d > 0, there exists only one point y 
such that d(x; y) = d.  This guarantees that all lookups for the same key converge 
along the same path, irrespectively of the originating peer. This way, caching (key, 
value) pairs throughout the lookup path alleviates hot spots. 
 
A Kademlia node stores a list of (IP address, UDP port, NodeID) tuples for peers within a 
certain distance. These lists (or k-buckets) are kept ordered by last time contacted, (least 
recently accessed node at the head, most recently accessed at the tail). 
 
The routing protocol employed by Kademlia is composed by: 
• PING messages which are used to probe a node in order to determine if it is active; 
• STORE instructs a node to store a (key, value) pair for posterior retrieval; 
• FIND NODE receives a 160-bit ID, and returns a {IP address, UDP port, NodeID} 
tuple for a number of the peers it knows that are closest to the target ID; 
• FIND VALUE is similar to FIND NODE, it returns {IP address, UDP port, NodeID} 
tuples, except for the case where a node received a STORE for the key. In such a 
case, the stored value is returned. 
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To locate a (key, value) pair, Kademlia nodes commence by performing a FIND VALUE 
lookup to find the k peers with IDs closest to the pair’s key. To adhere to the network, a peer 
n must know an already participating peer m. Peer n adds peer m to the appropriate k-
bucket, and then undertakes a peer lookup for its own NodeID. This procedure refreshes all 
k-buckets further away than n’s closest neighbour, and n also fills its own k-buckets and 
adds itself to other nodes’ k-buckets [17]. 
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Annex C – BM Inquiry Results 
C.1 Introduction 
The inquiry was composed of four parts. Said parts and their purposes are the following: 
• Query group 1 – its purpose is to: 
o evaluate user acceptance of correctness of rewarding content producers and 
CDists; 
o evaluate user awareness of the fact that if such rewarding does not take 
place the content will cease to be produced; 
 
• Query group 2 – its purpose is to evaluate user receptivity to a total dematerialization 
of content distribution (i.e. distribution performed completely on-line); 
 
• Query group 3 – its purpose is to assess user general  receptivity/preference 
relatively to content accessing modes supported though a lateral extraction of gains 
in opposition to those which imply a direct and mandatory payment for content 
access; 
 
• Query group 4 – its purpose is to evaluate user receptivity to three specific content 
accessing modes based on lateral gain extraction. As such it: 
o evaluates user receptivity to an open access mode, supported by voluntary 
donations; 
o evaluates user receptivity to an open access mode, supported by 
advertisement viewing; 
o evaluates user receptivity to an open access mode, supported by ransoms. 
C.2 Results 
The specific queries that where defined, and the obtained response results are presented 
below, discriminated by query group (results presented in percentage terms). 
C.2.1 Query Group 1 
 
Query/Answer 
I completely 
agree I agree 
I neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
I 
disagree 
I completely 
disagree 
1.1 
It is fair that media content 
producers are rewarded for the 
content that they produce 
59 39 2 0 0 
1.2 
It is fair that the intermediary 
players, in the field of media content 
production, are rewarded for their 
work, in the support of the action of 
media content producers. 
23 63 11 1 1 
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1.3 
The continued production of the 
media goods (movies, series, 
music, etc.), that we consume on a 
daily basis, depends on the 
economical compensation of that 
activity. If the final consumers stop 
compensating said activity those 
goods will cease to be produced. 
20 45 15 12 9 
1.4 
It is fair that I systematically access 
and consume media goods without 
compensating, in any way, the 
producers of such goods. 
2 15 27 48 9 
 
C.2.2 Query Group 2 
 
Query/Answer 
I completely 
agree I agree 
I neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
I 
disagree 
I completely 
disagree 
2.1 
For the same payment modes, on-
line media goods delivery is more 
convenient (to me as a consumer), 
and more efficient than the 
traditional distribution of such 
goods. 
28 45 16 10 1 
2.2 
It is acceptable that media goods 
are to be predominately distributed 
on-line, and that physical 
distributions of such goods (based 
on CDs, DVDs, etc.), are restricted 
to “vintage” or “collector” editions. 
9 33 24 24 10 
 
C.2.3 Query Group 3 
 
Query/Answer 
I completely 
agree I agree 
I neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
I 
disagree 
I completely 
disagree 
3.1 
The models of media content 
access on-line should be based on 
indirect and/or voluntary payment 
instead of on direct and mandatory 
one. 
17 44 30 9 0 
3.3 
I prefer an on-line media content 
access and producer rewarding 
model that allows me to have some 
control of how the revenue is 
shared, (amongst producers and 
others), to a model where I have no 
such power or responsibility. 
18 46 29 5 1 
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A mode where you had to pay for 
content access, where such 
payment would liberate only your 
access to that content and said 
access would be subjected to some 
constraints (e.g. the number of 
devices where you could consume 
the content). 
A mode where you made only 
voluntary donations to the artists of 
your preference, and where the access 
to media content was free, both for 
you and everyone else, regardless of 
any contribution (donation), yours or 
theirs. 
3.2 
Considering that you 
would spend about the 
same monthly amount, 
which content access 
mode would you 
prefer? 
30 70 
 
C.2.4 Query Group 4 
 
Query/Answer 
I completely 
agree I agree 
I neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
I 
disagree 
I completely 
disagree 
4.1 
If I had convenient and secure ways 
to do it, I would voluntarily perform 
monetary donations to artists and 
content producers that were 
responsible for the creation of 
media products (movies, songs, 
etc), which I considered worthy of 
being rewarded. 
13 49 22 13 2 
4.3 
The compensation of media content 
producers, by way of voluntary 
donations, enables that such 
entities are rewarded in a fairer 
manner. 
10 38 35 13 4 
4.6 
I am willing to watch commercial 
advertisements in order to 
contribute (with my attention, which 
is being resold to advertisers), to 
the rewarding of artists/content 
producers. 
21 52 15 11 1 
4.8 
If my “consumption” of 
advertisement messages is 
rewarded with some form of 
“credits” that I could donate to 
artists of my preference, I would 
voluntarily request the viewing of 
such messages. 
24 54 18 4 0 
4.10 
Within the context of the donation 
based rewarding of artists and 
media producers, if one such entity, 
that I trusted, requested to be 
financed, in advance, for the 
production of a media good (that I 
considered that I was going to like), 
I would have no problems in 
donating some amount to him, even 
before the actual good existed. 
11 32 22 24 11 
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 Yes No 
4.2 
Have you ever 
performed any 
monetary donation to 
some on-line initiative? 
17 83 
 
 
1 to 5 € 5 to 10 € 10 to 20 € 20 to 50 € more than 50 
€ 
4.4 
Considering that you 
would not have to 
spend any other 
resources to acquire 
the media goods of 
your preference, other 
than the amounts that 
you donated, how much 
would you be willing to 
donate (in average), on 
a monthly basis, to the 
set of artists and 
content producers of 
your preference? 
56 33 11 0 0 
      
      
 
1 to 5 € 5 to 10 € 10 to 20 € 20 to 50 € more than 50 
€ 
4.5 
And how much would 
you be willing to donate 
to each individual artist, 
in the same conditions 
ant time interval? 
87 13 0 0 0 
 
 
A model where publicity is juxtaposed 
with the media contet and must be 
consumed, for instance, before you 
can listen to/watch the desired 
content (for instance, in YouTube, 
before you can watch some of the 
videos you must first watch an 
advertisement). 
A model where the advertisement 
messages are separated from the 
media content and where you have 
to be the one to request the 
viewing of such messages, and 
thus, where you may “consume” 
them at the moment of your 
preference. 
4.7 
The two ways, of 
supporting content 
producers’ activity, 
presented below, are 
based on 
advertisement. 
Considering that you 
would have to 
“consume” the same 
amount of advertising 
messages in both of 
them, which one would 
you prefer? 
43 57 
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1 to 5 5 to 10 10 to 20 20 to 30 more than 30  
4.9 
In the context of 
question 4.8, how 
many minutes of your 
attention would you be 
willing to donate, on a 
daily basis, through the 
viewing of 
advertisement 
messages? 
51 38 10 0 1 
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Annex D – Data Model Info 
D.1 Registered Information 
D.1.1 Introduction 
The registry of all system events will comprise the following basic set of data fields: 
• The event’s ID – the system-wide unique identifier of the event; 
• The event’s beginning time – the time at which the event begun its existence, i.e. its 
participation in the system; 
• The event’s end time – the time at which the event ceased its existence, i.e. its 
participation in the system; 
• The EntCompEv’s validity state – a Boolean field indicating if the event is still 
existent; 
 
The following sections describe all the registered system events indicating the connections 
that bind all such registries into a coherent and meaningful tissue. 
D.1.2 Registered Global Information 
D.1.2.1 Registered Global PLL Information 
D.1.2.1.1 Registered Global PLL Relational and Procedural Complex Events 
 
Pr
o
c 
Co
m
p 
Ev
 
Event Name Peer Registration Event 
Event Nr #1 
Explanation This is an event that represents a peer’s registration with the system. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-initiationOf-Event Peer-participationIn-System 1 
Event-casusationOf-Event 
PregCertif 
-pertinenceTo- 
Peer-participationIn-System 
1 
Event-initiationOf-Event Peer-maintenanceOf-PeerIP 1 
Event-initiationOf-Event Peer-maintenanceOf-PeerKeyPair 1 
Event-initiationOf-Event User-ownageOf-Peer 1 
 
Pr
o
c 
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m
p 
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Event Name Peer Registration Update Event 
Event Nr #2 
Explanation This is an event that represents a peer’s updating of its registration with the 
system. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event PLoginCertif-pertinenceTo-Peer 0 –1 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-casusationOf-Event 
PregCertif 
-pertinenceTo- 
Peer-participationIn-System 
1 
Event-terminationOf-Event Peer-maintenanceOf-PeerKeyPair 1 
Event-initiationOf-Event Peer-maintenanceOf-PeerKeyPair 1 
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Event Name Peer Deregistration Event 
Event Nr #3 
Explanation This is an event that represents a peer’s registration with the system. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-terminationOf-Event Peer-participationIn-System 1 
Event-terminationOf-Event Peer-maintenanceOf-PeerIP 1 
Event-terminationOf-Event Peer-maintenanceOf-PeerKeyPair 1 
Event-terminationOf-Event User-ownageOf-Peer 1 
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c 
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p 
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Event Name Peers Evaluation Event 
Event Nr #4 
Explanation This is a periodical, internal, system event which consists of an evaluation of 
all of the system peer’s conduit.  
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event Peer Evaluation Event 1 – ∞ 
 
Pr
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c 
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Event Name Peer  Evaluation Event 
Event Nr #5 
Explanation 
This is an internal system event. It consists of the evaluation of a specific 
peers’s conduit, taking into consideration other peers’ misbehaviour reports 
regarding that peer. It may lead to the expulsion, quarantining or 
dequarantining of the evaluated peer. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event System-evaluationOf-Peer 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
System-analysisOf-
PeerMissbehavReport 
0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
(System-analysisOf-
PeerMissbehavReport)- 
pertainmentTo- 
(System-evaluationOf-Peer)  
0 – ∞ 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event System-evictionOf-Peer 0 – 1 
Event-initiationOf-Event System-quarantiningOf-Peer 0 – 1 
Event-terminationOf-Event System-quarantiningOf-Peer 0 – 1 
 
Re
l E
v 
Event Name System-evictionOf-Peer 
Event Nr #6 
Explanation This is a relational event that represents a peer’s eviction from the system. 
Subject 
Event System 
Object Event Peer 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event User Disconnection Event 0 - ∞ 
Event-causationOf-Event Peer Disconnection Event 0 –1 
Event-causationOf-Event MO Deregistration event 0 - ∞ 
Event-causationOf-Event Peer Deregistration event 0 - 1 
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Event Name Peer-loginTo-System 
Event Nr #7 
Explanation This is a relational event that represents a peers’s action to log into the 
system. 
Subject 
Event Peer 
Object Event System 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event Peer Connection Event 0 –1 
 
Re
l E
v 
Event Name Peer-logoffFrom-System 
Event Nr #8 
Explanation This is a relational event that represents a peer’s action to log out of the 
system. 
Subject 
Event Peer 
Object Event System 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event Peer Disconnection Event 0 –1 
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Event Name Peer Connection Event 
Event Nr #9 
Explanation This is an event which represents system procedures to perform a peers’s 
connection (logging in) to the system. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event PLoginCertif-pertinenceTo-Peer 0 –1 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-initiationOf-Event Peer Participation Session Event 0 –1 
Event-initiationOf-Event PLL Servicing Session Event 1 
Event-initiationOf-Event UEL Servicing Session Event 1 
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Event Name Peer Disconnection Event 
Event Nr #10 
Explanation This is an event which represents system procedures to perform a peer’s 
disconnection (logoff) to the system. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-terminationOf-Event Peer Participation Session Event 0 –1 
Event-terminationOf-Event PLL Servicing Session Event 1 
Event-terminationOf-Event UEL Servicing Session Event 1 
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Event Name Peer Participation Session Event 
Event Nr #11 
Explanation This event consists of a peer participation session in the system. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event Peer Reporting Event 0 - ∞ 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-supportingOf-Event User Attending Session Event 0 – ∞ 
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Event Name Peer Reporting Event 
Event Nr #12 
Explanation This event consists of a peer reporting the misbehaviour of another peer to 
the system. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event Peer-denouncingOf-Peer 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
PMissbehavReport 
-pertinenceTo- 
(Peer-denouncingOf-Peer) 
1 
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Event Name PLL Servicing Session Event 
Event Nr #13 
Explanation This event consists of the maintenance of PLL servicing responsabilities (over 
the peripheral peer collective) by a specific OCP. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
 (Peer(OCP) 
-pllServicingOf- 
Peer(PP)) 
1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
Instruction OP IO 
-pertainmentTo- 
 (Peer(OCP) 
-pllServicingOf- 
Peer(PP)) 
1 
 
D.1.2.1.2 Registered Global PLL Entitary Complex Events 
 
En
t C
o
m
p 
Ev
 
Event Name Peer 
Event Nr #14 
Explanation This event consists of a peer. 
Data Fields 
Peer Type The peer type (PP, OCP, or CCP) 
Peer Pub Key The peer’s public key 
Peer Priv Key The peer’s private key 
Is 
Quarantined 
An indication if the peer is quarantined 
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Event Name Peer Key Pair 
Event Nr #15 
Explanation This event consists of a peer’s public and private key pair. 
 
Pub Key The peer’s public key 
Priv Key The peer’s private key 
 
 
D.1.2.2 Registered Global UEL Information 
D.1.2.2.1 Registered Global UEL Relational and Procedural Complex Events 
D.1.2.2.1.1 User Originated 
 
Re
l E
v 
Event Name User-joiningOf-System 
Event Nr #16 
Explanation This is a relational event that represents a user’s action to join the system. 
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event System 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event User Registration Event 0 - 1 
 
Re
l E
v 
Event Name User-abandoningOf-System 
Event Nr #17 
Explanation This is a relational event that represents a user’s action to leave the system. 
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event System 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event User Derigistration Event 1 
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Event Name User Registration Event 
Event Nr #18 
Explanation This is an event which represents system procedures to perform a user 
registration. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-ownageOf-UAccount 1 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-initiationOf-Event User-participationIn-System 1 
Event-initiationOf-Event User-maintenanceOf-UserKeyPair 1 
Event-casusationOf-Event 
URegCertif 
-pertinenceTo- 
User-participationIn-System 
1 
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Event Name User Registration Update Event 
Event Nr #19 
Explanation This is an event which represents system procedures to perform a user 
registration update. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event ULoginCertif-pertinenceTo-User 0 –1 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-terminationOf-Event User-maintenanceOf-UserKeyPair 1 
Event-initiationOf-Event User-maintenanceOf-UserKeyPair 1 
Event-casusationOf-Event 
URegCertif 
-pertinenceTo- 
User-participationIn-System 
1 
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Event Name User Deregistration Event 
Event Nr #20 
Explanation This is an event which represents system procedures to perform a user 
deregistration. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User Disconnection Event 0 - 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event MO Deregistration Event 0 - 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event Peer  Deregistration Event 0 - 1 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-terminationOf-Event User-participationIn-System 1 
Event-terminationOf-Event User-maintenanceOf-UserKeyPair 1 
 
Re
l E
v 
Event Name User-loginTo-System 
Event Nr #21 
Explanation This is a relational event that represents a user’s action to log into the system. 
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event System 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event User Connection Event 0 –1 
 
 
Re
l E
v 
Event Name User-logoffFrom-System 
Event Nr #22 
Explanation This is a relational event that represents a user’s action to log out of the 
system. 
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event System 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event User Disconnection Event 0 –1 
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Event Name User Connection Event 
Event Nr #23 
Explanation This is an event which represents system procedures to perform a user’s 
connection (logging in) to the system. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event ULoginCertif-pertinenceTo-User 0 –1 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-initiationOf-Event User Attending Session Event 0 –1 
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Event Name User Disconnection Event 
Event Nr #24 
Explanation This is an event which represents system procedures to perform a user’s 
disconnection (logoff) to the system. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-terminationOf-Event User Attending Session Event 0 –1 
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Event Name User Attending Session Event 
Event Nr #25 
Explanation This event consists of a user participation session in the system. It starts with a 
user login and ends with his logoff. 
Event’s  
Relationships 
as Subject  
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-loginTo-System 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-logoffFrom-System 0 – 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event Forceful User Logout 0 – 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User Registration Update Event 0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-InsertionOf-MO 0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-removalOf-MO 0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event Add MO Insertion Event  0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event Add MO Removal Event 0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
User-insertionOf-
MORansmAnnoncement  
0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
User-removalOf- 
MORansmAnnoncement 
0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event MO Search Event 0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-consumptionOf-Mo 0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
User-consumptionOf- 
MORansmAnnoncement 
0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event MO Ownership Exchange Event 0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event MO Commenting Event 0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event MO Responding Event 0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event MO Versioning Event 0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User Reporting Event 0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event Donation Event 0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User Attention Sale Event 0 – ∞ 
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Event-inclusionOf-Event User-loadingOf-UAccount 0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-unloadingOf-UAccount 0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event Peer Ownership Exchange 0 – ∞ 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-precedenceOf-Event User Attending Session Event 0 – ∞ 
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Event Name User-insertionOf-MO 
Event Nr #26 
Explanation This is a relational event which represents the user initiated action of inserting 
an MO into the system. 
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event MO 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event MO Registration Event 0 – 1 
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Event Name MO Registration Event 
Event Nr #27 
Explanation This is an event which represents system procedures to perform an MO 
registration. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-initiationOf-Event User-ownageOf-MO 1 
Event-initiationOf-Event 
SemanticConcept 
-characterizationOf- 
MO 
1 – ∞ 
Event-initiationOf-Event 
MO 
-pertainmentTo- 
MORnsmAnn 
0 – ∞ 
Event-initiationOf-Event MO Storage Event 1 – ∞ 
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Event Name User-removalOf-MO 
Event Nr #28 
Explanation This is a relational event which represents the user initiated action of 
removing an MO from the system. 
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event MO 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event MO Deregistration Event 0 - 1 
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Event Name MO Deregistration Event 
Event Nr #29 
Explanation This is an event which represents system procedures to perform an MO 
deregistration. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-terminationOf-Event User-ownageOf-MO 1 
Event-terminationOf-Event 
SemanticConcept 
-characterizationOf- 
MO 
1 – ∞ 
Event-terminationOf-Event 
MO 
-pertainmentTo- 
MORnsmAnn 
0 – ∞ 
Event-terminationOf-Event MO-commentingTo-MO 0 – ∞ 
Event-terminationOf-Event MO-versioningOf-MO 0 – ∞ 
Event-terminationOf-Event MO-respondingTo-MO 0 – ∞ 
Event-terminationOf-Event System-quarantiningOf-MO 0 – 1 
Event-terminationOf-Event MO Storage Event 1 – ∞ 
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Event Name Add MO Insertion Event 
Event Nr #30 
Explanation This is a user initiated event that consists of the insertion of an Advertisement 
MO into the system.  
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-insertionOf-MO 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-insertionOf-InquiryIO  1 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
(User-insertionOf-InquiryIO) 
-pertainmentTo- 
(User-insertionOf-MO) 
1 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-insertionOf-InquiryRespIO 1 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
(User-insertionOf-InquiryRespIO) 
-pertainmentTo- 
(User-insertionOf-MO) 
1 – ∞ 
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Event Name Add MO Removal Event 
Event Nr #31 
Explanation This is a user initiated event that consists of the removal of an MO from the 
system.  
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-removalOf-MO 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-removalOf-InquiryIO 1 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
(User-removalOf-InquiryIO) 
-pertainmentTo- 
(User-removalOf-MO) 
1 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-removalOf-InquiryRespIO 1 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event (User-removalOf-InquiryRespIO) 1 – ∞ 
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-pertainmentTo- 
(User-removalOf-MO) 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-terminationOf-Event System-quarantiningOf-MO 0 – 1 
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Event Name User-insertionOf-InquiryIO 
Event Nr #32 
Explanation This event consists of the insertion of an Inquiry IO into the system.  
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event Inquiry IO 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event  OpIO Registration Event 0 – 1 
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Event Name User-insertionOf-InquiryRespIO 
Event Nr #33 
Explanation This event consists of the insertion of an Inquiry Response IO into the system.  
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event InquiryRespIO 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event  OpIO Registration Event 0 – 1 
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Event Name User-removalOf-InquiryIO 
Event Nr #34 
Explanation This event consists of the removal of an Inquiry IO into the system.  
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event InquiryRespIO 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event  OpIO Deregistration Event 0 – 1 
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Event Name User-removalOf-InquiryRespIO 
Event Nr #35 
Explanation This event consists of the removal of an Inquiry Response IO into the system.  
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event InquiryRespIO 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event  OpIO Deregistration Event 0 – 1 
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Event Name OpIO Registration Event 
Event Nr #36 
Explanation This is an event which represents system procedures to perform the 
registration of an operational IO. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-initiationOf-Event  OpIO-pertainmentTo-MO 0 – ∞ 
Event-initiationOf-Event  OpIO-pertainmentTo-Peer 0 – ∞ 
Event-initiationOf-Event  OpIO-pertainmentTo-User 0 – ∞ 
Event-initiationOf-Event  OpIO-pertainmentTo-OpIO 0 – ∞ 
Event-initiationOf-Event  Peer-storageOf-OpIO 0 – ∞ 
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Event Name OpIO Deregistration Event 
Event Nr #37 
Explanation This is an event which represents system procedures to perform the 
deregistration of an operational IO. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-terminationOf-Event  OpIO-pertainmentTo-MO 0 – ∞ 
Event-terminationOf-Event  OpIO-pertainmentTo-Peer 0 – ∞ 
Event-terminationOf-Event  OpIO-pertainmentTo-User 0 – ∞ 
Event-terminationOf-Event  OpIO-pertainmentTo-OpIO 0 – ∞ 
Event-terminationOf-Event  Peer-storageOf-OpIO 0 – ∞ 
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Event Name Peer-storageOf-OpIO 
Event Nr #38 
Explanation This is a relational event that represents the storage of an operational IO by 
some specific peer.  
Subject 
Event Peer 
Object Event All types of operational events 
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Event Name OpIO-pertainmentTo-OpIO 
Event Nr #39 
Explanation This is a relational event that represents a logical relationship between 
operational IOs.  
Subject 
Event InquiryIO, InquiryRespIO 
Object Event InquiryIO, InquiryRespIO 
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Event Name User-insertionOf-MORansomAnnoncement  
Event Nr #40 
Explanation This is a user initiated event that consists of the insertion of an MO Ransom 
Announcement into the system.  
Subject 
Event User 
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Object Event MORansomAnnoncement 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event 
MORansomAnnoncement 
Registration Event 
0 – 1 
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Event Name User-removalOf-MORansomAnnoncement 
Event Nr #41 
Explanation This is a user initiated event that consists of the removal of an MO Ransom 
Announcement from the system.  
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event MORansomAnnoncement 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event 
MORansomAnnoncement 
Deregistration Event 
0 – 1 
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Event Name MORansomAnnoncement Registration Event 
Event Nr #42 
Explanation This is an event which represents system procedures to perform an 
MORansomAnnoncement registration. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-initiationOf-Event User-ownageOf-MORnsmAnn 1 
Event-initiationOf-Event 
SemanticConcept 
-characterizationOf- 
MORnsmAnn 
1 – ∞ 
Event-initiationOf-Event 
Peer 
-storageOf- 
MORansomAnnoncement 
1 – ∞ 
Event-initiationOf-Event Ransoming Event 0 – 1 
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Event Name MORansomAnnoncement Deregistration Event 
Event Nr #43 
Explanation This is an event which represents system procedures to perform an 
MORansomAnnoncement deregistration. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-terminationOf-Event User-ownageOf-MORnsmAnn 1 
Event-terminationOf-Event 
SemanticConcept 
-characterizationOf- 
MORnsmAnn 
1 – ∞ 
Event-terminationOf-Event 
Peer 
-storageOf- 
MORansomAnnoncement 
1 – ∞ 
Event-terminationOf-Event Ransoming Event 0 – 1 
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Event Name MO Search Event 
Event Nr #44 
Explanation This event consists of the performing, by a user, of a search for MOs, based on 
user specified search criteria. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-emissionOf-SearchQuery 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
(User-emissionOf-SearchQuery) 
-causationOf- 
(System-returningOf-SQRO) 
1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event SQRO-respondingTo-SearchQuery 1 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-initiationOf-Event OpIO(SQRO) Registration Event 1 
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Event Name User-consumptionOf-MO 
Event Nr #45 
Explanation This event consists of the consumption, by a user, of a specific MO. 
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event MO 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-initiationOf-Event MO Storage Event 1 
Event-initiationOf-Event 
OpIO(SQRO) Deregistration 
Event 
0 - 1 
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Event Name User-consumptionOf-MORansomAnnoncement 
Event Nr #46 
Explanation This event consists of the consumption, by a user, of a specific 
MORansomAnnoncement. 
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event MORansomAnnoncement 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-initiationOf-Event 
Peer 
-storageOf- 
MORansomAnnoncement 
1 
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Event Name MO Storage Event 
Event Nr #47 
Explanation This event consists of the storage, by a specific peer, of a specific MO. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event Peer-StorageOf-MO 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
(Peer-StorageOf-MO) 
-implimentOf- 
(Peer-storageOf-MOFrag) 
1 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event Peer-storageOf-MOFrag 1 – ∞ 
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Event Name MO Ownership Exchange Event 
Event Nr #48 
Explanation This event consists of the exchanging of ownership, over an MO, between two 
users. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
User 
-proposalOf- 
(User-ownageOf-MO) 
1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
User 
-acceptanceOf- 
(User-ownageOf-MO) 
0 – 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
User 
-rejectionOf- 
(User-ownageOf-MO) 
0 – 1 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-terminationOf-Event User-ownageOf-MO 0 – 1 
Event-initiationOf-Event User-ownageOf-MO 0 – 1 
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Event Name MO Commenting Event 
Event Nr #49 
Explanation This event consists of a user inserting an MO into the system which consists of 
a comment to some other MO. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-insertionOf-MO 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
(User-insertionOf-MO) 
-establishingOf- 
(MO-commentingTo-MO) 
1 
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Event Name MO Responding Event 
Event Nr #50 
Explanation This event consists of a user inserting an MO into the system which consists of 
a response to some other MO. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-insertionOf-MO 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
(User-insertionOf-MO)-
establishingOf- 
(MO-respondingTo-MO) 
1 
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Event Name MO Versioning Event 
Event Nr #51 
Explanation This event consists of a user inserting an MO into the system which consists of 
a different  version of some other MO (of those owned by the inserting user). 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-insertionOf-MO 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
(User-insertionOf-MO)-
establishingOf- 
(MO-versioningOf-MO) 
1 
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Event Name User Reporting Event 
Event Nr #52 
Explanation This event consists of a user reporting the misbehaviour of another user 
(typically) regarding MO inserted by the latter. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-denouncingOf-User 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
UMissbehavReport 
-pertinenceTo- 
(User-denouncingOf-User) 
1 
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Event Name Peer Ownership Exchange Event 
Event Nr #53 
Explanation This event consists of the exchanging of ownership, over a Peer, between two 
users. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
User 
-proposalOf- 
(User-ownageOf-Peer) 
1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
User 
-acceptanceOf- 
(User-ownageOf-Peer) 
0 – 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
User 
-rejectionOf- 
0 – 1 
Annex D  272 
 
 
 
(User-ownageOf-Peer) 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-terminationOf-Event User-ownageOf-Peer 0 – 1 
Event-initiationOf-Event User-ownageOf-Peer 0 – 1 
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Event Name Donation Event 
Event Nr #54 
Explanation 
This event consists of a user donating some monetary resources to another 
user, on the grounds of some MO produced by the latter, that the earlier 
deems meritorious of a reward. 
Data Fields Total Donated Amount 
The value of the total amount donated by the 
donating user 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-likingOf-MO 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
(User-likingOf-MO) 
-causationOf- 
(User-rewardingOf-User) 
1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-rewardingOf-User 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
System 
-taxatingOf- 
(User-rewardingOf-User) 
1 
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Event Name User-rewardingOf-User 
Event Nr #55 
Explanation This is a relational event that represents a user action which consists of 
rewarding another user with a specific amount of monetary resources. 
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event User 
Data Fields Received
Amount 
The amount received by the rewarded user. 
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Event Name System-taxationOf-(User-rewardingOf-User) 
Event Nr #56 
Explanation This is a relational event that represents the system’s action of taxing an inter-
user donation. 
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event User 
Data Fields Taxed 
Amount 
The amount extracted by the system as tax. 
 
 
Annex D  273 
 
 
 
Pr
o
c 
Co
m
p 
Ev
 
Event Name User  Attention Sale Event 
Event Nr #57 
Explanation 
This event consists of the sale, by a user, of his attention, to another user 
(advertiser), by viewing some specific MO containing an advertisement 
message. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-consumptionOf-MO 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-answeringOf-InquiryIO 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-paymentTo-User 0 – 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
System 
-taxatingOf- 
(User-paymentTo-User) 
0 – 1 
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Event Name User-paymentTo-User 
Event Nr #58 
Explanation 
This is a relational event that represents a user action which consists of paying 
another user with a specific amount of monetary resources, for attention that 
the latter sold to the earlier. 
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event User 
Data Fields Paid 
Amount 
The amount paid by the advertiser user. 
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Event Name System-taxationOf-(User-paymentTo-User) 
Event Nr #59 
Explanation This is a relational event that represents the system’s action of taxing an inter-
user sale of attention. 
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event User 
Data Fields Taxed 
Amount 
The amount extracted by the system as tax. 
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Event Name Ransoming Event 
Event Nr #60 
Explanation This event consists of the requesting by the CCP, to some peripheral peer, for 
it to periodically report back to CCP on specific user actions. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event Ransom Donation Event 0 – ∞ 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event User-insertionOf-MO 0 – ∞ 
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Event Name Ransom  Donation Event 
Event Nr #61 
Explanation 
This event consists of a user donating some monetary resources to another 
user, on to pay for the ransom of some prospective MO, which is announced 
by some specific MO Ransom Announcement. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-likingOf-MORnsmAnn 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
(User-likingOf-MORnsmAnn) 
-causationOf- 
(User-rewardingOf-User) 
1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User-rewardingOf-User 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
System 
-taxatingOf- 
(User-rewardingOf-User) 
1 
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Event Name User-loadingOf-UAccount 
Event Nr #62 
Explanation This is a relational event that represents a user action which consists of 
loading a user’s account with monetary resources. 
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event UAccount 
Data Fields LoadedAmount The amount loaded by the user. 
 
 
 
Re
l E
v 
Event Name User-unloadingOf-UAccount 
Event Nr #63 
Explanation This is a relational event that represents a user action which consists of 
extracting monetary resources from his account. 
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event UAccount 
Data Fields LoadedAmount The amount extracted by the user. 
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Event Name User-insertionOf-Peer 
Event Nr #64 
Explanation This is a relational event that represents a user’s initiative to insert a peer into 
the system. 
Subject 
Event User 
Object Event Peer 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event Peer Registration Event 0 - 1 
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Event Name User-removalOf-Peer 
Event Nr #65 
Explanation This is a relational event that represents a user’s initiative to remove a peer 
from the system. 
Subject 
Event Peer 
Object Event System 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event User Disconnection Event 0 - ∞ 
Event-causationOf-Event MO Deregistration event 0 - ∞ 
Event-causationOf-Event Peer Deregistration Event 0 - 1 
 
D.1.2.2.1.2 System Originated 
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Event Name Report Requesting Event 
Event Nr #66 
Explanation 
This is an internal system event. It consists of the requesting by the CCP, to 
some peripheral peer, for it to periodically report back to CCP on specific user 
actions. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event Peer-requestTo-Peer 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
ERR 
-pertinenceTo- 
(Peer-requestTo-Peer) 
1 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event Reporting Event 0 – ∞ 
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Event Name Reporting Event 
Event Nr #67 
Explanation 
This is an internal system event. It consists of a peripheral peer reporting back 
to the CCP (regarding some user action), in response to a previous Event 
Report Request received by the earlier from the latter. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event Peer-respondingTo-Peer 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
ER 
-pertinenceTo- 
(Peer-respondingTo-Peer) 
1 
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Event Name Users Evaluation Event 
Event Nr #68 
Explanation This is a periodical, internal, system event which consists of an evaluation of 
all of the system users’ conduit.  
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event User Evaluation Event 1 – ∞ 
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Event Name User  Evaluation Event 
Event Nr #69 
Explanation 
This is an internal system event. It consists of the evaluation of a specific 
user’s conduit, taking into consideration other users’ misbehaviour reports 
regarding that user. It may lead to the expulsion, quarantining or 
dequarantining of the evaluated user. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event System-evaluationOf-User 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
System-analysisOf-
UserMissbehavReport 
0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
(System-analysisOf-
UserMissbehavReport)- 
pertainmentTo- 
(System-evaluationOf-User)  
0 – ∞ 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event System-evictionOf-User 0 – 1 
Event-initiationOf-Event System-quarantiningOf-User 0 – 1 
Event-terminationOf-Event System-quarantiningOf-User 0 – 1 
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Event Name System-evictionOf-User 
Event Nr #70 
Explanation This is an internal system event. It consists of the eviction of a user from the 
system’s user community. This implies the removal of all his MOs and Peers. 
Subject 
Event System 
Object Event User 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event User Deregistration Event 0 – ∞ 
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Event Name MOs Evaluation Event 
Event Nr #71 
Explanation This is a periodical, internal, system event which consists of an evaluation of 
all of the system MOs.  
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event MO Evaluation Event 1 – ∞ 
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Event Name MO  Evaluation Event 
Event Nr #72 
Explanation 
This is an internal system event. It consists of the evaluation of a specific MO, 
taking into consideration users misbehaviour reports that concern it. It may 
lead to the eviction, quarantining or dequarantining or of the evaluated MO. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
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as Subject Event-inclusionOf-Event System-evaluationOf-MO 1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
System-analysisOf-
UserMissbehavReport 
0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
(System-analysisOf-
UserMissbehavReport)- 
pertainmentTo- 
(System-evaluationOf-MO)  
0 – ∞ 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event System-evictionOf-MO 0 – 1 
Event-initiationOf-Event System-quarantiningOf-MO 0 – 1 
Event-terminationOf-Event System-quarantiningOf-MO 0 – 1 
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Event Name System-evictionOf-MO 
Event Nr #73 
Explanation This is an internally triggered relational system event. It represents the 
eviction of an MO from the system. 
Subject 
Event System 
Object Event MO 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event  MO Deregistration Process  0 - 1 
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Event Name UEL Servicing Session Event 
Event Nr #74 
Explanation This event consists of the maintenance of UEL servicing responsabilities (over 
the peripheral peer collective) by a specific OCP. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
 (Peer(OCP) 
-uelServicingOf- 
Peer(PP)) 
1 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
Instruction OP IO 
-pertainmentTo- 
 (Peer(OCP) 
-uelServicingOf- 
Peer(PP)) 
1 
 
D.1.2.2.2 Registered Global UEL Entitary Complex Events 
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Event Name User 
Event Nr #75 
Explanation This event consists of a system human user. 
Data Fields 
User Type 
The type of user (regular consumer/producer user or advertiser 
user) 
Username The user’s username 
Pub Key The user’s public key 
Priv Key The user’s private key 
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Event Name User Account 
Event Nr #76 
Explanation This event consists of a the user account of a system user. 
Data Fields Account 
balance 
The amount of momentary funds stored in the account 
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Event Name Trusted System 
Event Nr #77 
Explanation This event consists of another (P2PTube-like) system, which is trusted by the 
present system. 
Data Fields System 
Name 
The identifying name of the trusted system 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
Peer (the CCP of the trusted 
system) 
1 
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Event Name System 
Event Nr #78 
Explanation This event consists of the actual system. 
Data Fields System 
Name 
The identifying name of this system 
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Event Name Operational IO 
Event Nr #79 
Explanation This event consists of an operational information object in the system. 
Data Fields 
OpIO Type The type of operational IO 
Tstamp 
Time stamp indication the validity termination date of the data 
contained in the operational IO 
Usig 
The signature of the user involved (if any) in the production of 
the operational IO 
Psig 
The signature of the peer involved (if any) in the production of 
the operational IO 
Ssig The system’s (CCP’s or OCP’s) signature of the operational IO 
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Event Name Search Query IO 
Event Nr #80 
Explanation 
This event consists of a specific search query. Desides the data fields 
presented in the Operational IO event, its registry will also contain the one 
presented bellow. 
Data Fields Search 
Query 
The search query string. 
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Event Name MO 
Event Nr #81 
Explanation This event consists of a media object. 
Data Fields 
MO Usage 
Type 
The usage type of the media object (regular MO, advertisement 
MO, etc) 
Semantic 
Type 
The basic semantic category to which the MO pertains (comedy, 
drama, etc) 
Size The byte-wise size of the MO 
Duration The temporal length of the MO 
Usig The owner user’s signature of the media object 
Ssig The system’s (CCP’s) signature of the MO 
Frag Nr 
The number of fragments the MO is broken into for 
redistribution 
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Event Name MOFrag 
Event Nr #82 
Explanation This event consists of a fragment of an MO. 
Data Fields 
Size The byte-wise size of the MO fragment 
Ssig The system’s (CCP’s) signature of the MO fragment 
Frag Seq Nr 
The MO fragment’s sequence number within the context of its 
“parent” MO 
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Event Name MORansomAnnouncement 
Event Nr #83 
Explanation This event consists of an announcement of the ransoming of a prospective 
future M. 
Data Fields 
Semantic 
type 
The semantic type of the prospective MO 
Has Been 
Paid 
A boolean indication if the ransom has already been paid 
MO 
Delivered 
A boolean indication if the corresponding MO has already been 
delivered 
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Event Name User Key Pair 
Event Nr #84 
Explanation This event consists of a user’s public and private key pair. 
 
Pub Key The user’s public key 
Priv Key The user’s private key 
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Event Name Data Model Synchronization Event 
Event Nr #85 
Explanation 
This is an internal system event. It consists of the updating, by the CCP, of the 
data structure copies located at all the relevant OCP, so that all data structure 
copies are coherent. 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event Peer-updatingOf-Peer 1 – ∞ 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-causationOf-Event Peer  Evaluation Event 0 – ∞ 
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Event Name OCP Activity Reporting Event 
Event Nr #86 
Explanation This is an internal system event. It consists of an OCP reporting to the CCP 
information regarding its workload 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
Peer(OCP)-notificationTo-
Peer(CCP) 
1  
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
OCPActivityNotification 
-pertainmentTo- 
(Peer(OCP) 
-notificationTo- 
Peer(CCP)) 
1 – ∞ 
D.1.3 Registered Individual Peer Information 
The event registries, presented bellow, are temporarily stored at every peer to enable the 
coordination of their individual operation. They constitute the peer’s individual model and are 
not stored at the core data structure. 
D.1.3.1 Registered Individual PLL Information 
D.1.3.1.1 Registered Individual Relational and Procedural Complex Events 
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Event Name Inter-Peer PLL Connection Event 
Event Nr #87 
Explanation This event consists of the establishment of a PLL communicational connection 
between two peers.  
Parent Type Peer PLL Operation Event 
 Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event Peer-connectionTo-Peer 0 - 1 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-initiationOf-Event 
Inter Peer PLL  Comm Session 
Event 
0 – 1 
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Event Name Inter-Peer PLL Disconnection Event 
Event Nr #88 
Explanation This event consists of the termination of a PLL communicational connection 
between two peers.  
Parent Type Peer PLL Operation Event 
 Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event 
Peer-disconnectionFrom- 
Peer 
0 - 1 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-terminationOf-Event 
Inter Peer PLL  Comm Session 
Event 
0 – 1 
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Event Name Inter Peer PLL Comm Session Event 
Event Nr #89 
Explanation This event consists of a the maintenance of a communication session between 
two peers.  
Data Fields Session Key The secret key for the encryption of the messages exchanged 
during the communication session 
 Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-enablingOf-Event Inter Peer PLL Cooperation Event 0 – ∞ 
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Event Name Peer PLL Operation Event 
Event Nr #90 
Explanation This event consists of the performing of some specific PLL operation by some 
peer.  
Data Fields Op Type The type of the operation 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event Inter Peer PLL Cooperation Event 0 – ∞ 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-supportingOf-Event Peer UEL Operation Event 0 – 1 
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Event Name Inter Peer PLL Cooperation Event 
Event Nr #91 
Explanation This event consists of the cooperation between to peers (at the PLL level).  
Data Fields Played Role Client or server 
Coop Type The type of the cooperation 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event PLL Msg Sending Event 0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event PLL Msg Reception Event 0 – ∞ 
Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-supportingOf-Event Inter Peer UEL Cooperation Event 0 – ∞ 
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Event Name PLL Msg Sending Event 
Event Nr #92 
Explanation This event consists of the sending of a PLL message.  
Data Fields Msg. Seq. Nr The sequence number of the sent PLL message 
 Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-reactingTo-Event PLL Msg Reception Event 0 - 1 
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Event Name PLL Msg Reception Event 
Event Nr #9 
Explanation This event consists of the reception of a PLL message.  
Data Fields Msg. Seq. Nr The sequence number of the received PLL message 
 Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-reactingTo-Event PLL Msg Sending Event 0 - 1 
 
D.1.3.2 Registered Individual UEL Information 
D.1.3.2.1 Registered Individual Relational and Procedural Complex Events 
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Event Name Peer UEL Operation Event 
Event Nr #93 
Explanation This event consists of the performing of some specific UEL operation by some 
peer.  
Data Fields Op Type The type of the operation 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event Inter Peer UEL Cooperation Event 0 – ∞ 
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Event Name Inter Peer UEL Cooperation Event 
Event Nr #94 
Explanation This event consists of the cooperation between to peers (at the UEL level).  
Data Fields Plaid Role Client or server 
Event’s 
Relationships 
as Subject 
Structural 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-inclusionOf-Event UEL Msg Sending Event 0 – ∞ 
Event-inclusionOf-Event UEL Msg Reception Event 0 – ∞ 
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Event Name UEL Msg Sending Event 
Event Nr #95 
Explanation This event consists of the sending of a UEL message.  
Data Fields Msg Seq Nr The sequence number of the sent UEL message. 
 Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-reactingTo-Event UEL Msg Reception Event 0 - 1 
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Event Name UEL Msg Reception Event 
Event Nr #96 
Explanation This event consists of the reception of a UEL message. 
Data Fields Msg Seq Nr The sequence number of the received UEL message. 
 Contextual 
Connecting RelEv Name Connected Object Event Cardinality 
Event-reactingTo-Event UEL Msg Sending Event 0 - 1 
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